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Abstract 
Despite anthropogenically induced climate change being viewed by many as one of the greatest 
societal challenges of the 21st century, discernment from the public, especially young people, remains 
under explored within the mitigation debate. This is surprising given research demonstrating the 
potential for collective action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions nationally through individual 
behaviour changes. Young people are those in society that will live with the effects of future climate 
change the longest but are typically overlooked in forward planning. Consequently, this PhD thesis 
aims to provide detailed understanding of intersecting perception of climate change and levels of 
engagement being undertaken to explore how people, particularly the young, are reacting to climate 
change. 
The nexus of these themes was explored using a mixed method approach through the use of primary 
data collection, including interviews (N = 5), two national surveys (N = 1,134, survey 1 and N = 1,700, 
survey 2) and a participatory workshop using the Yonmenkaigi System Method approach (N = 16). In 
addition, this primary data is cross-analysed through the use of secondary data (BEIS and 
Eurobarometer) to extrapolate a more comprehensive picture based on the case of the United 
Kingdom.  
The research found that in the United Kingdom (and implicitly elsewhere) there are high-levels of 
perception of climate change as a major concern, especially amongst young people, and more 
extensively since 2013 when a social tipping point around this issue occurred. This has occurred 
despite of the ‘finite pool of worry’, a theory suggesting a likely plateauing or decline in concern when 
other crises start to predominate in people’s day to day, such as during the aftermath of the Brexit 
vote, COVID-19 and associated economic uncertainty. 
In terms of youth and perception, this thesis found that whilst young people were the most likely to 
believe a climate change was happening and most likely to view that climate change is a serious 
problem, they were one of the least likely group of people to be able to determine what impacts were 
already being felt within the United Kingdom due to climate change. 
Although there is this high level of belief in climate change amongst young people and civil society 
more widely, the level of engagement through mitigation strategies varies. Those strategies that are 
behavioural are generally undertaken, especially among the youngest in society and those who view 
climate change as serious. However, this applies when there is substantive investment. This 
demonstrates that if the government wants to implement significant change through the will of 
society to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, investment for those on low incomes is needed to enable 
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the requisite behaviour change needed. This research also confirms a view, as iterated by many of its 
respondents, that education on climate change within the United Kingdom is lacking; application of 
participatory methods, such as the Yonmenkaigi System Method, demonstrated how education would 
progress the interconnection between perception and engagement. 
This study recognises complexity involved in the interconnection between perception, engagement 
and reaction. However, it is argued that if social media generates fake news especially around climate 
change, then young people who are the most personal users of social media should be the most 
exposed. The results show that they are the most believing of climate change and that it is likely social 
media self-reinforces consistent beliefs through echo chambers. 
Into the current lacuna of action by the government during this PhD research period, climate activism 
groups of ‘Extinction Rebellion’ and ‘School Strikes for Climate Change’ materialised. It is argued that 
the actions of these groups are a form of ‘post-normal engagement’, where people apply their 
understanding, and that arises through a lack of facilitation of ‘post-normal science’ in relation to 
climate change within the United Kingdom. It was found that the majority of survey respondents were 
overall supportive of “Extinction Rebellion”. In addition, it was found that there was also a majority of 
support for the children striking for climate change and the mass civil disobedience that “Extinction 
Rebellion” called for in London in April 2019, though at varying levels across the demographic. 
However, respondents were generally not willing to themselves join future “Extinction Rebellion” 
protests. Women, younger people and left-leaning voters were more likely to support these two types 
of protests. The monitoring of the demographic composition of climate protests in terms of perception 
and engagement drivers helps to assess the nature of likely reactions and resistance to future climate 
policy including that associated with the content of COP26 being hosted in the UK during 2021. 
However, the implementation of a post-normal climate change science might help reduce the need 
for climate activism. 
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Chapter One -  
Introduction 
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 “We are the first generation to be able to end poverty, and the last generation that can take steps to 
avoid the worst impacts of climate change. Future generations will judge us harshly if we fail to 
uphold our moral and historical responsibilities” 
Ban Ki-Moon (2015, Online) 
8th Secretary-General of the United Nations 
 
This thesis explores “perception”, “engagement”, “reaction” and “response” in relation to the threat 
of climate change with a focus on youth.  It is response to a need to further understand how young 
people both perceive and engage with climate change; as this group is the first generation to both feel 
and observe the full impacts though not the last to have to try to stop the most extreme climate 
change from occurring. The following section introduces five main themes and highlights key issues 
and gaps within the literature. 
The issues are highlighted through a problem statement, which leads to the thesis aims and objectives. 
The chapter then outlines approaches the thesis has taken, presenting a rationale to the field research 
context and pathway to conclusions. 
The chapter also establishes the positionality of the author of this thesis, explaining what he believes 
about climate change in the context of this work. 
The chapter also explains the significance of the thesis towards the overall progression of knowledge 
within this area of research. The last section of the chapter provides a broad structure of the thesis 
and explains what each chapter explores. 
 
1.1. Background to the Study 
Climate change is defined as the large variation in the state of climate, which can occur over an 
extended period of a couple of decades or longer (Maunder, 1992; UNISDR, 2008; Grafton et al., 2012). 
As highlighted by numerous researchers, climate change can occur in both anthropogenic and natural 
forms (Stott et al., 2000; Tett et al., 2002; Karl and Trenberth, 2003; Grafton et al., 2012; Castree, 
Kitchin and Rogers, 2013). There is a consensus within the scientific community that current climate 
change is mainly caused by anthropogenic causes. The term “anthropogenic” is defined by Castee, 
Kitchen and Rogers (2013, p.18) as “something caused by intended or unintended human agency, as 
opposed to other causes such as natural forces”. In the case of this thesis, the term anthropogenic 
climate change means human influenced climate change. 
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It is worth noting that the theory of humans altering the climate has its origins in ancient Greek times, 
when Theophrastus told of how the draining of marshes in specific locations made them more 
susceptible to freezing (Neumann, 1985). In addition, Theophrastus believed that the land becomes 
warmer when they become clear of forests. It was not until the Renaissance age [14th-17th Century], 
that it was observed methods of irrigation and deforestation were changing the climate, and it was 
concluded that human intervention can have an impact on the local climate (Neumann, 1985). This 
was the first time that a link between human activity and climate was made. 
Increasing links were being made, by the scientific community and publicised in the media during the 
1970s (Sawyer, 1972; Broecker, 1975; Manade and Wetherald, 1975; Stuiver, 1978) and 1980s 
(Manade and Wetherald, 1980; Hansen et al., 1981; Dickinson and Cicerone, 1986; Matthews, 1988; 
Weisskopf, 1988; Bone, 1989; Mitchell, 1989; Pearce, 1989). Human altering of the climate started the 
debate about what would be the potential consequences; this was when the international community 
started to take notice. In 1988, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was established 
by the ‘United Nations Environmental Programme’ (UNEP) and ‘World Meteorological Organisation’ 
(WMO). The IPCC is recognised as the most prominent organisation on climate change science (Kerr 
and Kintisch, 2007; Bray, 2010). Its main aim is to examine all present scientific evidence about climate 
change, predicted climate change and policy responses; for example mitigation and adaptation. The 
United Nations organizations are collaborators into three sets of reports, which are released every 
few years. IPCC’s main reports have been released in 1990, 1995, 2001, 2007 and 2013; with the next 
expected to be released in 2022. In addition, the IPCC also produce special reports to give additional 
information about climate change, which is usually not included in the main reports. These include 
reports on, but not limited to; ‘Aviation and the Global Atmosphere’ in 1999; ‘Emission Scenarios’ in 
2000; ‘Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage’ in 2005; ‘Renewable Energy Sources and Climate Change 
Mitigation’ in 2011; and ‘Global Warming of 1.5oC’ in 2018. 
Within the latest full IPCC report, it was highlighted that the planet faces “severe, pervasive and 
irreversible” effects due to climate change if greenhouse gas emissions are not drastically cut (IPCC, 
2014a, p. 56). Some of these effects are further examined in section 2.1. However, the IPCC reports 
are not the only official scientific collaborated reports about climate change. Other examples are 
Marines Economics (Cefas, 2018), and World Health Organisation (WHO, 2009). These scientific 
reports about the climate have even been located at more national scale, for example the ‘UK Climate 
Change Risk Assessment 2017’ within the United Kingdom and the ‘National Climate Assessment 2014’ 
in the United States. 
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The tone of the findings by the researchers within these reports is becoming more afflictive 
throughout the years, pointing to the increased understanding, concern and importance of the issue 
for the current and future generations. This is demonstrated by the cautious and questioning language 
used within the first IPCC report in 1992. For example, this highlights that: 
“the size of this warming is broadly consistent with predictions of climate 
models, but it is also of the same magnitude as natural climate variability. 
Thus the observed increase could be largely due to this natural variability; 
alternatively this variability and other human factors could have offset a still 
larger human-induced greenhouse warming” 
IPCC (1992, p. 5) 
This demonstrates that at this point, as climate science was still relatively in its infancy, there were 
remaining questions over whether the temperature increases that had been observed from the 1950s 
until the 1980s were natural or due to anthropogenic activity. However, as highlighted in an earlier 
quote, there is little room left for that questioning, with the IPCC (2014a, p. 56) stating the planet faces 
“severe, pervasive and irreversible” damage if society does not reduce human induced greenhouse 
gas emissions. It demonstrates the increasing urgency that these reports are sounding to the 
international community. 
This is further demonstrated by a consensus from the scientific community that the current climate 
change is caused by anthropogenic activity. Whilst, the exact value is still up for debate with figures 
of between 90 and 100 per cent (Oreskes, 2004; Schulte, 2008; Doran and Zimmerman, 2009, 
Anderegg et al., 2010, Rosenberg et al., 2010; Powell, 2015; Powell, 2019), commonly quoted figures 
reviewed by Cook et al. (2013) indicate that 97 per cent of published scientific literature supports the 
theory of anthropogenic climate change. Despite, studies that demonstrate that most of the scientific 
community believe that current climate change is caused by anthropogenic activity, there are some 
that criticise the high values. For example, Legates et al. (2015) suggest that  Cook et al.’s (2013) 
statement of 97 per cent of academic literature supporting anthropogenic climate change is 
misleading due to the fact 66.39 per cent of academic papers that were surveyed did not state a firm 
position. The latest study in late 2019 by Powell highlights 100 per cent scientific consensus, as no 
research in the first half of 2019 was published that rejects anthropogenic climate change. Whilst, 
there is plenty of research being conducted that highlights the scientific consensus to be in the mid to 
late 90 per cent, it is questionable whether there can really ever be a 100 per cent consensus on any 
‘controversial’ (to some sectors) scientific issue such as climate change? 
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However, smaller percentages of the population and scientific community either do not believe in the 
notion of anthropogenic climate change or are sceptical; these are known as climate deniers and 
climate sceptics respectively. Examples of these have to date included politicians such as Tony Abbot 
(Knott, 2020; Readfearn, 2020), Jair Bolsonaro (Tharoor, 2019), Neil Hamilton (Hayward, 2019), Nigel 
Lawson (Lawson, 2008; Carrington, 2017), Christopher Monckton (Monbiot, 2010; Monckton, 2015), 
Owen Paterson (Watt, 2012), Donald Trump (New York Times, 2016; Tharoor, 2019), Ann 
Widdecombe (Widdecombe, 2014); and researchers, such as, Robert Balling (Michaels, Balling and 
Balling, 2000), Craig Idso (Idso et al., 2009), Ian Plimer (Plimer, 2009), Peter Ridd (Khan, 2019), Fred 
Singer (Singer and Avery, 2007; Idso et al., 2009), Roy Spencer (Spencer, 2007; Spencer, 2008; Spencer, 
2010), Valentina Zharkova (Nuccitelli, 2018). 
 
1.1.1. Perception 
Perception studies are important because climate change perception will influence whether an 
individual will engage with the issue. Amongst the public, studies about perception towards climate 
change have been undertaken for nearly thirty years (Brechin, 2010) and more regularly throughout 
the 2000s and 2010s, both by research groups and academia within the United Kingdom (Steentjes et 
al., 2017; Poortinga et al., 2019) and internationally (Steentjes et al., 2017; Funtatsu et al., 2019; 
Lorencová, Loučková and Vačkářů, 2019; Poortinga et al., 2019). Appendix A provides examples of 
studies that have been undertaken within the United Kingdom and Appendix B for those studies 
internationally. 
Perception is defined by Mayhew (2009) as a way in which an individual interprets the world around 
them through senses, which is shaped by their individual upbringing. Also, as climate change has 
emerged an interdisciplinary subject, its perception and interpretation can be defined in different 
ways. A way of defining perception with an environmental lens is “the way in which an individual 
perceives the environment; the process of evaluating and storing information received about the 
environment” (Mayhew, 2009 Online). Pidgeon et al. (1992, p.89)  expanded this definition by 
combining psychological aspect of perception and combining it with risks, such as climate change; by 
stating that  “risk perception involves people’s beliefs, attitudes, judgements and feelings, as well as 
the wider social or cultural values and dispositions that people adopt towards hazards and their 
benefits”. As highlight by Dessai et al. (2004, p.14) the public’s perception of climate change is “based 
on psychological, social, moral, institutional and cultural processes”. This is conceptually 
demonstrated later through Figure 1.1, within Section 1.8. The issue surrounding climate change 
perception is then further explored in Section 3.1 of this thesis. 
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It should be noted that the United States has been the most researched country in terms of climate 
change perception (Capstick et al., 2015); however, there have been studies undertaken within the 
United Kingdom. As demonstrated within Appendix A, these have  been undertaken by the academic 
community, research groups and governmental organisations about the British’s public perception 
about subjects that relate to climate change, including, but limited to, issues surrounding energy, 
climate terminology and climate imagery. It was found within a recent survey that most of the British 
public tend to believe that anthropogenic factors are changing the world’s climate (86 per cent) 
(Steentjes et al., 2017). However, within the same study, it is demonstrated that the United Kingdom 
is six and seven per cent lower than France and Norway respectively. In addition, when comparing the 
findings of this study with previous studies, it was found that the proportion that believes that 
anthropogenic factors are changing the world’s climate has declined from November 2005, when this 
percentage was 91 per cent using the same methodology, researchers and population (Poortinga, 
Pidgeon and Lorenzoni, 2006). However, it should be noted that this decline has not been linear and 
has recently shown signs of increasing again; with the lowest point occurring in March 2013 at 72 per 
cent (Poortinga et al., 2013). This raises the question of whether an increasing proportion of the British 
public believe that anthropogenic factors are changing the climate. Details of this trend in the 
proportion of the British public that believe the world’s climate is changing are provided in the findings 
and Appendix C of this thesis. 
The percentage of the British public that believe climate change is the greatest threat, based on 
Eurobarometer data between April 2008 and March 2017, indicates an 18 per cent decline from 32 to 
14 per cent during this ten-year period. However, this does not take into account that the term ‘global 
warming’ was used within the first sample. Therefore, using the first time that the Eurobarometer 
used the term ‘climate change’ in August-September 2009, it  has only fallen by three per cent from 
19 to 16 per cent, though fluctuating between 12 and 18 per cent during this time period. These results 
are important because past research has shown that many within civil society focus on one major 
societal issue at a time (Weber, 2006); this is likely to result in disengagement with climate change. 
Further data is provided in Appendix D. 
Research has shown that levels of particular perceptions about climate change overtime fluctuate 
(Nisbet and Myers, 2007; Ballew et al., 2019). This fluctuation could be as a result of media coverage 
(Mazur and Lee, 1993; Happer and Philo, 2016) or due to frequency and/or magnitude of extreme 
meteorological events in recent years (Brooks et al., 2014; Shao et al., 2014). Continuous studies of 
the public are required to monitor how the public responds to individual events. 
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Research has demonstrated that perception of climate change is not constant amongst the 
population, with differences amongst people with different worldviews. For example, there are 
differences between those who have a left-wing political ideology compared to those with a right-
wing one (McCright, Dunlap and Marquart-Pyatt, 2016). 
However, it was noticed that when researching climate change perception, one common gap in the 
research that emerged was the lack of published work involving or focusing on youth, as observed in 
the academic literature (Wray-Lake, Flanagan and Osgood, 2010; MacDonald et al., 2013). Whilst since 
these studies, there have been some additional studies about youth and climate change, such as for 
example Walsh and Cordero (2019), the research is still lacking compared to other worldview 
positions, such as on gender and political identification. The implication of this is further discussed 
within the next section of this thesis. 
In general, an increase in the perception that climate change is occurring and is a threat to society 
results in increased levels of engagement and behaviour to reduce emissions and promote 
environmental behaviour (Reser, Bradley and Ellul, 2014). However, in some extreme cases, 
researchers have observed eco-anxiety (Gifford and Gifford, 2016), which in some cases could cause 
disengagement due to a feeling of hopelessness about the future. 
 
1.1.2. Engagement 
Engagement can be defined as the action of a person in engaging with a specific reason or cause. In 
the terms of this thesis, it is the process of engaging with the issue of climate change. It has been 
observed that there are differences in levels of engagement in relation climate change across different 
societal groups (Corner, Markowitz and Pidgeon, 2014), based on gender, religion and political 
identification. These issues are further explored within Section 3.2. It has been highlighted by Collins 
et al. (2017) that further research is needed on engagement and disengagement within disaster 
related studies comprehensively, including climate change. 
There are varying ways in which an individual can engage with climate change. Examples are activism, 
education, mitigation and adaptation strategies. As mitigation and adaptation strategies are large 
subjects in their own right, only mitigation strategies are only focused on for the purpose of 
engagement as addressed in this thesis. The main reasoning for the focus on mitigation strategies is 
that within the global North, mitigation strategies are achievable for young people, as the first line of 
defence, and whilst adaptation strategies tend to be more expensive and therefore are less achievable 
and desirable to confront the under 30’s with until mitigation has been addressed. 
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Specifically, mitigation strategies are focused on because these are activities that individuals, 
especially young people, can do at home and at work to reduce their carbon footprint. Examples of 
mitigation strategies are walking to work and eating less meat. The examination of mitigation 
strategies between different generations is lacking within the literature, as most research looks at the 
overall picture of what all people are undertaking without disaggregated analysis. 
 
1.1.3. Reaction and Response 
Reaction is defined by Matsumoto (2009, p.452) as “any behaviour which reliability occurs 
immediately after a stimulus or as a reaction stimulus”. This depends in part on the ability of an 
individual during and after an extreme event. As seen globally, climate change amplifies extreme 
events. Therefore, reaction in this context includes how people think and respond during these events 
and in the aftermath how they reduce the event and/or its impacts. 
There is a growing body of literature that suggests that in the aftermath of experiencing an extreme 
meteorological event, there is an increase in awareness and/or perception of climate change and the 
likelihood to engage with climate change (Reser, Bradley and Ellul, 2014; McDonald, Chai and Newell, 
2015; Demski et al., 2017; Bergquist, Nilsson and Schultz, 2019). But not all social scientists and 
psychologists believe this to be the case (Marshall, 2014), because additionally there can be a focus 
on the issue of rebuilding and trying to get a sense of normality by developing a fatalistic attitude 
towards climate change. These interpretations can be described as a degree of ‘climate anxiety’. 
Similarly, people also can ‘respond’ to climate change. The definition of response to climate change is 
loosely set out by Tompkins and Adger (2005, p. 564); “as any action taken by any region, nation, 
community or individual to tackle or manage environmental change, in anticipation of that change or 
after change has occurred”. This definition is broad but distinctive as it differentiates between weather 
and climate, in that the definition does not use the terms of weather. Beyond this, the notion of 
activism as engagement furthers civil society members and politicians into action, such as seen in 2019 
with ‘Extinction Rebellion’ and ‘School Strike for Climate Change’ within both the United Kingdom and 
internationally. 
Both reaction and response to climate change will be further explored within the findings of this thesis. 
Overall, this section has briefly introduced individuals’ perception of, their engagement with, and their 
reaction and response towards climate change, suggesting these as important to reducing the effects 
and impacts that climate change will have on society. Further, it has flagged that there has been a lack 
of research undertaken on these processes in relation to youth. 
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1.2. Youth and Climate Change 
Throughout history, different researchers have offered varying definitions of “youth” (Kahane and 
Rapoport, 1997). The terms “youth”, “adolescent” and “young person” are often interchanged 
(Konopka, 1973). The term adolescence originates from the Latin term adolescere, which means “to 
grow up” (Kahane and Rapoport, 1997). Defining who is classed as “youth” can be quite complex, as 
scientists and organisations have different thresholds for this category. For example, variation within 
the United Nations in definitions of Youth and Adolescence are demonstrated in Table 1.1. 
Table 1.1 – United Nations Definitions of “Youth” and “Adolescent” 
United Nations Organisation Age 
UN Secretariats/UNESCO/ILO Youth: 15-24 
UN Habitat (Youth Fund) Youth: 15-32 
UNICEF/WHO/UNFPA Adolescent: 10-19 
Youth: 15-24 
Young People: 10-24 
Source: UN (No Date) 
These variations demonstrate that even at an international level and within one institution, there is 
not a uniform definition of this age group. Within this thesis, a standard term is applied in that youth 
means anybody under the age of 25 years old. This is because it is the most common at the 
international level, and research is starting to show that an individual’s development towards 
becoming an adult does not stop until the age of 25 (Sawyer et al., 2018), which is in line with the 
definition of adolescere. 
Therefore, within this thesis, the ‘youth’ that will be explored are those between the ages of 15 and 
24, which aligns with the definition laid out by most United Nations bodies, as defined within Table 
1.1.  
There are reasons why youth are a focus of this thesis in that whilst society might already be feeling 
the first effects of climate change [for example, the 2018 and 2019 heatwaves within the Northern 
Europe, North America and Japan; and 2019 forest fires in New South Wales and Queensland], the 
current generation of young people are going to be first to potentially feel the worst of the impacts of 
climate change (Lopez et al., 2018; ITV, 2018; Vaughan, 2018). It should also be noted that the young 
generation might be the last to stop the most dangerous climate change materialising (Pearce, 2010a). 
This is demonstrated in the quote from the former Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-
Moon at the beginning of this chapter. 
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Despite this, it has been highlighted within a couple of journal articles in recent years that there is a 
lack of research that investigates youth perception and engagement towards environmental issues, 
especially climate change (Wray-Lake, Flanagan and Osgood, 2010; MacDonald et al., 2013). 
This is surprising, when considering that, depending on the period represented by the definition in 
Table 1.1, the youth make up between 33.7 and 41.4 per cent of the world’s population; or 23.3 and 
29.4 per cent of the United Kingdom’s population (UN DESA, 2019). This demonstrates that not 
investigating young people’s perception and engagement with climate change is a major issue since 
they make up a large proportion of the population at both global and national scale that are arguably 
facing different circumstances to the generations that preceded them. It suggests a fundamental gap 
within the literature currently. 
This is further surprising, given the international community have recognised that the engagement of 
young people has been important in relation to climate change for the last twenty-six years. During 
the 1992 Earth Summit resolution that was adopted, also known as Agenda 21, it is highlighted in 
chapter 25 that both children and youth are important in sustainable development issues; and that 
they should be recognised as one of the nine key stakeholders (UN, 1992). Further evidence that the 
international policy community calls for engaging young people with climate change is highlighted in 
the Section 36(a)(i) of the UNISDR Sendai Framework for Action (2015-2030) which highlights that: 
“Children and youth are agents of change and should be given the space and 
modalities to contribute to disaster risk reduction, in accordance with 
legislation, national practice and educational curricula” 
UNISDR (2015, p.23) 
In relation to being recognised by the international community and world leaders, another important 
reason why young people need to be further researched in terms of perception and engagement with 
climate issues, is that there is a policy pathway set within the United Kingdom until 2050 to mitigate 
against climate change through developing a decarbonised society1; which will include the current 
young generation (Corner et al., 2015), This will mean that the current young generation are one of 
the first generations that will observe and participate in the transformation. 
A further rationale for a focus on young people is that during the adolescence period, they start 
undergoing cognitive changes and because of this start to question the world around them and to 
 
 
1 - Section 2.2 provides further information on what the United Kingdom is undertaking to develop this 
decarbonised society through policy. 
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develop their own personal beliefs (Lerner, Lerner and Finkelstein, 2001). In addition, within this stage 
of development, the teenagers and young adults are more likely to take more risks in relation to any 
other age group (Steinberg, 2008). This is in part due to invincibility theory (Wickman, Anderson and 
Greenberg, 2008).  If young people have that sense of invincibility theory, especially “it-won’t-happen-
to-me”, this might lead to young people thinking that the effects of climate change will fall short of 
having an impact on themselves, but currently it can be observed increasingly throughout 2019 that 
this is becoming less of a potential issue. However, much further research is going to be needed to 
further investigate how we need to prepare young people for the unfolding disaster of climate change. 
Lastly, the current generation of “youth” are the first generation where climate change is a scientific 
claim that is accepted at both the scientific and much of the political level. Despite this, there has been 
questions raised in American academic literature as to whether there is a current “climate spiral of 
silence” (Maibach et al., 2016 p.1), and this raises questions around whether it has links back to the 
issues surrounding cognitive development?  This means that young people are not willing to talk about 
climate change actively. Whilst there is no certainty that this concept carries over to the United 
Kingdom, it does raise questions as to whether similar issues about climate communications are 
occurring amongst British young people. 
 
1.3. Problem Rationale 
As introduced, there is a little information currently about the nature of climate change perception 
and engagement amongst youth within the United Kingdom. This has to date neither been explored 
in terms of this relationship relative to worldview factors and critical processes of potential 
intervention such as education and experiential learning. 
 
1.4. Research Aims and Objectives 
The aim of the thesis is to investigate youth perception of climate change within the United Kingdom 
and explore how this can alter climate related engagement and reactions.  
The above aim will be accomplished by fulfilling the following research objectives to: 
1. Integrate climate change ideas around the themes of perception, engagement, reaction and 
response, including through socio-economic data. 
2. Examine the national curriculum to explore what young people are being taught in relation to 
climate within the United Kingdom currently. 
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3. Evaluate the role of a participatory engagement methodology, represented by the 
Yonmenkaigi System Method, to observe experiential learning and how it may influence 
perception of climate change. 
4. Examine the key relationships in climate change behavioural interactions guided by youth 
engagement. 
5. Investigate how the recent emergence of ‘Extinction Rebellion’ and the ‘School Strike for 
Climate Change’ are influencing understanding of climate change engagement amongst 
youth. 
 
1.5. Overall Approach to Thesis 
The thesis uses a pragmatism research philosophy to investigate the research questions arrived at in 
Section 4.1. The definition of pragmatism is “a philosophy contending that what counts as knowledge 
is determined by its usefulness to human agents situated in changing historical and geographical 
circumstances” (Castree, Kitchin and Rogers, 2013, p.396). This method is particularly useful as this 
thesis deals with perception and engagement, which are constructed on knowledge. 
The research is based on primary and secondary data across a subsection of the United Kingdom 
Society.  In line with the pragmatism approach, mixed methods were applied for primary data 
collection, with questionnaires, interviews and the Yonmenkaigi System Method. Secondary data 
collection, including Google Trend data, was used to add further detail to the analysis. 
Two questionnaires were used to collect primary data during the process of researching this thesis. 
The first questionnaire was applied between March and September 2017, with 1,134 filled in 
questionnaires being collected across the United Kingdom and Crown Dependencies. This was 
undertaken using a self-filling paper form and an internet-based form using social media, web-forums 
and targeted emails, using the same questions on both forms. This was undertaken to gather the 
maximum exposure to the questionnaire. A second questionnaire was undertaken during May and 
July 2019, with 1,700 usable questionnaires being collected across the United Kingdom. For this round, 
due to the time limited nature of this survey, the questionnaire was only an internet based form. 
Questioning within this thesis is based on or the same as questions from other studies about 
perception and engagement with climate change to allow cross referencing of findings. However, this 
study is unique because of the specific focus on young people within the United Kingdom. 
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1.6. Field Site 
The research is fully based within the United Kingdom; but with some data being from other countries 
within the European Union, which are drawn on for comparison with similar studies from other 
countries over the last thirty years. 
The United Kingdom is expected to experience the effects of climate change, both directly and 
indirectly, during the rest of this century. Some of effects are more extreme heat waves, such as the 
ones experienced in the summer of 2018 and 2019; or more flooding events during winter, such as 
the floods that occurred in Yorkshire in October 2019. 
It should be noted that the definition of the United Kingdom within this thesis comprised the four 
countries that make up the United Kingdom [England, Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales], but will 
also include the Crown Dependency Islands of Isle of Man located within the Irish Sea, and the 
Bailiwicks of Guernsey and Jersey located within the Channel Sea. The reasoning for including the 
Crown Dependencies within this study is explained in sub-section 2.2.7 of this thesis. 
 
1.7. Positionality 
The author’s positionality throughout this thesis is that of a climate change believer. In addition, the 
author believes that climate change is mainly influenced by anthropogenic activity, but natural 
processes such as El Niño still have an impact on the climate. Also, the author believes that a lot of 
climate scepticism has its root influences from the media, as the media is the main resource for the 
public to gather their scientific information; and, because the media tends to prefer conflicting and 
sensationalist articles. In addition, the author has a positionality in viewing the United Kingdom 
education sector as not doing enough to promote climate change to the youth, instead leaving young 
adults confused about the processes and effects of climate change. 
 
1.8. Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is broken down into eight chapters, which is demonstrated in Figure 1.1.                 
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Figure 1.1. – Structure of thesis (Source: Author) 
Chapter 2 provides the scientific background of climate change and how that has informed policy both 
at a national level within the United Kingdom and internationally. 
Chapter 3 examines the extensive body of literature in relation to the theme of climate change 
engagement literature to provide an in-depth analysis of how the public engage with issues of climate 
change. This chapter highlights the research dedicated to climate change, awareness of climate 
change, climate sceptics, reaction to risk, vulnerability, education, experimental learning and the 
psychology of adolescents. Additionally, the chapter will also explore the different aspects of how the 
public form their world view. Lastly, this chapter presents the conceptual framework that has been 
developed from an explorative literature review. This conceptual framework helps to guide the 
direction of the research informing the thesis. 
Chapter 4 describes the different methods that have been used within this thesis including providing 
an overview of both the methodological philosophy and approach. Each of the research methods that 
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have been used are explored in detail; in which consideration to both the contributions and limitations 
of each method is addressed. In addition, this section considers the ethical challenges that occurred 
during this thesis; this includes issues around stereotyping and sexist language. 
Chapter 5, 6 and 7, contains an overview of the data that has being collected within this research 
project and analyses this data using the methods that have been identified within chapter 4. The 
findings are split into three chapters to demonstrate the three main areas of research within this 
thesis. 
Chapter 5 explores the public’s perception of climate change within the United Kingdom, focusing on 
youth. This includes how the British public believe climate change compares to both other societal 
and environmental issues. In addition, it explores whether the public believe that climate change is 
occurring and by how much. Lastly, it explores what the British public are thinking of different 
institutions in relation to communication of climate change and what they think of different policy 
responses that the United Kingdom government are making in combatting climate change. 
Chapter 6 explores public engagement of climate change within the United Kingdom, again focusing 
on youth predominantly. This includes looking at the levels of education that the questionnaire 
respondents have received about climate change in formal education. As a way to test whether more 
engagement techniques might yield more positive results in term climate change perception and 
understanding, a Yonmenkaigi System Method was undertaken, which included critical observation 
from this experiment. The chapter also explores the different techniques that the questionnaire 
respondents have undertaken within the last three years in mitigating against the effects of climate 
change.  
Chapter 7 explores the public’s reaction towards extreme climatic conditions that climate change is 
causing and/or is going to cause to the United Kingdom in the future. This was undertaken by 
examining how many of the questionnaire respondents have been affected by extreme 
meteorological events within the last five years. Also, it was done using YouGov surveys and how the 
public viewed different weather events in relation to climate change. In addition, this also focuses on 
the response of the public to what this thesis introduces as a “Post-Normal Engagement”, and how in 
this framing they both positively and negatively viewed ‘Extinction Rebellion’ and ‘School Strikes for 
Climate Change’. 
Chapter 8 encompasses both the discussion and conclusion of this thesis. This chapter discusses the 
major findings in chapter five to seven and what are the implications of the findings in terms of theory, 
methodology, policy and conceptual the ongoing conceptual framing of this topic. In addition, this 
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chapter puts forward a number of policy recommendations for engagement of the public in climate 
change related issues, as well as identifying areas for future research. Lastly, this chapter will outline 
potential limitations of the research. 
 
1.9. Significance of Study 
The importance of this thesis in terms of perception is that young people have a tendency to be 
concerned about climate change and how it will impact on their future. However, this study 
demonstrates that the level of concern in 2019 is at its highest point since at least 2008. In addition, 
it demonstrates that there was at least two social tipping points amongst young people that had 
impacts which have demonstrated short and medium-term impacts on concerns about climate 
change. It is demonstrated however that young people in the United Kingdom are on average less 
concerned about climate change compared to the rest of the European Union. 
The importance of the thesis in terms of climate change engagement is demonstrated in that, whilst 
young people acknowledge that climate change is a fundamental issue that society faces, their ability 
to mitigate is weaker compared to other groups. This is due to the lack of available financial resources 
that they have, meaning that they are restricted to more basic methods, such as turning off unused 
lights and walking to university and/or work more, which do not necessary have the greatest impact. 
In addition, it is found that the education that young people are receiving about climate change could 
be described as diluted at best, as demonstrated within the current curriculum’s limitation in 
addressing climate change. This is despite past research and the international community highlighting 
the importance of education in preparing young people for the future. 
In terms of the “response” chapter of this thesis, despite the potential perception and media coverage 
that young people are becoming the new driving force of the climate movement within the United 
Kingdom, there is suggestions from this study that a greater number of young people have not heard 
of ‘Extinction Rebellion’ and ‘School Strike for Climate Change’. However, younger people were more 
likely to support the civil disobedience; this demonstrated that significant number of people (more 
towards the younger end of the scale) may be ready for an escalation of non-violent action that could 
force change in the systemic and structural determinants of crises in the UK and elsewhere. The 
findings here are to expand our understanding of the nature of societal engagement in the climate 
debate and related disaster risk reduction. 
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©Claudio Mazzetti (2007) 
Chapter Two -  
Literature Review 
[Climate Science and Policy] 
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“Today we’re seeing that climate change is about more than a few unseasonable mild 
winters or hot summers. It’s about the chain of natural catastrophes and devastating 
weather patterns that global warming is beginning to set off around the world … the 
frequency and intensity of which are breaking records thousands of years old” 
Barack Obama (2006) 
44th President of the United States of America 
Cited in Olive (2008) 
 
In recent years, there has been a significant interest of the climate change sub-sector within each of 
the geography, psychology and sociology disciplines. This is due to more extreme climatic events 
occurring globally, the implications of the Paris Agreement signed in November 2015, and the mass 
climate activism organised by Extinction Rebellion and School Strike for Climate Change, both within 
the United Kingdom and internationally. To understand why this topic is relevant to scholarly 
investigation, it is important to place climate change in the context of past and present academic 
literature. This and the next chapter will critically examine the literature of climate change in terms of 
the scientific basis of climate change, the political lens of climate change, the comprehension of 
climate change, factors influencing perception, climate scepticism, education about climate change, 
the media coverage of climate change, the role of experiential learning, and environmental activism. 
These themes and theories will be considered within the research presented via the forthcoming 
chapters. Lastly, this section will set out the research questions that this thesis addresses. Figure 2.1 
demonstrates the structure of this and the next chapter, and shows that there are six main sections 
within these chapters. 
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Figure 2.1 – Structure of Chapter Two and Three [Literature Review] (Source: Author) 
 
2.1. Scientific Representation of Climate Change 
Climate change is not a new phenomenon; the temperatures of the planet have regularly changed 
throughout its history. For example, during the Last Glacial Maximum, about 21,000 years ago, the 
temperatures were between 3oC and 5oC colder than present (Alexander et al., 2013). At the other 
end of the scale, the Paleogene-Eocene Thermal Maximum, which was about 55.5 million years ago, 
it was estimated to have been between 6oC and 8oC warmer than today (McInerney and Wing, 2011; 
Meissnet et al., 2014). These examples were attributed to natural forcings. Some examples of natural 
forcings are the Milankovitch cycle (Hays, Imbrie and Shackleton, 1976; Berger, Loutre and Mélice, 
2006), solar activity (Bond et al., 2001; Zharkova et al., 2019), and volcanic activity (Bryson and 
Goodman, 1980; Robock, 2000). These natural forcings will be further explored in Section 3.3.2 of this 
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thesis, in relation to how deniers refer to these as natural phenomenon in order to deny the existence 
of anthropogenic climate change. 
As of 2018, research demonstrates that the planet has already warmed up by 1oC since 1880 (IPCC, 
2018). This represents an increase of 0.07oC per decade. However, the rate of warming per decade 
has been increasing, with a warming increase of between 0.15oC and 0.20oC since 1975 (NASA, No 
Date). As a consequence of this increasing warming rate, it is estimated that since 1880, two thirds of 
the temperature increases have occurred in the last forty-five years (NASA, No Date). The temperature 
increase coincides with the rise of greenhouses gases since the industrial revolution2 suggesting there 
is a link between the two. This relationship between greenhouse gas emissions and temperature is 
demonstrated within Figure 2.2. 
 
Figure 2.2 – Global temperatures in oF and carbon dioxide concentrations in ppm between 1880 
and 2012 (Source: Walsh et al., 2014, Online) 
 
 
2 - The Industrial Revolution was a period of change in society, between 1760 to c.1840, which led to the 
introduction of industry and the first introduction of machines. This period of history also experienced a rise in 
greenhouse gases, such as carbon dioxide (Neftel et al., 1985; Friedli et al., 1986; Keeling et al., 1995; Etheridge 
et al., 1996; Andres et al., 1999) and methane (Badr, Probert and O’Callaghan, 1992). These increases are due 
to the fuel needed to either create or run machines (Keeling, 1973; Keeling et al., 1995), and through climate 
change feedback such as the Arctic methane release (Schuur et al., 2015; Dean et al., 2018; Lewkowicz and Way, 
2019; Turetsky et al., 2019; Turetsky et al., 2020). 
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Whilst the effects of greenhouse gases have being studied since the early 19th century (Tyndall, 1861); 
it was not until 1957 that the link between greenhouse gases and atmospheric and oceanographic 
temperatures was proven (Revelle and Suess, 1957). Greenhouse gases absorb thermal radiation 
which is emitted from the Earth’s surface, therefore trapping this thermal radiation (EPA, 2015). This 
results in a build-up of greenhouse gas emissions, which acts like a blanket to keep the Earth warm 
(Houghton, 2004). There are different greenhouse gases within the Earth’s atmosphere. Examples of 
some greenhouse gases are carbon dioxide, chlorofluorocarbons, methane, sulphur hexafluoride, 
ozone, and water vapour. Table 2.1 demonstrates a quantity of these gases within the atmosphere 
and the global warming potential [GWP]3 for different greenhouse gas emission4. 
Table 2.1 - Greenhouse Gas Quantity in the Atmosphere and Global Warming Potential over 100 
years (Adapted from Myhre et al., 2013; EPA, No Date). 
Greenhouse Gas 
Parts per Billion (ppb) GWP over 100 
years 2005 2011 Change 
Water Vapour 18,000,000 - - 
Carbon Dioxide 379,000 391,000 3.17% 1 
Methane 1,774 1,893 6.71% 25-34 
Nitrous Oxide 319 324 1.57% 298 
Ozone 337 - - 
Chlorofluorocarbons 
(CFCs) 
 0.837 (Overall) 
0.527 (CFC-12) 
 10,200 (CFC-12) 
Hydrofluorocarbons 
(HCFCs) 









Source: Adapted from Myhre et al. (2013) and EPA (No Date) 
Full table of all greenhouse gas emissions and GWP are located with Appendix E 
 
 
3 - Global Warming Potential is a method to compare the warming impacts of different gases. GWP is the 
comparison to carbon dioxide. For example, a GWP of 20 means for every ton of the select greenhouse gas, it 
will have same impact of releasing 20 tonnes of carbon dioxides. (EPA, No Date). 
 
4 - For a full list of Greenhouse gases and their potential can be found within the latest Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change [IPCC] report (Myhre et al., 2013). 
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As demonstrated in Table 2.1, carbon dioxide and water vapour are the most abundant within the 
Earth’s atmosphere (Pidwirny, 2006), whilst chlorofluorocarbons and hydrofluorocarbons been the 
most potent5. Greenhouse gases, such as Water Vapour, Carbon Dioxide, Methane and Ozone are 
naturally occurring and are fundamental for life to exist on the planet. For example, without these 
greenhouse gases the average surface temperature of the Earth would be -18oC (Ma, 1998), which is 
roughly 33°C cooler than its current surface temperature. 
The levels of these gases have increased since the Industrial Revolution due to anthropogenic causes. 
In particular, it has been observed that the levels of carbon dioxide have been rising rapidly. The 
observatory at Mauna Loa, in Hawai’i, has the most comprehensive record for instrument recorded 
carbon dioxide in the world after been started by Charles David Keeling in March 1958 (Keeling et al., 
1976). It was at this observatory that it was observed that carbon dioxide emissions were rising 
(Keeling, 1960). The emission levels at the Mauna Loa Observatory have risen from 315.97 parts per 
million [ppm] in 1959 to 411.44 ppm in 20196 7 (NOAA, 2020), which represents a rise of 30.21 per 
cent during this 60 year time period. This demonstrates that the rate of increase of carbon dioxide 
emissions has been increasing in recent years, with an increase of 3.41 ppm in 2016. This is nearly a 
full 1ppm more than any other point before 2010. This can be attributed to carbon dioxide levels being 
emitted by human activity and is still increasing (Le Quéré et al., 2018). 
Some researchers believe that the increase of carbon dioxide is due to carbon sinks8 becoming clogged 
up (Canadell et al., 2007), but this belief is still highly contested. If natural sinks have not slowed down 
 
 
5 - Within this thesis, potent means the power in terms of potential to do the most harm to the environment. 
 
6 - Carbon dioxide levels naturally fluctuate during the year. This fluctuation is due to a number of factors, which 
are a mix of natural and anthropogenic. For example, hibernation of trees during the winter months results in 
the reduced ability to absorb as much carbon dioxide. An example of the anthropogenic activity causing 
increasing carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere in the winter months would be an increase usage of 
electricity and gas throughout the Northern Hemisphere for light and heat, due to less daylight hours and colder 
temperatures (Stouffer and Wetherald, 2007). However, there is a lag in the change of carbon dioxide, and as a 
result these gases tend to peak in May. This means that emissions peak during the winter months. It should be 
noted, that as a result of less population and land mass within the Southern Hemisphere the fluctuation of 
greenhouse gases are less pronounced there. 
 
7 - See Appendix F for a full list of greenhouse gas emission between 1959 and 2019 at the Mauna Loa 
Observatory. 
 
8 - Carbon sinks are defined by Mayhew (2015) as a phenomenon in which atmospheric carbon dioxide is 
absorbed. This process is also known as carbon sequestration and can be achieved through both natural and 
human processes. Examples of natural processes are those of the soil (Ciais et al., 2013a; Ciais et al., 2013b; Le 
Quéré et al., 2018; Varjani, Humbal and Srivastava, 2019), forests (Dixon et al., 1994; Pacala et al., 2001; Janssens 
et al., 2003; Pan et al., 2004; Piao et al., 2005; Dybala et al., 2019; Varjani, Humbal and Srivastava, 2019) and 
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in absorbing carbon dioxide, it raises the issue that there will come a point in the future in which 
natural sinks will not be able to absorb carbon emissions at the current rate. Consequently, if society 
does start reducing its greenhouse gas emissions through mitigation, the rate of change of carbon 
dioxide is going to keep increasing. It is expected by climate scientists that by 2050, carbon dioxide 
levels could reach 550 ppm (Meinshausen, 2006; Fisher et al., 2007; Marchal et al., 2012). This would 
represent a rise of a 58.24 per cent on 1959 levels. It will also be the first time carbon dioxide levels 
will be at their highest levels during the last 25 million years9 10 (Zhang et al., 2013). It has been noted 
that global carbon dioxide emissions before the start of the Industrial Revolution were roughly 
280ppm (Zalasiewicz et al., 2008; Monastersky, 2013; Varjani, Humbal and Srivastava, 2019). These 
changes demonstrate that because of human activity, the planet is entering a new epoch series, which 
some academics are calling the “Anthropocene” epoch (Zalasiewitz et al., 2008; Smith and Zeder, 
2013; Lewis and Maslin, 2015; Waters et al., 2016), but it is still to be recognised as an epoch by either 
the International Commission on Stratigraphy or the International Union of Geological Sciences 
(Edwards, 2015; Subramanian, 2019). Further information about other greenhouse gas emission is 
available in Appendix E and in the latest IPCC report (Myhre et al., 2013). 
Whilst the average global temperatures have risen by one degree Celsius [°C] between 1880 and 2018 
(McGrath, 2019), it has further been observed that global temperatures in 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017 and 
2018 were the five warmest years in recorded history (NOAA, 2017; Cole and McCarty, 2018; Cole, 
2019). It should be noted that whilst 2017 was not the warmest year on record, but the second 
warmest, it was, however, the warmest non-El Niño year on record, with the previous two warmest 
years [2015 and 2016] being when El-Niño helped push up global temperatures11. However, this 
warming of global temperatures does not occur equally across the planet. It was found by Bekryaev, 
Polyakov and Alexeev (2010) that average temperatures at the poles are raising at the fastest rate 
globally. This is demonstrated by a temperature rise of 1.38oC per century between 1879 and 2008 in 
 
 
seas (Palmiéri et al., 2015; Meyer et al., 2018). Examples of proposed human carbon sinks are ocean 
sequestration (Robinson et al., 2014); ocean iron fertilization (Robinson et al., 2014); mineral sequestration (Xu, 
Apps and Pruess, 2005; Gislason et al., 2010); and geological sequestration (Holloway, 1997). 
 
9 - The planet last observed greenhouse gas emissions at the 550ppm level roughly 25 million years during the 
Oligocene epoch. Global temperatures during this period were between 4oC and 6oC warmer than the average 
global temperatures between 1960 and 1990 (Hansen et al., 2013). 
 
10 - It should be noted that Homo sapiens (humans) have only been around for the last 200,000 years 
(Hammond, Royer and Fleagle, 2017); which means that humans are already experiencing the largest 
concentration of carbon dioxide emissions in the species’ history; with it expected to continue to increase. 
 
11 - See section 3.3.2 about natural processes affect climate change including El Niño. 
50 | P a g e  
 
the Arctic, which was twice as much as the rest of the Northern Hemisphere. This is demonstrated in 
Figure 2.3, which shows that during 2018, parts of the Arctic were up to 4oC above average 
temperature between 1951 and 1980 period; which can be attributed to local processes, such as 
surface albedo (Holland and Bitz, 2003; Serreze and Francis, 2006; Serreze et al., 2009; Pistone, 
Eisenman and Ramanathan, 2019). 
 
Figure 2.3 – Average temperature [oC] in 2018 compared with the 1951 to 1980 average (Source: 
NASA, 2019, Online) 
It should be noted that carbon dioxide is not the only greenhouse gas emission that has risen in the 
past few decades. Others include, but are not limited to methane (Mitchell et al., 2013; Worden et al., 
2017; Howarth, 2019), hydrofluorocarbons (Lunt et al., 2015; Montzka and Velder, 2019; Stanley et 
al., 2020), and sulphur hexafluoride (Dervos and Vassiliou, 2000). As demonstrated within Table 2.1, 
whilst these gases are scarce within the atmosphere, they are highly potent in relation to carbon 
dioxide.  
As a consequence of these types of greenhouse gases continuing to rise within the atmosphere, it is 
expected that atmospheric and oceanographic temperatures will continue to rise for the forthcoming 
decades. It has been projected by the Alexander et al. (2013) that global temperatures are likely to 
increase between 0.3°C and 4.8°C during the 2080-2100 period in comparison compared to the 
recorded period between 1986-2005; depending on the increase of greenhouse gases in the 
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atmosphere within the coming decades. But, as highlighted previously, these changes in temperatures 
are not going to be equally distributed. 
 
2.1.1. Climate Change at the National Level 
Within the United Kingdom, the average temperatures have risen by 1°C in the past century (DECC, 
2014). However, the temperature increase has not been constant, with 0.5°C occurring in the last 30 
years (DECC, 2014). In 2014, the Met Office estimated that average temperatures in the United 
Kingdom will continue to rise, with projected temperatures in 2100 expected to be up to 3°C warmer 
in the south of England and 2°C warmer in Scotland; compared to averages between 1960 and 1990 
(DECC, 2014). However, whilst these estimates will depend on various factors, for example the levels 
of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, the changes also depend on environmental mechanisms such 
as the Atlantic thermohaline circulation12. 
As a consequence of this warmer climate, the atmosphere will have the ability to retain more moisture 
(Lenderink and van Meijgaard, 2010) and the precipitation frequency and intensity will alter within 
the United Kingdom with expected climate change. The United Kingdom annual rainfall totals have 
not changed significantly in recent years (Jenkins, Perry and Prior, 2008); however, there has been an 
increase in the amount of extreme precipitation/storm events during the winters in the last 50 years 
(Osborn and Hulme, 2002; Jenkins, Perry and Prior, 2008; Maraun, Osborn and Gillett, 2008; Burt and 
Ferranti, 2011; Jones et al., 2013; Jones et al., 2014). 
It is not just warmer average temperatures that the United Kingdom will experience due to climate 
change. The following section will explore some of the expected effects of climate change within the 
United Kingdom. 
 
2.1.2. Impacts of Climate Change within the United Kingdom 
The Met Office (No Date a) highlight that there are thirteen different impacts that climate change will 
have on the United Kingdom. The following bullet points highlights what these are, what they mean 
and some examples. 
1. Change in Seasonality – It has been observed that seasonality has changed in the last 70 years. 
Within the Northern Hemisphere it is observed that leafing is occurring at 1.2 days per decade 
 
 
12 - This process is described in further detail within Appendix G 
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earlier, whilst the last spring frost is occurring at 1.5 days per decade earlier (Schwartz, Ahas 
and Aasa, 2006). 
 
2. Heat Stress - Typically, heat waves within the United Kingdom are not frequent, but still occur. 
Famous examples are during the summers of 1976, 2003, 2018 and 2019. During these 
heatwaves, the chances of heat stress amongst the public increases. It is most likely to affect 
the very young and elderly. During the 1976 heatwave, there was 20 per cent increase in the 
mortality rate, and a 56 per cent increase in 2003 for people over the age of 75 within London 
(Johnson et al., 2005; Kovats, Johnson and Griffiths, 2006). 
 
3. Habitable Region of Pests Expand – Increasing temperatures will result in the ability of pests 
to spread further. Research demonstrates that the United Kingdom will see an increase in the 
number of insect pests already within the country, with a number of new migrant pests 
(Cannon, 1998). 
 
4. Forest Mortality and Increased Risk of Fires – Temperatures are expected to be warming in 
the summer months with the combinations of dryer conditions during the same period within 
the United Kingdom. This establishes more ideal conditions for forest and moorland fires. In 
the past two years, the United Kingdom has observed a couple of relatively large moorlands 
fires on Saddleworth Moor, Greater Manchester; Winter Hill, Lancashire and Ilkley Moor, 
West Yorkshire. It estimated that the two years resulted in over 470km2 being burned within 
the United Kingdom (Houses of Parliament, 2019). 
 
5. Damage to Infrastructure – 2019 demonstrates that elements of the United Kingdom 
infrastructure are unprepared for 1oC increase in temperatures, but that temperatures are 
expected to rise. An example of the impact includes, for example, the threatened collapse of 
Whaley Bridge Dam in Derbyshire in April after intensive rainfall in the preceding days (CCC, 
2019). But, it is not just rainfall, but also the high temperatures that puts at risk the United 
Kingdom’s infrastructure; demonstrated by power outages, roads melting and rail line 
buckling during the heatwave in 2019 (BBC, 2019a; Middleton, 2019) 
 
6. Food Insecurity - Climate change can affect the food supply of the country either directly 
through crop failure (Challinor et al., 2014), or indirectly through increased food prices 
volatility caused by a decreased food supply globally (Kalkuhl, von Braun and Torero, 2016). 
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The majority of the planet, especially close to the Equator, will see a reduction in agricultural 
output by the 2080s, based on 2003 levels; whilst, the United Kingdom as a whole is likely to 
experience a reduction in agricultural output between 0 and 5 per cent by the 2080s, based 
on 2003 levels (Cline, 2007). In addition, it is expected that global population will continue to 
rise throughout this time, which will only increase pressure on crop resources. 
 
7. Risk to Water Supplies – More seasonal rainfall expected within the forthcoming years, is 
expected to raise the risks to water supplies, especially in the South East of England which 
already has a population stress upon their water supplies and is expected to increase (BBC, 
2019b). 
 
8. Conflict and Climate Migrants – As countries closer to the equator become warmer and dryer, 
the likelihood of crops failing and droughts occurring will increase. These slow onset disasters 
can lead to “displacement and forced migrations” (Collins et al., 2017); in addition to conflicts 
over water supplies both within and between nation states (Gleick, 1993; Gleick, 1994; Yoffe, 
Wolf and Giordano, 2003; Wolf, 2007). Some researchers already believe that the Syrian Civil 
War13 was caused in part due to a prolonged drought (De Châtel, 2014; Gleick, 2014), which 
has sparked a debated whether climate change has contributed to the conflict (Femia and 
Werrell, 2012; De Châtel, 2014; Gleick, 2014; Kelley et al., 2015; Selby et al., 2017; Daoudy, 
2020). It is widely predicted that the United Kingdom and the rest of Northern Europe will see 
continue levels of migrations from the Middle East and Africa (Black et al., 2011). 
 
9. Localised Flooding - In a warmer climate, it is expected that the more intensive rainfall events 
will occur (Allen and Ingram, 2002). It has been observed in Donat et al. (2016) that the 
increase in extreme rainfall events in recent years has been due to climate change. During the 
2007 flooding events across England, a report by the Environment Agency highlighted short 
but intensive rainfall that kept repeating every few days, which accumulated. For example, 
parts of the North Yorkshire Moors received four times the normal rainfall for June; and parts 
of Worcestershire received six inches of rainfall in just two days (EA, 2007). During the floods, 
the situation was described by the Environment Agency as “critical” (BBC, 2007a). 
 
 
13 - In drought affected Syria between 2006 and 2009, it is estimated that roughly 800,000 people lost their 
livelihood and that 1.3 million people in Eastern Syria were affected (Solh, 2010). It was estimated by ACSAD 
(2011) that this region of Syria lost 47 per cent of wheat production and 67 per cent of barley production, in 
addition the livestock population significantly contracted. 
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10. Flooding of Coastal Regions – Lowe et al. (2009) highlight that they could be a sea level rise 
difference within the United Kingdom of 25 centimetres by the end of the century, with the 
raise not been uniform as most will occur in the South of England. As a consequence, storm 
surges are likely to put more people at the coastline in danger of flooding. 
 
11. Damage to Marine Ecosystems - In the last few decades, there has been a steady decrease in 
the pH of the Earth’s Ocean, which has been attributed to increase levels of carbon dioxide 
within the atmosphere (Caldeira and Wickett, 2003). It is estimated that between 30 and 40 
per cent of extra carbon dioxide produced through anthropogenic activity is been absorbed 
by waterbodies (Millero, 1995; Feely et al., 2004). Increasingly acidity has harmful 
repercussions for marine life. An example is ‘coral bleaching’ (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2007).  
 
12. Fisheries Failing – Increased acidification of waterbodies also result in increased extinction 
rates amongst fish (Schofield, 1976; Rask and Tuunainen, 1990; Tremblay and Richard, 1993; 
Baldigo, Roy and Driscoll, 2016). 
 
13. Loss of Biodiversity - most researchers believe that the Earth is currently in its sixth mass 
extinction. They state that the current extinction rate, since 1900, is occurring at a rate 
between 100 and 1000 times above normal (Pimm et al., 1995; Pimm et al., 2014; De Vos et 
al., 2015). Many researchers dub it as either the Holocene Extinction or the Anthropocene 
Extinction (Sodhi, Brook and Bradshaw, 2009; Dirzo et al., 2014; Ceballos et al., 2015; Ceballos, 
Ehrilch and Dirzo, 2017). 
 
2.1.3. Overview 
As this section has demonstrated, the science shows that the planet is already seeing initial impacts 
of climate change. But it also shows that the impacts of climate change could get much worse in the 
future. In addition to this, over the last thirty years, climate change has emerged to become a major 
issue for society, especially as a political and social issue. Consequently, the following two sections will 
examine climate change within the United Kingdom through a political and social lens respectively. 
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2.2. Political Lens of Climate Change 
The issue of climate change was given political legitimacy early in the climate change debate in the 
late 1980s by a couple of key events and led Hulme (2009) to state that 1988 was the year which 
climate change took off in the western civil society conscience. The first occurred on the 23rd June 
1988, when NASA scientists, Dr. James Hansen testified before the United States Senate Committee 
on Energy and Natural Resources. Within the testimony, Hansen stated that “global warming has 
researched a level such that we can scribe with a high degree of confidence a cause and effect 
relationship between the greenhouse effect and observed warming … it is already happening now” 
(Shabecoff, 1988, pp. A1, A14). A number of researchers agree that this testimony increased public 
awareness of climate change (Weart, 2008; Besel, 2013; Holmes, 2015) and allowed the issue of 
climate change to enter the public discourse, not just within the United States, but globally. It also 
archived bringing the political/policy issue to the forefront (Besel, 2013); and some argued that in 
principle this occurred overnight (Wilford, 1988). 
The second was the two speeches that the then British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, gave on 
the issue in 1988 and 1989. The first she gave to the Royal Society; to which she referred to humankind 
having “unwittingly began [a] massive experiment with the [climate] system of this planet itself” 
(Thatcher, 1988, Online). The second speech was given to the United Nations in November 1989, in 
which she dedicated the whole speech to global environmental issues, specifically focusing on 
different elements of climate change. She was the first political leader to openly discuss and raise 
awareness of the issue (Nulman, 2015); but it is arguable whether she helped push climate change up 
the international agenda. Nevertheless, it demonstrated that the United Kingdom was at the forefront 
of recognising climate change from the beginning of international action. 
As a consequence of this shifting focus on climate change in mid to late 1980s by the scientific and 
political communities, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC] was created in 1988 by 
both the World Meteorological Organization [WMO] and the United Nations Environmental 
Programme [UNEP]. Any state that is a member of either the WMO or UN can be/are members of the 
IPCC. The main object of the IPCC “is to provide governments at all levels with scientific information 
that they can use to develop climate policies [and the] … IPCC reports are also a key input into 
international climate change negotiations” (IPCC, No Date a, Online). As a consequence, the IPCC has 
been described by Besel (2013) as a hybrid scientific body and a political organisation. The most 
recognised output of the IPCC organisations is the reports that are produced every five to ten years, 
to provide detailed analysis of the reviewing of the latest climate science. The latest report [AR5] was 
released in 2013-14; with the next due to be released in 2021-2022. However, on occasion, the IPCC 
will release special reports on a myriad of different topics related to climate change. For example, the 
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IPCC released a report called “Global Warming of 1.5oC” in 2018, which looked at the impacts of 
climate change at a 1.5oC increase based upon pre-industrial times; or the “Special Report on 
Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation” [SREX] 
in 2012, which was an exhaustive assessment on the risks that climate change poses and a range of 
options which different organisation and communities can choose  to reduce the vulnerability from 
climate change and thus increasing resilience. 
The latter of the two examples earlier paved the way for the United Kingdom to shape its policy around 
the issue of climate change, from the international, national and regional levels. The following 
subsections will explore the key policies at both the national and international level that have been 
brought forward in the past thirty years to combat climate change within the United Kingdom and 
Crown Dependencies; and to demonstrate the changes of carbon emission both within the United 
Kingdom and internationally due to these changes. 
 
2.2.1. Policy – United Kingdom’s Engagement Internationally 
The United Kingdom has a long history of dealing with climate change internationally in the past thirty 
years. This section will explore what the United Kingdom has undertaken and agreed upon to combat 
climate change. 
In 1992, the United Kingdom signed a voluntary agreement at the ‘United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change’14. This outlines a target that the United Kingdom’s emissions in 2000 
would be no greater than 1990 levels (UNFCCC, 1992; DoE, 1994). In addition, it paved the way for the 
annual Conferences of the Parties [COP] meetings. These meetings have the sole purpose to assess 
the progress in dealing with climate change; with the first taking place in 1995. 
It was and still is important for global issues, such as climate change, to be addressed at the 
international level with cooperation between different sovereign nations (Rosen, 2015). It has been 
proven in the past that environmental and societal issues have either been solved or are on their way 
to been so through this international cooperation. Quintessential examples of this success are 
reflected by the ‘Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer’ in 1985, and the ‘Montreal 
 
 
14 - The ‘United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’ is an international environmental treaty that 
was signed during the Earth Summit held in Rio de Janeiro between the 3rd and 14th June 1992. This treaty came 
into effect in May 1994, and was ratified by all 197 members’ states of the United Nations; also Palestine, Niue, 
Cook Islands and the European Union. 
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Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer’ in 1987 both of which were designed to slow 
down and stop the hole that had appeared in the ozone at the south pole (Benedick, 1998; Oberthür, 
2000; Behringer and Heydel, 2019); and public health issues, such as polio and small pox (Fenner et 
al., 1988; Aylward et al., 2003; Roberts, 2004; Barrett, 2007; Hampton, 2009). 
COP meetings have resulted in non-binding international agreements in setting targets to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions, such as the Kyoto Protocol. It is argued that this process had been based 
on the ozone layer protection that had occurred in the previous decade (Oberthür, 2001). 
In 1997, the United Kingdom signed the Kyoto Protocol, which became the first legally binding 
agreement to address climate change. This was an international agreement which required the United 
Kingdom to make a 12.5 per cent reduction on its greenhouse gas emission by 2012 compared to 1990 
levels. In 2012, this agreement was further extended with the Doha Amendment which raised the 
reduction of greenhouse gases to 20 per cent by 2020 (UN, 2015)15. This was the first protocol that 
had the overarching goal to reduce greenhouse gas emissions being emitted in the atmosphere, which 
of course was a step in the right direction towards the planet reducing the worst impacts of climate 
change. Professor Jorge Sarsmiento, Princeton University, proclaims that the Protocol has set the “first 
steps” of carbon reductions and “provides a framework” which can be revisited regularly in the future 
(quoted in Malakoff, 1997, p. 2048). However, despite this, there have been criticisms of the Kyoto 
Protocol within both the academic and political communities over the last twenty-three years as to 
why it will not be successful in the long-term. Arguably the loudest criticisms were the exemptions for 
developing countries, which allowed them to emit an unlimited amount of greenhouse gas emissions. 
The United States government felt that it would put the country at an unfair disadvantage in the future 
compared to newly developing countries (Reynolds, 2001; Sanger, 2001). As a result, whilst the United 
States signed the Kyoto Protocol in 1998, the change in government in January 2001 meant the 
agreement was not given ratification, which meant that it significantly impaired the ability of the 
agreement being effective in reducing greenhouse gas emissions (Li et al., 2004). 
At best, the Kyoto Protocol has only offset a fraction of greenhouse gas emissions of developing 
countries, such as China and India, who have continued to increase their emissions relentlessly for the 
past twenty-two years since Kyoto. 
 
 
15 - This target was agreed collectively with the European Union, see section 2.2.2. 
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In 2015, all UNFCCC members’ states, including the United Kingdom signed up to the Paris Agreement, 
which was the follow up of the Doha Amendment. The United Kingdom signed this agreement on the 
22nd April 2016; and it came into focus on the 18th December 2016. The main goal is to limit global 
temperature increase to well below 2oC and aim for an ambitious target of 1.5oC above pre-industrial 
levels and increase ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change (UNFCCC, 2015). It should 
be noted that the revised emission reduction targets for each member state are due to be announced 
at the COP26 in November 2020 (BBC, 2019c). However, there is increasing uncertainty surrounding 
the Paris Agreement since the then President of the United States of America, Donald Trump, 
announced his country’s planned withdrawal. The reason this has caused the uncertainty is that the 
United States is the second largest greenhouse gas emitter globally behind China. Therefore, the 1.5oC 
to 2oC target will need the corporation of the United States. However, it should be highlighted that in 
response the “United States Climate Alliance” (USCA) was founded and contains fifteen states and 
overseas territories, a non-partisanship coalition that aims to uphold the aims of the Paris Agreement 
(USCA, No Date); and also has the support of over four hundred cities within the United States (Climate 
Mayors, No Date). This demonstrates that whilst there are elements of uncertainty, there is still plenty 
of support at the regional and local level for the Paris Agreement within the United States. 
One way to achieve of the Paris targets was realised at COP23, when the “Powering Past Coal Alliance”, 
which was founded and lead by the United Kingdom and Canada, with 25 state and national 
governments signing up to the alliance (Le Page, 2017); and has since grown to 34 national 
governments and 33 subnational governments, including Scotland and Wales16. The aim of this 
alliance is to try to phase out the use of coal by 2030 in the Organisation for Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) and EU countries17; and by 2050 for the rest of the world (UK Government, 
2017). 
Lastly, the United Kingdom has agreed to host the twenty-sixth COP conference in November 2020 
within Glasgow, Scotland (UNFCCC, 2019), now postponed to November 2021. This will allow the 
United Kingdom to demonstrate to the world its commitment in combatting climate change. The next 
section examines how closely the United Kingdom has worked with the European Union to reduce its 




16 - A list of signed up national and sub national governments is provided in Appendix H 
 
17 - A list of OCED and EU28 countries is provided in Appendix I 
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2.2.2. Policy – European Union and Brexit 
Whilst writing this section, the United Kingdom has left the European Union on the 31st January 2020 
and is currently in a transition phase until the 31st December 2020. The full implications of the United 
Kingdom leaving will take time to fully understand. However, as this section will partly demonstrate, 
the United Kingdom receives a large proportion of its policy in relation to climate change from the 
European Union. This leaves a large uncertainty on whether the United Kingdom will keep European 
policy in relation to climate change. However, the United Kingdom currently still has the Climate 
Change Act 2008 to abide to. Despite there being a lot of concern about the future of environmental 
programmes within the United Kingdom, including climate change, there are some who regard this as 
also a great opportunity to have greater regulation on environmental issues (Cressey, 2017). The 
reason for this view is that due to a large bureaucratic system, the European Union is slow to change. 
In addition, as highlighted by Carvalho and Fankhauser (2017), the United Kingdom has some of the 
most ambitious greenhouse gas reduction targets within the European Union, both in the medium 
and long term. They estimate that the European Union will have to make an additional 4.5 per cent 
reduction to meet its 2030 targets; which is roughly the equivalent greenhouse gases of both Belgium 
and Estonia combined. This demonstrates that the European Union might find it more difficult to meet 
its greenhouse gas emissions without the United Kingdom. 
Nonetheless, the European Union has been pushing since the early 1990s for international policy on 
limiting greenhouse gas emissions (Böhringer, 2014). In 1996, the European Union adopted a target 
to cap the increase in global temperatures to 2oC, compared to pre-industrial levels (Tol, 2007). This 
is a target that the UNFCCC adopted nearly twenty years later in 2015. 
An example of how the European Union worked collectively to combat climate change is provided in 
relation to the Kyoto Protocol. The European Union collectively signed the Kyoto Protocol in 1998 that 
was ratified 2002 with the passing of decision 2002/358/EC. Within the Kyoto Protocol, it is highlighted 
that the European Union will collectively reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by eight per cent by 
2012. It should be noted that when the Kyoto Protocol was adopted, only fifteen countries were 
members of the European Union. These are commonly known as the EU-15. Appendix J highlights each 
country’s individual contributions to this reduction. It shows that the spread of planned greenhouse 
gas emissions reductions across Europe were not equal with some countries, such as for example 
Germany and Luxembourg, being asked to significantly decrease its greenhouse gas emissions. This 
occurred whilst other countries such as for example Greece and Portugal could significantly increase 
their greenhouse gas emissions. 
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The EU-15 overachieved on its goal of an eight per cent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, as it 
achieved a reduction of 15.1 per cent (EEA, 2014). This is demonstrated in Appendix J. In addition, only 
three countries within the EU-15 failed to meet their greenhouse gas emission targets. However, 
impact assessments commissioned by the European Parliament found that in addition to policies, 
economic downturns have previously reduced emissions, especially observed in Eastern Europe post-
communism (Höhne et al., 2009). 
In June 2000, the European Union launched the European Climate Change Programme [ECPP], with 
the purpose of avoiding dangerous climate change. The ECPP’s biggest contribution to reduce climate 
change is the ‘European Union Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading Scheme’ [EU ETS]. It was launched 
in 2005. The aim of the policy is to limit the amount of annual carbon dioxide emissions by allocating 
each participating emitter a certain amount of pollution permits. This is done through the European 
Union Allowances [EUAs] (Martin, Muûls and Wagner, 2016). The scheme was the first greenhouse 
gas emission cap and trade scheme internationally (Ellerman and Buchner, 2007) and is still the largest 
cap and trade scheme (Ellerman, Marcantonini and Zaklan, 2016). All twenty-eight European Union 
countries plus Iceland, Lichtenstein and Norway are participating in the EU ETS. EU ETS has been 
divided into a number of different ‘trading periods’. The first trading period was between 2005 and 
2007. The second trading period was between 2008 and 2012, which was deliberately timed to 
coincide with the Kyoto Protocol. The third and current trading period started in January 2013 and is 
expected to finish in December 2020, which coincides with the Doha Amendment. 
Another way in which the European Union has tried to combat climate change is promotion of green 
electricity. As such, in 2009, the European Union agreed on a target that twenty per cent of all energy 
consumed should come from renewable sources by 2020 under the Renewable Energy Directive 
2009/28/EC. In addition to this target, each country was given their own targets. These targets for 
each country were set depending on the amount of renewable energy produced at the time. 
Therefore, countries, such as Latvia and Sweden, who already had a large renewable base, were given 
larger targets than countries such as Luxembourg and Malta. 
These mitigation strategies that have been brought forward by the European Union have been 
working alongside national policy in combatting climate change. These national policies will be 
expanded on in the next sub-section. 
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2.2.3. Policy – United Kingdom National Level 
The history of climate change policy within the United Kingdom has its origins in 1988 with the then 
Prime Minister to Margaret Thatcher, who made a speech to the Royal Society (Pearce, 2006). As a 
consequence, in 1990, the government released a White Paper called ‘This Common Inheritance: 
Britain’s Environmental Strategy’, which was the first extensive statement on environmental policy 
within the United Kingdom (Pearce, 2006). Within this white paper, there was a chapter dedicated to 
the greenhouse effect, which highlighted its processes and the potential consequences. 
The United Kingdom signed the Kyoto Protocol in 1998 and as a response to this, in November 2000, 
the United Kingdom’s government launched its climate change programme. Within this programme, 
the government indicated that it can achieve greater cuts than the 12.5 per cent highlighted within 
the Kyoto Protocol, and goes further by setting a target of 20 per cent reduction by 2010 based on 
1990 levels (DETR, 2000). 
In 2008, the United Kingdom became the first country to impose national targets on climate change 
reduction under the ‘Climate Change Act 2008’. This act outlines that the United Kingdom needs to 
cut at least 80 per cent of its greenhouse gas emissions by 2050, based on 1990 levels. However, the 
act does not set out individual targets for each region within the United Kingdom (CCC, 2016). This is 
important as the emissions within each region of the United Kingdom vary, with England emitting the 
most overall, and Northern Ireland emitting the most per capita. In addition, the act also has four 
initial climate budgets, each lasting for five years. These are short term targets, which are to enable 
the United Kingdom to meet its long-term target of 80 per cent reduction. In 2015, the Committee on 
Climate Change made recommendations of a 57 per cent reduction by 2030 for the fifth climate 
budget (CCC, 2015). Table 2.2 demonstrates the climate budget reductions that have been agreed by 
both the Committee on Climate Change and the British Government. 
However, in June 2019, the government announced an amendment to the bill, which increases the 
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions target to 100 per cent by 205018. The United Kingdom became 
the first Group of Seven [G7] countries to set out legislation targets to become net carbon neutral by 
2050 (Walker, Mason and Carrington, 2019). Laurence Tubiana, a French academic and a key architect 
of the 2015 Paris Agreement, said the commitment by the United Kingdom will “reverberate right 
around the world … [as a result] … all eyes will now turn on the rest of the EU to match this pledge” 
(Harrabin, 2019, Online). However, it is yet to be announced how this will impact on carbon budgets 
within Table 2.2., but it is possible that the United Kingdom will need to change at least the fifth carbon 
 
 
18 - Also known as ‘Net Zero’. 
62 | P a g e  
 
budget, as if they fail to do so, the United Kingdom will have to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions 
by 43 per cent in twenty years, which is more than the United Kingdom has been able to do in the past 
thirty years. However, it is known that the CCC will be releasing its sixth carbon budget targets for the 
period 2033 to 2037, including a set reduction target by 2035, in December 2020 (CCC, 2020). 
Table 2.2 – United Kingdom’s Carbon Budget Targets 
Budget Year Per cent reduction 
1st Carbon Budget 2008 – 2012 23% 
2nd Carbon Budget 2013 – 2017 29% 
3rd Carbon Budget 2018 – 2022 35% by 2020 
4th Carbon Budget 2023 – 2027 50% by 2025 
5th Carbon Budget 2028 – 2032 57% by 2030 
Source: Adapted from CCC, 2015 
In addition to these policies that headline legislation, and which is specifically referred to be 
committing the United Kingdom to cutting greenhouse gas emissions, there has also been other 
legislation that had the partial purpose of combatting climate change. These are explored in the 
following four sub-sections including evaluation of the successes and failures of these policies. 
 
2.2.3.1. Fuel Duty 
Hydrocarbon oil duty, commonly known as fuel duty, is a fuel tax which is levied on fuel which has a 
carbon origin (Hydrocarbon Oil Duties Act 1979, c.5). Fuel duty was first introduced in 1909 with the 
passing of the ‘Financial Act 1908’ (Mackett et al., 2013). The current rates within the United Kingdom 
have been the same since 23rd March 2011 and are demonstrated in Table 2.3. It should be noted that 
all fuel duty prices shown in Table 2.3, do not include the 20 per cent value-added tax [VAT]. For 
example, £1.10 per litre of petrol would result in £0.76 per litre or 69 per cent of the price at the petrol 
station goes to the government. The percentage of taxation varies depending on the price of oil; as 
the cheaper the fuel prices, the greater percentage of the price of fuel that goes to the government in 
the form of taxation. 
Table 2.3 – Current Fuel Duty Rates within the United Kingdom as of October 2020 
Fuel Rate 
Petrol, Diesel, Biodiesel and Bioethanol £0.5795 Per litre 
Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) £0.3161 Per Kg 
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Natural Gas (e.g. Biogas) £0.2470 Per Kg 
‘Fuel Oil’ [For Furnace or Heating] £0.1070 Per litre 
Source: (UK Government, No Date a) 
In 1993, under the Conservative Government, the then Chancellor of the Exchequer Norman Lamont, 
introduced the ‘road fuel escalator’, also known as the ‘fuel price escalator’ (Seely, 2011). The initial 
rate of the fuel price escalator was set at three per cent plus inflation, but was raised later in the year 
to five per cent plus inflation. There were a number of reasons why the fuel price escalator was 
increased, but the one was as a technique for the United Kingdom to meet its carbon dioxide targets 
set at the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development19 (AA, 2008). 
The aim of the road fuel escalator was to force manufacturers to make more fuel-efficient vehicles 
and discourage the public in making unnecessary purchases (Gray et al., 2001). It is estimated that the 
fuel price escalator did have a positive impact for the environment. Firstly, it was estimated by the 
OECD (2001) that the escalator helped reduce between 2 and 5 million tonnes of carbon dioxide, which 
roughly reduced the United Kingdom’s greenhouse gas emission by between 4.6 to 11.5 per cent 
based on 1990 levels. This reduction in emissions was in part due to the improved efficiency of 
vehicles, especially articulated lorries. It is estimated by DETR (1999) that between 1993 and 1998, 
articulated lorries improved their duel efficiency by roughly 13 per cent. Despite this, it is estimated 
that 90 per cent of transport emissions are still accountable to road transport. This includes personal 
vehicles, bus/coaches and articulated lorries (Green Fiscal Commission, 2010). 
However, the substantial increase in fuel duty in a short period of time resulted in a growing 
discontent amongst the public, especially lorry drivers. This lead to the mass fuel protest in September 
2000, as fuel within the United Kingdom went from being one of the cheapest within Europe to being 
the most expensive, and that at the time 72.3 per cent of fuel was taxed (BBC, 2000a). Because of this 
protest, which lasted a week, the then Labour Government decided to freeze fuel duty until 2002 
(Elliot and White, 2000), and between 2000 and 2007, there was only two rises in fuel duty, which 
were in line with inflation (Green Fiscal Commission, 2010). Between April and June 2017, the price of 
fuel within the United Kingdom has been £1.14 per litre, which is the 13th most expensive within the 
European Union. As demonstrated in Figure 2.4 and Appendix K, the price of fuel in significantly more 
expensive in Scandinavia and Netherlands as within the United Kingdom, especially Norway, which is 
£0.30 per litre more expensive. This is despite the sharp drop in the pound following the European 
Union referendum in 2016, which resulted in the price of importing of goods into the United Kingdom, 
 
 
19  - The summit has informally also being known as the 1992 Rio Summit and the Earth Summit 
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including oil, becoming more expensive. Nonetheless, the price of fuel within the European Union is 
much more expansive compared to countries, such as the United States, Canada and Japan, where the 
price of fuel is £0.52, £0.71 and £0.87 respectively (Bloomberg, 2017). These variations could be due 
to reasons such as corporation profits and price of delivery. However, the likely overriding reason for 
the variation in prices is the amount of tax on the fuel. 
As demonstrated, fuel duty within the United Kingdom has previously proven to be successful in 
reducing emissions, but is highly unpopular. As the fuel prices within the United Kingdom in recent 
years have not risen as fast as the rest of Europe, it is important to gauge whether the public would 
support an increase fuel duty soon. But it is known that in 2018 France tried to introduce a similar 
scheme when the fuel escalator was introduced through their carbon tax component within the fuel 
tax (Douenne and Fabre, 2020). Consequently, like the United Kingdom, it resulted in large-scale 
protests, also known a Gilets Jaunes protests, leading to the scrapping of future taxes on fuel in 
December 2018 (Willsher, 2018). 
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Figure 2.4 – The price of fuel within the European Union between April and June 2017 (Adapted 
from Bloomberg, 2017). See Appendix K for Full Details for Each Countries Price of Fuel. 
 
2.2.3.2. Climate Change Levy 
In 2001, the Climate Change Levy was introduced under the Finance Act 2000. This scheme was the 
replacement of the Fossil Fuel Levy (Bowen and Rydge, 2011). The purpose of the scheme is to tax 
energy that is delivered to non-domestic customers within the whole of the United Kingdom. The 
overarching aim of the scheme is to provide business an incentive to improve energy efficiency, which 
will reduce carbon emission from lower electricity usage. The government’s forecast was that the 
scheme will reduce annual carbon emission by 2.5 million tonnes by 2010. It should be noted that 
energy that is derived from nuclear is not exempt from the scheme, despite it producing virtually no 
carbon emissions. Therefore, only renewable energy schemes, such as solar and wind, were exempt 
from the scheme. However, in July 2015, the Government announced that this exemption would be 
removed from the 1st August 2015 (Ofgem, No Date). This removal of the exemption was highly 
criticised by environmental groups, who stated that it would remove incentives to invest in renewable 
energies (Macalister and Vaughan, 2015). 
 
2.2.3.3. Vehicle Excise Duty 
Another method to reduce carbon emissions from road transport has been vehicle tax20. There has 
been some sort of vehicle tax within the United Kingdom since 1903 and between 1946 and 1999 it 
was a flat rate. In 1999, a two-tier system was created, depending on the size of the engine21 
(Leicester, 2006). It could be argued that the introduction of this two-tier system was a first attempt 
to influence the public towards more environmentally friendly cars. Small engine sizes produce fewer 
emissions as they burn less fuel. Currently, within the United Kingdom, vehicle tax rates depend on 
the carbon dioxide emissions each produce after its introduction in 2001 (Leicester, 2006). Throughout 
the time, the vehicle tax rates for high emitting vehicles have been steadily increasing. This was 
especially so since April 2017, as the regulations were changed to a thirteen-tier sliding system 
 
 
20 - Officially known as the Vehicle Excise Duty (VED) within the United Kingdom, but is sometimes called road 
tax. 
 
21 - The two tiers were below and above 1,100cc engines. 
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depending on the amount of carbon dioxide emissions per kilometre for the first year and then a fixed 
amounts depending on the fuel type (UK Government, No Date b). 
In a study by Lancaster (2006), it was found that the average greenhouse gas emissions from new cars 
dropped from 189.8 g CO2/km in 1997 to 169.4 g CO2/km in 2005; which represents an emissions 
reduction of 10.75 per cent during the eight year period. This demonstrates that the combination of 
this tax and fuel duty, discussed in the previous sub-section, has resulted in manufacturers having to 
produce more environmentally friendly cars, as the cost of running cars was increased in this period.  
 
2.2.3.4. Green Deal Scheme 
During the Conservative-Liberal Democratic coalition of 2010 to 2015, the Government focused on 
improving the energy efficacy of homes to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. This led to the 
introduction of the Green Deal Scheme. Green Deal was a policy in which the government give loans 
to homeowners to make energy efficacy improvements to their homes, with the loans being repaid 
back through the saving on their energy bills. The scheme came into force in January 2013. However, 
the scheme was considered a failure (Carter and Clements, 2015). This was demonstrated within the 
press, which reported that within the first six months of the scheme, 38,259 Green Deal assessments 
had taken place, but only four households had signed up to the Green Deal loan (Gray, 2013). In terms 
of engaging with the public about climate change, the free assessment showed that the public were 
engaging with the issue. But one major reason for its failure was financial due to the high interest rates 
on the Green Deal loans; the interest rate was eight per cent, which was nearly double of some 
mortgage rates at the time (Lonsdale, 2014; TGDFC, 2013). As a result, the scheme was cancelled in 
July 2015 (Vaughan, 2015). 
 
2.2.4. Policy – Northern Ireland 
In 2013, it was reported that Northern Ireland’s greenhouse emissions were only 4 per cent of the 
United Kingdom’s greenhouse gas emissions (CCC, 2015c). Whilst it represents a small amount of the 
overall greenhouse emissions in relation to the United Kingdom, when compared to factors such as 
population and gross domestic product (GDP), which are 2.8 per cent and 2.1 per cent respectively, it 
is demonstrate that Northern Ireland is proportionally emitting significantly more than the rest of the 
United Kingdom. As demonstrated within Figure 2.5, the majority of emissions within the Northern 
Ireland are from agriculture whilst in the rest of the United Kingdom it is from power supply. 
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Figure 2.5 – Total and sectoral emissions (tCO2e) per capita in both Northern Ireland [Blue] and the 
United Kingdom [Red] in 2013 (CCC, 2016) 
Despite this, it estimated that Northern Ireland has reduced its greenhouse gas emissions by 20.2 per 
cent compared to 1990 levels, as demonstrated in Figure 2.6 and Appendix L. But this compares with 
the rest of the United Kingdom having reduced their greenhouse gas emissions by a 30 per cent in the 
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Figure 2.6 – Northern Ireland’s greenhouse gas emissions (KtCO2e) by sector in 1990, 1995 and 
between 1998 and 2018 (Source: Data Adapted from DAERA, 2020). See Appendix L for Full 
Breakdown of Greenhouse Gas Emissions. 
The Northern Ireland Executive highlighted its target to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at 
minimum of 35 per cent by 2025 within its Programme for Government (2011-2015) (NIGOV, 2010). 
This is lower share of reduction compared to the rest of the United Kingdom. However, as highlighted 
by the CCC (2016), Northern Ireland has the highest share of agriculture, which is the hardest sector 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, due to the large methane produced from pastoral farming 
(Palmer, 2009; Pinares-Patiño et al., 2009). 
One of the most ongoing concerns about Northern Ireland’s progress in reducing its greenhouse gas 
emissions is that they do not have any long term legislation passed by Stormont, the national 
assembly, to cut emissions, which the rest of the country do; and is likely to take a while to pass any 
new legislation as Stormont only sat for the first time in three years at the beginning of 2020. In 
addition, as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic impact on Northern Ireland, the national 
assembly have put had large amount of their focus on the management of the spread of COVID-19 
and the medium-term economic recovery package. 
 
2.2.5. Policy – Scotland 
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, there was momentum within Scotland for greater independence 
from the United Kingdom. This led to the Scotland Act 1998, which was amended in both 2012 and 
2016. This act created the Scottish Parliament, which led to the devolution of power. This devolution 
allowed Scotland to take control from the United Kingdom on some laws which affect Scotland, 
including Climate Change. It is estimated that Scotland’s Greenhouse gas emissions only account for 
10 per cent of the United Kingdom’s overall emissions (Scottish Government, 2009). 
In 2009, the Scottish Government passed the Climate Change (Scotland) Act 2009. The overall target 
is to cut 80 per cent of greenhouse gas emissions by 2050, which is in line of the rest of the United 
Kingdom under the Climate Change Act 2008. However, the targets of reduction set in the mid-term 
are much greater than the United Kingdom. The Act states that Scotland must reduce its greenhouse 
gas emissions by 42 per cent by 2020, based on 1990 levels. This compares to the rest of the United 
Kingdom which has set a target of 35 per cent. It is worthy to note that Scotland has already exceeded 
this target, with a 45.4 per cent reduction by 2018, due to the 70 per cent decline from the energy 
supply sector, as demonstrated in Figure 2.7 and Appendix M. 
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Also, Part 6 of the Act, sets out how the Scottish Government will increase the public engagement of 
climate change. This includes publishing a strategy paper on the steps that the government would be 
undertaking to encourage the public to engage with climate change. This was undertaken in December 
2010, through the publishing of the “Low Carbon Scotland – Public Engagement Strategy” report 
(Scottish Government, 2010). 
However, whilst there had been plans to increase the rate of reduction of greenhouse gas emissions 
in legislation since 2017 (Scottish Government, 2017), it was not until October 2019 that this was 
realised with the Climate Change (Emissions Reduction Targets) (Scotland) Act 2019. This Act partly 
replaces the Climate Change (Scotland) Act 2009 and includes that Scottish emissions will be net zero 
by 2045, instead of the 2050 being set at the national level. In addition to this, ten year interim targets 
have been set to help the transition to a low carbon state. These include cutting greenhouse gas 
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Figure 2.7 – Scotland’s greenhouse gas emissions (MtCO2e) by sector in 1990, 1995 and between 
1998 and 2018 (Source: Data Adapted from Scottish Government, 2020). See Appendix M for Full 
Breakdown of Greenhouse Gas Emissions. 
 
2.2.6. Policy – Wales 
In 2016, Wales passed the Environment (Wales) Act, which states that Wales needs to reduce its 
greenhouse gas emissions by 80 per cent by 2050; which is the same target as for the rest of the United 
Kingdom. In addition, Wales will be setting interim targets for 2020, 2030 and 2040. 
In nearly 30 years, there has been an overall downward trend in the amount of greenhouse gases that 
Wales has been emitting. This has been observed by DECC (2014) which highlights that between 2005 
and 2012, there has been a nineteen per cent decline in the annual emissions of carbon dioxide within 
Wales. However, it should be noted that between 1990 and 2014, there has been only an eighteen 
per cent decline in greenhouse gas emissions (CCC, 2017). This can be attributed to a sudden rise in 
the emissions of the early 1990’s, due to the closure of Transfynydd nuclear power station in 1991, 
which were replaced with gas-fired power stations (CCC, 2017). 
In addition to the targets set by the United Kingdom, Wales in 2010 set a three per cent target 
reduction per year in carbon dioxide emissions (Welsh Government, 2010). This is demonstrated in 
Table 2.4. In addition, Wales set out a 40 per cent greenhouse gas reduction target by 2020, based on 
1990 levels (Welsh Government, 2010). It should be noted that the three per cent reduction is based 
on projected emission results from 2010, which was estimated to be 34.03 MtCO2e.  However, in 2010 
there was a drastic rise in the amount of carbon dioxide produced in Wales, and the overall figure of 
39.1 MtCO2e (Thomas and Kluiters, 2012). This equates to nearly 5 MtCO2e or 14.9 per cent increase 
on project emissions rate. This has been attributed to two extreme cold snaps during 2010 (Hughes, 
2012; Thomas and Kluiters, 2012). In addition to this, Wales’s greenhouse gas emissions increased by 
ten per cent. This was attributed to cold winter weather, increased industrial production and 
increased coal production (CCC, No Date). 
Table 2.4 – Emission saving targets for Wales between 2011-2012 and 2019-2020 
Year % saving Emissions saving 
(MtCO2e) 
Emissions trajectory 
based on current 
baseline of 34.03 
MtCO2e 
71 | P a g e  
 
2011-2012 3 1.02 33.01 
2012-2013 6 2.04 31.99 
2013-2014 9 3.06 30.97 
2014-2015 12 4.08 29.95 
2015-2016 15 5.10 28.93 
2016-2017 18 6.13 27.91 
2017-2018 21 7.15 26.88 
2018-2019 24 8.17 25.86 
2019-2020 27 9.19 24.84 
Source: Welsh Government, 2010 
As highlighted earlier, Wales by 2014 had decreased its greenhouse gas emissions by roughly 18 per 
cent. Since then, Wales has observed an increasing rate of decline in its greenhouse gas emission, with 
this reduction levels in 2018, were at 31.1 per cent22. As observed within Figure 2.8, the main reason 
for this decline in emissions is due to the reduction in the emissions from the energy supply, with 
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Figure 2.8 – Wales’s greenhouse gas emissions (KtCO2e) by sector in 1990, 1995 and between 1998 
and 2018 (Source: Data Adapted from StatsWales, 2020). See Appendix N for Full Breakdown of 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions. 
 
2.2.7. Policy – Crown Dependencies 
The Crown dependencies are self-governed states that traditionally do not form part of the United 
Kingdom or the British Oversea Territories. Each of the Crown Dependencies has control of their own 
laws, and International and British laws can only be enforced with the consent of the Island’s 
parliaments (UK Parliament, 2010). However, at the international level, the Crown dependencies are 
recognised as territories of the United Kingdom, rather than been classified as a sovereign nation 
(Justice Committee, 2014). This is because of Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, which was adopted in 1969, states that “unless a different intention appears from the treaty 
or is otherwise established, a treaty is binding upon each party in respect of its entire territory” (UN, 
1969, p.11). Despite this, the United Kingdom’s pledge to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions to a 
net zero by 2050 does not include the emissions from the Crown Dependencies (ONS, 2019a). 
There are three Crown Dependencies located around the British Isles, which include the Isle of Man, 
and the Bailiwicks of Guernsey and Jersey. As each has their own parliament, it means that each also 
have separate laws in relation to climate change. But, in general these islands tend to follow the United 
Kingdom, as until 2019, each had targets to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by 80 per cent by 
2050. 
 
2.2.8. Levels of Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
The previous sections have outlined how there has been a number of policies which have been 
legislated in the past thirty years to combat climate change. 
However, the carbon dioxide emitted each year has continued to rise (Peters et al., 2020), despite all 
the warnings the scientific community provided; this is demonstrated by Frumhoff, Heede and 
Oreskes (2015) in Figure 2.9 Showing that the amount of carbon dioxide emitted between 1988 and 
2014, is roughly equivalent to that was emitted between 1751 and 1987. 
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Figure 2.9 – The levels of carbon dioxide being emitted globally each year between 1751 and 2014 
(Frumhoff, Heede and Oreskes, 2015, p.164) 
As of 201923, the United Kingdom has reduced its greenhouse gas emissions by 45.2 per cent [358.6 
MtCO2e] and its carbon dioxide emissions by 41.0 per cent, based on 1990 levels. It should be noted 
that internationally there can be a small variation in the amount of emissions been reported as the 
United Kingdom is also responsible for the emissions of the UK Overseas Territories24. This reduction 
in greenhouse emissions is demonstrated in Figure 2.10, which shows that 2015 was the first year that 
greenhouse gas emissions within the United Kingdom dropped below the 500MtCO2e level. It should 
be noted that this reduction has been achieved at a time when the population of the United Kingdom 
has been steadily rising, with an estimated population of 57.2 million in 1990 and 66.9 million in 2019 
(ONS, 2019b). This meant that whilst the United Kingdom has overall lost 38 per cent of greenhouse 
gas emissions between 1990 and 2015, it has actually made a 53.1 per cent reduction of greenhouse 
gas emissions per capita in the same period. 
 
 
23  - Based upon provisional greenhouse gas emission for 2019 
 
24 - The UK Oversea Territories include Anguilla, Ascension Island, Bermuda, British Antarctic Territory, British 
Indian Ocean Territory, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands, Gibraltar, Montserrat, Pitcairn 
Islands, Saint Helena, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, Tristian de Cunha, and Turks and Caicos 
Islands. 
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Blue Background = Conservative Government; Red Background = Labour Government; Gold/Blue Background 
= Conservative-Liberal Democrats Government 
Figure 2.10 – The greenhouse gas emissions for the United Kingdom between 1990 and 2019 
(Adapted from BEIS, 2020a). Full Breakdown of Greenhouse Gas Emissions within the United 
Kingdom is available in Appendix O. 
 
It should be noted that greenhouse gas emissions are not equally spread across different sectors as a 
consequence of varying policies and development of technology. As demonstrated within Figure 2.11, 
the sector that has observed the most reduction in the past thirty years is the energy supply sector. 
This can be attributed to sharp reductions in recent years for coal usage in the generation of electricity, 
from 40 per cent in 2014 to 5 per cent in 2018 (Evans, 2019). Consequently, this has been the largest 
contributor in the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions within the United Kingdom, with a 62.8 per 
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Figure 2.11 – The greenhouse gas emission per sector for the United Kingdom between 1990 and 
2015 (Adapted from BEIS, 2020a). See Appendix O for values of each sector year on year. 
Lastly, the level of greenhouse gas emission reductions between the different nations that make up 
the United Kingdom also vary, as demonstrated within Table 2.5. 
Table 2.5 – Greenhouse Gas Emission Percentage Reduction in all Four Nations between 1990 and 
2018 
Nation Percentage Reduction 
 England 45.7% 
 Scotland 45.4% 
 Wales 31.1% 
 Northern Ireland 20.2% 
 United Kingdom 43.1% 
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2.2.9. Emission Outsourcing 
As demonstrated in the previous sub-sections, in the United Kingdom there is a large amount of 
legislation in relation to climate change mitigation. As a result, the United Kingdom as a whole has 
reduced its emissions by 45.2 per cent, based on 1990 emissions (BEIS, 2020a). However, it is 
debatable whether the United Kingdom has actually reduced its emission by as much as it has claimed. 
In the last 40 years, the United Kingdom and other developed countries have observed a steady 
decline of the manufacturing industry (Berry, 2018; Harris and Moffat, 2019), with much of this moving 
to developing countries, such as China (Li, 2013; Li, 2018) and India (Iyer, 2018). This outsourcing has 
two major issues that result in high emissions from these industries. Firstly, the vast majority of energy 
in a number of developing countries, and especially so in China’s case, is derived from fossil fuel (China 
Electricity Council, 2019); principally coming from coal, which is the highest emitting fossil fuel. 
Secondly, large quantities of energy are needed to transport goods and therefore large quantities of 
greenhouse gas emissions being emitted, when these same items used to be produced within the 
United Kingdom. It is currently estimated that carbon dioxide emissions from transporting freight is 
equivalent to thirty per cent of global transport carbon dioxide emissions, and six per cent of global 
carbon dioxide emissions (ITF, 2015). 
It was found by Yunfeng and Laike (2010) that between 10.03 and 26.54 per cent of all carbon emission 
emitted by China were related to goods that were manufactured to be consumed outside China, with 
the vast majority been sold within developed countries. It has been estimated that this form of 
outsourcing of emissions has increased from 150.18 megatonnes [Mt] of carbon dioxide in 1997 to 
593 Mt in 2007. However, these two sets of figures were taken from a decade ago, which means that 
it is highly probably that these emissions and per cent of emissions will have changed. 
 
2.2.10. Overview 
As demonstrated within this section, the United Kingdom has been at the forefront of combatting 
climate change since it became recognised as a major environmental issue at the global level over 
thirty years ago. It shows that the United Kingdom has committed itself to some of the most ambitious 
greenhouse gas reduction targets in the world. So far, the United Kingdom has observed one of the 
largest greenhouse gas emission reductions since 1990. This success is not down to one single piece 
of legislation, it has been combined with a number of smaller pieces of legislation since the mid-1990s. 
However, it should be noted that the overall success of future reductions will be difficult. Whilst there 
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is support for action on climate change25, some of this will be unpopular and could see the public 
resist, such as in relation to the fuel price escalator that was scrapped in September 2000. 
Lastly, whilst the devolution of the issue of climate change to national assemblies and parliaments 
within the United Kingdom has seen Scotland pulling ahead in reducing its greenhouse gas emissions, 
there are risks that other parts of the United Kingdom, especially Northern Ireland are falling further 
behind. Already, it is the only part of the country not to have legislation or national plans to combat 
climate change, and this is unlikely to be achieved due to Northern Ireland having only just reopened 
its parliament after three years, and therefore it will focus on perceived more pressing issues. 
What is clear in the United Kingdom is that without the public in support and/or demanding for action 
in relation to climate change action, no legislation is likely to be passed. Therefore, it is important to 
engage in research that seeks to understand what United Kingdom resident people think about and 





25 - See Section 3.1 for further details on this level of support for action on climate change 
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3.1. Public Perception and Comprehension of Climate Change 
The previous chapter addressed the science of climate change and what has been undertaken both at 
the international and national scale to mitigate against the worst potential impacts of climate change. 
The science is becoming increasingly certain and sluggish action is been taken against reducing 
greenhouse gas emission globally. It is important to note that without the support of the public, action 
and progress will further dawdle and opportunities to avoid climate tipping points will be missed. 
Research has highlighted public support and attitude towards climate change as important for 
policymakers to legislate against the issue (Stotenborogh and Vedlitz, 2012 cited in Stoutenborough, 
Liu and Vedlitz, 2014). In the past thirty years, extensive research has been undertaken in Australia, 
Europe and the United States about civil societal perception of climate change (Lorenzoni and 
Pidgeon, 2006; Whitmarsh, 2011; Brulle, Carmichael and Jenkins, 2012; Lee et al., 2015). This is key to 
understanding public action. 
Research on climate change perception and comprehension amongst the public within the United 
Kingdom has been undertaken for at least two decades using a myriad of different research 
techniques.  For quantitative questionnaire approaches, there is a regular government’s ‘BEIS Public 
Attitudes Tracker’ survey26, which are carried out by the Department for Business, Energy and 
Industrial Strategies every three months including questions about climate change being asked every 
March (BEIS, 2019). In addition, to these surveys, academic surveys have been conducted by Dessai 
and Sims (2010), Larcom, She and van Gevelt (2019), and Whitmarsh, Xenias and Jones (2019). Also, 
opinion pollsters have been conducting surveys about climate change as well, for example Ipsos MORI 
and YouGov. An extensive array of studies that have been undertaken to gather the public’s 
perception and comprehension on climate change within the United Kingdom are listed in Appendix 
A. 
The most researched country in relation to public perception of climate change is the United States, 
with a number of qualitative (Rohling et al., 2016; Whitmarsh, Xenias and Jones, 2019) and 
quantitative studies (Dunlap, McCright and Yarosh, 2016; Bohr, 2017; Ballew et al., 2019; Ballew et al., 




26 - Previously known as the ‘Public Attitudes Tracker: Energy and Climate Change’ before August 2018 
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3.1.1. Awareness of Climate Change 
Extensive research has been undertaken both within the United Kingdom and internationally, which 
demonstrates that there is widespread awareness of climate change (Norton and Leaman, 2004; 
Pelham, 2009). However, this awareness of climate change is unequally distributed internationally, 
with people from Europe, Japan and North America being the most likely to be aware of climate 
change and Japan being the most aware at 98.9 per cent (Lee et al., 2015). The United Kingdom 
respondents were overall the fifth most aware (97.4 per cent).  
 
3.1.2. Comprehension of the Cause of Climate Change 
There is acceptance amongst the British that climate change is occurring, a recent study indicating 
that 94 per cent say climate change is occurring (BEIS, 2019), with the majority of these believing it is 
due to anthropogenic activity (BEIS, 2019); this finding is similar to past studies, but to varying extents 
(Poortinga et al., 2011; Poortinga, Aoyagi and Pidgeon, 2013). Overall, using the BEIS survey for the 
2010s, the lowest point in the acceptance of climate change was in March 2013 at 92 per cent; whilst, 
the highest point was in March 2016 at 96 per cent (BEIS, 2019). 
One of the issues for society is the complexity of climate change; as a consequence, research has 
demonstrated that the public can confuse climate change with other environmental risks. The most 
common commingle is in relation to ozone depletion and how that can cause climate change. It is 
worth noting that there is a small relationship between depletion of the ozone and climate, but it 
should have a negative impact on temperatures (DEFRA, No Date). Within the United Kingdom, it was 
found that 19.9 per cent of respondents to surveys believed that the depletion of the ozone layer was 
causing climate change (Whitmarsh, 2009), with similar results been observed by Poortinga, Pidgeon 
and Lorenzoni (2006). In addition, Whitmarsh (2009) found that 25.3 per cent of respondents consider 
ozone depletion to be a cause of global warming; this compares to 13.7 per cent who indicated it to 
be due to climate change. However, these figures are down from those of DEFRA (2002), which show 
70 per cent of English respondents believed that ozone depletion is a cause of climate change. 
This is not an interpretation that is confined to the United Kingdom, with past studies finding a similar 
confusion internationally, including in the United States, Canada, Japan, Brazil, Indonesia and 
Singapore,  amongst civil society (Bostrom et al., 1994; Dunlap, 1998; Brechin, 2003; Hargreaves, Lewis 
and Speers, 2003; Leiserowitz, 2006; Lorenzoni and Pidgeon, 2006; Gifford and Comeau, 2011; Ahsan 
and Brandt, 2015) and amongst students (Boyes and Stanisstreet, 1994; Rye, Rubba and Wiesenmayer, 
1997; Österlind, 2005; Chang and Pascua, 2016). Research suggests that this confusion originates from 
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both climate change and ozone pollution being an atmospheric environmental issue (Read et al., 1994; 
Hargreaves, Lewis and Speers, 2003). 
 
3.1.3. Concern about Climate Change 
In the last thirty years, climate change has become an increasing concern within civil society. Within 
the latest Eurobarometer that focused on climate change in 2019, 75 per cent of the British ranked 
climate change as a very serious problem, which is 13 per cent greater compared to 2017. When 
compared to the European Union in general, the United Kingdom is ranked below average, which is 
79 per cent (Eurobarometer, 2019a). Despite this, the public’s concern of climate change in relation 
to health, security and social issues is increasing, but is still behind immigration at the European Union 
level (Eurobarometer, 2019b). 
Further to this Brechin (2010) demonstrates that 52 per cent of the public believed that global 
warming is a ‘less serious’ problem, with 45 per cent saying it was a ‘very serious’ problem. This 
demonstrates that marginally more people believed climate change is a serious issue. These figures 
compare to the United States, which shows that 50 per cent of the public believe that global warming 
is a ‘less serious’ problem; and 47 per cent it was ‘very serious’ problem. This demonstrates that 
previously, there was more concern about climate change within the United States compared to the 
United Kingdom. 
 
3.1.4. Scepticism of Anthropogenic Climate Change 
There are some who are sceptical whether the current climate change is caused by anthropogenic 
activities (Bostrom et al., 1994; Gelbspan, 1998; Fortner et al., 2000; Anderegg et al., 2010). Section 
3.3 provides further details about what drives scepticism about anthropogenic climate change. BEIS 
(2019) found that between 2014 and 2019, the proportion of the public who believe the climate 
change is caused by natural processes has declined, from 13 per cent to seven per cent. In addition, it 
was found that in the 2019 study, only two per cent of the respondents did not believe there was 
change in the current climate; and three per cent did not know. This contrasts to the United States 
where the proportion of respondents that do not believe in [or do not know about] anthropogenic 
climate change is 41 per cent (Leiserowitz et al., 2019a); which equates to a difference of 29 per cent 
between the two nations. In addition, 12 per cent of American’s do not believe that climate change is 
occurring (Leiserowitz et al., 2019a), which is a 10 per cent difference. This demonstrates that the 
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United Kingdom is much less sceptical about anthropogenic climate change compared to other 
western countries. 
It was also found within the BEIS (2019b) that the proportion of 16 to 24 year olds that believed in 
anthropogenic activity causing climate change is 61 per cent, which compares to the population 
average of 48 per cent. 
As explored in Section 3.3 and 3.5, the scepticism being observed within both the United Kingdom and 
United States is likely to be a result of the media presentation of climate change. In addition to this, 
climate change can be viewed as a slow-onset disaster, as people are not able to see the visual changes 
to climate and environment around them from one day to the next, as it takes years, if not decades 
for the changes to be felt. 
 
3.1.5. Environmental Taxation 
Environmental taxation has two distinctive aims; firstly it is to raise revenue which is raised to fund 
‘greener’ infrastructure (EEA, 2000). The second is as a way to influence the behaviour of civil society 
and businesses to protect the environment (McEldowney and Salter, 2015). 
Environmental taxation has occurred within the United Kingdom since 1993 with the introduction of 
the ‘road fuel escalator’; since then, there has been plenty of legislation that has aimed to influence 
behaviour in society to become more environmentally friendly. However, it is argued that these are 
regressive taxes (Leicester, 2006). This means, that the poorest in society, who generally already emit 
less than more affluent counterparts, are being taxed a greater proportion of their income. As a 
consequence, as observed in the United Kingdom and France, these measures have resulted in mass 
protests due to the rising costs outstripping wage increases (BBC, 2000a; Elliot and White, 2000; 
Tapiero, Robinson and Smith-Spark, 2018; Douenne and Fabre, 2020). This is presumed to also 
influence public comprehension about the criticality of climate change. 
 
3.1.6. Overview 
The findings within this section suggest that there is a difference between society’s perception and 
comprehension of climate change compared to that of climate scientists. These differences could be 
due to varying factors, some of which have been introduced. These relationships are explored further 
in chapter five of this thesis, as findings resulting from methodologies in line with the application of 
inter-disciplinary research involving public perception of a set issue. 
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3.2. Factors Influencing Perception about Climate Change 
It is believed that perceptions of climate change are easily influenced (Li, Johnson and Zaval, 2011). 
The following sub-sections will explore potential factors that the literature has highlighted previously 
might be influencing climate change perception. 
 
3.2.1. World View 
The term world view comes from the German word ‘Weltanschauug’, which is translated as either 
‘worldview’ or ‘world outlook’ (Marshall, Griffioen and Mouw, 1989).  Ibrahim and Kahn (1987, p. 164) 
refer to “beliefs, values and assumptions, derived from the socialization process in a specific cultural 
context”. This highlights that beliefs are subjected to the process and interactions that an individual 
has with people and the environment around them. This is why Kraft (2008) highlights that worldviews 
can be changed but rarely replaced, as the worldviews are viewed as the fundamental core beliefs of 
individual processes.  
The following three sub-sections will explore different world view factors that might affect an 
individual’s perception and/or comprehension of climate change. 
 
3.2.1.1. Political Identity 
The most politically divided country in terms of perception of environmental issues, including climate 
change, is the United States, but this has not always been the case. Until the 1980s; the left and right 
leaning voters had similar perception levels (Guber, 2013). However, most research has found that 
left-wing voters are more likely to believe anthropogenic climate change compared to right-wing 
voters (Leiserowitz, 2006; McCright and Dunlap, 2011; Whitmarsh, 2011; Unsworth and Fielding, 
2014; Milfont et al., 2015; Poortinga et al., 2019; Ballew et al., 2020). Ballew et al. (2020) highlights 
that this political differences between left and right wing voters in belief of climate change within the 
United States increases with higher levels of education and/or income. However, it has been found 
that the United Kingdom and Europe as a whole is much less divided compared to the United States 
(Poortinga et al., 2019). 
Research has shown that within western countries, as individuals become older, the more 
conservative they become, in both nature and politically (Cornelis et al., 2009); and as demonstrated 
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political identification has regularly been noted as a cause for the divide in beliefs about climate 
change. 
Traditionally, within the United Kingdom, the Labour party is a left or centre-left wing party; whereas, 
the Conservative party are centre-right to right wing. However, the 2019 General Election has 
observed that traditionally Labour voting areas changed to Conservative, which was in part due to lack 
of implementation of Brexit (Sabbagh, 2019). This change in voting is making it more difficult to define 
who are the left-wing or right-wing voters. Research will be needed to see if these changes of alliance 
actually have changed the proportion of left and right wing voters that either support or reject the 
importance of anthropogenic climate change. 
 
3.2.1.2. Gender 
During the 1960s and 1970s, there was no clear evidence that there was a relationship between 
gender and environmental concerns, including climate change (Van Liere and Dunlap, 1980; McCright, 
2010). However, since the 1980s there has been a growing body of literature, which is increasingly 
suggesting that women are more concerned about the environment and therefore exercise a greater 
level of pro-environmental values and attitudes than their male counterparts (Greenbaum, 1995; Bord 
and O’Connor, 1997; Zelezny, Chua and Aldrich, 2000; Dietz, Kalof and Stern, 2002; McCright, 2010; 
Xiao and McCright, 2012; McCright and Xiao, 2014; McCright and Xiao, 2015). However, some research 
shows that in rare cases, men have been found to be more environmentally concerned than their 
female counterparts, such as in China (Xiao and Hong, 2010). Further, in a study by Chan, Pong and 
Tam (2019) it was found that the environmental concern varies depending on gender inequality.  
One of the main theories that have been brought forward for this difference in beliefs is ‘gender 
socialisation theory’. This theory argues that boys and girls are taught from an early age the 
differences in values and expectations between the genders in their societies culture (Wharton, 2009; 
Xiao and McCright, 2015). For example, in the western world, boys are taught about behaviour in a 
masculine way, which means that men are expected to show leadership and be independent, with 
traits of courage, assertiveness, physical strength and being unemotional (Franklin, 1984). In contrast, 
girls are taught about and how to behaviour in a feminine way, which means that females are expected 
to show sensitivity (Windsor, 2015), warmth (Burke and Stets, 2009), empathy (Vetterling-Braggin, 
1982), and being emotional and understanding (Kite, 2001). 
However, the expectation of masculinity and femininity are evolving with changing attitudes amongst 
civil society of the United Kingdom and other western nations (Anderson, 2009a; Anderson and 
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McCormack, 2015). For example, this change can be demonstrated with the raise of metrosexual 
males and more recently the spornosexual males within both Generation Y and Generation Z 
(Wolfman, 2017). Both types of men demonstrate a more liberal attribute, which is outgoing 
emotionally, inclusive and non-judging (Trubo, 2003; Adams, 2011). 
In addition, it is likely that gender socialisation theory is having an impact on the level of knowledge 
that females have on climate change. Research has found that females in Western countries are more 
likely to have misconceptions about climate change compared to their male counterparts (Ballew et 
al., 2018). Research has shown that females are less likely to study sciences and mathematics where 
this is a choice for higher level study, including at college and university (Delaney and Devereux, 2019); 
this is despite them scoring similar levels to male counterparts in school (O’Dea et al., 2018). There 
are several potential explanations for this. Firstly, gender socialisation theory highlights that 
traditionally, hard science is perceived by school students to be masculine (Kelly, 1985). Another is 
possibly the lack of role models in STEM subjects for girls to inspire (Cheryan et al., 2011). A final 
potential reason is the females tend to underestimate their ability in STEM subjects and their 
likelihood to succeed within these types of subjects (Meece et al., 1982; Sax, 1994; Correll, 2001; 
Ehriliner and Dunning, 2003; Moakler and Kim, 2014). 
Overall, the attitudes of masculinity and femininely are changing amongst today’s youth. 
 
3.2.1.3. Youth 
As previously stated in section 1.2, the terms “youth”, “adolescent” and “young person” are often 
interchanged. This leads to the debate whether the term ‘youth’ or ‘adolescent’ is more appropriate 
within the context of this thesis. Ostensibly, the two terms are identical, with the definition of ‘youth’, 
within a western context, being the stage of human life between childhood and adulthood (Kehily, 
2007). The definition of ‘adolescence’ is the transitional period of a human’s life between late 
childhood and the beginning of adulthood (Choudhury, Blakemore and Charman, 2006; Andersen and 
Vandehey, 2011). However, psychology researchers go further and state that the term also 
incorporates the social, mental and physical changes that virtually all humans undergo (Roche et al., 
2004; Eaton et al., 2006; Ernst, Pine and Hardin, 2006). As a consequence, adolescence deals with the 
biological and psychological aspects of a young person of a certain age, whilst, youth is a socially 
constructed term. When exploring young people’s relationship with climate change, these two terms 
should not be mutually excluded from each other, since during the adolescent period, young people’s 
cognitive development is an ongoing process (Paus, 2005). 
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There are two types of brain development during adolescence. The first is in the regions of the brain 
that are important for the regulation of emotion, behaviour and the perception, whilst the second is 
in those linked to the evaluation of both risks and rewards (Steinberg, 2005). For example, it is 
estimated that within the United States, seventy-one per cent of all adolescence deaths each year are 
due to car accidents, other unintentional injuries, homicide, and suicide (Eaton et al., 2006). This is 
relevant to climate change perception, as highlighted within section 1.2 of this thesis, since young 
people may have this invincibility feeling, that the worst of the effects “won’t-happen-to-me”. 
The other type of youth brain development flagged here is the still developing area of analytical skills 
and the relationship of this to world views (Vollerbeg, Iedmea and Raaijmakers, 2001). As a 
consequence, young people start to ask questions about the world around them, rather than 
accepting the beliefs of ‘adults’ (Lerner, Lerner and Finkelstein, 2001), and start developing their own 
unique beliefs through their interactions with different social and cultural environments (Lerner, 
Lerner and Finklestein, 2001). As such, it is important to provide this age group with new ideas, 
opinions and ways of understanding to allow them to engage with societal issues and ultimately to 
help address them. 
 
3.2.2. Weather 
On the 26th February 2015, the Senator for Oklahoma, James Inhofe, the new Chairman of the Senate 
Committee on Environment and Public Works, threw a snowball across the United States Senate to 
illustrate his point that climate change is a fraud (Fisher, Waggle and Jasny, 2015; Bohr, 2017). This 
was at a time when in the United States when a polar vortex was bringing historical cold temperatures 
to the eastern side of the country (Fritz, 2015). He is not the only politician to present the relationship 
between extreme cold and climate change as a hoax, the others being Donald Trump (Cheung, 2020) 
and Stuart Agnew MEP (Agnew, 2015).  Also, the media have tried to make the link to be wrong in the 
past, including the Daily Mail (Daily Mail, 2009).  
Researchers have suggested that civil society constructs many of their beliefs in real time depending 
on local and national events (Radvansky and Zacks, 2011), which is arguably to affect people’s 
perception on climate change. 
A number of researchers have made the relationship between the levels of perception and resulting 
concern about climate change and local temperatures (Lorenzoni and Pidgeon, 2006; Joireman, 
Truelove and Duell, 2010; Li, Johnson and Zaval, 2011; Akerlof et al., 2013; Howe et al., 2013). This has 
been demonstrated with studies proving that civil society are more likely to believe that climate 
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change is occurring when local temperatures are warming beyond the normal (Krosnick et al., 2006; 
Egan and Mullian, 2010; Li, Johnson and Zaval, 2011). Some researchers and commentators were 
starting to make the link between the decline of concern for climate change both within the United 
States and Europe during the late 2000s and early 2010s as being in part due to the extremely cold 
and snowy conditions during the winter months, as this goes against perception and imagery of global 
warming (Perkins, 2010; Moser and Dilling, 2011; Capstick and Pidgeon, 2014). As a result, Knight 
(2012) has argued that these extreme weather events in part caused the COP15 in December 2009 at 
Copenhagen, Denmark, to collapse27. 
 
3.2.3. Uncertainty 
Every individual faces a great deal of uncertainty in their everyday activities. For example, driving a 
car has a degree of uncertainty over the risk of been involved in a car crash, but the vast majority of 
society accepts this risk; as the level of risk is very low to any one individual albeit high for society as 
a whole, as meted out by car crash statistics. 
Whilst there is near certainty amongst the majority of the scientist that climate change is due to 
anthropogenic activity; there is a degree of uncertainty of its severity and the risk that climate change 
poses to the public and future generations. 
It has been highlighted by Marshall (2014) that policy makers and campaigners on both sides 
acknowledge that the climate change uncertainty is important for understanding certainty and 
uncertainty related actions. As highlighted within article 3.3 of the founding principles of the UNFCCC, 
the “lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing … measures” in 
combating the adverse climatic effects of climate change (UNFCCC, 1992, p.4). 
To increase transparency about the uncertainty of climate science to both the public and policy 
makers, the 5th IPCC Assessment Report in 2013 introduced a likelihood scale, which was brought in 
to demonstrate the level of probability of claims being made. The likelihood scale is demonstrated in 
Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1 – The Likelihood Scale used within the 5th IPCC Assessment Reports 
 
 
27 - It should be noted that ‘climategate’ occurred during the negotiation of the Copenhagen Climate Conference 
and this might have played just as important role in the collapse of this discussion. See section 3.3.3.2 for further 
information about the ‘climategate’ controversy. 
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Term Likelihood of the Outcome 
Virtually Certain 99-100% Probability 
Very Likely 90-100% Probability 
Likely 66-100% Probability 
About as Likely as Not 33-66% Probability 
Unlikely 0-33% Probability 
Very Unlikely 0-10% Probability 
Exceptionally Unlikely 0-1% Probability 
Source: Mastrandrea et al. (2010, p.3) 
 
3.2.4. Mistrust 
As highlighted in Johnson (1999), when an individual has a higher degree of trust in an institution or a 
group, then the individual views the estimates of risk and therefore the hazard policies to be more 
creditable and acceptable. Unlike many other risks, including health, the risks attributed to climate 
change cannot be avoided through individual action, but through collective action. Typically, in this 
type of circumstance, many within civil society want the government to impose different types of 
regulations and legislation to make people act collectively within a collective nature (Darier and 
Schule, 1999). O’Riordan and Rayner (1991, p.98) highlight that the overall concept of public trust is 
that it: 
“…operates through the cultural and political norms and institutions that frame a person’s 
and a culture’s relationship with everything else, including nature. These management 
systems function because people expect them to function properly. They do not need to 
know what others are doing. They simply have to feel confident that others are acting with 
the same sense that the system will work in such a way to improve social well-being. That 
system could be a government, or a non-governmental organization, or a network of 
presumed similar behaviours” 
There have been numerous previous studies that suggest that many members of the public have a 
degree of mistrust in the science and the risks involved with climate change, especially if the messages 
are coming from scientists and policy makers (Lorenzoni and Pidgeon, 2006). However, this issue 
affects numerous different sciences from the safety of Genetically Modified (GM) foods and vaccines 
to Acquired Immune Deficiency syndrome [AIDs] to Darwin’s Evolution theory (Casiday, 2005; 
Lofstedt, 2011; Gauchat, 2012; Kahan, 2013; Westergaard et al., 2014). 
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Bråten, Strømsø and Salmerón (2011) ran an experiment with students to see how they rate the 
trustworthiness of difference sources of information when trying to communicate about climate 
change. It found that those with low background knowledge of climate change were more likely to 
trust and believe the least trustworthy sources, such as a report from an oil company and newspapers. 
It is arguable that potentially people with low knowledge of climate change reading two completely 
different opinions of climate change, could result in confusion and thus reducing the belief of climate 
change. 
“Climategate” was when emails were stolen and released which suggested British and American 
scientists had altered the research to make global warming seem worse (Leiserowitz et al., 2013). This 
was at a time when public understanding and acceptance of anthropogenic climate change had been 
increasing (Leiserowitz, Maibach and Roser-Renouf, 2010). The aftermath resulted in the opposite 
occurring (Maibach, Witte and Wilson, 2011). This is likely a demonstration of mistrust amongst the 
public about the science of climate change (Maibach, Witte and Wilson, 2011; Leiserowitz et al., 2013). 
One researcher described what Climategate did for the global warming controversy as being 
comparable to what the Pentagon Papers28 did for the Vietnam War 40 years ago: “It changed the 
narrative decisively” (Hayword, 2011, Online). However, Anderegg and Goldsmith (2014) have 
suggested that the impact of the “climategate” controversy was short-lived on climate change 
perception. 
Marris, Langford and O’Riordan (1996) undertook a survey to find which institutions do the public 
trust to tell them the truth about environmental risks. It was found that the government, companies 
and the media were least trusted. This is demonstrated in Figure 3.1 with indicates the lack of trust 
the public have with the government in terms of environmental issues. 
 
 
28 - The Pentagon Papers were a set of leaked reports from the Pentagon about the United States efforts before 
and during the Vietnam War. The fallout of these reports increased the anti-war feeling and which some believe 
lead to the United States withdrawing from the Vietnam War. 
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Figure 3.1 – The percentage of respondents who said that they often/always trust an institution to 
tell them the environmental risk (Source: Marris, Langford and O’Riordan, 1996, p.101) 
 
3.2.5. Climate Change Terminology 
The term “climate change” has its origins dating back to at least the 1920s (Willis, 1925). However, 
since the 1980s, the term ‘global warming’ has predominantly been used to describe the impacts of 
the increase greenhouse gas emissions, due to anthropogenic activity, and its effects on current and 
future climates (Whitmarsh, 2009). It has been highlighted by Houghton (2004) that the metaphor of 
“warming” has been effective in capturing the public attention to the issue. However, it does not 
demonstrate the complexities of the climate system and potential global risks that climate change is 
expected to trigger. 
The two terms have different technical definitions. The term ‘global warming’ only refers to the 
increase in global surface temperatures (Jacobs et al., 2016). Whereas, the term ‘climate change’ does 
not just refer to the increase of temperatures both at a local and global scale, but also describes the 
changes in climatological features and/or processes due to these temperature changes, including the 
prevalence of extreme climatic conditions (Meehl et al., 2000). For example, the alteration of spatial 
distribution of precipitation globally (Trenberth, 1998; Sorribas et al., 2016); the distribution and 
frequency of droughts (Dai, 2013); and the location, frequency and intensity of tropical storms 
(Knutson et al., 2010). 
However, research being conducted by climate researchers has highlighted that civil society view 
these two terms in completely different ways. Whitmarsh (2009) found that 79.8 per cent of the British 
civil society thought that global warming was an important issue compared to 66.6 per cent for the 
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case of climate change. This seems to suggest that there is a difference in which individuals within the 
British civil society cognitively frame each issue. This study is now 11 years old and with increased 
usage of climate change, it is possible that these differences might not be as large or even statistically 
exist now. 
These are not the only two terms that have been used regularly to describe climate change. The term 
‘climate emergency’ has been increasing in frequency within the last couple of years. This is 
demonstrated as the term was declared the word of the year in 2019 by Oxford Dictionaries (Zhou, 
2019), as they said that the usage of the word increased by a hundred fold compared to the previous 
twelve months. 
 
3.3. Climate Scepticism 
Climate sceptics are defined as people who express doubt about either the cause and/or credibility of 
scientific climate change consensus (Anderegg et al., 2010), whereas, a climate change denier is 
somebody who dismisses the scientific consensus of climate change (Anderegg et al., 2010; Powell, 
2012). This is despite a report by Alexander et al. (2013) demonstrating that the majority of the 
warming in the last century is due to anthropogenic activity. It should be noted that sceptics or deniers 
of science are not a new phenomenon and there has been plenty of research on this previously 
(Björnberg et al., 2017). The term ‘climate scepticism’ first emerged in 1995, which was attributed to 
journalist Ross Gelbspan who authored the first book on the topic (Painter and Ashe, 2012). 
Mann (2012) suggests that there are “the stages of denial” within the climate change realm, as follows: 
1. Carbon Dioxide and other greenhouse gases are not increasing 
2. Increasing levels of greenhouse gases have no impact on climate as there is no conclusive 
evidence that temperatures are warming 
3. If warming is occurring, it has natural origins (for example the Milankovitch Cycle and El Niño) 
4. If warming cannot be explained one hundred per cent by natural causes, then anthropogenic 
causes are small and the impact of greenhouse gases are minimal 
5. Even if the current and future human effects are not small on the climate, the changes to the 
climate will be beneficial to humans and our environment 
6. Even if the changes in climate are not beneficial, human are adaptable to change; and besides 
it is too late to make any major changes and a technological fix will come along 
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3.3.1. The Heartland Institute 
To demonstrate how there are some sceptic groups being used to disseminate misinformation about 
climate change, this sub-section will explore the work of The Heartland Institute. 
The Heartland Institute is a public policy think tank based in the United States, which has conservative 
and libertarian ideologies (Heartland Institute, 2016). The Heartland Institute was a small regional 
think tank in the 1990s, which has emerged to become one of the global leading climate change 
deniers within the last fifteen years (Hoggan and Littlemore, 2009; Dunlap and McCright, 2010). 
The Heartland Institute is not just against recognising the problem of climate change, but also other 
important proven societal issues such as smoking. For example, they published a report by Bast and 
Sherman (2006) which said that fatality rates of smoking are exaggerated and called second-hand 
smoking illness as junk science. 
In 2009, the Heartland Institute produced a series of ‘pseudoscience’ reports under the banner of the 
“Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change” [NIPCC]. The purpose of these reports was 
to offer the counter argument of the IPCC reports, which were published two years previously. The 
author of the one study by NASA which is cited within the report, Yogesh Sud, stated that the NIPCC 
“totally misinterpreted my paper” (Tollefson, 2011, p.441). Whilst it cannot be fully certain whether 
the group deliberately misinterpreted this study within the report, Michael Mann of Pennsylvania 
State stated that the report “is nothing but a mix of myths, half-truths, cherry-picked distortions, and 
regurgitated climate-change-denial talking points” (Tollefson, 2011, p.441). 
However, this raises questions as to why The Heartland Institute is so against recognising climate 
change and motivated to attacking those that are concerned about it. It is relevant then to note that 
the Heartland Institute receives the majority of its funding from the Charles G Koch Charitable 
Foundation, which is a foundation set up by a billionaire American coal tycoon (O’Brien and O’Keefe, 
2013). In addition, they receive additional funding from organisations such as the American Petroleum 
Institute, Chrysler Foundation, ExxonMobil and General Motors Foundation (Dunlap and McCright, 
2010; UCSUSA, 2013). Each of these organisations has an invested interest in the fossil fuel industry, 
which is vigorously opposed to the theory of anthropogenic climate change; as it is a threat to their 
industry and these are the largest producers of carbon emissions (Taylor and Watts, 2019). 
 The Heartland Instituted is not the only group/think tank that is actively promoting climate 
scepticisms. Others include, but are not limited to, the Global Warming Policy Foundation, and 
Institute of Economic Affairs (Lawrence, Pegg and Evans, 2019); and the Marshall Institute (Oreskes, 
Conway and Shindell, 2008; Dunlap and McCright, 2010). 
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These institutions tend to use information on natural processes to explain away any changes in the 
environment, whilst some try to discredit climate science through generating controversies. The 
following sub-sections will explore the use of this type of information in further detail. 
 
3.3.2. Natural Processes 
Sceptics have previously used natural processes as the explanation for the recent changes in the 
climate. This section will explore how these processes have affected the climate previously. 
1. El Niño and La Niña – The definition of this process has changed over time. However, El Niño 
can be defined as the cycle of warm ENSO in the South Eastern Pacific, which usually occurs 
during the Southern Hemisphere summer months (Trenberth, 1997). The most famous 
example of El Niño affecting global temperatures occurred in 1998. Global temperatures in 
1998 were 0.2oC above the trend line (Hansen et al., 2006), which was not matched until 2015. 
This resulted in some climate sceptics/deniers to say that climate change was not occurring, 
or at the rate that scientists were predicting, due to a pause in warming. However, research 
has demonstrated that there is a potential for El Niño to intensify due to climate change. 
 
2. Milankovich Cycle – The Milankovich Cycles describes the change in the obit of the Earth and 
how this impacts on the Earth’s climate system (Holden, 2008a). Some climate sceptics have 
highlighted that the climate has changed in the past, using the example of the Ice Age. It 
cannot be argued that the Milankovich Cycle, or more specially the eccentricity cycle, has had 
negative and positive changes in global temperatures, and therefore levels of ice on the planet 
(Hays, Imbrie and Shackleton, 1976; Abe-Ouchi et al., 2013). However, the changes that the 
cycles bring to the Earth’s climate happen over thousands of years, not over a hundred years. 
In addition, the Earth should be coming to the end of an inter-glacial period, if natural cycles 
were the dominant factor (Renwick, 2019). 
 
3. Solar Sunspots and Solar Activity – Past research has suggested that solar activity has 
previously had an effect on global temperatures. For example, Spörer Minimum between 
1460 and 1550; and the Maunder Minimum between 1645 and 1715 were periods in history 
where low solar history correlated with low global temperatures (Shindell et al., 2001; 
Lockwood et al., 2010; Lockwood et al., 2017). A similar solar minimum to that of the mid to 
late 1600s today, would result in a global temperature drop of 0.3oC (Feulner and Rahmstorf, 
2010). This would only slightly offset the temperature increase that has already occurred. 
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4. Volcanic Eruptions – In the past, society has observed that explosive eruptions can have a 
cooling effect on global temperature. An example of how volcanic eruptions can affect global 
temperatures occurred with the 1815 Mount Tambora eruption29 in Indonesia, which led to a 
few severe climate abnormalities lasting for several years. The following year, 1816, become 
known as the “Year without a summer” (Stommel and Stommel, 1979). An example of why it 
got its name is demonstrated in that there was snowfall within New York State during July 
(Stothers, 1984). It is estimated that the average global temperature decreased by between 
0.4oC and 0.7oC, with the largest decline experienced in North America and Europe (Klingaman 
and Klingaman, 2013). This demonstrates how a highly explosive volcanic eruption can have 
consequences on the global climate for the following few years. Similar cooling events were 
experienced in the aftermath of the 1783 Laki eruption (Sigurdsson, 1982), the 1883 Krakatoa 
eruption (Bradley, 1988) and the 1991 Mount Pinatubo eruption (Ward, 2009). 
 
3.3.3. Climate Change Controversies 
Groups, such as The Heartland Institute have meant that climate change has remained one of the most 
controversial issues for the current population and which is already, or is going to, affect every society 
on the planet. Whilst it is accepted as fact amongst most climate scientists (Cook et al., 2013), it is still 
a highly debated issue amongst society, as demonstrated in section 2.2 of this thesis. There have been 
some controversial events that have occurred in the last twenty years, which have been used to fuel 
this doubt amongst the public. The following sub-sections will highlight three of these controversial 
events. These are the ‘Warming Pause’, ‘Climategate’, the ‘Hockey Stick Model’ and ‘Mistakes in the 
IPCC reports’. 
 
3.3.3.1. Warming Pause 
Between 1998 and 2013, it was observed that global temperatures had not exceeded the 1998 
temperature (Schiermeier, 2013). This led numerous climate sceptics such as Monckton (2015) to 
state that it demonstrates that global temperatures are not warming, and therefore proving that 
anthropogenic climate change is false. It should be noted that climate change and/or global warming 
 
 
29 - The Mount Tambora eruption occurred between the 5th and 17th April 1815, with a Volcanic Explosively 
Index of 7 out 8, and index number which was the largest since the eruption of Mount Rinjani in 1257 and not 
been matched since. 
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does not mean that every year is going to be warmer than the previous. This is because there are a 
number of different natural processes that have impacts on the climate change, with the vast majority 
only impacting on the global climate in the short term. Since 2013, the previous five years were all 
warmer than 1998 (Vinas Garcia, 2020), which further demonstrated that global temperatures in 1998 
were abnormally high. 
 
3.3.3.2. Climategate 
The “Climate Research Unit email controversy”, commonly known by both academic community and 
the media as “Climategate” (Chameides, 2010; Pearce, 2010a; Leiserowitz et al., 2013), was the 
hacking and theft of emails from the Climate Research Unit based at the University of East Anglia by 
an external hacker in November 2009 (Revkin, 2009). The selection of stolen emails was published on 
the internet (Chameides, 2010). 
Climate sceptics and right-wing media believed and promoted that the climategate emails were proof 
that the current climate change is false. Some proclaimed that there was a conspiracy to exaggerate 
temperature warming data and delete any data that suggested anthropogenic climate change was not 
happening. This is demonstrated from a Daily Mail headline in November 2011, which stated 
“Climategate scientists DID collude with government officials to hide research that didn’t fit their 
apocalyptic global warming” (Waugh, 2011, Online). 
Meanwhile climate scientists believed that the leak was timed to coincide with the 15th Conference of 
the Parties Conference in Copenhagen, to undermine the negotiations, as it was leaked two weeks 
before the start of the negotiations. In addition, it has been attributed by some that Climategate was 
one of the causes for the collapse of the negotiations, and the whole conference was labelled by a 
German journalist as a “political disaster” (Traufetter, 2010).   
In the aftermath, there were at least eight separate inquiries held within both the United Kingdom 
and the United States by the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee [STC]; the 
Independent Climate Change Email Review; Department of Commerce; National Science Foundation; 
the United States Environment Protection Agency; and two by Pennsylvania State University (Russell 
et al., 2010; Willis et al., 2010; CBC News, 2011; Ward, 2011). The aims of the investigation were to 
examine the allegations of falsified scientific data and potentially misleading the public. In all the 
inquiries, it was found that within all cases, the climate scientists did not mislead the public (Russell 
et al., 2010) with falsifying data (Foley, Scaroni and Yekel, 2010; Zinser, 2011). In addition, it was 
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highlighted by the United Kingdom’s Science and Technology Committee that their “actions were in 
line with common practice in the climate science community” (Willis et al., 2010, p.3). 
Ward (2011) believed that this was demonstrated, as the coverage of findings from the following 
inquiries was muted in comparison. This could be viewed as one example of how some sectors of the 
media are not giving equal reporting of the climate change issue; further review of the media’s 
reporting of the issue of climate change is explored later within this chapter. 
However, despite near exonerations of the scientists, a consequence was a decline in the public belief 
and concerns about climate change in forthcoming years. Further information about the impact that 
this event had are available in Section 3.2.4 of this thesis. 
 
3.3.3.3. Hockey Stick Model 
Mann, Bradley and Hughes (1999) produced a chart of the average global surface temperatures for 
the Northern Hemisphere over the last 1,000 years, as demonstrated in Figure 3.2. The chart 
demonstrates that the current temperature is warmer than any point over the last 1,000 years, with 
a sharp experiential increase during the last 200 years. As highlighted in Section 2.1, this happens to 
coincide with the increased levels of carbon dioxide within the atmosphere due to anthropogenic 
activity, which was instigated by the Industrial Revolution. This model was completed using climate 
proxy records and instrumental temperature records. This model built upon work with climate 
reconstruction of the Northern Hemisphere for the last 500 years (Mann, Bradley and Hughes, 1998). 
However, a report by McIntyre and McKitrick (2003) criticises the hockey stick model, as they highlight 
that it is based upon a flawed methodology. They state that the model had “collation errors, 
unjustifiable truncation or extrapolation of source data, obsolete data, geographical location errors, 
incorrect calculation of principal components and other quality control defects” (McIntyre and 
McKitrick, 2003, p.751). These claims were due to the lack of temperature change demonstrated from 
either the Medieval Warm Period30 or the Little Ice Age31. However, these claims were refuted by Wahl 
 
 
30 - The Medieval Warm Period, later to become known as the Medieval Climatic Anomaly, occurred between 
c.950 to c.1250. It is a period of history where temperatures changed in the North Atlantic region, which is 
where most of the population lived at the time. The reason for a lack of temperature increases on the Hockey 
Stick Model and other temperature reconstructions are due to the temperature decline in other regions, such 
as the Tropical Pacific (Mann et al., 2009). 
 
31 - The Little Ice Age refers to the period between the 16th and 19th century (Mann, 2002), but sometime is 
defined as between 1300 and 1850 (Miller et al., 2012). This is a period in history where there were colder 
than average weather conditions within the Northern Hemisphere (Lamb, 1995). 
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and Ammann (2007), who highlight that whilst there might be a slight difference in the first part of 
the model, the general trend is correct. Due to this criticism, its inclusion within the 3rd IPCC report 
was highly controversial (de Freitas, 2002), as there was plenty of debate amongst the academic 
community about the true validly of the Hockey Stick Model. 
 
Figure 3.2 – Northern Hemisphere temperature anomaly (oC) between 1000 and 2000 (Mann, 
Bradley and Hughes, 1999) 
In recent years, further reconstructions have been undertaken by different climate scientists. Most of 
these reconstructions demonstrate the same sharp increase in global temperatures starting in the last 
20th century (Kaufman et al., 2009; Marcott et al., 2013), therefore consistent with the Hockey Stick 
Model. 
 
3.3.3.4. IPCC Mistakes 
Within the 4th IPCC report, Cruz et al. (2007, p.493) stated that the “glaciers in the Himalaya are 
receding faster than in any other part of the world … the likelihood of them disappearing by the year 
2035 and perhaps sooner is very high if the Earth keeps warming at the current rate”. The board of 
the IPCC later admitted that this was an incorrect statement. It was found that this claim was based 
upon three reports that were not peer-reviewed, which led to the debate as to whether grey literature 
should be appearing in these types of reports (Pearce, 2010b). 
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This has resulted in climate sceptics, such as Laframboise (2011) to state that the IPCC reports cannot 
be trusted due to these types of errors. However, FOEI (2010) defended these reports by stating that 
only one mistake in over 3,000 pages of climate change reporting does not mean that all the research 
should be discredited. 
 
3.4. Education 
Bangay and Blum (2010) highlight that education is vital in combating climate change and should not 
be forgotten. In addition, it is highlighted by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organisation [UNESCO] (2009) that education should help people to understand the changing climate 
and how best to mitigate against and adapt to the changing climate. 
In 1992, all countries that were members of the United Nations (UN), including the United Kingdom, 
signed the UNFCCC agreement. Within this agreement, Article 6 is devoted to ‘Education, Training and 
Public Awareness’ of climate change. Further to this, Article 10e of the Kyoto Protocol, states the 
following: 
“Cooperate in and promote at the international level, and, where appropriate, using 
existing bodies, the development and implementation of education and training 
programmes, including the strengthening of national capacity building, in particular 
human and institutional capacities and the exchange or secondment of personnel to train 
experts in this field, in particular for developing countries, and facilitate at the national 
level public awareness of, and public access to information on, climate change” 
United Nations (UN), 1998, p. 10 
As demonstrated within the Kyoto Protocol, the United Nations highlights the need for education and 
training programs towards the public in order to help develop their understanding of the climate 
change issue, which builds the national capacity. This demonstrates that the UN believes that 
education has a critical part to play in the development of a climate change narrative. This belief in 
the role of education is supported by social scientists (Cherry, 2011; Sharma, 2012). One study by 
Cherry (2011) highlighted that young people have a tendency to communicate their studies to their 
parents, thus increasing the transfer of knowledge. Similar results have been found by Mochizuki and 
Bryan (2015). 
A report by Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment highlights that 
“there can be no justification for omitting climate change from the National Curriculum, 
and the education of pupils would be deficient if they did not receive teaching about it … 
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if core climate change teaching is not included as compulsory learning … there is a risk that 
some students would not acquire essential basic knowledge about climate change. As the 
UK Youth Climate Coalition points out, “climate change is too important to be left to 
individual teacher choice” 
Hicks, Ward and Lester (2013, pp.3-5) 
 
3.4.1. Climate Change Education within the United Kingdom 
Within the United Kingdom, some form of formal education is compulsory until the age of 18. 
However, from the age 14, the students have the ability to drop some subjects that they are not 
interested in, one of which is geography, which is where most of the climate change education occurs 
within the British education curriculum (George, 2017). In the school year 2015-16, 41 percent of 15 
and 16 years undertook General Certificate of Secondary Education [GCSE] Geography (Carroll and 
Gill, 2017). This demonstrates that most students are not receiving extensive knowledge about climate 
change. However, it should be noted that elements of climate change education are still available 
post-14, be it assiduous to carbon dioxide and methane increases and the uncertainties of the impact 
this has on climate change (DfE, 2014a; George, 2017). Basic education may, for example, present 
these as the most concentrated and potent greenhouse gases in the atmosphere respectively, but 
neglect to go into the details as to how they are not the only greenhouse gases that contribute to 
climate change. 
The education of climate change is important in trying to combat it, as students and other young 
people become informed about the sources, impacts and different strategies to both mitigate and 
adapt. The hope is that they start to adopt more environmentally friendly behaviour (UNESCO, No 
Date). 
A number of countries and regions globally, such as Brazil, China, Denmark, Singapore, South Africa, 
South Korea and Vietnam, have adopted climate change in the national curriculum in recent years 
(Han, 2015; Læssøe and Mochizuki, 2015; Sung, 2015; Trajber and Mochizuki, 2015; Chang and Pascua, 
2017). However, despite this progress, other countries, such as New Zealand, are still teaching limited 
amount of climate change, if any at all (Eames, 2017). 
In the United Kingdom, climate change first appeared on the national curriculum in 1995; it has 
featured regularly despite rumours in the majority of major national newspapers that it was under 
threat of been taken off the curriculum in 2013 (DfE, 2013a; Coughlan, 2017). 
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Within the current geography curriculum, climate change is taught at different levels. Within Key Stage 
332 the national curriculum states that students should be taught about key processes within physical 
geography, such as “weather and climate, including the change in climate from the Ice Age to the 
present; and glaciation” and “understand how human and physical processes interact to influence, 
and change landscapes, environments and the climate; and how human activity relies on effective 
functioning of natural systems” (DfE, 2013b, p.2). This demonstrates that students should be given 
the basic fundamentals of climate change as they start secondary school within England. Within the 
Key Stage 433 curriculum, whilst there is education of climate change, it is very limited and is very 
similar to the Key Stage 3 with only one brief mention, which states: 
“Changing weather and climate – The causes, consequences of and responses to extreme 
weather conditions and natural weather hazards, recognising their changing distribution 
in time and space and drawing on an understanding of the global circulation of the 
atmosphere. The spatial and temporal characteristics, of climatic change and evidence 
for different causes, including human activity, from the beginning of the Quaternary 
period (2.6 million years ago) to the present day.” 
DfE (2014b, p.6) 
This demonstrates that the amount of climate change education within the national curriculum is very 
limited. Further, the inclusion of climate change on the national curriculum within the United Kingdom 
has not been without controversy. During the mid-2000s, the United Kingdom government started to 
increase the amount of climate change included within the national curriculum. This is demonstrated 
when the government announced that the academic year 2006/07 would be the “Sustainable Schools 
Year of Action”, with the underlying aims to promote sustainable development and other 
environmental concerns, for example climate change (DfES, 2006). This led to all schools within 
England, Scotland and Wales being given a free copy of Al Gore’s ‘An Inconvenient Truth’. In addition, 
the government announced guidance notes and resources about how climate change fits within the 
national curriculum alongside the Al Gore documentary (WalesOnline, 2007). However, in May 2007, 
a court case was brought by Stewart Dimmock, who took legal action against the Secretary of State 
for Education and Skills, in an effort to stop Al Gore’s ‘An Inconvenient Truth’ being shown in schools. 
It should be noted that Stewart Dimmock, had ‘backing’ from Viscount Monckton (Leake, 2007), who 
is a prominent climate change sceptic. The court ruled that the film "is substantially founded upon 
scientific research and fact, albeit that the science is used, in the hands of a talented politician and 
 
 
32 - Key Stage 3 within the United Kingdom is usually for children between the ages of 11 and 14 
 
33 - Key Stage 4 within the United Kingdom is usually for children between the ages of 14 and 16 
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communicator, to make a political statement and to support a political programme." (Dimmock vs. 
Secretary of State for Education and Skills, 2007, Online). Therefore, he ruled that an amendment is 
needed to the notes to highlight that there are alternative points of views and that teachers need to 
highlight the nine mistakes within the film. 
Currently, most teaching is done by conventional methods, such as movie and students listening to a 
teacher. The problems of these methods are they are prone to students losing attention throughout 
the lesson, which leads to the question as to how much of the information they obtain, let alone 
personalise and act upon? 
 
3.4.2. Attention Rates of Students 
There is a growing body of research on how student’s attention within classes declines throughout a 
lesson (Davis and Buskist, 2002; Bradbury, 2016). However, there are slightly conflicting results as to 
when, and the length of time, it takes for students to lose concentration. Sousa (2006) suggests that 
the unmotivated students will start to lose focus within the first ten to twenty minutes of a lesson. 
This finding is backed up by similar observations of Davies (1993), Benjamin (2002) and Wankat (2002). 
However, other research has found that that there are cycles in concentration of students’ lapse 
(Johnstone and Percival, 1976; Bunce et al., 2010). For example, Johnstone and Percival (1976) state 
that lapses in student’s attention tend to last between two and four minutes, as students settle into 
the lecture, and then between ten and eighteen later. In addition, they found that by the end of lesson, 
the average lapses of attention by the students were occurring every three to four minutes. 
Despite these differences in opinion amongst researchers, one thing that can be agreed upon by nearly 
all researchers is that the attention rate in the class declines throughout the class; with attention lapse 
becoming more frequent and longitudinal. Therefore, methods are needed to try and keep the 
student’s attention rate throughout the period. 
One suggestion by Sousa (2006) is that classes should be split up into segments of between 15 and 20 
minutes; as a method of keeping the students’ attention throughout the lesson. Other suggestions are 
that alternative features should be used within lessons to keep the attention of the students (Brunce 
et al., 2010). Later in this thesis a method that was implemented as a part of this new research was 
implemented to examine not only attention but also test a fuller engagement with the issue being 
taught. 
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3.4.3. Experiential Learning and Risk Perception 
The basic definition of experiential learning is the process of learning from experience. This is done by 
reflecting on the doing (Felicia, 2011). Sometimes, the process is termed “experiential education”, but 
this involves a broader philosophical approach to education, whereas experiential learning considers 
the learning process for each individual (Breunig, 2009). 
The concept of Experiential Learning was first developed in the early 20th Century by John Dewey. 
Dewey (1933) suggested that humans are active and problem-solving species that continuously 
develop intelligence and capacity through the use of reflection of experience. This process is 
demonstrated in Figure 3.3. 
 
Figure 3.3 – Dewey’s Model of Experiential Learning (Kolb, 1984, p.23) 
This work was built further by Kurt Lewin in 1951, who developed a model which highlights that there 
are four distinctive stages, which is demonstrated within Figure 3.4. This model is particularly useful 
during the aftermath of climate related events, when deciding how to better adapt in the future, as 
there is emphasis on how observation and reflection develop. 
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Figure 3.4 – The Lewinian Experiential Learning Model (Kolb, 1984) 
When exploring climate change perception in relation to risk perception, it is highlighted that direct 
experience can change an individual’s evaluation of environmental threats, especially climate change 
(Slovic, Fischhoff and Lichtenstein, 1981). It is arguable that this is one of the fundamental barriers to 
climate change action, as most of the public have not experienced extreme meteorological events. 
This is especially true, as climate change refers to a long-term period, not just one short-term impact, 
for example, the heatwave that impacted the United Kingdom in 2019. However, reaction to these 
events raises the discussion about the rating of the issue amongst civil society. 
The many risks around us, including those associated with climate change, are generally under-
estimated amongst the civil society (Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, 1982). However, risks that are 
more locally felt tend to be of greater importance compared to those of global risk (Hinchliffe, 1996). 
This means that an individual’s experience is fundamentally more important in perceiving the 
existence of a risk compared to second-hand information (Demski et al., 2017). As a result, it can 
potentially lead to greater engagement with climate change actions (Lorenzoni and Pidgeon, 2006; 
Weber, 2010; Reser, Bradley and Ellul, 2014; McDonald, Chai and Newell, 2015). This is because these 
individuals have a greater understanding of the impacts associated with the risk of climate change 
(Bickerstaff and Walker, 2001; Spence, Poortinga and Pidgeon, 2012; Smith and Joffe, 2013). In 
addition, Myers et al. (2013) found that within the United States, experimental learning about climate 
change mainly occurs amongst people that are less engaged in the climate change issue. This is 
because individuals are more likely to trust their own senses. This direct perception has been observed 












of concepts in 
new situations
104 | P a g e  
 
the media and is known to have negative impacts on human health (Heidbreder et al., 2019). Likewise, 
research has demonstrated that people find that climate change is a creditable explanation for 
observed changes in the weather compared to what they experienced during their youth (Kempton, 
1997). 
Therefore, experiential learning is important to truly understand climate change, but many will either 
not directly experience climate change or not make the connection. Consequently, it is critical that the 
media can portray climate change in a way that is factual and accessible to the general public. 
Renewed discussion about climate change within the United Kingdom in 2019 and 2020 due to the 
media’s coverage of the Extinction Rebellion protests in London and the Australian Bushfires may have 
an influence going forward. What may or may not influence these actions undertaken by civil society 
is also a part of the exploratory research of this thesis. 
 
3.5. Media 
Mass media is defined as the production and diffusion of messages to the population (Chandler and 
Munday, 2011). Today, this is undertaken in a number of different ways including newspapers, 
television, movies and social media. 
The Eurobarometer (2007) undertook a survey throughout the European Union to determine what 
news related issues the public were interested in, with a maximum of three answers available. It was 
found that scientific research, such as on climate change, was ranked the fifth most popular out of the 
eight at 31 per cent. In addition, it was found that within the United Kingdom, this number is lower at 
29 per cent; see Appendix Q for the full figures. This demonstrates that only just over a quarter of the 
population are interested to find out the latest scientific research, albeit this varies between 13 per 
cent in Czech Republic and 56 per cent in Sweden. 
The following section critically explores the link between media and climate change. 
 
3.5.1. Media Coverage of Climate Change 
Studies have found that most of the population’s understanding of science and climate change is via 
the media (Wilson, 1995; Wilson, 2000; Carvalho and Burgess, 2005). Therefore, media coverage 
greatly influences public opinion on climate change (Anderson, 2009b; Antilla, 2010). This means the 
media are important in the role of “constructing” the issue of climate change to the public (Hannigan, 
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1995). Nelkin (1995) states that good media coverage on the issue could engage and empower the 
public with the climate change issue, whilst the opposite can happen with poor media coverage.  
As highlighted by Beck (1995, p.65) “no mass media information, [results in] no consciousness of risk”. 
Research by Nelkin (1995, p.71) found that news articles on the existing risks “can lead to dramatic 
changes in behaviour”. This demonstrates that by the media highlighting the risks that climate change 
is currently creating, the public are more likely to engage with climate change and undergo a 
behavioural change. 
It has been observed by Boykoff et al. (2019) that the amount of attention that the media gives to 
climate change fluctuates. This is highlighted by Boykoff and Roberts (2007) who demonstrated that 
during 2005 and 2006, there were two spikes in the amount of climate change coverage within the 
UK’s media. These spikes occurred in June/July 2005 and September to November 2006, which is 
demonstrated in Figure 3.5. The first spike contributed to the Group of Eight (G8) summit held in 
Glenegales, Scotland. The summit had a partial focus on climate change, but came under scrutiny by 
the media about the need to fly in so many people to talk about climate change. The media highlighted 
that flying this large number of people to the G8 summit would substantially contribute towards 
climate change. The other spike in media attention between September and November 2006 was a 
combination of four major events. These four major events are: 
1. Al Gore’s ‘An Inconvenient Truth’ which was released within the United Kingdom during 
September 
2. Richard Branson’s donation of £1.8 billion to biofuel research and renewable energy initiatives 
3. The ‘Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change’, which was ordered by the then Prime 
Minister, Gordon Brown, and was released on 30th October 
4. On November 4th, the ‘Stop Climate Chaos’ group held a rally in London’s Trafalgar Square. 
This event was held in correlation with the Twelfth Conference of Parties (COP12) meeting 
held in Nairobi, Kenya. 
This fluctuation in the media coverage on issues, such as climate change, can cause fluctuations in 
concern amongst the public (Mazur and Lee, 1993). 
The shift of news towards online and cable television has created myriad news coverage. However, 
this is leading to what Feldman et al. (2014) describes as “echo chambers”. Jamieson and Cappella 
(2008) describe echo chambers as occurring when individuals only expose themselves to opinions that 
fit their personal beliefs, which can include climate change (Dunlap, 2013). Stroud (2011) found that 
this leads to a polarization of attitudes amongst the public towards scientific issues, such as climate 
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change. Experts have warned that blogs could be or are becoming concentrated echo chambers, in 
which people are exposing themselves to beliefs that they already hold (Sunstein, 2006). 
  
Figure 3.5 – The amount of newspaper coverage of climate change between 2003 and 2006 
(Boykoff, 2007, p.473) 
This sub-section has broadly focused on how climate change is consumed through the media at an 
international level within Western Societal context. The following sub-section will increasingly focus 
on the British media in general and how they have reported on climate change. 
 
3.5.2. The British Media 
Within the United Kingdom, the sales of newspapers have been in decline since the 1950s (Thompson, 
1990). The average daily circulations of newspapers have declined from 38.4 million in 1965 to 32.6 
million in 1985. However, it sharply declined to 22.7 million in 2007 (Franklin, 2008). Table 3.2, 
demonstrates the average daily circulation of each newspaper compared to their online viewership. 
It can be observed that for the majority of the newspapers, the online daily viewership is significantly 
higher than average daily newspaper circulations. However, it should be noted that online daily 
viewing figures also include people from outside the United Kingdom; this is especially true for the 
Daily Mail which has an Australian and United States version. 
Tabloid journalism has less depth in reporting with an increase of representation of issues that are 
simplistic and sensationalist; with a greater focus on entertainment and sports than political and 
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environmental issues (Djupsund and Carlson, 1998). Table 3.3 presents examples within the United 
Kingdom tabloid media of headlines that have been used in recent years to discuss climate change. 
Table 3.2 – Average Daily Circulations of Newspaper and Online Viewership within the United 
Kingdom during March 2016 




Type of Newspaper 
The Sun 1,739,206 2,255,172 Tabloid 
Daily Mail 1,576,121 14,390,593 “Middle-Market” 
Tabloid 
Metro 1,346,414 1,194,511 Freesheet 
Evening 
Standard 
891,746 498,764 Freesheet 
Daily Mirror 784,122 4,455,426 Tabloid 
Daily Star 485,652 706,253 Tabloid 
Daily Telegraph 481,525 4,172,345 Quality Press 
The Times 420,570 N/A Quality Press 
Daily Express 415,022 1,218,492 “Middle-Market” 
Tabloid 
I 270,182 N/A Quality Press 
Financial Times 202,836 N/A Quality Press 
Daily Record 173,061 N/A Tabloid 
The Guardian 164,630 8,821,223 Quality Press 
City A.M. 96,124 N/A Freesheet 
The Independent 54,984 3,082,936 Quality Press 
Source: Ponsford, 2016a; Ponsford, 2016b 
In February 2017, the Daily Mail ran a story about how climate change data was manipulated in the 
run up to the Paris COP in 2015 (Rose 2017). However, this article was referred to the Independent 
Press Standards Organisation, where it was found that the Daily Mail/Mail on Sunday had broken 
Article 1 (accuracy) of the Editors Code of Practice. It was highlighted that it was inaccurate and was 
misleading the public. This article, along with strong and emotive language, such as “Exposed”, “Killer” 
and “Monster”, demonstrated that the tabloid newspapers are misrepresenting climate change with 
sensationalised stories to sell newspapers. However, it highlights the questions: Do people who read 
tabloid newspapers have a negative impact on the wider world’s awareness and actions on climate 
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change?  If so, do tabloid newspaper readers believe that climate change should be reported less in 
the media? 
Boykoff (2008) found that tabloid newspapers within the United Kingdom tend to report on climate 
change through extreme climatic events, for example flooding, and movements of political actors, 
whereas there have been very few stories with the focus on climate change science and the risks 
associated with climate change. 
Table 3.3 – Example of Climate Change Headlines within British Tabloid Newspapers 
Title Newspaper Reference 
GLOBAL COOLING: Decade long ice age predicted as sun 
‘hibernates 
Daily Express Austin (2015) 
‘Global warming the greatest scam in history’ claims founder of 
Weather Channel 
Daily Express Taylor (2015) 
What Global Warming? USA temperatures DOWN as 
climatologists claim 2015 was hottest year 
Daily Express Austin (2016) 
Greta Thunberg outrage: BBC viewers furious as it announces 
activist series – ‘Not paying’ 
Daily Express Day (2020) 
Climate change targets ‘will add £500 to family’s fuel bill within 
four years’ 
Daily Mail Groves 
(2011) 
The fatcat ecocrats exposed: Web of ‘green’ politicians, tycoons 
and power brokers who help each other benefit from billion 
raised on your bills 
Daily Mail Rose (2013a) 
Stunning new data indicates El Nino drove record highs in global 
temperatures suggesting rise may not be down to man-made 
emissions 
Daily Mail Rose (2016) 
More monster wind farms are set to loom over Britain Coast but 
power will cost 40% less than Hinkley 
Daily Mail Poulter 
(2017) 
Exposed: How world leaders were duped into investing billions 
over manipulated global warming data 
Daily Mail Rose (2017) 
Plummeting temperatures could send the world into a ‘mini ice 
age’ in 2030 and could OVERRIDE global warming, claim 
mathematicians 
Daily Mail Weston 
(2017) 
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Monster tsunami warning for UK as climate change raises risk of 
giant deep sea landslide 
Daily Star Havis (2016) 
Climate change warning: Killer winter storms for next THIRTY 
years 
Daily Star Young (2013) 
 
However, in a survey undertaken by Ofcom (2004), it was found that two in three people believe that 
television news provides the most unbiased and fair news reporting. Examining how the public are 
consuming news within the United Kingdom, a study carried out by Whitmarsh (2009) highlights that 
the public within the United Kingdom are mostly likely to gain their scientific knowledge through mass 
media, in particular Television (91.5 per cent) and Newspapers (85.1 per cent). It was also highlighted 
that the public are less likely to use journals (18.7 per cent), libraries (7.1 per cent) and the internet 
(13.2 per cent). A similar trend was observed in MORI (2005). However, there is likely to be a change 
in these figures. With the drastic increase in usage of the internet in recent years, it is increasingly 
likely that the internet will have a far higher proportion. This includes mass engagement with social 
media. The following sub-section will explore social media and how it tends to report climate change. 
 
3.5.3. Social Media 
Generally, social media is a broad category of media which allows social interaction between groups 
of people (Chandler and Munday, 2011). Using this definition it can be argued that traditional media 
can be viewed as social, as it always has provoked discussion amongst people. But, Obar and Wildman 
(2015) argue that social media is typically viewed as the interaction between individuals using web 2.0 
internet. This includes smartphone communication, for example WhatsApp and Viber. 
Today, there is a multitudinous use of social media websites. Increasingly, social media is becoming a 
source of news consumption. As highlighted in Table 3.4 at least a quarter of the population within 
the United Kingdom use social media to consume news. This increases to at least 41 percent in the 
under 35s. As demonstrated, the social media website Facebook is the most used for the consumption 
of the news. Most major news outlets within the United Kingdom have both a Facebook and Twitter 
page, which provide updates throughout the day of the latest news. 
Table 3.4 – Social Media News Consumption within the United Kingdom 
Rank Social Media % All % U35s 
1 Facebook 28 41 
2 Twitter 12 20 
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3 YouTube 7 11 
4 WhatsApp 3 5 
5 LinkedIn 2 3 
Source: Newman et al. (2016) 
In the last five years, traditional media have gradually moved to social media to inform the public 
about different news stories. There are three ways in which this is done. The first is to give the headline 
and a link to take them to news articles on their own website, as demonstrated in Figure 3.6. The 
second is when there is a video attached to the message, as demonstrated in Figure 3.7. The last, is 
usually reserved for when important news is breaking. Then the news organisation just writes what is 
happening, as demonstrated in Figure 3.8. 
One of main reasons why social media has become increasingly popular is that it provides instant 
news; and during breaking news situations it can be faster than traditional news. Social media gives 
ordinary members of the public a chance to become journalists in these situations. For example, in 
the aftermath of the 2017 Manchester Arena Bombings, information and pictures were shared around 
Twitter, with many news organisations using this information whilst they tried to get to the scene. 
 
Figure 3.6 – An example of linked news stories on Twitter (Sky News, 2017a) 
However, it should be noted that whilst social media has become an important source for news in 
recent years, its reliability is becoming of increased focus. This increased focus is due to the alleged 
attacks in the 2016 United States Presidential elections using social media to spread fake news (Allcott 
and Gentzkow, 2017; Langin, 2018). The following section examines what is meant by the term “fake 
news”, the impacts and what it might mean for climate change. 




Figure 3.7 – An example of news on Twitter with a video attachment (Sky News, 2017b) 
 
Figure 3.8 – An example of breaking news format on Twitter (Sky News, 2017c) 
 
3.5.4. “Fake News” 
Fake news is defined by Lazer et al. (2018, p.1094) as “fabricated information that mimics news media 
content in form but not in organizational process or intent”. These fake news outlets do not have 
standard processes in place to ensuring the creditability and accuracy of news stories (Lazer et al., 
2018). 
On Twitter, most fake news stories originate from Twitter Bots. A Twitter Bot is a type of web robot 
software that controls a Twitter account, and repeatedly tweets fake news using a number. The ability 
to tell the difference between fake tweets from a Twitter Bot and a real tweet can vary, depending on 
how well set an account is. Research conducted by Langin (2018) has demonstrated that fake news 
tweets on Twitter can travel six times quicker than truthful news tweets. In addition, it found that the 
spread of these fake news tweets can travel further as well. It was also discovered that when removing 
the ‘bots’ from these figures, it makes no difference to the speed of fake news tweets compared to 
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the truthful news tweets. This demonstrates how destructive social media can be to real information 
about climate change. 
Similar to fake news is the process of disinformation dissemination. Disinformation is known as the 
conscious spread of distorted information with the sole purpose to circumvent civil society (Pacepa 
and Rychlak, 2013). The term originates from the Russian word “dezinformatsiya”, which was deviated 
from a Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (KGB) propaganda department set up by the Soviet 
Leader, Joseph Stalin, in the 1920s (Pacepa and Rychlak, 2012). The Great Soviet Encyclopaedia in 
1952 defined disinformation as the spreading of “false information with the intention to deceive public 
opinion” (Bittman, 1985, p.49-50).  
As definitions of these two terms highlight, they are very similar to the fake news of today. It could be 
argued that fake news is virtually the same as both disinformation and misinformation; but is more in 
line with misinformation. This view can however be highlighted as secondary disinformation processes 
for misleading the general public as the majority of this is done today within the Twitter Bots. 
 
3.5.5. Celebrity Culture – “Celebritization of Climate Change” 
As pointed out by Driessens (2013), in recent years there are increasing celebrity influences in society 
and culture. Through the help of media, both traditional and modern media, celebrities have become 
public figures that become ‘intimate strangers’ (Schickel, 2000). 
The rapid increase of celebrity culture has led academic authors to discuss the importance in identity 
formation (Redmond, 2014) and social cohesion among fans (Marshall, 2010). In recent years, there is 
a growing awareness among the public about climate change, whereby celebrities have increasingly 
become a community that are influencing the discourse and actions people may take (Boykoff and 
Goodman, 2009). Cooper (2008) states this is because celebrities have influence in framing global 
issues that attract attention, creating new channels of communication. This is demonstrated by actor 
Leonardo DiCaprio, during his famous Oscars win in 2016, in which he dedicates his victory speech to 
highlight the plight of climate change as is demonstrated in the quote below. This was hugely 
important as it brought climate change to the attention of the world’s media. Some examples of this 
are demonstrated in Table 3.5, though in the reporting of stories about celebrities and climate change, 
echo chambers still exist. This is demonstrated within the Fox News headline that tried to point out 
that he is championing the issue but is not undertaking action himself. 
“Climate Change is real, it is happening right now. It is the most urgent threat facing our 
entire species, and we need to work collectively together and stop procrastinating. We 
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need to support leaders around the world who do not speak for the big polluters, but who 
speak for all humanity, for the indigenous people of the world, for the billions and billions 
of underprivileged people out there who would be most affected by this. For our children’s 
children, and for those people out there whose voices have been drowned out by the 
politics of greed. … Let us not take this planet for granted” 
Leonardo DiCaprio 
Oscars Awards, 2016 
Table 3.5 – Examples of Leonardo DiCaprio Oscar Climate Change Headlines 
Headline Newspaper Country Author 
Leo’s Oscar’s lecture: DiCaprio uses his long-
overdue award for Best Actor to deliver homily 
on the dangers of global warming 
Daily Mail United 
Kingdom 
Dodge (2016) 
Leonardo DiCaprio preaches environmental 
responsibility, but does he practice it? 




Leonardo DiCaprio Wins First Oscar, Says 






Leonardo DiCaprio tackles climate change in 
Oscars acceptance speech, doesn’t mention 





Leonardo DiCaprio ties his work in “The 








Oscar 2016: Leonardo DiCaprio FINALLY won an 




How Leonardo DiCaprio became one of the 
world’s top climate change champions 




Oscars 2016: Kevin Rudd congratulates 
Leonardo DiCaprio for climate change speech 
The Sydney 
Morning Herald 
Australia Bourke (2016) 
Leonardo DiCaprio uses Oscars speech to 
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During the 2019 Extinction Rebellion protests34, some celebrities expressed their support for the 
protests, including Mel C, Bob Geldof, Sir Mark Rylance and Ray Winstone (Extinction Rebellion, 2019). 
In addition, celebrities and politicians joined the protests, including Jonathan Bartley, Caroline Lucas, 
Greta Thunburg, and Emma Thompson. Currently, there is no research on the trust of and the impact 
that celebrities have on the communication of climate change. The following section explores the 
background of environmental and climate activism overall and within the United Kingdom. 
 
3.6. Environmental and Climate Activism 
Ockwell et al. (2009) states that climate activism is an effective approach to achieve action on reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions, as governments are not willing to act without the pressure of the voting 
public and individual conservation/action will not be enough to tackle the scale of the problem. It has 
been argued that the cap-and-trade system introduced within the United States in 2010 was an 
example climate activism in action (Skocpel, 2013). 
Roser-Renouf et al. (2014) developed a theoretical socio-cognitive model which aims to explain the 
political activism for climate change mitigation, as demonstrated in Figure 3.9. It demonstrates that 
there are two key stages; initially it explains climate change impact and then how an individual value’s 
something35. 
Climate activism has its roots embedded in environmental activism. The beginning of the 1990s was 
accompanied by the emergence of the first environment direct action groups within the United 
Kingdom (Bowers and Torrance, 2001; Doherty, Plows and Wall, 2007). The first group that formed 
was the UK Earth First!, which is a group that were founded in the late 1970s to the early 1980s. They 
are described as a radical environmental advocacy group (Jarboe, 2002). Earth First! has since 
expanded to nineteen countries36. 
It should be noted that the United Kingdom branch of Earth First! do not use anarchist tactics that the 
group within the United States have been using since 1990s. The reason for this difference was 
described by two of their founders as being due to “We knew EF! US's original hardline "rednecks for 
 
 
34 - See section 7.4 for further information about Extinction Rebellion 
 
35 - Also known as “world view” 
 
36 - The nineteen counties that Earth First! operate in are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, France, 
Germany, India, Italy, Mexico, the Netherlands, Nigeria, New Zealand, the Philippines, Poland, Republic of 
Ireland, Slovakia, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States 
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wilderness" attitude wouldn't appeal here, so we set out to build a group that combined radical action 
and social justice to protect Britain's few remaining natural places” (Bowers and Torrance, 2001, 
Online). 
 
Figure 3.9 - Theoretical social-cognitive model of political activism for climate change mitigation 
(Source: Roser-Renouf et al., 2014, p. 165) 
Until recently, the United Kingdom was known for its lack of social movements compared to its 
European counterparts (Rootes, 1992), but with a recent increase of protests surrounding the 
environmental issues, such as anti-road and fracking protests. Chris Rowe, who is the former head of 
Greenpeace, highlights in 1999 that within the United Kingdom, environmental activism was highly 
unusual. He stated that the biggest issue for Greenpeace in the United Kingdom is that: 
“the use of direct action throws up many conundra and questions and difficulties to people 
as to whether or not they think this is a legitimate thing to do, that …  becomes the issue 
sometimes instead of what it is they’re trying to campaign about ... (in) Germany … direct 
action, street theatre and street politics is seen as a completely legitimate form of political 
expression … whereas here (United Kingdom) it seems totally alien in this culture”. 
Dryzek et al. (2003, p.46) 
The most regular form of activism for climate change protesting within the United Kingdom is Earth 
Hour. This is an international event organised by the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF). The event 
encourages individuals, communities, companies and local governments to switch off non-essential 
lights for one hour; to highlight climate change and to be a symbol of solidary to the planet. The event 
has its origins to Sydney, Australia in 2007 and occurs between 19:30 and 20:30 on the last Saturday 
of March; with the exception of when it clashes with Holy Saturday (Earth Hour, No Date). In 2017, it 
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is estimated that 187 countries and territories observed Earth Hour (WWF, 2017). It was estimated by 
Olexsak and Meier (2014) that between 2007 and 2012, the electricity consumption within ten 
countries drops on average by four percent. But this varies, with New Zealand increasing its 
consumption by two percent and Canada decreasing its electricity consumption by 27 percent.  
However, since 2018, the United Kingdom has seen the raise of activism in relation to climate change, 
with ‘Extinction Rebellion’ and the ‘School Strike for Climate Change’. Further research that examines 
public attitudes to these two groups activities are presented in Chapter 7 of this thesis. However, it is 
already apparent that both groups employ nonviolence protests to demonstrate their feeling towards 
climate change and get the attention of the media, politicians and civil society in general. The term 
“nonviolence” is difficult to define, with Johansen (2007) highlighting that it is used variously in 
different contexts. The most common method that these two groups have used is civil disobedience 
which broadly fits with the following list of attributes.  
1. A violation of a law or generally accepted norm 
2. It is done without the use of violence 
3. It is done in full openness 
4. It is done with a serious commitment 
Johansen (2007, p. 150) 
 
3.7. Youth Engagement 
Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole and Whitmarsh (2007) refer to engaged people in this context as those who 
evaluate and respond to climate change through behavioural, cognitive and emotional engagement. 
As demonstrated in Section 3.2.1, within civil society, the level of engagement differs depending on 
different social groups, including across gender and political identification. 
Stern (2000) highlights that there are four types of environmentally significant behaviour: 
1. Environmental Activism 
2. Non-activist Behaviours in the Public Sphere 
3. Private-Sphere Environmentalism 
4. Other Environmentally Significant Behaviours 
In terms of youth engagement within the sustainable development context, it has been acknowledged 
by the United Nations General Assembly (2012, p.9) that there is great importance in young people’s 
engagement, as indicated with the following statement: 
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“We stress the importance of the active participation of young people in decision making 
processes as the issues we are addressing have a deep impact on present and future 
generations, and as the contribution of children and youth is vital to the achievement of 
sustainable development. We also recognize the need to promote intergenerational 
dialogue and solidarity by recognizing their views” 
It should be noted that the young are key stakeholders for climate change as they will face increasing 
risks due the effects of climate change in the future. Therefore, it is important that the youth are given 
the resources, knowledge and skills to further increase their adaptive capacity towards climatic threats 
(El Ansari and Stibbe, 2009; Nisbet, 2009). In addition, it has been reported by Olsen (2009) that 
climate change will have an impact on the job market in the future. Renner, Sweeney and Kubit (2008) 
highlights that there are four future ways that the job market will change within the future. Firstly, 
there will be a creation of new jobs, for example the manufacturing of pollution-control devices. 
Secondary, the replacement of jobs, for example the transition of working from landfill sites towards 
recycling plants. Thirdly, the elimination of some jobs. This has already been seen in the plastic bag 
industry after the five pence tax for every plastic bag in supermarkets. Lastly, this group will contain 
many workers and is an adaptive group, for example in engaging subtle changes in working practices. 
Consequently, some researchers in recent years have created models that conceptualise potential 
ways to engage young people with modern societal issues, such as climate change. One method was 
created by Fletcher and Vavrus (2006) who developed the ‘Cycle of Youth Engagement’, which is 
demonstrated within Figure 3.10. 
One of the main issues is trying to get young people to engage. Corner et al. (2015, p.530) highlighted 
that “young people do not necessarily see what they can do in response to climate change, and when 
perceived self-efficacy is limited, personal engagement with climate change is likely to be lower”. 
Therefore, by using climate activism, it encourages young people to challenge the power relationship 
that they have with other adults, and put pressure on the government to legislate practices and 
behaviours that mitigate against and adapt to climate change (O’Brien and Selboe, 2015). This practice 
has been observed in 2019, with the protests by both ‘Extinction Rebellion’ and ‘School Strikes for 
Climate’ which have led to changes to the 2008 Climate Change Act, resulting in more ambitious 
targets. 
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Figure 3.10 – Cycle of youth engagement (Adapted from Fletcher and Vavrus, 2006) 
 
3.8. Literature Review Summary 
It is demonstrated that the world’s climate change has increased by 1oC since the start of the Industrial 
Revolution. This change is caused predominately by the release of myriad greenhouse gas emissions 
through anthropogenic activity. Currently, it is impossible to tell how high the temperature will rise by 
the end of the century, but it is targeted under the Paris Agreement to try to limit temperature 
increases to 1.5oC; but under business as usual, temperatures will rise by around 4oC. To meet these 
targets, each government including the regional and national government have varying mitigation 
strategies and targets to help the international effort. 
However, without public support for legislation to mitigate climate change, little of the policy 
formulations will work. Whilst the majority of people are aware and concerned about climate change, 
there are others that have a miscomprehension on the causes of climate change, and a further few 
who are sceptical of climate change. The varying levels of perception are determined to be due to a 
number of factors, including an individual’s world view, recent weather, the uncertainty of climate 
change, mistrust in science or communication of climate change and the terminology that an 
individual receives and uses to describe the recent changes in the climate. Whilst there has been 
research on the role of world view factors undertaken within the United States, this has not been fully 
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Climate scepticism can be observed within both the United Kingdom and the United States. There are 
think-tanks, including The Heartland Institute, which promote climate scepticism and denial. One of 
the most popular ways of these think tanks and their accomplices is to confuse civil society’s 
understanding of climate change using arguments of ‘natural processes’ that have previously changed 
the climate. The methods have also been to try to undermine current science research through 
generating controversies, including ‘Climategate’. 
Two ways in which the public are taught about the science of climate change are through education 
and the media. The media and personal experiences can be viewed as supporting an informal 
education. Within the United Kingdom, formal education mostly limits the teaching of climate change 
to be within the geography subject area. The media is where the public gain most scientific 
information about current issues; it is therefore important for the scientific community to work with 
the media. Further, it is demonstrated that climate change reporting in tabloid newspapers are more 
likely to be unfavourable and can produce a negative emotive language against climate science and 
climate change mitigation. Also, the increasing myriad of media via satellite television or social media 
has resulted in the development of echo-chambers and fake news. Within this context it is important 
to acknowledge the increasing influences of celebrities in communicating climate change. All of the 
above raise questions as to how people within the United Kingdom are learning about and engaging 
with climate change. 
In 2019, there has been an increase in climate activism within the United Kingdom via ‘Extinction 
Rebellion’ and ‘School Strike for Climate’. However, environmental activism has been observed within 
the United Kingdom since the early 1990s. These groups in the most part use non-violent techniques, 
commonly akin to civil disobedience. However, as large-scale environmental activism until recently 
has been relatively uncommon within the United Kingdom, there is a need to understand why people 
within the United Kingdom are becoming increasingly supportive of these groups. 
Lastly, the grounding in this topic presented by this review is highly consistent with a view that it is 
increasingly critical for youth to have an active role in addressing climate emergency. It is likely that 
the current generation of youth will be the last generation to live before a significant worsening of 
climate change impacts that are already underway.  However, much more in depth analysis of the 
perception and engagement of the youth within wider society around the issues of climate change is 
needed to be able to understand the nature of these rapidly occurring processes of change. 
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3.9. Research Questions 
To address some of the key gaps in research to date as justified from this review chapter, a number of 
research questions have been identified as follows: 
• What influences perception of current and future adverse climate change impacts? 
o Are there certain demographic groups (such as Gender, Age, and Income) that are more likely 
to believe or reject climate change? 
o Are the public, particularly youth, influenced by different types of media (Printed, Television 
and Social) in terms of climate change? 
• In what way, and how important is education in engaging the youth in climate change action? 
• How do different factors influence the levels of engagement and disengagement towards adverse 
climate change impacts? 
• How do extreme climate events affect an individual’s views towards climate change during and in 
the immediate aftermath of the event? 
• Why do UK youth and other parts of society become supportive of environmental activism, and 
likely to continue to participate in environmental activism? 
 
3.10. Conceptual Framework 
The purpose of this section is to explore the more consolidated conceptual framework that underpins 
this thesis, and that has been developed with the influence of the literature presented. The conceptual 
framework sets out different stages in the relationships of how people are engaging with climate 
change.  
To clarify its role in this thesis, conceptual frameworks are used when a researcher wants to clarify, 
evaluate and integrate concepts, models and methodologies from previous research (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994; Robson, 2011). The conceptual framework is often derived from objectives in theory 
and is done prior to research being undertaken (Merriam and Simpson, 2000). The conceptual 
framework within this thesis, as shown in Figure 3.11, is a feedback loop which is demonstrating how 
perception, engagement with climate change and reaction and response to the risk of climate change 
are interlinked. 
Figure 3.11 demonstrates that there could be four main factors that influence the overall perception 
of climate change. The first factor is an individual’s world view. Existing research has demonstrated 
this trend. For example, individuals that are politically right-wing are less likely to believe in 
anthropogenic climate change compared to those who are left-wing voters (Krosnick et al., 2006; 
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Dietz, Dan and Shwom, 2007; Dunlap and McCright, 2008; McCright and Dunlap, 2011; Weber and 
Stern, 2011; Guber, 2013; Hamilton et al., 2015; McCright, Dunlap and Marquart-Pyatt, 2016; 
Leiserowitz et al., 2019b). World views that influence an individual’s climate change perception are 
relative to age (Reinhart, 2018; Ballew et al., 2019b); gender (McCright, 2010; van der Linden, 2015); 
levels of education (Hamilton, 2011; van der Linden, 2015); ethnicity (Benegal, 2018; Elias et al., 2019). 
In addition, some aspects of an individual’s worldview [especially political identification] can influence 
media representations via television, traditional news and social media. This allows individuals to 
consume news that conforms to their own belief systems, otherwise known as residing in an echo-
chamber (Walter, Brüggemann and Engesser, 2018). These echo-chambers are problematic, as they 
can lead individuals to “mistake the selected confirmative media content for public opinion” (Eilders 
and Porten-Cheé, 2016, p. 94). As a consequence, individuals can believe that “anthropogenic climate 
change is up for debate, when in fact outside of this echo chamber there is overwhelming evidence 
and scientific agreement about climate change” (Farrell, 2015, p. 720). 
It is suggested that an individual’s experience of extreme weather events can have a direct impact on 
the perception of climate change (Krosnick et al., 2006; Lorenzoni and Pidgeon, 2006; Li, Johnson and 
Zaval, 2011; Bergquist, Nilsson and Schultz, 2019). This creates a feedback loop within the conceptual 
framework, but, experience can also come in the form of experimental learning which can come from 
education. 
Education forms an important part of the perception of climate change, as it informs individuals about 
the basic sciences and risks that are associated with climate change. It has been raised as important 
enough for international organisations to have flagged this (UN 1992; UN, 1998; UNESCO, No Date). 
As climate change is a relevantly new concept, it has meant that a large proportion of the population 
[especially older] have not received any form of formal education about it. It is therefore important 
that non-formal education is enabling the scientific community to educate the public about the threats 
that climate change poses. 
All of these factors have implications for individual perceptions of climate change. As demonstrated 
within Figure 3.11, an individual perception of climate change could influence the nature of 
engagement and reaction and responses to risk that an individual demonstrates. In most cases, those 
who are very concerned about climate change (perception) are more likely to engage and respond. 
However, in some cases, there are individuals who express extreme levels of a perception, experience 
or education related to climate change. In these cases, there is the potential to have a feeling of 
hopelessness overwhelmed by the information been given to them, which can lead to a 
disengagement (O’Neill and Nicholson-Cole, 2009), as they feel that they cannot do anything and/or 
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it is too late. However, this thesis also considers that heightened experience, perception and 
education may have the effect of increasing actions on climate change. 
Climate policy has commonly been used globally, especially within the United Kingdom, as a method 
to tackle climate change, either through mitigation and/or adaptation. This is an influential method, 
as it forces the civil society and businesses to change their behaviour towards reducing future impacts 
through reducing carbon emissions or adapting to the changes that future climate change will 
produce. Some of the examples of legislation within the United Kingdom to mitigate against climate 
change include the Climate Change Levy under the Finance Act 2000, Climate Change and Sustainable 
Energy Act 2006, and fuel price escalator [between 1993 and 1999]. However, it is not a linear process 
at this policy level, and the public have previously protested the perceived lack of action to bring 
forward or revise legislation. For example, it is argued here that the Extinction Rebellion protests in 
the centre of London in April 2020, resulted in a revising of the 2050 target set by the Climate Change 
Act 2008 from 80 per cent to 100 per cent. 
Climate Hazard is the overall background influence that weather can have on the atmosphere. This 
directly feeds into the ‘magnitude and frequency of environmental change’, though is a function of 
risk dependent on human vulnerability and exposure factors, these terms are introduced in the 
glossary. The nature of human engagement within this process determines the intensity and extent of 
the disaster impact outcome. A low level of engagement from civil society and organisations would, 
in general, tend to suggest that less mitigation of climate change would be undertaken, which in turn 
will result in a greater warming of the Earth’s atmosphere and all the risks that entails. 
As such, ‘magnitude and frequency of environmental change’ combines with the ‘vulnerability and 
exposure’ to create the ‘intensity and extent of disaster impact outcomes’. Whilst increased intensity 
of the storms with increased exposure that civil society will experience leads to ‘Intensity and Extent 
of Disaster Impact Outcomes’ within this conceptual framework, adaptation measures reduce the 
extent of disaster outcomes upon civil society. 
The impacts of extreme climatic events will result in two different impacts. The first is fed back to the 
‘reaction and response to risk’. This is because the civic societies that have been impacted want 
something to be undertaken to improve adaptation to the impact of these climatic hazards. This has 
been institutionally undertaken in recent years within regions that have been impacted by flooding, 
with the building of flood barriers [as seen in York] or the dredging of the rivers [as seen in the 
Somerset Levels]. But the impacts will form as a part of experience, which highlight to those that have 
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been impacted the potential dangers and threats that climate change poses to themselves and their 
families, especially if the impact of climatic events are progressively becoming worse. 
Secondly, those who have, or are more likely to believe that climate change is occurring due to 
anthropogenic activity, might have higher levels of engagement, but not in every case due to various 
psychological factors, such as fatalistic attitudes. These people are more likely to undertake mitigation 
strategies, such as reduction in the usage of private transportation, and buying insulation for the 
home, which will in turn contributes to reducing the magnitude and frequency of environmental 
change. In addition, this engagement could have an impact on the levels of vulnerability an individual 
faces. This is known as adaptation, which is Engagement whereby an individual undertakes to prepare 
for the elevated risks that climate change poses, which feedbacks to ‘Intensity and Extent of Disaster 
Impact Outcomes’. Further societal reactions include pushing for greater advocacy in reducing climate 
change, including through non-violent direct action and civil disobedience, as returned to later in this 
thesis. 
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Figure 3.11 – Conceptual framework of climate change perception, engagement and response (Source: Author)
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Chapter Four - 
Methodology 
©Tom Reading (2014) 
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“We’re running the most dangerous experiment in history right now, which is to see how 
much carbon dioxide the atmosphere … can handle before there is an environmental 
catastrophe” 
Elon Musk in 2013) 
CEO of SpaceX and Tesla, Inc. 
Cite by Woodyard (2013, Online) 
 
This research uses an inductive approach based on data derived through mixed methods, which was 
undertaken between March 2017 and July 2019. The varying methods included the use of two sets of 
questionnaires, interviews, Yonmenkaigi System Method and the use of secondary data analysis 
throughout. The secondary data sources include academic journals, research reports and market-
based research. All data collected was analysed using statistical, observational and content analysis. 
Patterns observed are integrated and used to inform a theory of climate change perception, 
engagement and response amongst young people within the United Kingdom. 
Figure 4.1 demonstrates the methodological mapping of this thesis including the different types of 
data and when it was collected. It also demonstrates how the varying research data feeds into the 
different chapters. In addition, it demonstrates how recent and current events influenced this thesis. 
In April 2019, there was a mass protest by both ‘Extinction Rebellion’ and the ‘School Strike for 
Climate’ movements. Consequently, it became fundamental to this research to capture this potential 
change in attitudes towards climate change, especially amongst young people. The COVID-19 
pandemic also impacted during the latter part of this work and consideration of the learning for 
climate change perception, engagement and response during pandemic represents an emphasis of 
ongoing research drawing on this thesis. 




Figure 4.1 – Methodological map of this thesis (Source: Author)
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4.1. Research Philosophy 
Philosophy is defined by Teichman and Evans (1999, p.1) as “a study of problems which are ultimate, 
abstract and very general. The problems are concerned with the nature of existence, knowledge, 
morality, reason and human purpose”. The philosophical basis of this thesis is based on the 
examinations of climate change in terms of the nature of societal engagement with it; how knowledge 
of climate change is taken up and what is done with this information. 
Within social science, there are multiple research paradigms to choose from. These are broadly 
ontology [what do we believe?], epistemology [how do we know?], and axiology [what do we believe 
is true?] (Patton, 2002). This thesis examines the knowledge of climate change amongst British society; 
the thesis has used an epistemology defined by Scott (2015, Online) as the “philosophical theory of 
knowledge – of how we know what we know”. This highlights that epistemology is interlinked with 
depth of knowledge. It should be noted, as highlighted in Figure 4.2 in the form of an Euler diagram 
there is knowledge as truth, belief and justification. 
 
Figure 4.2 - Interlinkage between knowledge, truth, belief and justification (Source: Cline, 2019, 
Online) 
Therefore, the previous definition of epistemology can further expand so that its states “all 
researchers, indeed all lay actors too, have sets of epistemological beliefs (of which) these beliefs are 
debatable” (Castree, Kitchin and Rogers, 2013, p.136). This highlights that people obtain their beliefs 
from different sources, which results in differing opinions. Example of these differing beliefs within 
the climate change realm can be observed within the United States between Democratic and 
Republican voters. This is demonstrated in a study by Leiserowitz et al. (2018) showing that 78 per 
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cent of Democratic voters think global warming should be a high priority for the president and 
congress, compared to 25 per cent of Republican voters. 
It should be noted that epistemologically, there are contrasting types of approaches to relevant 
research in this field that can be undertaken; positivism, interpretivism, and pragmatism. The 
differences between these are demonstrated within Table 4.1. Within this thesis, pragmatism was 
predominant due to the need to draw from varied sources and perspectives to understand the 
multidisciplinary realm represented by climate related issues. As demonstrated within Table 4.1, 
pragmatism is a research paradigm that allows the use of mixed-methods; which “focuses instead on 
‘what works’ as the truth regarding the research questions under investigation” (Tashakkori and 
Teddlie 2003, p.713). 





Ontology Axiology Research 
Strategy 
Positivism Deductive Objective Value-free Quantitative 
Interpretivism Inductive Subjective Biased Qualitative 









Source: Wilson, 2010 
As highlighted within Table 4.1, pragmatism research can either be objective or subjective depending 
on the research project. Objective research is “an ethic of impartiality in which a person analyses or 
judges things without bringing their own values, preferences, or prejudices to bear” (Castree, Kitchin 
and Rogers, 2013, p.352). This means that research within the context of this thesis should try not 
being either pro-climate change or pro-climate denial and should be an even-handed approach to the 
research, which is not always the case, as constructivist researchers would argue that researchers 
cannot be objective as individuals will always interpret the world through an unconscious lens. 
Whereas subjective leaning research contrasts with more objective approaches37, there are with 
either pro-climate change or pro-climate denial arguments to be confronted throughout. 
Within this thesis, an objective approach has been attempted, but it is recognised that much of the 
subject is a critical and emotive realm such that writings on climate change perception, engagement 
and response may never be fully objective. This is because as the author has an invested interest, 
 
 
37 - Subjective research tends to rely on person opinion and judgment; whereas, objective research is based 
upon observation and measurements. 
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feelings and opinions might unwittingly influence. This research is therefore closest to the pragmatist 
position. The research technique can therefore either be biased or value-free. Value-free is described 
by McLean (2011, p.316) as “research that has been produced by a completely impartial and 
dispassionate researcher. The proposition is that if a researcher can conduct a study shorn of his or 
her own particular beliefs, values, prejudices and opinions, this impartiality will presumably be 
reflected in the end product of the research”. 
As a consequence of attempting to use an objective approach, this research has been personal value-
free as possible. The author has attempted to not be biased by their perception and emotions to the 
subject; but see Section 1.7, for further information about the author’s positionality. As highlighted in 
the previous paragraph, it can be debated whether any social science research can be value-free, and 
this is highlighted by McLean (2011). This is because human perception is influenced by all major social 
science issues that people have come into contact with. This is especially the case with controversial 
intra-society debated issues, such as climate change, as demonstrated within section 3.1. The issues 
concerned here could be viewed as heightened with varying types of social science researchers, where 
they have a vested interest with the topic. 
Traditionally, a pragmatism-based research approach can be viewed as the “philosophical partner” for 
a mixed methods approach (Denscombe, 2010, p. 148), as also demonstrated within Table 4.2. 
This thesis triangulates the data that was needed. A triangulation approach is when more than two 
methods of data collection are used to gather data within the research to study a phenomenon or 
issue (Denzin, 2006; Casey and Murphy, 2009). Triangulation in research has its origins traceable back 
to the 1950s according to a study undertaken by Campbell and Fiske on the validity of psychosocial 
traits (Creswell, 2003). Triangulation approaches to data collection have been gaining popularity since 
the 1980s (Onwuegbuzie and Leech, 2005). Within the last fifteen to twenty years, there has also been 
a marked increase in the number of studies that have used mixed-methods (Brierley, 2017; Chapman 
et al., 2017; Shuckburgh, Robison and Pidgeon, 2012). 
The use of multiple approaches to collect data increases the validity of the data being collected. This 
is done by “increasing confidence in research data, creating innovative ways of understanding a 
phenomenon, revealing unique findings, challenging or integrating findings, and providing a clearer 
understanding of the problem” (Thurmond, 2001, p.254). However, Johnson, Onwuegbuzie and 
Turner (2007) highlight that instead of the three categories of quantitative, qualitative and mixed 
methods, there are five categories of methods, which highlight quantitative and qualitative dominated 
mixed methods. These different categories of methods are demonstrated within Figure 4.3. 
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Figure 4.3 – The five subset categories of methods within research (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie and 
Turner, 2007 p.124) 
It should be noted, that with all research methods, there are different strengths and weaknesses of 
using a mixed method approach. These are demonstrated within Table 4.2. It is demonstrated that 
there are significantly more benefits in using a mixed methods approach. The main advantage of using 
mixed methods is that it gives broader and more in-depth answers to the research questions with 
stronger evidence, as has been found through the process of this thesis. However, it was more 
expensive and time consuming due to the amount of time spent on setting up, undertaking and 
analysing data that was collected from the different methods that were used. 
Whilst this thesis uses a mixed method approach, the definition of qualitative research and/or data is 
a challenge not least since this more comprehensive view of data extends to “a term for non-numerical 
information, including text, images, and sounds, including literature, diaries, policy documents, 
interview transcripts, photographs, art, video, films and music” (Castree, Kitching and Rogers, 2011, 
p.405). It should be noted that whilst quantitative data is used in this thesis, the qualitative is the 
collection of data that focuses on the quality of research rather than quantification. Whilst overall one 
is not better than the other, they have different functions and are fit for different purposes. The 
research therefore allowed for the researcher to examine the research topic in greater detail and more 
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Table 4.2 - Strengths and Weaknesses of a Mixed Method Approach 
Strengths Weaknesses 
• Words, pictures, and narrative can be 
used to add meaning to numbers 
• Numbers can be used to add precision 
to words, pictures, and narrative 
• Can provide quantitative and 
qualitative research strengths 
• Researcher can generate and test a 
grounded theory 
• Can answer a broader and more 
complete range of research questions 
because the researcher is not confined 
to a single method or approach 
• A research uses the strengths of an 
additional method to overcome the 
weaknesses in another method by 
using both in a research study 
• Can provide stronger evidence for a 
conclusion through convergence and 
corroboration of findings 
• Can add insights and understanding 
that might be missed when only a 
single method is used 
• Can be used to increase the 
generalizability of the results 
• Qualitative and quantitative research 
used tightly together produces more 
complete knowledge necessary to 
inform theory and practice.  
• Can be difficult for a single researcher 
to carry out both qualitative and 
quantitative research, especially if two 
or more approaches are expected to be 
used concurrently; it may require a 
research team 
• Researcher has to learn about multiple 
methods and approaches and 
understand how to mix them 
appropriately 
• Methodological purists contend that 
one should always work within either a 
qualitative or a quantitative paradigm 
• More expensive 
• More time consuming 
• Some of the details of mixed research 
remain methodologically complex (e.g., 
problems of paradigm mixing, how to 
qualitatively analyse quantitative data, 
how to interpret conflicting results) 
Source: Adapted from Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) 
Nonetheless, within this overall methodology, quantitative research and/or data are defined as “a 
term for numeric information and its use in systematic inquiry” (Castree, Kitching and Rogers, 2011, 
p.405). Therefore, it should be noted that as the data is numerical, it allows a larger amount of data 
to be progressed/analysed in a short period of time. However, it only gives a small snapshot of what 
might be happening. 
Further examples of how previous studies have approached climate change perception and 
engagement of civil society within the United Kingdom are demonstrated within Appendix A. In 
addition, Appendix B demonstrates the same, but for international studies. Each study listed 
demonstrates whether they are using quantitative (survey), qualitative (focus group/interviews) or a 
mixed method approach. 
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Lastly, there are a number of different approaches towards data analyses, but the most common two 
are inductive and deductive. Since an inductive approach to analysing the data was used, this is 
qualified as a recursive research, as defined by Castree, Kitchin and Rogers (2011, p.96); “a form of 
reasoning from which general conclusions are drawn from the observations of a single class or 
combination of phenomena”. The fundamental reasoning in the use of this approach is in that it allows 
generalisation of the findings of the research. For example, if X per cent of young people within the 
sample believed that climate change was caused by anthropogenic climate change, then it can be 
assumed that X per cent of young people within the population may believe that climate change was 
caused by anthropogenic climate change. In addition, it also allows theories to be put forward as to 
why trends are observed within the quantitative data, with the help of the qualitative data. 
 
4.1.1. Overall Thesis Methodology in Relation to the Objectives 
Five objectives emerged around research questions tackled in this research process. Table 4.3, 
outlines the different research questions, research methods, sampling approach for each method and 
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Table 4.3 - Use of research questions 






What influences perception of current and 
future adverse climate change impacts? 




In what way, and how important is education 
in engaging the youth in climate change? 
Questionnaire Random Civil Society 







Selective First Year BSc 
Students 
How do different factors influence the levels of 
engagement and disengagement towards 
adverse climate change impacts? 




Interviews Selective Questionnaire 
Participants 
Why do UK youth and other parts of society 
become supportive of environmental activism? 
In addition, in what way are UK youth and 
other parts of society likely to continue to 
participate in environmental activism? 
Questionnaire Random Civil Society 
How do extreme climate events affect an 
individual’s views towards climate change 
during and in the immediate aftermath of the 
event? 









A questionnaire, as applied in this research, is a research method that uses a group or sequence of 
questions that are designed to collect information about one or more topics from respondents (Dodge, 
2003). Survey questionnaires are regularly used with social science research, and have extensively 
been used previously to examine perception and engagement with climate change globally, such as in 
the research by Whitmarsh (2009); Whitmarsh (2011); Poortinga et al., 2013; Asekun-Olarinmoye et 
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al., 2014; Shi,Visschers and Siegrist, 2015; Kabir et al., 2016; Chan et al. (2017); Li et al., 2017; MartÍnez, 
Piña and Moreno (2018); Douenne and Fabre (2020)38. 
When designing a questionnaire, there is the option to choose between either an open or closed 
question for each question. Most climate change perception and engagement research has tended to 
apply the closed question approach. However, for both questionnaires designed and applied within 
this thesis, a mixture of both types of question were used. A closed question gives the respondents a 
limited response by giving them different opinions to choose from (Foody, 1993). In this thesis this 
allowed the general threads overall and between the different socio groups to be determined. Open 
questions allowed the respondent to respond to the question more freely, therefore not being 
influenced by the researcher (Foody, 1993). However, open questions are more difficult to analyse 
than closed questions (Schuman and Presser, 1996). Open questions were important in this thesis, as 
they helped to inform the author of why choices were made in the closed questions and to help 
theories of causality to be identified in relation to the trends observed. Interviews have been used for 
this process, but open questions have been prioritised, as questionnaires allow the researcher to 
collect data from more people in a shorter timeframe compared with interviews (Babbie, 2013). 
It was important to determine questionnaire format; whether online, face to face or a mix of both. In 
recent years, the usage of electronic questionnaires within academic research has continued to 
increase, as already flagged for over a decade (Jansen, Corley and Jansen, 1996; Van Selm and 
Jankowski, 2006; Dolniclar, Laesser and Matus, 2009). The major benefit of electronic questionnaires 
is that they are cost effective. Whilst conducting research, Mavis and Brocato (1998) found that paper 
questionnaires can be seven times more expensive than electronic questionnaires. This can be 
attributed to the labour hours that are required to collect the data and materials used (Mavis and 
Brocato, 1998; Kaplowitz, Hadlock and Levine, 2004). However, electronic questionnaires have some 
negatives. Wiersma (2011) believes that low response rates are an issue; with a study by Murphy et 
al. (2020) who had an average response rate from email surveys of 4.5 per cent. This compares to 
Cook, Heath and Thompson (2000) who highlighting an average response rate from email surveys of 
39.6 per cent. Research has demonstrated that in the last couple of decades, the response rates from 
email surveys have been declining (Sheehan, 2001; Shannon and Bradshaw, 2002; Fan and Yan, 2010; 
Roberts and Allen, 2015; Fosnacht et al., 2017). In addition, it has been suggested by Scott et al. (2011) 
that a lack of trust from the respondents in sending information about themselves over the internet 
to an unknown source is why internet questionnaires get a lower response rate than paper. 
 
 
38 - Further examples are given in Appendix A and Appendix B 
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It is demonstrated by the ONS (2015) study that only 14 per cent of households within the United 
Kingdom do not have access to the internet. This is an increase from 2006, when the figure was 43 per 
cent. This demonstrates that more people use the internet for their everyday activities. In addition, it 
was observed that for households that only have one or more adults over the age of 65, this figure 
increases to 51 per cent. This demonstrates that more people are using the internet, but that the 
majority of people over the age of 65 still do have access to the internet. The study attributes this to 
cost and lack of skills. Therefore, it was originally determined that traditional paper-based 
questionnaires are still needed to be undertaken, as there is a high proportion of elderly adults that 
are still not connected to the internet. 
Within this thesis, two main questionnaires have been used. The first questionnaire collection 
occurred between March and September 2017, and this was undertaken to gain an overview of the 
civil societal, especially young people’s, perception and levels of engagement with climate change. 
Overall, 1,134 questionnaires were completed by the members of the public. The second 
questionnaire collection occurred between May and July 2019, and this was undertaken to gain an 
overview of the civil societal, especially young people’s thoughts on both ‘Extinction Rebellion’ and 
‘School Strike for Climate’ protests. Overall, 1,700 questionnaires were completed by members of the 
public for this second survey. Information about the socio demographics of the respondents can be 
found in section 4.2.6 and Appendix R of this thesis. 
It should also be noted that both online and paper questionnaires were used within this survey. The 
reason why electronic questionnaire were used in this research is that they were proving to be more 
efficient in terms of time and expenditure in gathering results from around the country. However, 
after the first questionnaire, it was determined that for the second questionnaire, it was not 
necessary, as the response within the first questionnaire from the oldest in civil society was high 
enough using the online survey to provide sufficient comparisons between the different age groups. 
In addition to these two main questionnaires, a smaller questionnaire was undertaken in October 
2018, during the Yonmenkaigi System Method exercise, which is one of the techniques used to 
examine group engagement with climate change. The purpose of the questionnaire was to see if there 
was a change in relation to perception during the engagement experiment with students; to 
determine how successful this learning technique has been amongst youth. Overall, sixteen 
respondents responded to the questionnaires during the Yonmenkaigi System Method experiments. 
Lastly, it should be noted that within both questionnaires, some questions are either based on or use 
the same questions from previous studies. This was done to be able to compare studies, as wording 
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can alter the response of the answers given. Further details on the psychology influencing opinions 
are provided in Section 3.2. Table 4.4 provides a list of questions that have been taken from different 
studies and strategically included within this study. 
Table 4.4 – List of Questions that have been borrowed from other studies 
Question Number 




3 1 Do you believe that the world’s climate 
is changing? 
Capstick et al. (2015) 
4 2 What do you believe is the cause of this 
change? 
Capstick et al. (2015) 
12 N/A What do you think is the percentage of 
climate scientists that believe humans 
are causing climate change/global 
warming? 





As previously stated, there have been two main questionnaires that have been conducted with two 
different purposes. The following two sub-subsections will explore how these questionnaires were 
designed with reference to the literature and conceptual framework, and how they link with the 
forthcoming results chapters. 
 
4.2.1.1. Questionnaire 1 
The main aim of this questionnaire is to gather an overview of both perception of and engagement 
with climate change from the civil society in both the United Kingdom and the Crown Dependences. 
Due to the wide range of questions these two themes can generate, this questionnaire was split into 
seven different sections, with each focusing on a different aspect, as demonstrated in Appendix S. 
The first section was called “Climate Change”, which consists of thirteen questions, and is to gain 
general overall background of the respondents about their perception of past, current and future 
climate change. It also explores how respondents rate different global threats and environmental 
issues in relation to climate change. Lastly, the section examines who the respondents trust in relation 
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to communications about the science and impacts of climate change. This section is important, as it 
provides background information about climate change and the overall perception of the issue. This 
is needed, as highlighted within the conceptual framework of chapter three, as an individual 
perception of climate change plays a fundamental role in whether or not people engage with the issue 
of climate change, and if they do, to what extent. Therefore, all findings of this section are included 
within chapter five of this thesis and are used to build a picture about the general perception of climate 
change within the United Kingdom and how different socio-economic groups compare. 
The second section was labelled “Climate Change and Education”, consisting of only five questions, to 
determine how many of the respondents have been educated about climate change in the formal 
education setting. In addition, this asked to what level respondents were taught about climate change, 
what level should students be taught at and whether the public should be offered free workshops 
about the effects of climate change. Lastly, the respondents were asked about what they were taught 
at school, college and university. This is to see if any misconceptions were taught about climate change 
at school, an issue demonstrated in Section 3.4 of this thesis. The rationale is that education about 
climate change has been recognised by the United Nations for its importance in relation to forming 
young people’s perception of climate change. This importance of education is further demonstrated 
within the conceptual framework of Figure 3.10. The questionnaire section was included so as to 
gather information about civil societal receipt of any formal education about the background and 
effects that climate change will have on the planet, and whether they feel it is important.  
The third section was called “Climate Change and You”, consisting of seven questions, and the purpose 
of which was to examine how the respondents have personally been affected by extreme climatic 
events. The first four questions examine the number of respondents that have been affected by 
extreme weather, its type, if affected and who else had been affected by these extreme weather 
events. In the following question, the respondents were given a list of nineteen different climate 
mitigation techniques and were asked which they had undertaken in the previous three years. The 
final two questions focused on how many and what type of environmental organisation the 
respondents were members of. These questions have been included to gather a mix of quantitative 
and qualitative feelings and attitudes towards this personal attachment towards slow-onset disaster. 
The fourth section was called “Climate Change Policy”, which consists of seven questions, and the 
purpose of this section was to examine how the respondents felt about climate change policy and the 
overall role of the current government in responding to climate change. This was done by asking four 
simple questions about how supportive they were of current environmental policy within the United 
Kingdom. The policies covered greenhouse gas reductions, fuel duty and road tax. Then a question 
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was asked about what they were about, and which electricity supply should the United Kingdom be 
using. Lastly, they were asked to rate the British Government’s handling of climate change on a scale 
of one to five, and how the United Kingdom can improve in the future. These questions are important 
as without the support of civil society, policies are likely to be changed deviating away from the 
original goals. These are especially important when the majority of policies relating to climate change 
and the environment can require a degree of financial investment, for example taxes, which are 
regressive and have a greater impact on low-income individuals (Dorfman, 1977; Johnson, McKay and 
Smith, 1990; Poterba, 1991; Jorgenson, Slenick and Wilcoxen, 1992; Poterba, 1993; Hamilton and 
Cameron, 1994; Cornwell and Creedy, 1996; Speck, 1999; Baranzini, Goldemberg and Speck, 2000; 
Metcalfe, 2009; Gough et al., 2012; Dorban et al., 2019; Wang and Matsumoto, 2021), who are 
disproportionately young people. 
The fifth section was called “Media and Climate Change”, which consists of eleven questions, and the 
purpose of this section was to examine the role of the media and climate change. The first four 
questions were asking the respondents which traditional media they engaged with and how often 
each week. Then they were asked to create newspaper headlines about climate change. This was to 
see what type of images, emotions and language respondent’s use when answering the question. In 
the following three questions, the respondents are asked about their usage of social media and 
whether they use it to collect information about climate change. This is important as there is a growing 
media to provide information to the public about climate change. The final three questions of this 
section were to examine the respondent’s opinions about the media’s reporting of climate change. As 
highlighted earlier, media is the main source in which civil society gains its understanding of climate 
change; it is important to understand whether the message is being elucidated. This is especially 
important given the rise of social media alongside widely perceived or real increases in misinformation 
and fake news. 
The sixth section was called “Demographic Data”, which consists of ten questions, the purpose of 
these questions being to cross compare this data with the questions in sections one, three and four. 
The types of questions that were asked within this questionnaire were also quite similar to the 
demographic questions asked in the 2011 Census. Further details about the demographics of the 
survey are included with the results In Section 4.2.6. 
The final section was called “Further Information”, which consists of two questions. The purpose of 
this section was to ask the respondents of the questionnaires if they were willing to answer further 
questions in the form of an interview or through the Yonmenkaigi System Method. The idea behind 
this was to further explore themes that arose from the questionnaire. Respondents were also asked 
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whether they wanted a copy of the findings. There are two main reasons why this option was given. 
Firstly, it was to allow the respondents to know how other people view climate change against their 
own beliefs, and secondly as common courtesy, as they have invested time within the study by 
participating. 
 
4.2.1.2. Questionnaire 2 
As highlighted in the methodological map in Figure 4.1, the second questionnaire was undertaken in 
the aftermath of the outbreak of the mass protests by both ‘Extinction Rebellion’ and ‘School Strike 
for Climate Change’. The main aim of this chapter is to determine the civil society’s perception towards 
these protests, which can be viewed as response to real or perceived inaction in combatting climate 
change. The questionnaire was only split into three sections, containing fifteen overarching questions, 
which contain four further sub-questions, as seen in Appendix T. 
The first section is the main section within this questionnaire, starting with the background belief in 
climate change, using questions that appeared within the first questionnaire. These are then explored 
in relation to public opinion of Extinction Rebellion and whether they are supportive of their actions 
and causes. After this, the questionnaire asks similar questions, but this time focusing on the School 
Strikes for Climate Change. In between these two blocks of questions, the respondents were asked 
about whether they would join an Extinction Rebellion protest. This question is important as it will 
start to determine the number of people who could be exhibiting signs of moving towards post-normal 
engagement of climate change. 
The final two sections of this questionnaire are similar to the first questionnaire in 2017, with 
questions based upon socio-demographic and whether the participant wants a copy of the findings. 
 
4.2.2. Pilot Study 
Within a social science context, a pilot study has two different meanings. The first is a feasibility study, 
which is a small run undertaken in preparation for a major study (Polit, Back and Hungler, 2001). The 
second is the testing of the research instruments, for example the suitability of the questions within 
the questionnaire (Baker, 1994). 
There are numerous benefits of using a pilot study. Firstly, it allows the researcher to check whether 
the respondents are able to understand terminology within the questionnaire (van Telijinger and 
Hundley, 2001). For example, within this thesis members of the public might not be able to understand 
climate jargon like “anthropogenic” but are more likely to understand “human made”. Whilst pilot 
141 | P a g e  
 
studies do not always guarantee that a research project will be successful, they can significantly 
increase the likelihood (Simon and Goes, 2011). 
Before every questionnaire was set, a pilot study was undertaken making sure the questions were not 
going to be misinterpreted or confusing to the public. 
Hertzog (2008) highlighted that there is very little literature on a suitable sample size for a pilot study. 
In addition, different studies tend to have various sizes of pilot, the highest being by Lackey and 
Wingate (1998) who used 10 per cent of the overall sample size; compared to Nieswiadomy (2002) 
who used 10 participants. For each pilot study within this thesis, a sample size of 10 participants was 
applied. Also, all data gathered within the pilot study was not used within the final findings of this 
thesis, as some wordings of questions were altered subsequent to the pilot. It was nonetheless also 
noted that other researchers, such as Leon, Davis and Kraemar (2011), had also recommended the 
approach of not using pilot study data in the main study. 
 
4.2.3. Pre-Notification 
Pre-notification of the respondents is where an initial contact between the researcher and the 
participant takes place, which can happen via a formal letter, email, telephone call or personal contact 
(Kent and Turner, 2002). For this research, pre-notification was only used for the questionnaires used 
within the Yonmenkaigi System Method. As the wider studies had to collect a large number of 
questionnaires, pre-notification would have been a time consuming and logistically an impractical 
process, and using forums and social media to spread the questionnaire, it would not have been 
possible. 
The rationale behind pre-notification is that if the respondent knows about the study and the 
researcher, they are more likely to complete the survey (Duncan, 1979). However, research conducted 
in social and medical science fields has highlighted a potential mixture of the effectiveness of pre-
notification. Some studies that have shown an increase in response rates (Fox, Crask and Kim, 1988; 
Yammarine, Skinner and Childres, 1991; Hembroff et al., 2005; Link and Mokdad, 2005; Dykema et al., 
2011; Koitsalu et al., 2018), some made no difference (Heberlein and Baumgartner, 1978; Wright, 
1995; Hammink, Giesen and Wensing, 2010; Koopman et al., 2013) and others showed a decline 
(Jobber and Sanderson, 1983). Overall, more studies seem to point towards a small but significant 
increase with pre-notification. 
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4.2.4. Coding 
Coding is an analytical process in which both qualitative (for example, interviews) and quantitative 
(for example, questionnaires) are categorized to allow analysis to be undertaken (Fielding, 2015). As 
stated by Silvey (1975, p.16) “research ultimately must be based on comparisons”, therefore coding 
responses allows data to be gathered quicker and in a more useable form, which allows it to be 
analysed and contrasted easier (Wilkinson and Birmingham, 2003). 
Within this thesis, the two questionnaires contain both the two types of data; qualitative and 
quantitative. Google Forms was used for the collection of the online questionnaires. It automatically 
puts all responses into a spreadsheet, which can be opened on Microsoft Excel. All the qualitative data 
contains the response given in written form, which does not provide useful information. Consequence, 
each column of data is coded with a number in relation to the response given. This allows the data to 
be analysed on SPSS. For all the qualitative data, these were sorted into the responses based upon the 
question. All were put into a Microsoft Word document and were inserted into NVivo as a suitable 
qualitative data analysis software. For the paper-based questionnaire, these were however 
individually typed based on the author’s coding. 
 
4.2.5. Response Bias 
The term “Response Bias” is defined as a cognitive bias that occurs during responding to a survey that 
affects the responses provided (Hurley, 1998; Villar, 2008). Furnham (1986) argues that response bias 
has major implications on the data output and therefore researchers need to take steps to either 
mitigate or reduce response bias within questionnaires. 
There are several different types of response bias, such as for example ‘extreme responding’, ‘social 
desirability bias’ and ‘demand characteristics’. Each of these response biases have been explored as 
follows in this section. 
Extreme responding biases [ERB] are when respondents’ only choses the most extreme options or 
answers available (Meisenberg and Williams, 2008). ERB was first investigated in the 1950s (Berg, 
1953); however its effects are commonly ignored by researchers (Paulhus, 1991). ERB is particularly 
common when using a Likert scale (Kieruj and Moors, 2010); but some respondents are likely to only 
respond with the extreme numbers on the scale. For example, using a 1 to 5 scale, these respondents 
are likely to only use 1 or 5 for all answers. 
Social desirability biases are when the respondent denies undesirable beliefs or qualities, to conform 
to more socially desirable ideologies (Nederhof, 1985). This usually is derived from the respondent’s 
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lack of comfort to reveal their true attitudes (Groves et al., 2009); this is also known as ‘impression 
management’ (Holtgraves, 2004; Uziel, 2010). 
Demand characteristics in social science research are when a participant forms an interpretation of 
the experiment’s purpose and therefore changes their beliefs and/or behaviour to conform to this 
interpretation (Lammers and Badia, 2005). 
To reduce some of these biases, several different approaches have been undertaken within this thesis. 
The first is to be careful with the wording of a question, especially in avoiding a leading question and 
in relation to the length of a question (Lavrakas, 2008). This is thought to have reduced ERB. Another 
method that should have reduced the likelihood of ERB was through changing the format of the 
question quite often, for example, making sure all Likert Scale questions are not presented together.  
It needs to nonetheless be acknowledged that no questionnaire design is going to get rid of all bias. 
The steps taken represent awareness of approaches that are needed in attempting to reduce these 
biases. 
 
4.2.6. Sampling Approach and Self-selection Bias 
Within this thesis, the sampling approach for both questionnaires was to post the surveys onto local 
community groups on the social media platform Facebook; an example of these local community 
groups used within this thesis is “Isle of Man, advice, help & local events”. The predominant reason 
why social media sites such as Facebook were used is due to the large proportion of the United 
Kingdom population who use the site regularly, thus widening the scope of potential responses. This 
is illustrated by data gathered from the ONS (2020) which suggests that in 2020, roughly 70 per cent 
of the United Kingdom population have used one of these sites within the last three months of being 
surveyed. However, this approach raised the potential for self-selection bias.  
Withing surveying, self-selection is defined by Bethlehem (2010, p.162) as where “it is completely left 
to individuals to select themselves for the survey”. They go further into detail but in the case of web-
based surveys, such as the case of the questionnaires within this thesis, a survey is simply put on a 
website; meaning that the respondents must be able to access the Internet, visit the site in which it 
has been posted on, and then decide that they wish to spare time in participating within the survey 
(Bethlehem, 2010). Consequently, the researcher does not have any control of the selection on who 
is accessing and participating within the survey. 
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To reduce the potential impacts at self-selection bias could have had on both the surveys within this 
thesis, the social demographic data was regularly monitored throughout. In the case that the 
researcher discerned that there was an underrepresentation of a certain social demographic group, 
the researcher would attempt to seek out people from these underrepresented groups via the use of 
targeted emails to certain public body organisations. In addition, paper surveys were conducted 
during the first survey, with a predominant aim to further target underrepresented socio-
demographic groups. The sampling was also intuitive on the basis of collecting sufficient responses to 
reach a saturation point of new information, whereby it would not be cost effective in the context of 
this scale of PhD research to simply increase numbers of respondents even further amongst an already 
large number replies. 
 
4.2.7. Socio-Demographic Breakdown 
Within this research, two different questionnaires were undertaken to answer the questions set out 
earlier in this thesis. As highlighted through Chapter Three of this thesis, there are socio-demographic 
factors that can have an influence on a person’s attitude towards climate change. Therefore, this 
section addresses the proportionality of respondents within the two questionnaires compared to their 
respective population proportionality. 
 
4.2.7.1. Gender 
As highlighted within Section 3.2.1.2, there are gender differences in response to climate change. This 
has been included in the work for this thesis albeit exposing also the further research needed to 
examine this in full.  
According to the latest United Kingdom statistics of the overall population in 2015, it is estimated that 
50.7 per cent of the British population are female, whereas, 49.3 per cent are male (ONS, 2016). It 
should be noted that within the survey for this thesis, a third option was available to represent people 
who are an intersex or transsexual. This option to indicate this was included within the questionnaire 
as there is a significant population that do not label themselves either ‘female’ or ‘male’. This is 
demonstrated in a study by Reed et al. (2009) who estimated that the United Kingdom might have 
56,000 transsexuals, which represents roughly 0.1 per cent of the population. 
As shown in Table 4.5, of the 1,134 individuals who responded to the first questionnaire, 39.5 per cent 
were female and 59.7 per cent were males. In addition, it indicates that 0.2 per cent of the 
respondents identify themselves as other. Within this questionnaire, only 7 [0.6 per cent] refused to 
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disclose their gender. This compares to the second questionnaire, as shown in Table 4.6, where 57.7 
per cent were female and 41.2 per cent were male.  
 
Table 4.5 – First Questionnaire Respondent’s Gender 
Respondent’s Gender Number of Respondents Percentage 
Female 448 39.5% 39.8% 
Male 677 59.7% 60.1% 
Other 2 0.2% 0.2% 
Refused 7 0.6%  
Total 1,134 100.0% 
Note: All Percentages might not add up to 100 per cent due to rounding errors 
Source: Author 
Regards the difference between male and female respondents between the two questionnaires 
attention is drawn to a literature on who are mostly likely to complete online surveys, a question that 
is still being debated. Some researchers have found that males are more likely to fill in questionnaires 
(Stanton and Rogelberg, 2001; McDonald and Adam, 2003; McCabe et al., 2006), whilst other 
researchers have found the opposite (Sax et al., 2003; Saleh and Bista, 2017). Therefore, it is not 
possible to determine why these differences occurred for these particular questionnaires. 
Table 4.6 – Second Questionnaire Respondent’s Gender 
Respondent’s Gender Number of Respondents Percentage 
Female 981 57.7% 58.2% 
Male 700 41.2% 41.5% 
Other 4 0.2% 0.2% 
Refused 15 0.9%  
Total 1,700 100.0% 




According to the latest United Kingdom statistics estimating the population age in 2015, it is estimated 
that 22.6 per cent of the United Kingdom population are over the age of 65; whilst the 45 to 54 age 
group represent 17.9 per cent; 25 to 34 represent 17.2 per cent; 35 to 44 represent 16.3 per cent; 55 
to 64 represent 14.5 per cent; and 11.5 per cent are between the age of 18 and 24 (ONS, 2016). It 
should be noted that these percentages do not represent people under the age 18 and also do not 
include people who live in the Crown Dependencies. 
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Table 4.7 illustrates the age categories of the individual respondents to the first questionnaire survey. 
The highest respondent age range were the over 65s at 26.6 per cent, which is above the national 
proportion of over 65s. One possible reason is that the majority of people over the age of 65 are likely 
to be either semi-retired or fully-retired, and therefore they have more time to respond to the 
questionnaire. It should also be noted that the age group “18-24” also provided responses above the 
national proportion; this is because this age group was specifically a focal aspect of the topic being 
examined - their attention was brought to it more. it was necessary that this group of respondents 
would be sufficiently high. 
Table 4.7 - The First Questionnaire Respondent’s Age 
Respondent’s Age Number of Respondents Percentage 
18-24 163 14.4% 14.4% 
25-34 151 13.3% 13.4% 
35-44 115 10.1% 10.2% 
45-54 168 14.8% 14.9% 
55-64 230 20.3% 20.4% 
65+ 302 26.6% 26.8% 
Refused 5 0.4%  
Total 1,134 100.0% 
Note: All Percentages might not add up to 100 per cent due to rounding errors 
Source: Author 
As demonstrated within Table 4.8, the proportion of the young people completing the second 
questionnaire is much greater compared to the first. One possible explanation is that due to it been a 
much shorter questionnaire, young people will have more available time to complete the survey.  
Table 4.8 – The Second Questionnaire Respondent’s Age 
Response Frequency Percentage Valid Percentage 
18-24 398 23.4% 23.5% 
25-34 291 17.1% 17.2% 
35-44 260 15.3% 15.4% 
45-54 301 17.7% 17.8% 
55-64 274 16.1% 16.2% 
65+ 170 10.0% 10.0% 
Refused 6 0.4%  
Total 1,700 100.0% 
Note: All Percentages might not add up to 100 per cent due to rounding errors 
Source: Author 
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It should be noted that the sample was considered suitable for this study as numbers or respondents 
are sufficiently high in each group and the research makes no claim to present a representative sample 
of the UK population structure as a whole. 
 
4.2.7.3. Political Identification 
As highlighted in the previous chapters, political identification has been demonstrated to have an 
impact on an individual’s perception of and therefore engagement with climate change.  
Within this survey, the respondents were asked which political party they identify with, and then a 
generalised political portioning of the sample was applied. For example, individuals indicating the 
Labour and the Green Party are in this survey grouped as being of a generally more left-wing political 
position. This was undertaken, as some members of the public might not know the difference between 
left- and right-wing politics as interpreted in early 21st century context. It can also be noted that for 
the second questionnaire, a fourth category was identified to accommodate the Brexit Party for which 
some of the membership had come from the Labour Party in the context of Brexit, despite the party 
been right-wing. It is also recognised that the identification of left or right around the central margins 
can be blurred such that, for example, in some interpretations both centre and right-wing respondents 
might be viewed as right wing from some positions within the left-wing. 
Table 4.9 Demonstrates the responses based upon the first questionnaire, whilst Table 4.10 the 
responses for the second questionnaire. 
Table 4.9 – The Political Leaning of the Respondents in the First Questionnaire 
Respondent’s Political Position Number of 
Responses 
Percentage 
Left-Wing 517 45.6% 53.8% 
Centre 148 13.1% 15.4% 
Right-Wing 296 26.1% 30.8% 
Unknown 173 15.3%  
Total 1,134 100.0% 
Note: All Percentages might not add up to 100 per cent due to rounding errors 
Source: Author 
Within both Table 4.9 and Table 4.10, it was found there is a higher percentage respondents 
identifying with more left-wing parties, and for Table 4.9 when taking out those of unknown political 
positions, 53.8 per cent of the respondents had a left-wing political position compared to 30.8 per 
cent who have a right-wing political position, albeit the care that is needed is in how to consider those 
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indicating ‘centre’ politics. However, a likely reason for the higher numbers on the left is that these 
political parties have a stronger environmental ideology (Neumayer, 2004; Mooney, 2006)39, which 
means that this questionnaire is likely to interest them more. As highlighted within Table 4.10, this 
divide became larger in the second questionnaire, which would be in part due to a higher proportion 
of voters between 18 and 24, which are known through recent election results to be more likely to 
vote for left-wing parties. 
Table 4.10 – The Political Leaning of the Respondents in the Second Questionnaire 
Respondent’s Political Position Number of 
Responses 
Percentage 
Left-Wing 881 51.8% 63.20% 
Centre 274 16.1% 19.7% 
Right-Wing 198 11.7% 14.2% 
Brexit Party 41 2.4% 2.9% 
Unknown 306 18.0%  
Total 1,700 100.0% 




Within qualitative research, interviews are the most widely used technique (Cassell, 2005). As 
individuals, we actively engage with interviews each day during general conversation with friends and 
family, with each of us as the ‘interviewer’ and ‘interviewee’ (Edwards and Holland, 2013; Alsaawi, 
2014). Patton (1980) describes the purpose of interviewing as being to find out what is in someone 
else’s mind and those things that cannot be observed directly. It is also described by Fontana and Frey 
(1994), as a popular and useful way to understand human beliefs. An interview can be conducted in 
three different ways: structured, semi-structured, and unstructured (Bryman, 2001). For the 
interviews conducted for this thesis, a semi-structured format was used. This gave the interviewer and 
interviewee a knowledge of what themes were going to come up, as the interviewees were given a 
list of themes beforehand, but also the freedom to further discuss points that the interviewee raises 
that the interviewer feels are important (Oppenheim, 1992). 
Each interview was recorded with the permission of the interviewee as recording allows for a great 
accuracy and speed of transcribing the interviews. Before each interview, the interviewees were asked 
 
 
39  - See section 3.2.1.1 for further details about political position and climate change 
149 | P a g e  
 
to complete a permissions form, as demonstrated in Appendix U. This form explains to the interviewee 
the purpose of the interview, the protection of the data and themselves, such as anonymity. Lastly, it 
gives them contact details, so they can find out more information about the research and/or if they 
wish to withdraw certain sections or the entire interview, which is in line with academic best practice. 
Within this thesis, five interviews were conducted. A larger number was not considered necessary as 
the questionnaires, which are extensive, had already proved significant amounts of qualitative 
information due to the high levels of response. The purpose of the interviews were nonetheless 
conducted to ask for clarity in areas related to some of the responses from the questionnaire, or in 
one case, an insight into the education of climate change within schools from a current teacher. Some 
of the broad themes that were discussed within the interviews included: 
• Education on Climate Change 
• Engagement of Climate Change 
• Thoughts about Climate Change (including the Causation, and Impacts) 
After these interviews were conducted, the author transcribed recordings. When these were 
completed the author coded the interviews; a full break down of how this was undertaken is provided 
in Section 4.6. 
The use of the data from the interviews was predominantly used to shape ideas and theories. 
However, in one case, a respondent retold an important story in the case of how they personally 
experienced a teacher being selective and dismissive in relation to the belief of natural climate change. 
The use of this quote was important in debating the ethical and moral issues surrounding teaching 
climate change within the education sector. 
 
4.4. Secondary Data Analysis 
Secondary data analysis is a method of using existing data from previous studies and using it for a 
different purpose to the original source (Johnson, 2014). Szabo and Strang (1997) stated that this can 
be done by either having a new resource question or looking at an alternative perspective. 
Quantitative data is commonly used for secondary data analysis (Hinds, Vogel and Clarke-Steffan, 
1997; Long-Sutehall, Sque and Addington-Hall, 2010). Secondary data analysis has become 
increasingly popular within academic research, not least due to its increased abundance (Goodwin, 
2012; Cheng and Phillips, 2014; Johnson, 2014).  Secondary data analysis used in this thesis related to 
the public’s perception of climate change in collected previous works, such as for example in Poortinga 
et al. (2013) and as outlined in the next section. 
150 | P a g e  
 
 
4.4.1. Secondary Data Analysis within this Thesis 
Secondary data analysis has been used within this study in the context of data that has been collected 
within the questionnaires for which comparative previous studies are used to observe trends over 
time. See Appendix V for a list of sources that have been used. 
In addition, this thesis has used questionnaire data that have been collected by the Department of 
Energy and Climate Change [DECC] until 2016 and then by the Department of Business, Energy & 
Industrial Strategy [BEIS]. These questionnaires about the British public energy and climate change 
perceptions are collected roughly every three months; a timeline of data collection is available in 
Appendix W of this thesis. As demonstrated there have been 34 sets of questionnaires since 2012 and 
this allows an analysis of perception over a timescale of eight years; a breakdown of the respondents 
of these questionnaires is available in Appendix W. An example of the questionnaire is available in 
Appendix X of this thesis and full overview results from these are available in Appendix Y. These 
datasets have previously been subject to overall cross-sectional analyses but have not analysis of 
change over time or between different socio-economic groups. 
Also, this thesis has used the questionnaire data that has been collected by the European Commission 
within its Eurobarometer series. The EC usually runs a focused Eurobarometer questionnaire every 
two years that collects the thoughts of the civil society within all European Union countries, including 
the United Kingdom. There are eight sets of data that have been collected, and will be analysed for 
overall trends, but also between different socio-economic groups over time. However, unlike the 
secondary data collected from DECC and BEIS, it allows the research to be based upon the differences 
in overall United Kingdom perception and engagement in comparison with other EU countries. It also 
allows this comparison to be undertaken between young people from different countries. An example 
of the questionnaire is available in Appendix Z, with full results in Appendix D. 
Lastly, Google Trends has also been used within Chapter Five. This was to observe the influence of 
major media events on how the public seek information. This has not been limited to just climate 
change, but other perceived threats that the British public have rated highly previously. 
 
4.5. Statistical Analysis 
As demonstrated within Figure 4.4, there are two different types of statistics, Enumerative and 
Inferential. 
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Enumerative Statistics, also known as Descriptive Statistics, is the practice of describing the main 
features from a collection of data (Mann, 1995), whereas, Inferential Statistics is where there is 
generalisation, predication, estimations and conclusions from data which has been collected from a 
survey (Upton and Cook, 2008). 
 
 
Figure 4.4 – Different types of statistics (Source: Adapted from Trochim and Donnelly, 2006) 
The following sections demonstrate all types of statistics that have been used within this thesis. 
Microsoft Excel and SPSS programmes were used to compute the statistics that are demonstrated in 
the following sections. 
 
4.5.1. Enumerative Statistics 
Enumerative statistics are defined as “quantitative measures derived from a set of data that describe 
how values are distributed within that data series” (Castree, Kitchin and Rogers, 2013, p.100). Within 
this thesis, the main enumerative statistical measure that has been used is the mean of the values. 
This was chosen over mode or the medium. As most of the questions are Likert Scale, it means that all 
of the responses can be included, but also means that potential polarisation in responses is shown. 
The other enumerative statistical measure used is the standard deviation. This is used to inform the 
reader about the spread of the data being presented from the mean value, whereby the larger the 
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4.5.2. Inferential Statistics 
Within this thesis, two main inferential statistics have been used to analyse the quantitative data, 
these being the Pearson’s chi-squared test and a Fisher’s Exact Test. The following two sub-sections 
detail why these have been chosen and how they have been used. 
 
4.5.2.1. Significance Testing – Pearson’s chi-squared test 
A Pearson’s chi-squared test is an inferential statistical test which tells the probability of independence 
between two groups of data. It does not inform any additional details about the relationship. A chi-
squared test has been used throughout this thesis to compare differences in responses between 
different socio-economic groups. 
Usually, 90, 95 and 99 per cent significance levels are used to describe the data, with most research 
using the 95 per cent level (Craparo, 2007). Within this thesis, a significance level of 95 per cent has 
been the level required to consider there to be a statistically different value, but if data has a p-value 
between 0.06 and 0.10, then a significance level of 90 per cent has also been acknowledged. In similar 
fashion, if a p-value of either 0.00 or 0.01 was revealed, then a significance level of 99 per cent has 
been acknowledged. Any other value indicates a non-significant relationship is being reported. Table 
4.11 summarises the meaning of the 90, 95 and 99 per cent significance within this thesis. 
Table 4.11 - Levels of Significance Difference 
Per cent Significance p-value Meaning 
99% 0.000-0.015 Large Significance 
95% 0.016-0.055 Significance 
90% 0.056-0.105 Small Significance 
>90% 0.106-1.000 No Significance 
Source: Author 
 
4.5.2.2. Fisher’s Exact Test 
Fisher’s Exact Test is also a statistical significance test (Fisher, 1922; Agresti, 1992). It is an alternative 
method to calculate whether the p-value works from a 2x2 contingency tables, in a similar way to 
which the chi-squared test does, though is commonly used for a small sample size. For example, this 
is the case for when the observed number is under five, which means that the chi-squared test cannot 
acutely calculate the p-value (Yates, Moore and McCabe, 1999). As it works similar to a Person’s chi-
squared test, the levels of significance of the p-values are the same as listed in Table 4.11. 
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4.6. Content Analysis 
Content Analysis is defined as a flexible research method to analyse text data (Cavanagh, 1997), that 
draws conclusions from observations of content (Stempel, 1981). Content analysis was first used in 
the 19th Century in Scandinavia (Rosengren, 1981). Originally, content analysis was used in both 
qualitative and quantitative research (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). However, in recent years, it has 
predominantly been used with qualitative data, thus gaining its other name of qualitative content 
analysis (Morgan, 1993). 
There are three main contrasting types of content analyses; these are conventional, directed and 
summative. Table 4.12 highlights the differences between the three versions providing the rationale 
of its application in this research. 
Table 4.12 - Coding Differences between the Three Approaches to Content Analysis 
Type of Content 
Analysis 
Study Starts With Timing of Defining 
Codes or Keywords 




Observation Codes are defined 
during data analysis 




Theory Codes are defined 
before and during 
data analysis 
Codes are derived 





Keywords Codes are defined 
before and during 
data analysis 
Keywords are derived 
from interest of 
researchers or review 
of literature 
Source: Hsieh and Shannon, 2005 (p. 1286) 
Within this thesis, conventional content analysis has been used for both the interviews and documents 
that focus on the educational syllabus within the United Kingdom; which aimed to answer the research 
question, “In what way, and how important is education in engaging the youth in climate change?”. 
This thesis has followed the eight steps to coding qualitative data as highlighted by Zhang and 
Wildemouth (2009); which are: 
1. Prepare the Data 
2. Defining Units of Analysis 
3. Develop Different Categories and Codes 
4. Test the Codes 
5. Code the Text 
6. Check Codes for Consistency 
7. Make Theories/Conclusions from the Coded Data 
8. Report the Findings 
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4.7. Yonmenkaigi System Method for Observation of Engagement 
Yonmenkaigi System Method is a participatory method which was originally developed in the mid-
1980s in Chozi, Tottri Prefecture, Japan (Okada et al., 2013). The Yonmenkaigi System Method has 
typically been used post-disasters within Japan and was especially useful in the aftermath of the 1995 
Great Hansin Earthquake Disaster, in Kobe, Hyōgo Prefecture (Na, Okada and Fang, 2009). 
The relevance of this approach to this research was that the Yonmenkaigi System Method had 
developed as an action with local communities through interactive workshops (Na, Okada and Fang, 
2009) and offered particular consideration of engagement processes. It is recognised that there are a 
variety of participatory methods available that claim engagement, though this one has been used 
particularly in disaster risk settings. An opportunity for the author to engage in it through his 
association with work by Japanese scholars was also a factor in its selection. Samaddar et al. (2015) 
describes how the Yonmenkaigi System Method framework allows stakeholders to debate an issue 
through face-to-face communications during which they learn about other people’s points of view on 
such issue. The main purpose of using this method was to test whether using participatory approach 
in the education of climate change can yield a higher degree of concern about climate change to 
potentially get young people to engage with the issue further, either in the short or medium term. The 
usage of this method was further determined after research in Section 6.2 demonstrated that 
education of climate change within the United Kingdom is still being taught using a film or being told 
by the teachers as facts before moving onto the next topic. Research presented in Section 3.4.2 
demonstrated that attention rates in classes fluctuates, especially when being talked to. It was 
considered in the context of the research for this thesis that if the students have the ability to talk 
about the issue with their fellow classmates, that they will stay alert for much longer and it might 
make them more willing to openly talk about such issues as engaging their practices around the issue 
in the future, without feeling uncomfortable. 
For this research, the Yonmenkaigi System Method study was conducted on the 11th October 2018 at 
Northumbria University within Newcastle-upon-Tyne in the North East of England. The students who 
participated in this study were sixteen first year undergraduate students on the environmental 
management course, as demonstrated in Figure 4.5. The exercise was conducted on the first week of 
study and therefore students were limited to very little to no information about climate change. As a 
result, the students would only have the knowledge that they were either self-taught via their own 
interactions or were taught within formal education. 
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Figure 4.5 – The students debating during the Yonmenkaigi System Method exercise (Source: 
Author) 
 
4.7.1. Yonmenkaigi System Method Process 
Firstly, it is important to determine how many participants were allowed in the workshop. A typical 
Yonmenkaigi System Method Workshop has between eight and sixteen participants and a facilitator 
(Okada et al., 2013). Within this case, it was felt that it would be better to use the maximum 
recommended amount of sixteen participants, as it would be more representative of usual class sizes 
within schools and/or colleges. 
After this, the method itself is engaged. As demonstrated in Figure 4.6., the Yonmenkaigi System has 
four different components: undertaking a SWOT Analysis, completing a Yonmenkaigi Chart, debating, 
and preparing and presenting action plans. 
 
Figure 4.6 – The Yonmenkaigi System Method Framework (Na, Okada and Fang, 2009 p.60) 
However, within this thesis, another two steps were added to test the change in perception of climate 
change before and after the application of the Yonmenkaigi System Method; this change is illustrated 
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in Figure 4.7. Note, that the identification stage, within Figure 4.7, is often included within the SWOT 
Analysis. 
 
Figure 4.7 – Yonmenkaigi System Method’s seven steps (Source: Author) 
When undertaking the Yonmenkaigi System Methods, there are basic characteristics that need to be 
considered, such as the objective, the theme and scenarios that are being tested. A full overview of 
the basic characteristics is demonstrated within Table 4.13. Overall, this was an important supplement 
to the work of this thesis as it also enabled and assessment of likely processes of perception, 
engagement and response of the young people through direct observation. 
Table 4.13 – Basic characteristics of the Yonmenkaigi System Method 
Application Disaster mitigation and prevention 
Objective Collecting visions and hopes of residents for proactive disaster 
reduction planning 
Who Decides the Theme and 
Scenario 
The facilitator suggests guidelines and participants determine the 
theme and scenarios 
Participants Self-governed community association for disaster reduction (as 
representatives of residents) 
Facilitators Specialists 
Typical Size One team (8 to 16 people), four groups (2 to 4 people each) 
Outcomes Development of an action plan for disaster reduction for the local 
community 
Source: Na, Okada and Fang (2009, p.63) 
Before undertaking the method, a theme and scenario needed to be determined. Within this thesis, 
the theme used for the Yonmenkaigi System Method was “climate change within Newcastle-upon-
Tyne”. The scenario/brief that was given to the students was; “You are being asked by Newcastle City 
Council to discuss and give ideas to what can Newcastle do to reduce the effects of climate change 
through mitigating and adaption”. A full brief that was given to the students can be found in Appendix 
AA. This scenario was left quite open, as it would give the students room to express their feelings 
about climate change, as well as what can be undertaken. 
The first step within this method was a questionnaire. This questionnaire uses ten questions that 
explores the students’ perception of climate change, including personal responsibility about climate 
change, mitigation policies, and the impacts of climate change. See Appendix AB for a full version of 
this questionnaire. 
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The next step was to undertake a SWOT (Strength, Weakness, Opportunities and Weakness) Analysis 
within the exercise. A SWOT Analysis allows the participant to share their ideas and views about the 
positives and negatives of their local community. As highlighted in Figure 4.8, for a SWOT Analysis, 
there are four different components: Strengths, Weakness, Opportunities and Threats. These four 
components are broken down into two categories, known as internal and external factors. Using a 
SWOT analysis within the Yonmenkaigi exercise was important, as it helped participants to see the 
present and future risks to their community and therefore helped them recognise that action is 
needed to reduce these risks (Na, Okada and Fang, 2009). This is especially important in relation to 
climate change, as it is in the context of this research considered good for students to understand that 
there are some opportunities associated with climate change within the United Kingdom. This is 
important, as by teaching only the ‘doom and gloom’ of climate change, could lead to ‘eco-anxiety’40 
(Harrington, 2020); which in turn can lead to disengagement due to the feeling of fear (Georgiou et 





Figure 4.8 – SWOT analysis (Source: Author) 
Following the SWOT Analysis, the participants were then split into four groups. The students were 
then asked, based upon the results of the SWOT analysis, to identify stakeholder roles that were 
required to fulfil the brief. Four of the most important roles were chosen, and each group of students 
were assigned a role. The four chosen were ‘Communication and Engagement’, ‘Mitigation’, 
‘Resources and Logistics’, and ‘Research and Data’. 
Once all stakeholders have been assigned a role, then each respondent was asked to convey their 
action components and views in accordance with their role. This was done by using a colour card 
placed in the Yonmenkaigi Chart (Na, Okada and Fang, 2009), which is demonstrated within Figure 4.9. 
Within the Yonmenkaigi exercises undertaken within this thesis, each role is assigned the following 
colours: 
1. Communication and Engagement [Green] 
2. Mitigation [Blue] 
3. Resources and Logistics [Yellow] 
 
 
40 - sometime researchers refered to it as ‘eco-fear’ (Buzzell and Chalquist, 2019). 
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4. Research and Data [Red] 
 
Figure 4.9 – Application of Yonmenkaigi Chart (Source: Author) 
Within the Yonmenkaigi Chart, each group is split into a further four sections, each represents a 
different time. It should be noted that these time scales are not fixed, and different time scales have 
been used previously. This was demonstrated by Samaddar et al. (2015) who allocated timescales of 
within 3 months, 6 months, 1 year and after 1 year; whereas, Na and Okada (2011) allocated a 
timescales of within 3 months, 6 months, 1 year and 2 years. Within this Yonmenkaigi, the students 
choose timescales of within 6 months, 2 years, 5 years and after 5 years. The reason given by the 
students for the longer timescale compared to the previous examples was due to climate change not 
being a quick fix and as an issue that impacts on Newcastle for the short, medium and long term. 
The next stage of the YSM process, as demonstrated in Figure 4.7 is debating. The purpose of the 
debating is to provide a platform to process all the ideas by each group, which allows the ability of the 
students to further develop a potential combining of ideas together (Samaddar et al., 2015). Within 
the YSM process, two types of debating are available to the group; these are general debating and 
inverse debating (Na et al., 2009). For general debating, two groups debate with each other to defend 
their own ideas (Samaddar et al., 2015). By way of contrast, inverse debating is when two groups swap 
position, and start debating in relation to their new group (Na, 2016). For example, if group A and B 
are debating; when inverse debating occurs, Group A must defend the ideas of B. The purpose of the 
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inverse debating is that it challenges their thinking about the idea, especially when it is not their own. 
As the students have written their ideas on card, when debating, the students can move the cards 
around, including adding and removing cards when appropriate. 
After the debating is completed, an Action Plan Chart was created; an example of one of these is 
demonstrated in Figure 4.10. The action plan chart is classified in accordance with the time frame and 
each of the four roles (Samaddar et al., 2015). 
 
Time ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------→ 
 6 Months 2 Years 5 Years Beyond 5 Years 
M     
I     
S     
H     
Figure 4.10 – Action plan chart in the Yonmenkaigi System (Adapted from Na, Okada and Fang, 
2009) 
Lastly, the final step of the Yonmenkaigi used within this thesis was a second questionnaire. This was 
used to compare the results to the first set of results, to determine whether any changes in the 
perception could be detected amongst the sixteen students. 
It is important to note, that both the change in perception and also the changes which occurred as 
they discussed and engaged with the topic that are important to this exercise. This type of change is 
not easily judged with questionnaires, therefore observational analysis was undertaken for this 
sample by the researcher. 
 
4.7.2. Reflection on Participatory Action Research 
Participatory action research [PAR] is a research approach within a community which emphasises 
participation and action, as demonstrated within Figure 4.11. The main objective of PAR is to 
understand and improve the environment by changing it (Baum, MacDougall and Smith, 2006). As 
highlighted by Tandom (1988, p.7) “participatory research attempts to present people as researchers 
themselves in pursuit of answers to the questions of their daily struggle and survival”. 
McIntyre (2008) highlights that whilst undertaking PAR research, there should be four steps 
undertaken, which are the following and are demonstrated within the spiral within Figure 4.11: 
• Questioning of the issue 
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• Investigate the issue and reflect from a personal standpoint 
• Develop an action plan 
• Implement the action plan and refine when necessary 
 
 
Figure 4.11 – The recursive process of participatory action research (Source: McIntyre, 2008, p.7) 
As a consequence, the participatory action research concept and application has applied in this 
research for this thesis, in both that the potential for students to be stimulated when exploring the 
issue of climate change and in the overall protracted engagement of the author in the topic over the 
years of the research. In addition, it goes further, such as where students and all participants in the 
research process could start to question and reflect on how their perception, engagement and 
ultimate responses to the topic impacts on their lives, both now and in the future. At minimum the 
methodology and technique applied for this thesis intended to lead to participants gaining a reflective 
and increased understanding of the importance of such an issue. Lastly, it would be hoped that 
through these processes the younger people in society will be more comfortable to speak about such 
matters, which due to future demographics will impact on their lives more than any other generation 
to date. 
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4.8. Ethics 
Ethics are defined as “a set of concepts and principles that guide us in determining what behaviour 
helps or harms sentient creatures” (Paul and Elder, 2006, p.2). In addition, Kidder (2003, p.63) stated 
that ethics is “the science of moral duty”. The definitions are similar, they highlight that ethics are a 
set of rules that should present research and its findings causing undue anxiety or harm towards its 
participants. 
Underlying this research was an understanding that ’modern ethics’ guidance has its origins in post-
World War II at the Nuremberg Trials. This was due to the forced human experiments which were 
carried out by Nazi Germany during World War II within the concentration camps (Roelcke and Maio, 
2004). Declaration of Helsinki [DoH] is a set of ethical practices regarding human activity in research, 
which was developed by the World Medical Association [WMA] (WMA, 2013). However, the 
Declaration of Helsinki is widely regarded as the essential document for research involving humans in 
all fields (Burgess, 1989; Babbie, 1998; Ezzy, 2002; WMA, 2013). 
Beyond this grand narrative, which is upheld by this thesis, the research complied in detail with the 
guidelines outlined by Northumbria University, Research Ethics and Governance Handbook 
(Northumbria University, 2015). Northumbria University has a policy that requires an application and 
approval of research before any research is undertaken and this was fully granted following due 
process. 
Before the collection of data from human participants, either via the form of questionnaires or 
interviews, either online or in person, a consent form was filled in. The consent form explained the 
project and participant individual rights, including issues about anonymity, confidentiality and 
withdrawal rights; this complies with both the outgoing Data Protection Act 1998 and the incoming 
EU General Data Protection Regulation of 2018. 
All data that has been collected at all times has been stored in a secure location in accordance with 
the Data Protection Act 1998. Therefore, all coded data has been stored on a computer, with each file 
having password protection to stop unauthorised access. In addition, all paper-based copies of 
questionnaires were stored within a filling cabinet, which was lockable with a key and stored a room 
that is locked with a key. 
Within all aspects of the research and the writing up process of this thesis non-gender related 
language has been used. This is because language like “manmade” and “mankind” can be viewed as 
sexist language (Douglas and Sutton, 2014); therefore, words like “human made” have been used 
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instead. It is recognised that sexist languages can lead to potential exclusion and trivialisation of either 
gender, in particular for women and girls (Doyle, 1998; Parks and Robinson, 2004; Croswell, 2009). 
 
  
163 | P a g e  
 
 
Chapter Five – 
Perception of Climate Change 
©Benjamin Evans (2006) 
164 | P a g e  
 
“If the planet were a patient, we would have treated her long ago. You, ladies and 
gentlemen, have the power to put her on life support, and you must surely start the 
emergency procedures without further procrastination” 
Charles, Prince of Wales (2015) at the World Economic Forum 
 
This chapter addresses the first overarching research question (Section 3.9) and climate change 
perception in terms of socio-demographic groups, including age, gender, location and political 
affiliation. This includes perception of climate change impacts, differing terminology, scientific 
consensus, trust, climate policies, energy, transportation and media reporting. Overall, it is argued 
that complex perception of climate change underlies the way different groups engage with climate 
change.  
The findings are supported by analysis of respondents from different socio-demographic groups 
participating in the two surveys and secondary data compared for significant differences using a 
routine of chi-square testing. Abbreviations *, **, and *** are used to indicate 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 
significance levels, respectively.  The chapter comprises 11 sub-sections that examine different 
elements of climate change perception. Figure 5.1 demonstrates how each of the sub-sections 
interlinks, with the arrows on the right side indicating particularly strong relationships between the 
subsection themes. This structure is determined from the themes that emerged from the 
questionnaires. 
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Figure 5.1 – The overall structure of chapter 5 as representing interlinked influences on Climate 
Change perception within the United Kingdom 
Source: Author 
 
5.1. Greatest Societal Issues? 
In recent years, British and global societies have faced a myriad of threats. These range from infectious 
diseases, such as Ebola (Cooper, 2014; BBC, 2015), measles (New Scientist and PA, 2019; WHO, 2019) 
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and the COVID-19 pandemic (Ferguson et al., 2020), to terrorist attacks in London (Dearden and 
Bulman, 2017), Manchester (BBC, 2018) and Paris (Chow and Kostov, 2015) to threats of the use of 
nuclear weapons in 2017 between North Korea and the United States (Johnson and Yoshida, 2017; 
Shugerman, 2017). Consequently, for some members of the public it can often feel that there is so 
much to be worried about in the short-term, that long-term issues can wait. This is known as a ‘finite 
pool of worry’, being when an individual only has a rudimentary capacity for worry about issues that 
will affect themselves (Linville and Fischer, 1991). This means that individuals are limited to how many 
issues they can focus on at any one time. They tend to pick on issues that require more attention in 
the short-term, leading to other medium to long term issues being left to one side (Weber, 2006). This 
results in a cunctation of meaningful action in either mitigating or adapting to climate change and a 
consequent low cognitive engagement with climate change. An example of this is the 2008-09 Great 
Recession. At the time, public concern about climate change declined about 14 per cent, which in part 
was due to the increased worry about economic instability and job security (Weber, 2010; Leiserowitz 
et al., 2013). 
Short-term societal issues that civil society faces, can lead to reduced levels of worry about, and 
engagement with, climate change mitigation and adaptation. However, this raises questions as to how 
the public view these societal issues compared to climate change. Accordingly, the respondents within 
the first questionnaire were asked “Which of the following do you think is the greatest threat that we 
currently face?” and were given a list of eight to choose from, including, but not limited to, climate 
change, diseases, and terrorism41. 
It was found that a preponderance of the respondents of the survey (36.76 per cent) thought that 
climate change is the greatest threat that society faces currently; but, it should be noted that there 
may be bias, as the respondents knew about the theme of the research project before completing the 
questionnaires. This was followed by terrorism and economic instability, with 19.93 and 12.75 per 
cent respectively. Espionage had the least responses (0.26 per cent). In addition, climate change was 
the most selected response of all age groups. However, the proportion of concern is not equally spread 
amongst the age groups, with the 18-24 group being the most concerned at 42.33 per cent; Whilst the 
35-44 age group [least concerned] response rate for climate change was 32.17 per cent there is not a 
significant difference between these two age groups at the 5 per cent level of significance, just at the 
10 per cent level (χ2=2.949, p=0.086*). 
 
 
41 - Each of the eight terms are defined in Appendix AE. 
167 | P a g e  
 
These results suggest that across the age spectrum, there is an overarching concern about climate 
change, compared to other social issues. However, the results could be interpreted in varying ways. 
These results suggest that across the age spectrum, there is an overarching concern about climate 
change, compared to other social issues. However, the results could be interpreted in varying ways. 
Table 5.1 – Respondents perception of the largest societal issue in 2017 overall and by age groups 
 18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+ Overall 


















































































































All 163 151 115 168 230 302 1,129 
Gold = Greatest Societal Issue; Silver = Second Greatest Societal Issue; Bronze = Third Greatest Societal Issue; 
Red = Least Greatest Societal Issue 
Source: Author 
It is surprising that the results for climate change were greater than the results from terrorism, as the 
questionnaires were taken during the time of two major terrorist attacks in both London and 
Manchester. These findings somewhat go against the hypothesis of Weber (2006) about the ‘finite 
pool of worry’ and past research in the aftermath of the Great Recession in 2008. One potential 
explanation for this could be an increased awareness and observation of severe weather events that 
could be associated with climate change during this time period, such as the hyperactive Atlantic 
Hurricane season in 2017 (NOAA, 2017); the heatwave in June that affected South England and Wales 
(Siddique and Taylor, 2017); and the naming of European winter wind storms by the Met Office and 
Met Éireann. For example, respondent [OLC199] in the questionnaire survey stated that “flash 
flooding in summer storms made me realise climate change is real and affecting this country, not just 
something you see on the news in a faraway land” [55-64, Female, South West England]. This is backed 
by respondent [OLD109] who stated with a similar remark that “our thunderstorms are getting bigger 
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and more powerful … they are generated by our hotter summers” [55-64, Female, South East England]. 
These two respondents are highlighting that they have observed significant changes in the British 
climate in their lifetime. The chapter later explores the awareness of impacts of climate change 
amongst civil society further. 
Another way to test how much climate change is seen as a more important social issue compared to 
other current events, is to observe whether people think climate change or COVID-19 is the bigger 
issue. In 2020, humanity experienced its worst pandemic since H1N1 influenza in 191842 (Ferguson et 
al., 2020; Phillips, 2020; Webel and Freeman, 2020); with COVID-19 causing nearly half a million deaths 
globally [correct as of 24th June 2020]. Due to there being no known vaccine and specific treatment 
plan, other than symptomatic treatment, it has resulted in most countries, including the United 
Kingdom (BBC, 2020), introducing strict measures to stop the spread of the virus. The resultant locking 
down of whole countries and social distancing has led to major social and economic disruption. 
Consequently, it would have not been surprising, during this period, that most of the concern amongst 
the public would be about COVID-19/infectious disease over climate change. This is demonstrated in 
two polls that have been conducted by YouGov during the lockdown within the United Kingdom in 
April and May 2000. The respondents of both surveys were asked “regarding the overall impact on 
humanity, are you more concerned about the impact of coronavirus or climate change?”. The overall 
response demonstrates that the public concern about coronavirus increased between April and May 
from 49 per cent to 52 per cent (YouGov, 2020a; YouGov, 2020b), whereas concern about climate 
change declined from 32 per cent to 30 per cent. However, the change in perception was not equally 
spread amongst different age groups. As observed in Table 5.2, the level of concern for Coronavirus 
has increased amongst every age group, apart from the youngest age group, amongst which there was 
an increase in concern for climate change. The increase in concern for Coronavirus increases with 
older age groups. This is not surprising, given that levels of mortality increases for the elderly 
compared to the young, with more concern about this short-term disaster compared to the long-term 






42 - Commonly known as “Spanish Flu” 
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Table 5.2 – The overall concern amongst respondents about Coronavirus [COVID-19] versus climate 
change in April and May 2020 


















































































































Coronavirus 40% 37% 45% 48% 54% 60% 58% 66% 
Climate change 37% 39% 34% 34% 27% 27% 30% 23% 
I’m not worried about either 7% 7% 9% 7% 10% 6% 7% 7% 
Don’t Know 15% 17% 13% 10% 9% 7% 4% 4% 
Date Source: Adapted from YouGov 2020a, YouGov 2020b 
Now that it has been established that the largest group of respondents in this study believed that 
climate change is one of the biggest issues facing society within the United Kingdom, it is important 
to understand this in relation to evidence about comparative climate change denial there may be 
within British society. 
 
5.2. Do Civil Society Believe that the World’s Climate is Changing? 
As highlighted extensively throughout section 2.1, the climate is changing. However, numerous past 
studies have found that there are those who do not believe that the climate is changing (Spence et al., 
2010; Poortinga et al., 2011; Shuckburgh, Robison and Pidgeon, 2012; Capstick et al., 2015; Steentjes 
et al., 2017). It is therefore important to gain an indication of the proportion of the population that 
are and are not likely to believe that the climate is changing. Survey respondents were asked within 
both main questionnaires implemented for this research “do you believe that the world’s climate is 
changing?”. As highlighted in Table 5.3, this question was framed to be the same as for past research 
conducted by Poortinga et al. (2013). 
Table 5.3 – The number of the respondents that believe the climate is changing 
Response February – September 2017 May – July 2019 
Yes 1,077 94.97% 1,674 98.47% 
No 15 1.32% 10 0.59% 
Don’t Know + Refused 42 3.71% 16 0.94% 
Total 1,134 100.00% 1,700 100.00% 
Source: Author 
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As demonstrated in Table 5.3, the clear majority of the respondents believe that the climate is 
changing, and this rose between 2017 and 2019 by 3.50 per cent from 94.97 to 98.47 per cent. These 
figures demonstrate that there is increasing certainty amongst the public that the climate is changing. 
This could be due to the increased frequency and magnitude of extreme weather conditions that have 
impacted the United Kingdom and around the world during this period. For example, the heatwaves 
during the summer of 2018 and 2019 provided record temperatures that were recorded in a number 
of European countries including the United Kingdom. In addition, wildfires, heavy snowfall and 
numerous flooding events were observed during these two years. 
Other studies undertaken during the past fifteen years have also explored this issue. Figure 5.2 
compiles data demonstrating the British public’s response on whether the climate is currently 
changing between November 2005 and July 2019. Its shows that it is the most recent results that show 
the highest proportion of people believing that the climate is changing. In addition, the proportion of 
respondents who do not believe that the climate is changing reached a record low. It has also been 
observed that the perceived decline in the number of people who believe that the climate is changing 
has seemly stopped, and since March 2013 it increased by nearly 25.5 per cent. This trend is observed 
using a regression analysis, which shows that the regression line through all the “yes” points during 
the fourteen-year period is: 
𝑦 = 0.0002𝑥2 − 0.429𝑥 + 91.354 
 
Figure 5.2 - The change in belief between 2005 and 2019 on whether the climate is changing. 
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The two surveys from this study are higher than any other observed data points; this could be due to 
methodological differences between the studies, due to an increased acceptance that the climate is 
changing or a mixture of both reasons. 
 
5.3. Perception of Change? 
As the previous section has demonstrated, the majority of the respondents believe that the climate is 
currently changing. However, as demonstrated within Section 2.1 and 3.3.2, there are different factors 
that are influencing this change, both anthropogenic [burning of fossil fuels] and natural [solar 
activity]. Knowledge of both causes is important, as greater numbers of respondents believing that 
the main cause of current changes in the climate are natural means these respondents are less likely 
to believe that individual or societal actions are going to make much difference. In addition, 
researchers have previously found that some educational institutions have only been teaching about 
the human processes, so as to avoid confusing their students (Seow and Ho, 2016). This means that 
there is a possibility that young people might not fully understand and/or appreciate the complexity 
of the climate system. In addition, when censored information is being challenged, it is likely to lead 
to more confusion leaving people to believe that there is not a scientific consensus.  
Therefore, it is appropriate at this point to determine what the respondents of this study believed is 
the actual cause of the current change in the climate. Therefore, in both questionnaire 1 and 2, the 
respondents were asked “what do you believe is the cause of this change [in the climate]?”. 
Table 5.4 indicates what the respondent believes is the cause for the change in the climate. It 
demonstrates that there has been a difference in response between the intervening two-year period 
between the two questionnaires. During the 2017 questionnaire period, a ‘combination of human and 
natural processes’ was the most chosen belief (48.15 per cent), whereas in 2019, human processes 
was selected the most (48.82 per cent). The difference between the two choices has narrowed in the 
two-year period with no significant difference between the two responses in 2019. This demonstrates 
that fewer respondents are recognising natural processes only as being involved with climate change 
and being the cause of the current change in the climate; there are fewer people demonstrating what 
Mann (2013, p.23) describes as stage three of denial of climate change, which states that “even if 
there is a warming, it is due to natural causes”. This is likely to have ramifications, as, in theory, more 
people believing that the climate is changing due to human processes should mean that there is a 
greater proportion also recognising that mitigation is needed to reduce the impacts of climate change. 
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Table 5.4 – Respondent perception of the causes of climate change 
Response February – September 
2017 
May – July 2019 Chi-Square 
Caused by natural processes, 
either mainly or entirely 
57 5.03% 36 2.12% 18.13*** 
Caused by human processes, 
either mainly or entirely 
475 41.89% 831 48.82% 13.40*** 
Caused by a combination of 
human and natural processes 
546 48.15% 803 47.24% 0.63 
Do Not Believe Climate is Changing 50 4.41% 26 1.53% 21.62*** 
Refused / Don’t Know 6 0.53% 4 0.24% 1.67 
Total 1,134 1,700  
Chi-Square (H & C) 22.61*** 0.92 
*** = Significant at the 99 per cent significance; H & C = ‘Human Processes’ and ‘Combination of Human and 
Natural Processes’ respectively 
Source: Author 
In addition to the data that has been collected within this survey, this type of question has been asked 
by researchers for the British Government. This allows the ability to track the response within the 
United Kingdom for the past eight years. Figure 5.3 presents BEIS survey results alongside this thesis 
questionnaire response [the data points that have orange diamonds]. It has been noted that the 
responses from this thesis are slightly lower for the natural and higher for the human processes 
compared to the BEIS. This is most likely due to differences in surveying techniques. Overall, Figure 
5.3 demonstrates that there has been a general decline in those indicating climate changed by natural 
processes between 2012 and 2019. This reaffirms the thesis results that the British public are 
increasingly less likely to believe that the current change in climate is due to natural processes; it is 
then reasonable at this point to postulate that increasingly more believe that climate change is a 
process in which there is collective responsibility, and that society can limit it. 
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Figure 5.3 – Perception of the Cause of the Current Change in the Climate between June 2012 and 
July 2019 
Gold Diamonds = Survey Data Directly Collected from this Thesis 
Source: Full Details of Source Available in Appendix Y 
 
5.3.1. Youth Beliefs 
Table 5.5 and 5.6 demonstrates the breakdown in responses to climate change causality by age groups 
for 2017 and 2019 respectively. It can be observed within Table 5.5 that there is a decline for each age 
group in those believing the current change in the climate is due to natural processes. There is a 
significant difference at the 99 per cent level between the proportion of 18-24 and 65+ age groups 
that believe that the current change in the climate is due to natural processes  (χ2=8.494, p=0.004). It 
can also be observed that only two of the six age group brackets have a higher proportion of the 
responses for the human processes compared to the combination option. 
Table 5.6 demonstrates a distinctive shift towards human processes in all age groups, with only the 
65+ group more likely to choose a combination of human and natural processes. However, it should 
be noted that there is no significant difference for between the human processes and combination 
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Table 5.5 – Cause of the current change in the climate depending by age groups in 2017 
Response 18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+ 
Caused by natural processes, 













Caused by human processes, 













Caused by a combination of 





































Total 163 151 115 168 230 302 
Chi-Square (H & C) 3.14* 5.32** 1.77 3.47* 3.52* 17.62*** 
Gold = The Most Popular Choice For That Age Group; * = Significant at the 90 per cent significance; ** = 
Significant at the 95 per cent significance; *** = Significant at the 99 per cent significance; H & C = ‘Human 
Processes’ and ‘Combination of Human and Natural Processes’ respectively 
Source: Author 
Table 5.6 – Cause of the current change in the climate by age group in 2019 
Response 18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+ 
Caused by natural processes, 













Caused by human processes, 













Caused by a combination of 





































Total 398 291 260 301 274 170 
Chi-Square (H&C) 2.01 0 0.07 0.54 0.07 0.19 
Gold = The Most Popular Choose for That Age Group; H & C = ‘Human Processes’ and ‘Combination of Human 
and Natural Processes’ respectively 
Source: Author 
To further explore these differences between age groups over time, the BEIS datasets between 2013 
and 2020 were analysed; with two age groups, 16-24 and 25+ as shown in Figure 5.4. It can be 
observed that there is an 8.9 per cent increase [31.4 to 39.3 per cent] in the proportion of 16-24 year 
olds that believe that human activity is the cause of climate change. As a consequence there is a 
significant difference between the proportion of 16-24 year olds that believe it is mostly due to 
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anthropogenic activity between 2013 and 2020, at the 90 per cent level of significance (χ2=3.640, 
p=0.056*). However, the proportion of respondents that are 25 and older that believe climate change 
is due to human activity rose at a much more modest rate of 2.8 per cent over the same period. This 
seems to suggest that young people are increasingly more likely to be putting an emphasis on current 
climate change being due to the activity of humans. Whilst it is difficult to confidently attribute the 
actual reason for this, there are some potential explanations. 
Firstly, it could be due to student education. As mentioned earlier, previous research has shown that 
some teachers are refusing to teach the natural processes that might influence climate change due to 
the risk of confusing students. This issue was demonstrated by Interviewer 1 [18-24, Female, Scotland] 
who recalled an incident when learning about climate change in class, when “another student asked 
about the natural climate change, the teacher was highly dismissive and said that it was all due to 
humans”. Whilst there is currently no data available about the number of teachers that are engaging 
in this practice for their teaching about climate change, it is evident that it is happening. 
The second potential reason is due to a narrative that is learnt from the media. The early 2010s was 
an era for climate change that emerged in scandal and controversy with ‘climategate’ and mistakes 
being made within the IPCC reports (Boykoff, 2011), as explored in detail in Section 3.3.3. In the 
intervening period, the media attention has again become focussed on the human activity that is 
driving climate change, therefore promoting this notion. Also, since roughly late 2018, there has been 
attention raised about how humans are altering the climate through the climate school strikes around 
the world (Crouch, 2018; Carrington, 2019), with particular attention to the speeches by Swedish 
Teenage climate activist Greta Thunberg (Chasan and Wainer, 2019). As demonstrated in the 
timeframe of Figure 5.4 this was around the same period as the largest increase in belief that human 
activity was the cause of climate change amongst the youngest in British society. Chapter Seven will 
further explore British civil society’s perception and attitude towards this movement. 
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Figure 5.4 – Belief in the cause of climate change between March 2013 and March 2020 for 16-24 
year olds and 25+ 
Source: See Appendix Y for Full Details 
Whilst the undercurrent theme of this thesis is youth and climate change, it is important to examine 
other socio-factors which also might be impacting on differing perception of climate change. The 
following sub-section will briefly explore these factors in turn. 
 
5.3.2. Other Socio-Factors Influencing Differing Perception of Climate Change 
As highlighted throughout Chapter Three, there are socio-economic factors that can influence 
perception towards climate change. This can be examined further by exploring the Wave 29 [March 
2019] of the BEIS Public Attitudes Trackers. This dataset was selected as the vast sample size allows 
for a comprehensive socio-economic review of young people. A breakdown of the results is shown in 
Table 5.7. 
In terms of gender, females seemed more likely to believe that there is no such thing as climate change 
or that it is due predominantly due to natural processes than their male counterparts [7.2 per cent for 
females compared to 5.5 per cent for males]; but there is no significant difference between the two 
genders (χ2=0.587, p=0.443). Whilst there is a 2.9 per cent difference, the ‘don’t know / no opinion’ 
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In terms of ethnicity, the results demonstrate that whilst proportionally there are fewer younger 
people that believe there is no climate change, there are more young BAME respondents that believe 
climate change is due to natural processes. As demonstrated further in Appendix Y there is a similar 
trend that can be observed for the wider BAME community within the United Kingdom, though it 
should be noted that this difference is not significant (χ2=0.124, p=0.724). If this would be a more 
significant difference it could be viewed as somewhat surprising, as it has been noted in past research 
that the BAME community are currently the mostly likely to be vulnerable to disasters within 
developed countries such as the United Kingdom (Fothergill, Maestas and Darlington, 1999), including 
in climate change events; and being a scenario also borne out during the COVID-19 pandemic (PHE, 
2020). A similar type of trend was observed within the United States by Krogstad (2015) in 2014, who 
noticed that those of black ethnicity were more likely to believe in natural processes compared to 
white counterparts [26 per cent versus 22 per cent]. 
Within social groups, it was found that amongst young people there is a significant difference between 
the highest social class group ‘AB’ and the lowest ‘DE’ who believe either climate change is natural or 
do not think there is a such a thing as climate change (p=0.048**). This difference between the two 
social classes is further significant at the 99 per cent level for the age groups 25+ (χ2=23.111, 
p=0.000***). Social class group ‘DE’ are typically those who are either unskilled workers and/or 
receiving financial support from the state. Consequently, in the event of disasters associated with 
extreme events, they are the more vulnerable in society, as they have no additional financial support 
behind them. That those considered more vulnerable people in contexts of climate change are least 
likely to believe in anthropogenic climate change is a further demonstration that perceptions on the 
basis of class is also important. 
In summary, the data suggests that for young people (16-24 year olds): 
• Those who are female, white, live in an urban area, and from social group DE are the most 
likely to believe that climate change is not real. 
• Those who are female, BAME ethnicity, live in an urban area, and of social grade DE, are the 
most likely to believe that climate change is due to natural processes. 
These contrast to all other age groups, for which: 
• Those who are male, BAME ethnicity, live in an urban area, are from a household income 
group / social grade DE, are the most likely to believe that climate change is not real. 
• Those who are male, BAME ethnicity, live in a rural area, are from a household income group 
/ social grade DE, are the most likely to believe that climate change is due to natural processes. 
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Table 5.7 – Belief in the cause of climate change amongst different socio groups for 16 to 24 year 




































































































































































































































































H & C = ‘Human Processes’ and ‘Combination of Human and Natural Processes’ respectively; BAME = Black, 
Asian and Minority Ethnic; AB = upper middle class and middle class; C1 = lower middle class; C2 = skilled 
working class; DE = working class and non-working. 
Source: Data Adapted from BEIS (2019b) 
Both Table 5.7 and previous summaries demonstrate that there are some differences between young 
people and the other age groups. The most noticeable difference is that females in the youngest age 
group are the most sceptical and/or denialist of anthropogenic climate change compared to the rest 
of the population. 
The breakdown of responses within different regions as well as income groups within the United 
Kingdom, for the age group of 16-24 year olds, could not be extracted due to the low numbers of 
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respondents within certain areas; however a breakdown of data sufficient to contrast regions for all 
ages together is available in Appendix Y. Regional differences for all ages from the survey examined 
together are demonstrated in Table 5.8. 
Table 5.8 shows that the three most sceptical areas within the United Kingdom regards anthropogenic 
climate change according to the respondents are West Midlands, East of England and Wales at 13.2, 
12.3 and 11.7 per cent respectively; compared to the two lowest, which are South West England and 
South East England at 6.1 and 6.7 per cent, respectively. This suggests that beliefs in climate change 
are identified with some localised difference. There is, for example a demonstrated significant 
difference at the 99 per cent level between West Midlands and the South West England (χ2=10.671, 
p=0.001***). 
In terms of income group, a similar trend can be observed with a general trend that those with less 
income are the most sceptical about climate change. As highlighted earlier in this section, these are 
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Table 5.8 - Overall belief in the cause of climate change for different regions and income groups 








































































































































































































































































































Source: Data Adapted from BEIS (2019b) 
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5.3.3. Perceptions on the Change 
This section so far has highlighted that there are still some people within the British populace that 
either do not believe that climate change is occurring or that the process is of natural origins. Within 
the qualitative elements of the surveys, the respondents often went into detail about their responses 
to explain why they think that it is of natural origins. Three main themes that were often cited relate 
to: fiscal, conspiracies, other misleading claims and global cooling. 
As respondent ‘OLA181’ highlights; “climate change is a natural process and all this hype is for other 
companies to get money out of us including the government” [Female, 45-54, Northern Ireland]. This 
is backed up by respondent ‘OLC173’ who indicated that; “'climate change' is a natural phenomenon 
which is hyped up by scientists, government and the media to justify excessive additional taxation.” 
[Male, 65+, South East England]. These two quotes exemplify how some believe climate change is no 
more than fiscal policy to generate additional taxation for the treasury. This interpretation has 
previously been identified as a concern by the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and 
the Environment, who highlight that there is distrust, such that climate change is a clandestine way to 
increase taxation, rather than incentive to reduce emissions (Carattini, Carvalho and Fankhauser, 
2017). As highlighted previously in Chapter 3, the United Kingdom has employed taxation methods 
linked to climate change that have proven to encourage people and companies to reduce their carbon 
emissions. Levels of support for some of these taxations are explored further later in this chapter. 
The second disbelief in climate change according to comments received related to conspiracy and 
claims, specifically misleading and controversial claims. For example, respondent OLB010 stated that 
‘credulous public believes big-business conspiracy that climate change is a hoax’ [Male, 45-54, North 
East England]. As highlighted earlier in Chapter 1 and 3, it has previously been reported that 
misinformation campaigns have been waged against climate change concerns by climate-denier 
groups and individuals. Examples of these groups are ‘Global Warming Policy Foundation’ and ‘Exxon’ 
(Monbiot, 2006). It is not possible to list all manner of changing climate denial beliefs within this thesis. 
However, in recent years, due to the escalation of social media, a new style denialism relating to both 
climate change and science in general is very detectable. Examples are famously provided by Donald 
Trump who tweeted that “the concept of global warming was created by and for the Chinese in order 
to make U.S. manufacturing non-competitive” (Trump, 2012, Online). This is an example of a 
conspiracy claim about climate change, which will have been seen by millions of Twitter users and has 
been reported by numerous new reports in the intervening years, giving this conspiracy claim large 
exposure.  
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These types of conspiracies are not mentioned in Mann’s (2013) six stage of denial. However, 
Hoofnagle (2009) had a different take on science denial indicating the following five types: 
1. The use of forceful statements to subdue the truth. Note that the Trump tweet from the 
previous paragraph is a clear example of this. 
2. Being selective of the data. An example of this is when climate sceptics (Eastbrook, Oliver and 
Carter, 2013) state that global temperatures for most of the last 10,000 years have been 
warmer than they are presently based on work by Alley (2000). However, the last recorded 
temperature was from 1855, and when the temperatures since then are included, results 
show that current temperatures are above much of the past 10,000 years. 
3. The use of fake experts. An example of this occurred last year, when a letter by self-proclaimed 
‘prominent scientists’ sent a letter to António Guterres, the UN Secretary-General stating that 
there is no climate emergency. When observing the list, most had a history of climate 
denialism and little to no expertise in climate change science (Walker and Leviston, 2019). 
4. Either moving the goalposts on expectations or having implausible expectations. This is when 
denialists refuse to concede when their challenges have been addressed by climate scientists 
and start making new claims. 
5. Logical paradox. This has been seen numerous times in the news in recent years along the 
lines of Betz (2020) who called out a number of royal family members and celebrities who 
have used private jets as ‘hypocrites’. 
In addition to these arguments, there are some whose scepticism about climate change is due to their 
historical engagement with the issue being earlier related to global cooling. This is demonstrated with 
respondent ‘OLC173’ who recalls that they are “old enough to remember when we were being told 
that we would all have to move to the Sahara because of the new 'ice age'” [Male, 65+, South East 
England]. This perception about climate change has its origins in the 1970s, when there were stories 
within the media, especially within the United States, leading the public to the belief that the climate 
was cooling. Some examples of these are shown in Table 5.9. This occurred despite growing scientific 
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Table 5.9 – List of global cooling news in the 1970s 
Headline Publication Reference 
“Colder Winters Held Dawn of New Ice 
Age: Scientists See Ice Age In the Future” 
Washington Post 
11th January 1970 
Boldt (1970, p. A1) 
“Science: Another Ice Age?” Time Magazine 
13th November 1972 
Time Magazine (1972, Online) 
“Scientists Ask Why World Climate Is 
Changing; Major Cooling May Be Ahead: 
Scientists Ponder Why World's Climate Is 
Changing; a Major Cooling Widely 
Considered to Be Inevitable” 
New York Times 
21st May 1975 
Sullivan (1975a, p. 92) 
“WARMING TREND SEEN IN CLIMATE: 
Two Articles Counter View That Cold 
Period Is Due” 
New York Times 
14th August 1975 
Sullivan (1975b, p. 24) 
Source: Author 
The former climate cooling alert leads to some older respondents’ scepticism about current concerns 
as they are more likely to believe that climate change is natural due to having seen the media 
discussing global cooling and then global warming. This aside, and despite the overwhelming 
consensus on climate change as currently known about more comprehensively, there are still stories 
in the media that try to promote the natural phenomena and/or global cooling. Examples of these for 
the past ten years are demonstrated within Table 5.10. 
However, overall, it can be observed within this sub-section of the thesis, that most of the public do 
agree that climate change is happening and that it due to anthropogenic activity. Therefore, it is 
pertinent to this thesis to consider whether the public in the United Kingdom think that the impacts 
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Table 5.10 – Example news since 2010 that could have been attributed to global cooling 
Headline Publication Reference 
“The mini ice age starts here” Daily Mail 
9th January 2010 
Rose (2010, Online) 
“Dawn of a new ice age” Daily Express 
21st December 2010 
Warren (2010, Online) 
“So much for global warming as Planet 
Earth gets colder” 
Daily Express 
5th July 2011 
Ingham (2011, Online) 
“Britain faces a mini ‘ice age’” Daily Express 
10th October 2011 
Caroe (2011, Online) 
“And now it’s global COOLING! Return of 
Arctic ice cap as it grows by 29% in a year” 
Daily Mail 
8th September 2013 
Rose (2013b, Online) 
“Scientists warn the sun will ‘go to sleep’ 
in 2030 and could cause temperatures to 
plummet” 
Daily Mail 
10th July 2015 
Prigg (2015, Online) 
“Earth heading for ‘mini ice age’ within 15 
years” 
Daily Mail 
11th July 2015 
Hyde (2015, Online) 
“World is on brink of new ice age and 
Britain could be hit the hardest” 
Daily Mirror 
16th October 2015 
Carr (2015, Online) 
“GLOBAL COOLING: Decade long ice age 
predicted as sun ‘hibernates’” 
Daily Express 
1st December 2015 
Austin (2015, Online) 
“Freak climate changes could spark ‘mini 
ice-age’ in Britain from 2017” 
Daily Express 
13th August 2016 
O’Brien (2016, Online) 
“Three decade ICE AGE to freeze Earth 
from 2030 – scientist make ‘97% accurate’ 
prediction” 
Daily Star 
27th October 2016 
Nevett (2016, Online) 
“Plummeting temperatures could send 
the world into a ‘mini ice age’ in 2030 and 
could OVERRIDE global warming, claim 
mathematicians” 
Daily Mail 
27th December 2017 
Weston (2017, Online) 
“Could we face a mini ice age in the next 
30 years? Scientists make extraordinary 
prediction based on the sun’s natural 
cycles…and it would even reverse global 
warming!” 
Daily Mail 
1st January 2018 
Naish (2018, Online) 
“‘Mini ice age’ on Earth could cause -50C 
temperatures and food shortage, experts 
warn” 
Daily Star 
2nd February 2020 
Taylor (2020, Online) 
 
5.4. Impacts of Climate Change within the United Kingdom 
As reported extensively within chapter two and the latest IPCC reports, there is going to be extensive 
changes in the climate of the United Kingdom in the forthcoming years (EA, 2018; Lowe et al., 2018; 
Brown, 2020). However, it is questionable whether the British public are aware of the changes to both 
the natural environment and humanity sufficiently to be able to best adapt to the changing conditions. 
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To determine overall views of the British regarding their beliefs about the impact of climate change 
impacts on the British public, those surveyed in BEIS wave 29 [March 2019] and 33 [March 2020] were 
asked to describe their “views about the impact of climate change in the UK?”. The questions included 
four main options ranging from climate change as already having an impact within the United 
Kingdom, to those who believe that climate change is happening but will not have an impact within 
the United Kingdom. Figure 5.5 demonstrates that most of the respondents believe that climate 
change is having an impact now, and this has increased by 0.5 per cent between March 2019 and 
March 2020; however, albeit the increase over this short period is not significant (χ2=0.125, p=0.724). 
The small rise in perception that climate change is already having an impact within the United Kingdom 
is likely due to the extreme weather between March 2019 and March 2020. This included the 
unprecedented heatwave that affected the United Kingdom in late July and the severe winter flooding 
affecting England and Wales between November and February, which culminated in the wettest 
February in at least 250 years (Met Office, No Date b). 
 
Figure 5.5 – Overall belief of whether climate change is already impacting the United Kingdom in 
March 2019 and March 2020. Full Data Breakdown is Available in Appendix Y. 
These results are potentially embedded with three facets. The first is that the public are likely to be 
more associated with the older generation’s observations of changes in the meteorological conditions 
in their local area over their lifetime. This has been observed by respondent OLC424 who believed that 
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to very mild winters with little extreme cold weather” [Female, 65+, North East of England]. This quote 
demonstrates that the respondent feels that the winters are becoming increasingly milder. However, 
it might be the case that what this author would argue is “snow nostalgia”. This is when an extreme 
weather event is experienced by an individual, the way it is perceived and understood being stored 
within their memory or in the community as a whole (Hassan, 2000). These events can play a powerful 
role in shaping the memory of events (Forgas, Goldenberg and Unkelbach, 2009; Pillat, 2012). In this 
case of winter, with cold temperatures and snowfall usually automatically associated with this season, 
it can be argued that experiencing these weather events, especially when young, can make an 
individual benchmark future winters to these conditions (Hall and Enfield, 2016). This is demonstrated 
in the part of the quote “expecting hard cold winters”, which seems to suggest that every or nearly 
every winter during that period had either extreme cold conditions or heavy snowfall. But this was not 
the case as the winter following in 1947-1948 was normal to above normal in terms of temperature, 
with little snowfall during that month (Met Office, 1948a; Met Office 1948b). This is not to say that 
they do not perceive a real change in the climate of the winter months becoming warmer. As 
demonstrated in Chapter Three, winter months have become milder and wetter (Otto et al., 2018). 
However, as for the case of “snow nostalgia” theory applied to the older generation, at some point in 
the future, maybe similar references will be made to winters of 2017-1843 by the current young 
generation. 
Other respondents looked at a wider range of seasons, and some of the respondents stated that the 
seasons are starting to become increasingly blended. This has for example been remarked upon by an 
elderly respondent OLC221, who stated that “over the last 30 years, you can never tell what season it 
is, other than the day light!” [Male, 65+, North West England]. In addition, respondent OLE018 also 
stated that “now we have non seasonal weather at any given time of year” and went on to say that 
“nobody would be surprised if a snow blizzard happened in July” [Male, 45-54, Isle of Man]. Whilst 
this is a facetious remark, it does highlight that increasingly some people are perceiving that the 
traditional seasons of the British weather are becoming harder to tell apart from each other. This could 
because some winter days in recent years have been very mild for the time of the year. An example 
of this was observed in February 2019, when a day temperature was recorded in Kew Gardens of 
21.2oC (BBC, 2019d), which is 12.5oC above the average maximum day temperature and was slightly 
warmer than the average temperature for June (Met Office, No Date C). 
 
 
43  - This winter was synonymous with the ‘Beast from the East’, which resulted in widespread heavy snowfall 
and unusual temperatures in both February and March for both the United Kingdom and most of Europe. 
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The second facet is that of observation of extreme meteorological conditions either in their own local 
area or as observed in both traditional and social media. This has been demonstrated by respondent 
OLA019 who stated that the “real life experience of extreme weather events provide[d] evidence to 
support science-based claims [about climate change]” [Male, 18-24, East of England]. This feeling is 
backed up by respondent OLA174 who stated that “flooding of the local town just reinstated in my 
mind how real the threat is” [Male, 18-24, Wales]. These two quotes and for many who have been 
impacted by extreme weather events in recent years serves as a reminder that climate change is a 
threat to their community and/or a nation. It is arguable that this is a type of experiential learning, as 
the respondents that are experiencing extreme methodological events are being taught about just 
how extreme the weather can and is likely to be in the local community in the forthcoming years. It 
should be noted that this type of learning is not just for individuals and local communities, but it also 
can be for governments and for both category 1 and 2 responders44. This is demonstrated in the 
aftermath of the 2003 European heatwave, which resulted in the death of over 2,000 people due to 
the prolonged extreme heat (Bhattacharya, 2003). Despite the temperatures being warmer in 2019, 
it is estimated that this event resulted in fewer than 900 deaths (Carrington, 2020; Osborne, 2020). It 
is likely that both individuals and organisations have acknowledged the potential impacts of climate 
change and have engaged with the issue to best adapt to the changing conditions as now experienced. 
In addition, with more international travel, it is increasingly likely that people travel to places that are 
still rebuilding after an extreme meteorological event. This was the case for respondent OLA134 who 
stated that they “have travelled to countries where the impact is obvious” [Male, 45-54, Yorkshire and 
the Humber]. 
The final facet is that of been told by the media, experts and/or the education sector about the impact 
that climate change is having within the United Kingdom. This is highlighted by respondent OLB011 
who stated that in their life span they “have seen more frequent occurrence of extreme weather in 
the UK” [Male, 45-54, Isle of Man]. This respondent highlights the change within the United Kingdom 
as a whole, and as viewed via the media. Another respondent used facts they had recalled about local 
extreme meteorological events to justify their belief that the United Kingdom is already experiencing 
the impacts of climate change. Respondent OLD274 stated with regards to major floods in Woking 
 
 
44  - Category 1 and 2 responders are defined within the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. Category 1 are the main 
responders and includes the local authorities, all the emergency services (including NHS trusts) and the 
Environment Agency. Whereas category 2 are the utility companies (including telecommunications) and 
transportation. 
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that “have been 1927and 1968/9 (41 year gap), 2002/3 (34 year gap), 2005/6 (3 year gap) and 2013 
(8 year gap)” and are “clearly becoming more frequent” [Female, 45-54, South East England]. 
So far, this sub-section has highlighted whether people in Britain believe climate change is already 
having an impact on the United Kingdom. However, this needs to be built upon with an understanding 
of the different types of impacts that they have in mind. The next sub-sections examine what the 
public believe has already happened in recent years and then what climate change impacts the public 
believe are going to happen in future. This draws on data from the BEIS dataset, taken in 2019 and 
2020, and the first of the thesis questionnaires for 2017. 
 
5.4.1. Current Impacts of Climate Change within the United Kingdom 
Whilst most scientists agree that one direct extreme weather event cannot be attributed to climate 
change, an overall trend in a series of similar extreme weather events, such as flooding, can be 
(Schiermeier, 2011). The respondents of the BEIS public attitudes survey were asked “how much, if at 
all, do you think climate change is currently affecting people in: your local area, people in the UK as a 
whole, and people in other countries”, and were given the option of “a great deal”, “to some extent”, 
“not too much”, and “not at all”, the results being those shown in Figure 5.6. 
It can be observed from Figure 5.6 that overall, the respondents are more likely to believe that the 
climate change in other countries contrasts with that of the United Kingdom to “a great deal”, and 
this has increased by 4.2 per cent in the year intervening period. This difference is significant at the 99 
per cent level (χ2=9.006, p=0.003***). This is likely due to the impact of severe weather that had been 
shown in the media, especially that of the wildfires that severely impacted another high economic 
income country (Australia) in late 2019 and early 2020. 
At the United Kingdom level, 25.3 per cent of respondents thought the impact of climate change was 
occurring a great deal and a further 53.1 per cent that it was to some extent. There was an increase 
of 11.8 per cent in the ‘a great deal’ response between March 2019 and March 2020. This is the biggest 
increase of the three areas considered (other countries, UK and local). This increase is significant at 
the 99 per cent level (χ2=9.006, p=0.003***). The increase is again likely due to the extreme weather 
that occurred in the one-year period between the two surveys; increasing heatwaves that broke the 
all-time temperatures in the United Kingdom and the severe flooding that affected both England and 
Wales. However, despite these events, the level of change acknowledged for the local area was less 
than both the other countries and United Kingdom categories. Arguably this may demonstrate the 
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power of the media in flagging the whole country rather than specific areas that are overall more at 
risk.  
 
Figure 5.6 – The British public’s opinion on how much climate change is currently impacting the 
climate of their local area, the United Kingdom as a whole and other countries in March 2019 and 
March 2020 
Source: Data Adapted from BEIS (2019b) and BEIS (2020b). 
For comparing the different age groups, only the March 2019 is used here, and is shown in Figure 5.7. 
This is because the March 2020 BEIS survey was cut short due to COVID-19, meaning the sample size 
is very much smaller for younger people compared to the March 2019 survey. When comparing these 
results with people of different age groups, it is found that young people are significantly more likely 
to believe that other countries are already experiencing a greater impacts of climate change 
(χ2=8.750, p=0.003), with 7.1 per cent difference between the age groups of ’16-24’ compared to that 
of ‘25+’. The difference between the two is smaller for the United Kingdom (5.1 per cent) and within 
local area categories (1.3 per cent). It is however from this not possible to pinpoint exactly as to why 
there is a difference between the age groups in this case, especially regards the perspective on ‘other 
countries’. 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Local Area - March 2019
Local Area - March 2020
United Kingdom - March 2019
United Kingdom - March 2020
Other Countries - March 2019
Other Countries - March 2020
Percentage of Responses
A great deal To some extent Not too much Not at all Don't Know
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Figure 5.7 – The British public’s opinion on how much climate change is currently impacting the 
climate of their local area, the United Kingdom as a whole and other countries in both March 2019 
based upon their age 
Source: Data Adapted from BEIS (2019b).  
With this indication that respondents are likely to think that climate change is impacting other 
countries more than the United Kingdom, it is important to determine what current changes 
respondents have in mind. They were asked whether they have “noticed any impacts of climate 
change [within the United Kingdom] over the last few years? If so, which ones?”. From this, there were 
eleven different sets of impacts that were recorded. As shown in Figure 5.8, the most popular selection 
for March 2020 was flooding and rising sea levels, with an increase of 18.9 per cent between March 
2019 and 2020. This represents a significant difference between the two periods at the 99 per cent 
level (χ2=207.219, p=0.000***). The increase is likely to be due to the extreme flooding in England 
and Wales as also suggested from the data in Section 5.4. 
Figure 5.9 also demonstrates that there is a 12 per cent decline in respondents who consider that 
‘rising temperatures / heat / hotter summers’ were occurring during this period, also a significant 
difference at the 99 per cent level (χ2=76.355, p=0.000***). This is however somewhat surprising 




0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Local Area - 16-24
Local Area - 25+
United Kingdom - 16-24
United Kingdom - 25+
Other Countries - 16-24
Other Countries - 25+
Percentage of Responses
A great deal To some extent Not too much Not at all Don't Know
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Figure 5.8 – Proportion of respondents indicating differing potential impacts of climate change already impacting the United Kingdom 
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To determine how young people differ in their perception of the current impacts of climate change 
within the United Kingdom, a further analysis of the Wave 29 [March 2019] of the BEIS dataset was 
undertaken. The 16-24 age group was separated from the rest of the age groups to determine how 
much they are different to the other ages groups and whether this difference is significant. Then all 
the age groups were separated to determine which groups are the most and least likely to believe that 
the impact was currently occurring within the United Kingdom. These results are demonstrated within 
Table 5.11. 
It can be observed that young people within this dataset were less likely to believe that climate change 
impacts were currently occurring within the United Kingdom for six of the listed impacts. For two of 
these impacts, ‘rising sea levels / more flooding’ and ‘changes to seasons / erratic weather patterns’, 
it was found that the differences with the rest of the age groups were significant at the 95 per cent 
level. The biggest difference was for the impact of ‘rising sea levels / more flooding’, with 16-24 being 
4.4 per cent less likely to believe that this was occurring within the United Kingdom compared to the 
rest of age groups, and 9.6 per cent less likely compared to the 35-44 age group. Whilst the work 
carried out as a part of this thesis cannot give a definitive answer as to why young people are 
significantly less likely to believe that this is happening, it could be that this is because they have been 
alive for less time and therefore are less aware of this being a recent change compared to previous 
decades (Stevens, Clarke and Nicholls, 2016). A similar reason could be attributed to the low result for 
the ‘change of the seasons’ impact compared to the other age groups. 
Lastly, it can be observed that both the 16-24 and 65+ age groups were recording the lowest 
percentages indicating any of the types of impacts. Again, for the ’16-24’ group, this may be due to 
the potential lack of life experience, meaning that they might not have been observing the change yet. 
For the case of ‘65+’, they are the least likely to believe climate change is occurring or to worry about 
the issue, as indicated by the earlier results and had also been observed by other researchers (Ballew 
et al., 2019b). It is possible that given the nature in the way in which the question was worded, id est 
the inclusion of the term ‘climate change’ may mean that they are less likely to believe that these 
changes are happening. 
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Table 5.11 – Proportion of different age groups that believe impacts on the United Kingdom 
climate in March 2019 
 16-24 25+ Difference Highest Lowest Sig. 
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* = Significant at the 90 per cent significance; ** = Significant at the 95 per cent significance; *** = Significant 
at the 99 per cent significance; Sig. = Significance 
Source: Data Adapted from BEIS (2019b). Full Data Breakdown is Available in Appendix Y. 
Table 5.12 summaries the impacts of climate change already going on, as identified the most by the 
16 to 24 years olds depending on their differing social group category. It shows that for most of the 
impacts [8], the social group ‘AB’ were the most likely to believe they are occurring, and significantly 
most likely (95 per cent level of significance) to believe that there are more extreme meteorological 
events occurring within the United Kingdom currently. 
The results also demonstrate that females in the most part were likely to believe each of the impacts 
were occurring; however, there were no significant differences between any of the impacts. 
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Table 5.12 - Socio group, gender, area and ethnicity of 16 - 24 age group with highest numbers 
believing impacts on the United Kingdom climate, March 2019 
 Social Grade Gender Area Ethnicity 
Rising sea levels 
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AB = upper middle class and middle class; C1 = lower middle class; C2 = skilled working class; * = Significant 
at the 90 per cent significance; ** = Significant at the 95 per cent significance. 
Source: Data Adapted from BEIS (2019b). Full Data Breakdown is Available in Appendix Y. 
In terms of the area in which the respondents live, those who live in an urban area, are in the most 
part, more likely to believe that impacts of climate change are already impacting compared to their 
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rural counterparts. This is especially so for the ‘reduced water availability / droughts’ category, as 
there was a significant difference between the two groups at the 95 per cent level. Albeit this is a 
further detail for which this thesis cannot truly give a particular explanation, it serves to expose a 
complexity regarding perceptions of climate change impacts across age, gender and socio-economic 
status.  
Further, a similar significant difference was observed within the ethnicity group, where ethnic 
minorities were significantly more likely to believe that the United Kingdom had experienced reduced 
water availability in recent years due to climate change, though only at the 90 per cent level of 
significance. Meanwhile, there were only two impacts in which white ethnicity are more likely to 
believe them compared to ethnic minorities. These were the rising temperatures and more extreme 
weather events categories, though these differences are not statistically significant. 
In contrast to findings earlier in this chapter, where the youngest age group in the survey (16-24 group) 
were the most likely to believe that the impacts of climate change was impacting the United Kingdom 
‘a great deal’ (Figure 5.7), when they were given a different list of impacts, they were regularly the 
least likely to choose these impacts listed in Table 5.11 and Table 5.12. This may show that they may 
acknowledge that the impact is already occurring in the United Kingdom as sufficient (Figure 5.7), 
whereas the older generations overall need more evidence having an expectation that the impacts 
should be much bigger by now, though they may recognise that they are going to become much larger. 
 
5.4.2. Future Impacts of Climate Change within the United Kingdom 
Research within the United States has previously demonstrated that an individual’s perception of 
climate change impacts could have a positive influence in their support for adaptation actions (Singh 
et al., 2017), but could in some cases create a negative health impact, being termed eco-anxiety (Hügel 
and Davies, 2020), which was briefly discussed in Chapter 1.1. These types of behaviour for calling 
action on adaption measures for climate change have been observed when a community has already 
been affected by an extreme meteorological event. Pielke Jr. et al. (2007) highlighted that climate 
change post-Hurricane Katrina was not focused on mitigating against future impacts but was more 
about how to build the capacity of the most vulnerable in society to adapt more to present risks that 
climate change poses than potential future risks. This could have an overall negative impact in 
combatting climate change. Singh et al. (2017) highlight that focusing on climate change impacts and 
the adaption towards climate change as it occurs, may reduce focus and perceptive need to mitigate 
against future more uncertain climate change. This then highlights the need to see what future climate 
change impacts there are likely to be on the British public, medium and long term. Better 
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understanding the risk of future impacts is pertinent, as it will give some discernment as to what the 
public will need to expect to be done to adapt to these impacts. It might also give an insight into the 
potential levels of support for mitigation strategies towards climate change presently and in the 
medium term. 
The respondents from the BEIS questionnaire from the previous sub-section were asked “which of 
these do you think are likely to occur in the UK in the next 15 to 20 years [present until 2035-2040] as 
a result of climate change?” The respondents were allowed multiple answers. This enabled a 
comparison between the change in those who think that the impacts are occurring now and those 
who think that they will occur in the medium-term future. The results for March 2019 and March 2020 
are demonstrated within Figure 5.10. These show that in March 2020, respondents indicated the most 
likely impact of climate change that is going to affect the United Kingdom to be ‘rising sea levels and 
more flooding’, with 60.6 percent of the respondents having chosen this impact. For March 2019, this 
impact was only the second most chosen impact, indicating there was a significant 6.9 percent 
increase during the intervening period (χ2=26.045, p=0.000). 
Figure 5.10 also demonstrates that in the intervening period between March 2019 and March 2020, 
perception of eight of the eleven impacts have declined; of which five had varying levels of significant 
difference between the two dates. None of the changes were as large as for ‘rising temperatures / 
heat / hotter summers’, as this category declined by 9.3 percent from the most selected potential 
future impact in March 2019 to the third most in March 2020. 
In analysing why these changes are occurring, there are several potential reasons. The first links back 
to the ‘finite pool of worry’ theory. During the time of the survey in March 2020, as highlighted 
throughout Section 5.4.1, the United Kingdom had just come out of a major flooding event a couple 
of weeks previously, especially in Yorkshire, Midlands, South of England and Wales. This could prompt 
more people to worry about the potential impacts and consequences of flooding and relate it back to 
climate change. This is further demonstrated in Figure 5.8 when the respondents were asked about 
the current impacts of flooding, which rose by 18.9 percent. The combination of these two results 
might be a good indicator that these flooding events were still fresh in their mind. 
The other reason for where numbers are in decline for the different impacts might be due to the 
COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic may have changed the proportion of responses slightly, as the 
BEIS stated that results are fieldwork, id est consequently slightly different proportions of respondents 
were being asked. For example, an increased proportion of young people ’16-24’ year old were asked 
in March 2020 compared March 2019. However, this should not be a major factor in discounting the 
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change as having occurred. Another reason related to COVID-19 is also the ‘finite pool of worry’, as 
increasing numbers of COVID-19 were occurring in March 2020, the news reports about potentially 
how deadly the virus was, and the looming threat of the national lockdown might have been praying 
on their mind. Consequently, they might not be as focused on climate change and its impacts even 
when prompted by this survey. It would be useful to continue this observation after the COVID-19 
pandemic has subsided to see if these numbers rebound. 
The following results and analysis are also extracted from the BEIS (2019b) data from fieldwork carried 
out in March 2019 as it was important for this thesis to examine the differences between age groups 
in isolating any varying levels of concern about climate change from young people [16-24]; how these 
translate to understanding and perception of the potential impacts that are expected to impact in the 
medium to long-term future of the United Kingdom. A summary of the results is demonstrated in 
Table 5.13. 
It can be observed that for young people [16-24] there are just three impacts that are perceived to be 
of a lower risk at a significant level (95 per cent level) than the average response for the 25 and over 
age group. The only one which is at the 99 percent significance level is ‘increased coastal erosion’, 
which is 10.3 percent lower than the ‘25+’ age group. Within Table 5.9 a similar trend was observed, 
though with only a 1.8 percent difference. Overall, the differences between age groups raises 
questions as to why young people are so much less likely to believe that projected future climate 
change within the United Kingdom will result in ‘increased coastal erosion’. One explanation in this 
instance is that populations that are most likely to be affected by coastal erosion are the more elderly 
(Beatty, Fothergill and Wilson, 2011). More elderly people are likely to be in communities under threat 
or know somebody who is under threat from future increases in coastal erosion. As observed in Table 
5.11 and similarly in Table 5.13, the age groups that are most likely to think that certain impacts are 
not going to impact the United Kingdom in the medium-term are the ’16-24’ and ‘65+’ groups; except 
for the ‘change to season / no definitive season / erratic weather patterns’ category, for which the 
’25-34’ and ’55-64’ age groups record no responses. However, too few recorded a response for this 
impact [19] for a valid conclusion to be drawn. 
Overall, there are significant differences between the age groups, mainly at the 99 percent significance 
level.  Though there is an increased proportion of the older population that may believe climate 
change is occurring, its effects are considered only marginable amongst that group in comparison to 
younger groups.  
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Figure 5.9 - Respondents Differing Perceptions of Potential Impacts of Climate Change Likely to Occur in the Next 15 to 20 Years 
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Table 5.13 – Proportion of different age groups that believe listed climate Impacts will occur in the 
United Kingdom within the next 15 to 20 Years, March 2019 
 16-24 25+ Difference (p) Highest Lowest p 
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* = Significant at the 90 percent significance; ** = Significant at the 95 percent significance; *** = Significant 
at the 99 percent significance; Sig. = Significance 
Source: Data Adapted from BEIS (2019b). Full Data Breakdown is Available in Appendix Y. 
Intergenerational differences in perception of impact are explored across social groups as summarised 
in Table 5.14. 
In terms of social grade, either ‘AB’ or ‘C1’ were the mostly likely to think climate change impacts are 
likely to happen. In these cases, most of the responses lead to differing levels of significance 
differences between the social grades. As demonstrated by the data in more detail in Appendix Y social 
grade ‘C2’ and ‘DE’ for all types of impact are never higher than the highest two social grades [‘AB’ 
and ‘C1’]. Therefore, it can be concluded that social grade can influence a young person’s perception 
of the future impacts of climate change within the United Kingdom. One of the likely explanations is 
that social grade ‘AB’ and ‘C1’ are classed as those who are in supervisory, managerial, and 
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administrative and professional lines of work (NRS, No Date). Consequently, those within the social 
grade ‘AB’ and ‘C1’ are likely to have received some levels of higher education. Past research has 
shown that those with a higher education background have higher levels of belief in climate change 
(Clements, 2012; Taylor, Bruine de Bruin and Dessai, 2014). 
In general, females are more likely to believe in these future impacts in the United Kingdom. The only 
impact that males were significantly more likely to believe is going to happen compared to their 
female counterparts is ‘rising temperatures / heat / hotter summers’, albeit at the 90 percent 
significance level. However, the lack of any significant difference between the two genders within the 
vast majority of future impacts means that an overall conclusion that there is a difference on the basis 
of gender as well as socio group is not reached from this data. 
Similar to gender, area urbanism and ethnicity trends for this forecasting of impact is also a mixed set 
of results, where area of residence is interchangeable within the cross-analysis. However, regards 
ethnicity of groups, those who are of white ethnicity are the most likely to perceive these impacts to 
be occurring in all but three categories. 
It should be noted that all impacts that the BEIS chose were based on what the science is telling society 
as to what is expected to happen in the near to long term future. However, not everybody will believe 
this. Within the first questionnaire for this research in 2017, the respondents were asked “with future 
climate change, how do you think the following issues are going to change within the United 
Kingdom?”. To determine overall response to this question, the responses were converted to a Likert 
scale, with ‘lower occurrence’ being given a value of ‘1’, ‘same rate of occurrence’ being given a value 
of ‘2’, and ‘greater occurrence’ equal to ‘3’, and the mean calculated. Table 5.15 demonstrates the 
difference in responses depending on type of climate change impact. The table has been ordered from 
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Table 5.14 - Highest proportions of social groups, between the ages of 16 and 24, that believe 
listed impacts are going to have an impact in the United Kingdom within the next 15 to 20 years 
 Social Grade Gender Area Ethnicity 
Rising sea levels 
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AB = upper middle class and middle class; C1 = lower middle class; C2 = skilled working class; * = Significant 
at the 90 percent significance; ** = Significant at the 95 percent significance. 
Source: Data Adapted from BEIS (2019b). Full Data Breakdown is Available in Appendix Y. 
Table 5.15 demonstrates that the respondents more frequently believed the most likely occurring 
impact of climate change in the future within the United Kingdom will be ‘flooding’ with a mean value 
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of 2.88; only five of the respondents believed that flooding will be become less of a problem in the 
future due to climate change. Their perception in this instance conforms to the majority of the studies 
highlighting that flooding is going to become an increasingly common occurrence in the future. For 
most impacts listed, the respondents are expecting that they will increase at varying levels. The only 
exception is ‘problems with water availability’, where most of the respondents believe that it will 
remain the same. 
Table 5.15 – Respondents perception of what impacts will occur within the United Kingdom in the 
future due to climate change 
 Lower 
Occurrence 
















































































































N = 1,134 
Source: Author 
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5.5. Perception of Climate Change as a Serious Problem? 
The results show that the British public generally think that the United Kingdom is already being 
impacted by climate change, albeit with varying views on how that has been occurring and how it will 
occur in the future. This raises the further question as to whether, although they think that it is already 
happening, do they think that climate change is a serious problem. 
The Eurobarometer has been recording how serious a problem civil society across the European Union 
has viewed climate change between 2008 and 2019. The respondents were asked “how serious a 
problem do you think climate change is at this moment?”. These results were collected using a Likert 
Scale between 1 and 10 [1= Not at all a serious problem, 10 = An extremely serious problem]. 
Table 5.16 demonstrates the top five countries overall within the European Union for the levels of 
how serious civil society in each view climate change for the previous two Eurobarometer surveys in 
2017 and 2019. It shows that that for both dates, the United Kingdom has been constantly scoring 
lower concern scores compared to several other European Union countries. This is demonstrated 
within the latest Eurobarometer survey from April 2019, which shows that the United Kingdom was 
seventeenth out of twenty-eight countries, and was averaging a mean score of 1.07 behind Spain, the 
highest scoring country. This gap is fairly constant, as the gap in 2017 was 1.02; however, the United 
Kingdom gained seven positions in the intervening period with an expanding heterogeneity in how 
serious a problem climate change is viewed across the European Union. 
Table 5.16 – Top five countries within the European Union and the United Kingdom for 2017 and 
2019 in ranking perception of how serious a problem climate change is currently viewed 
2017  2019 
 Country Mean  Country Mean 
1  Spain 8.21 1  Malta 8.90 
2  Greece 8.19 2  Spain 8.55 




4  Cyprus 8.33 
 Hungary 5  Hungary 8.31 
24  United Kingdom 7.19 17  United Kingdom 7.83 
-  European Union 7.59  -  European Union 7.88 
Source: Data Adapted from Eurobarometer (2017) and Eurobarometer (2019). Full Figures are 
demonstrated in Appendix D. 
The United Kingdom based perception of how serious a problem climate change is currently has not 
been constant. This is shown in both Table 5.16 and Figure 5.10. Figure 5.10 demonstrates that 
between 2008 and 2019 there are two main stages to the levels of seriousness that the British 
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respondents had about climate change. The first stage is the decline from the start of the survey in 
April 2008 to December 2013, where the mean score dropped from 7.01 to 6.09. The next stage is the 
recovery of the perception score from December 2013, with the score rising from 6.09 to 7.83 in April 
2019. This data is consistent with the likelihood of at least two ‘social tipping points’ in the last decade 
and half. 
Within climate change studies, tipping points are regularly and increasingly talked about in terms of 
an environmental issue. However, it needs to be analysed as to what way there is an actual social 
tipping point within climate change studies. Milkoreit et al. (2018, p.10) defines social tipping points 
as “self-reinforcing positive feedback mechanisms, that inevitably and often irreversibly lead to a 
qualitatively different state of the social system”. This thesis provides evidence consistent with this 
definition, in that data is suggesting the possibility of there being a self-reinforcing feedback 
mechanism that can be controlled by numerous external focuses, including extreme meteorological 
events, controversy, activism or media coverage. It demonstrates also that changes in perception are 
inevitable. 
In relation to Figure 5.10, the first tipping point occurred at some point before 2009. Though this is 
before the available data, this social tipping point of climate change has been observed in numerous 
previous studies from roughly this time period, when there was an increase in climate scepticism, 
especially within Australia (Connor and Higginbotham, 2013), Germany (Ratter, Philipp and von 
Storch, 2012), the United Kingdom (Spence et al., 2010; Corner et al., 2011), and the United States 
(Shwartz, 2010; Leiserowitz et al., 2014). There have been other studies in recent years that speculate 
as to why this occurred. The first reason, as highlighted in Section 3.2.2, is due to extremely cold and 
snowy weather within the United States and Europe (Perkins, 2010; Moser and Dilling, 2011; Capstick 
and Pidgeon, 2014a). A secondary potential cause was the state of the economy; past research 
reported by Kahn and Kotchen (2010) demonstrated that higher levels of unemployment have a 
positive association to lower levels of environmental concerns. This is linked to the ‘finite pool of 
worry’ theory as backed up by Weber (2010). However, as highlighted earlier in this chapter, there are 
some questions as to whether the ‘finite pool of worry’ effect is strong. Despite the aftermath of Brexit 
and the economic uncertainty it is bringing, and in addition to the increased number of terrorist 
attacks within the United Kingdom and Europe as a whole in the mid-2010s, the level of concern with 
climate, as observed within Figure 5.10, continued to rise following its earlier decline. The third theory 
was the controversy that surrounded ‘climategate’, but as demonstrated within Section 3.3.3.2, 
researchers believed that this impact was only short-lived (Anderegg and Goldsmith, 2014). The final 
theory is the lower levels of media coverage during that period (Leiserowitz et al., 2013), and Boykoff 
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(2011) demonstrates that apart from one month in 2009 [which was the time of the Copenhagen COP 
conference], there was a decline in the amount of media coverage that climate change received in 
both the United Kingdom and the United States from 2007. This would have an impact, as highlighted 
within Chapter 3.2. The institutional media has previously been the most important way to 
disseminate scientific information about climate change. However, while it is becoming less important 
with the advent of social media, it remains an important tool in communicating climate science with 
the public. 
The current trajectory is suggesting that climate change scepticism is still declining. However, it is 
unwise to speculate on the future trajectory, as past research has shown that events can play an 
influential role in forming the national psyche towards climate change perception and therefore its 
engagement. 
 
Figure 5.10 – Mean Perception Score for the British Respondents to the question “How Serious a 
Problem is Climate Change?” 
Blue Diamonds = Observation Data; Black line = Trend Line 
Source: Data Adapted from Eurobarometer (2008); Eurobarometer (2009); Eurobarometer (2011); 
Eurobarometer (2013); Eurobarometer (2015); Eurobarometer (2017); Eurobarometer (2019) 
As highlighted within Table 5.14, there are apparent major differences in the perception of how 
serious the public of each nation believe climate change is currently. However, this difference can be 
more localised within the borders of a country, as so often demonstrated within the United States. 
Figure 5.11 demonstrates the perception score on the seriousness of climate change using the NUTS1 
[Nomenclature d’Unités Territoriales Statistiques] break down of the different regions. It can be 
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observed that within the United Kingdom, there are regions, such as Cornwall and Northern Ireland, 
which are ranked within the top category within the map of the European Union regards believing 
that climate change is a serious problem. In contrast, North East of England and ‘Yorkshire and the 
Humber’ are ranked much lower and have similar scores to those recorded in Eastern Europe and the 
most northern extremes of Europe. The striking story that the map tells is the level of differences that 
can be observed within the map with contrasting regions often next to each other. This highlights that 
each area has a unique balance of factors that influence perception, and therefore should highlight to 
the scientific/academic community trying to communicate climate change to the public that a rigid, 
one approach model would not be successful in trying to get the public more engaged with climate 
change. 
 
Figure 5.11 – Seriousness of the Climate Change problem as viewed Across the European Union in 
April 2019 at NUTS1 (Nomenclature d’Unités Territoriales Statistiques) Level 
Source: Data Adapted from Eurobarometer (2019) 
207 | P a g e  
 
Figure 5.12 demonstrates the difference in between the age groups between April 2008 and April 
2019. The data shows that young people [15-24] have throughout the eleven years period been the 
third out of the four age groups for concern of climate change within the United Kingdom. This 
demonstrates whilst young people are concerned about climate change, compared to other age 
groups they have not constantly viewed it as a serious problem compared to the older counterparts. 
The results in Figure 5.12 is constant with the results from the earlier sections of this chapter; that the 
most elderly respondents within the survey are typically least likely to think that climate change is a 
serious problem compared to other age groups. However, the reduction observed pre-2013 is not as 
large compared to other age groups. In addition, the overall divide between the age groups has 
reduced in recent years, with it now standing at 0.19 compared to 1.32 in April 2008. 
 
Figure 5.12 – Mean Perception Score for British Respondents to the question “How Serious a 
Problem is Climate Change?” based upon Age Groups 
Source: Data Adapted from Eurobarometer (2008); Eurobarometer (2009); Eurobarometer (2011); 
Eurobarometer (2013); Eurobarometer (2015); Eurobarometer (2017); Eurobarometer (2019) 
When the youth of the United Kingdom are compared to other European Union countries, it can be 
observed within Table 5.17 that they are ranked quite low down in 22nd and 17th place in June 2017 
and April 2019, respectively. The gap below Malta, the top ranked country at both dates, is slowly 
closing from 1.21 to 0.94 in the intervening two-year period. This means that the difference between 
the younger respondents and the overall responses are becoming quite similar in comparison to other 
countries. 
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Table 5.17 – Top five countries within the European Union and the United Kingdom for 2017 and 
2019 in ranked perception of how serious a problem climate change is currently viewed for 
respondents aged 15 to 24 years old 
2017  2019 
 Country Mean  Country Mean 
1  Malta 8.37 1  Malta 8.82 
2  Greece 8.29 2  Italy 8.71 
3  Italy 8.26 3  Spain 8.62 
4  Spain 8.23 4  Hungary 8.52 
5  Sweden 8.16 5  Denmark 8.49 
22  United Kingdom 7.16 17  United Kingdom 7.88 
-  European Union 7.51  -  European Union 7.90 
Source: Data Adapted from Eurobarometer (2017) and Eurobarometer (2019). Full Figures are 
demonstrated in Appendix D. 
Lastly, the Eurobarometer data allows us to compare socio group differences in the responses. Within 
the latest data, females within the United Kingdom were more likely to think that climate change was 
a serious problem compared to their male counterparts [7.95 versus 7.73]. This is consistent with 
Section 3.2.1.2 that highlighted that females are generally more concerned with environmental issues, 
such as climate change, albeit some of the data in the thesis shows this to be a barely significant 
difference. In terms of political identification, it was found that the further left the voter, the higher 
they score in terms of acknowledging the seriousness of climate change, with the average for a left-
wing voter scoring 8.21 compared 7.09 for a right-wing voter. These results are consistent with past 
research (Whitmarsh, 2011; Unsworth and Fielding, 2014; Milfont et al., 2015; Poortinga et al., 2019; 
Ballew et al., 2020), which suggest that there is some kind of political polarisation in climate change 
perception within the United Kingdom. 
 
5.6. The Role of Terminology in Climate Change Perception 
As highlighted in chapter three, the terms “climate change” and “global warming” have often been 
interchanged, especially by the media. In recent years, the media have moved more towards the term 
“climate change”. This is important as past research has shown that within the United Kingdom the 
images conveyed by each of the two terms are different amongst the public. Whitmarsh (2009) 
highlights that the term “climate change” is often associated with numerous impacts on the climate, 
impacts that have already occurred, and are of natural origins. Meanwhile, the research highlights the 
term “global warming” as often alluding to warm temperature impacts (e.g., melting of ice and 
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increases in temperatures), is of anthropogenic origins associated with greenhouse gas emissions and 
has been mistakenly mis-associated with ozone depletion alone. The issue of using the ‘global 
warming’ term is that when an area experiences colder weather than normal it can almost feel 
contradictory. This can lead sceptics to air their negative opinions about the issue. An example of this 
has been observed in the United States in the past when, for example, Donald Trump in 2011 tweeted 
“It snowed over 4 inches this past weekend in New York City. It is still October. So much for Global 
Warming.” (Trump, 2011, Online). 
 
5.6.1. Personal Use of Terminologies 
Different climate terminology can evoke certain images, such as for example, ‘global warming’ usually 
evokes an image of warm temperatures, whereas climate change can produce an image of more 
extreme meteorological events, such as storms. Consequently, differing people are using one term 
over the other, producing a varied national narrative that influences the perception of climate change. 
Respondents to the first thesis questionnaire [in 2017] were asked what term they use to describe the 
“current perceived change in the climate?” 
As demonstrated in Table 5.18, the most popular choice was “climate change” at 60.67 per cent; with 
global warming second at 38.36 per cent of the responses. This demonstrates that there is a split in 
the public discourse about what to call “climate change”. It is also demonstrated that eight 
respondents or 0.71 per cent, stated that the current perceived change in the climate is due to global 
cooling; the reason why some are still using this terminology is explored in Section 5.3.3. 
Table 5.18 – Overall response in the first questionnaire to the term respondents use to describe the 
current change in the climate 
Response Number of Responses Percentage 
Climate Change 688 60.7% 
Global Cooling 8 0.7% 
Global Warming 435 38.4% 
Refused 3 0.3% 
Total 1,134 100.0% 
Source: Author 
As with the previous sections, it is likely that there are differences depending on respondent’s socio-
economic circumstances. Therefore, the rest of this sub-section will explore these factors further to 
further exposing factors pertinent to understanding a myriad of influences in the perception, 
engagement and overall response nexus. 
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The results in Table 5.19 demonstrate an increase in the number of respondents that use the term 
‘climate change’, which is highest within the ’35-44’ age group, at 68.7 per cent. After this peak, the 
overall proportion that uses the term climate change is lower, with the age group ‘65+’ having a similar 
response to the ’18-24’ age groups. Young people are significantly less likely to use the term ‘climate 
change’ compared to the ’35-44’ age group (χ2=3.873, p=0.049**). 
Table 5.19 – Response in the first questionnaire to the term respondents use to describe the 
current change in the climate based upon the age groups 
Response 18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+ Sig. 

















































Total 163 151 115 168 230 302  
Sig. = Significance; N = 1,129 
Source: Author 
It can be observed within Table 5.20 that males are more likely to use the term ‘climate change’ 
compared to their female counterparts by five per cent. This suggests that males are statistically more 
likely to use the ‘climate change’ term within normal conversation compared to females (χ2=2.788, 
p=0.095*). This is despite using a statistical difference test to compare all groups; it was found that 
there was no significant difference as demonstrated in Table 5.18. The proportion of responses 
indicating the term ‘Global Cooling’ is similar, both being just 0.7 per cent. 
Table 5.20 – Response in the first questionnaire to the term respondents use to describe the 
current change in the climate based on gender 
Response Female Male Sig. 

















Total 448 677  
Sig. = Significance; N = 1,125. Source: Author 
211 | P a g e  
 
5.6.2. Google Searches 
An effective way to tracking what people are calling a change in climate is by looking at the history of 
Google searchers by using an online package called ‘Google Trends’. Figure 5.13 demonstrates the 
popularity score of ‘climate change’, ‘global warming’, ‘global cooling’, and ‘climate emergency’ 
between January 2004 and July 2020 within the United Kingdom. The inclusion of ‘climate emergency’ 
is due to the increased discussion of this term in 2019 by prominent news agencies. The values within 
Figure 5.13 are between 0 and 100. A value of 100 demonstrates that the term was the highest 
searched of all the terms; a value of 50 means it was roughly half as searched as the 100 value. A value 
of 0 means that the term was searched so few times within the United Kingdom, that Google Trends 
could not register a response. 
The general observation throughout the sixteen and half year period demonstrated in Figure 5.13 is 
that in the early years the term ‘global warming’ was for most months the most searched term about 
the change in the climate.  The term ‘climate change’ was searched more frequently than ‘global 
warming’ only five times in the first five years between 2004 and 2008, with all of these been observed 
in the month of August. The change of the popular used terms starts to be observed in 2009 onwards, 
when the search terms were similarly searched until 2014. At this stage, it becomes clearer that the 
term ‘climate change’ was searched more regularly than ‘global warming’. 
Overall, the British public searching using these terms followed a general decline throughout the late 
2000s and the early to the mid-2010s for ‘climate change’ and global warming’. This coincides with 
what has been considered in this thesis as a period of declining concern with climate change amongst 
the civil society in United Kingdom [perception] and a decline in media coverage (Boykoff, 2011) and 
this will be explored within Section 5.9. However, in recent years there has been an increase of 
concern with climate change amongst civil society and this has coincided with an increase in the search 
of the topic on Google.  This suggests that perception of climate change and engagement in searching 
for climate change related terms can be a two-way system. That whilst high levels of climate change 
can drive engagement of climate change, the relationship is paralleled by engagement of climate 
change to research the issue (such as reflected in online searches) drives up concern and perception 
of climate change. 
212 | P a g e  
 
 
Figure 5.13 – Google Web Searches within the United Kingdom for Terms Climate Change, Global 
Warming, Global Cooling and Climate Emergency between January 2004 and July 2020 
Source: Data Adapted from Google Trends (2020). Full values are available in Appendix AC. 
In addition to the usage and consequent understanding of climate change throughout the time period, 
this aspect of the research allows analysis of when climate change was most talked about within the 
United Kingdom. This is demonstrated with the large spike for communications about ‘global warming’ 
in March 2007. The most likely explanation of this spike is the release of a polemical documentary film 
called “The Great Global Warming Swindle” by Channel 4. This film will be discussed more in Section 
5.9 of this thesis. In addition, there was another spike in the previous month, due to the release of Al 
Gore’s documentary film “An Inconvenient Truth” winning two awards at the Academy Awards. 
To further demonstrate how events can result in engagement of the public to search for climate 
change related terms, there were two spikes for the term ‘climate change’ in November/December 
2015 and November 2016. Both spikes are likely to be due to Agreement and Effective of the Climate 
Change Paris Agreement, respectively. 
In addition, it can be observed that since late 2018, there has been a large increase in the amount of 
searching of the term ‘climate change’, and it is at its most sustained level since the late 2000s. This is 
likely to do with the increase of climate activism that has occurred both within the United Kingdom 
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the activist Greta Thunberg. These groups and individual will be discussed in much greater detail in 
Chapter Seven. 
The term ‘global cooling’ was rarely searched throughout the period, with only a few times in sporadic 
intervals that this term receives popularity score of 1. The most recent score of 1 was during the winter 
of 2009-10, which happened to coincide with the unusually snowy and cold winter that occurred 
across the whole of the United Kingdom. This is perhaps is a demonstration that extreme 
meteorological events, as well as activism and political events, can influence the number of times the 
public search for climate related terms. 
Lastly, the term ‘climate emergency’, before 2019 was ranked with a popularity score of 0, indicating 
that virtually nobody was searching for this term on Google. However, there has since been an 
increase in its usage, but despite being named as the Oxford Dictionary Word of the Year for 2019 
(Zhou, 2019), it only scored 4 at its peak in May 2019.  This timing of this peak coincided with its 
informal declaration by the UK Parliament. In addition, as with all the other terms, the search 
frequency of the term ‘climate emergency’ reduced back to a score of 1, returning nearly back to pre-
2019 levels. Arguably, this demonstrates that despite all the hype that was building around this term 
by activists and the media, the public are still using the terms that had been set out by scientists and 
academics. 
 
5.6.3. Personal Perception of Change Associated with Each Term 
Whilst the public are confirmed here to have different imagery, and consequent perceptions, 
associated with the terms ‘climate change’ and ‘global warming’, as had been approached by 
Whitmarsh (2009), previous research had not extended to what the public think is the cause of each 
phenomena. Therefore, the respondents were asked within the first questionnaire “what do you think 
is the cause of both climate change and global warming?”. The respondents were given the same three 
choices within Section 5.6.1 [‘Natural Processes’, ‘Human Processes’, and ‘Both Human and Natural 
Processes’]. This question can determine whether the respondents really do see the two main terms 
differently in terms of their causes. It should be noted, that for this section the term ‘global cooling’ 
was not used. It does not have widespread usage within the academic literature as research has shown 
the planet is warming. 
Table 5.21 demonstrates that for both terms, the majority believe the underlining causes are both 
‘natural and human processes’, albeit with differences in the proportions of responses. For example, 
with the term climate change, respondents were significantly more likely to believe that it is due a 
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mixture of both natural and human processes [59.6 per cent] compared the term global warming [50.7 
per cent] (χ2=4.467, p=0.035**). There was a significant difference between the two terms for every 
different potential climate related process. The data suggests that, where respondents consider 
natural processes or combined natural and human processes, they are significantly more likely to refer 
to climate change, and where they consider human processes alone in this context, they are 
significantly more likely to refer to global warming (10.5 per cent difference). 



























Total 1,134 1,134   
* = Significant at the 90 per cent significance; ** = Significant at the 95 per cent significance; *** = Significant 
at the 99 per cent significance. Note – Not all columns add up exactly to 100 per cent due to rounding error. 
Source: Author 
Regarding the thoughts and beliefs of the youngest age group, there are some significant differences 
compared to the other age groups as demonstrated within Table 5.22. The proportion of respondents 
that believe the term climate change is associated with human processes reduces from 31.4 per cent 
for the age groups above 24 years old to 26.4 per cent for the age group 18 to 24 years old. 
The younger generation are significantly less likely to believe that global warming is due to natural 
processes [4.1 per cent difference], whilst at the same time, they are significantly more likely to 
believe it is due to human processes [8.5 per cent difference]. It should also be noted that the younger 
generation is more likely to use the term ‘global warming’ proportionally compared to other age 
groups, as demonstrated within Table 5.17. This suggests the younger generation have a higher belief 
that human processes are causing the current change in the climate [albeit just 43.7 per cent for 18–
24 year-olds compared to the 41.4 per cent for 25+]. Also, as demonstrated within Table 5.3, it is 
suggesting that younger people consider (through image perception of the terminology) that global 
warming is more exclusively due to human processes. 
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Table 5.22 – Respondents [aged 18-24] belief in causation behind the terms ‘Climate Change’ and 
‘Global Warming’ in 2017, and as compared with other age groups 
 Climate 
Change 
Global Warming Significance 
Result Diff. Result Diff. 

























Total 163 163   
** = Significant at the 95 per cent significance; *** = Significant at the 99 per cent significance. Note – Not all 




O’Neill and Nicholson-Cole (2009) highlight that climate change fear has been used extensively in the 
past within the United Kingdom to promote climate change to the public. Examples of this have been 
within the Green Party’s election manifesto, which included the term “climate emergency” (Green 
Party, 2019); or the name of a protest group [“Extinction Rebellion”]. 
Research in the past has shown that the media like to use the fear factor as it increases 
newsworthiness of the issue as they link to the threats to humanity (Weingart, Engels and Pansegray, 
2000). However, recent research has demonstrated that this approach might be contributing to 
negative engagement due to eco-anxiety (Nugent, 2019; Sharman and Nunn, 2019). 
Accordingly, the respondents within the first questionnaire were asked “how fearful are you of both 
climate change and global warming?”. The responses were registered using a Likert Scale, with a score 
of ‘1’ meaning that they were not fearful at all; and ‘5’ meaning that there were very fearful. This was 
to see what level of fearfulness is associated with the two concepts. 
Table 5.23 demonstrates that overall, the respondents are slightly more fearful about global warming 
[3.75] compared to climate change [3.73] but not significantly so. However, the high means suggest 
that the public are quite fearful of both phenomena, which, as highlighted earlier could mean they are 
at increased risk of eco-anxiety. As this survey was undertaken in 2017, and before the peak in climate 
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change interest due the climate activism in 2019, there will need to be further research in the future 
to see if this level of fearfulness amongst the British public is increasing. 
Table 5.23 – Fearful scoring for ‘Climate Change’ and ‘Global Warming’ based upon differing socio-
economic groups 
 Climate Change Global Warming Sig. 
Mean S.D. Skew. Kurt. Mean S.D. Skew. Kurt. 
Overall 3.73 1.088 -1.026 0.607 3.75 1.112 -1.040 0.553 0.456 
Age 
18-24 3.88 0.935 -1.009 1.074 3.86 1.012 -1.069 0.883 0.771 
25-34 3.79 0.933 -1.124 1.592 3.87 0.869 -1.117 1.949 0.132 
35-44 3.78 1.082 -1.328 1.505 3.80 1.102 -1.355 1.556 0.639 
45-54 3.68 1.110 -0.936 0.353 3.69 1.089 -0.885 0.311 0.649 
55-64 3.71 1.132 -1.011 0.405 3.72 1.155 -1.023 0.352 0.548 
65+ 3.63 1.185 -0.874 0.041 3.64 1.244 -0.878 -0.124 0.687 
Gender 
Male 3.67 1.121 -0.969 0.363 3.67 1.164 -0.954 0.194 0.894 
Female 3.81 1.037 -1.105 1.012 3.86 1.026 -1.147 1.175 0.245 
Ethnicity 
White 3.73 1.092 -0.992 0.520 3.74 1.116 -1.015 0.482 0.593 
Ethnic Minority 3.71 1.089 -1.208 1.042 3.73 1.114 -1.146 0.844 0.711 
Household Income 
<£10,000 3.56 1.125 -0.992 0.363 3.69 1.117 -1.092 0.645 0.159 
£10,000 - £19,999 3.80 1.060 -1.041 0.798 3.76 1.131 -0.931 0.236 0.298 
£20,000 - £29,999 3.71 1.142 -1.120 0.624 3.75 1.124 -1.086 0.612 0.530 
£30,000 - £39,999 3.72 1.106 -0.967 0.415 3.72 1.136 -1.022 0.507 0.814 
£40,000 - £49,999 3.69 1.003 -1.010 1.098 3.72 1.029 -1.091 1.181 0.241 
>£49,999 3.77 1.082 -1.033 0.660 3.77 1.112 -1.057 0.586 1.000 
S.D. = Standard Deviation; Skew. = Skewness; Kurt. = Kurtosis; Sig. = Significance. 
Source: Author 
In addition to this, it was found that there were no significant differences between the two terms 
within the different socio-economic factors that were researched. Therefore, it is suggested here that 
most of the public view the two terms just as important as each other and are fearful of the impacts 
of either. 
The issue of fearfulness and its potential role in perception of climate change, as detected from this 
research and the results presented in Table 5.23, is summarised as follows: 
• The most fearful of ’climate change’ are those who are aged between 18 and 24 years; female; 
of white ethnicity; and who have a household income of between £10,000 and £19,999. 
• The most fearful of ‘global warming’ are those who are aged between 25 and 34 years; female; 
of white ethnicity; and have a household income of over £49,999. 
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5.6.5. Ongoing Discussion on Terminology 
As highlighted previously, both ‘global warming’ and ‘climate change’ have their own technical 
definitions and have been interchanged in the media. However, it has become apparent that the 
interchange of these two terms can lead to confusion and scepticism. As some individuals believe that 
when the weather is cold, the educational sector calls it ‘climate change’ and use ‘global warming’ for 
when extreme heat and rainfall events occur.  
However, as highlighted in the previous few sub-sections, there is a further term, “Global Cooling”. 
The term was extensively used in the 1970s, especially in the United States media, to explain the 
change in the climate. Whilst most of the scientific community were already publishing research about 
“global warming”, there were media reports through several major publications, such as the New York 
Times and the Washington Post, which give accentuation to some research about ‘global cooling’ as a 
topic of the time, some of which is reflected in Table 5.10. This has resulted in influencing some people 
to be climate sceptics. For example, respondent CCAA1432 highlights that “scientists have been 
predicting that an Ice Age is coming and I was taught this sixty years ago at school … nothing has 
changed” [Male, 65+, East Midlands] and respondent CCAB0046 who say that they remember being 
“told that we were all facing a new ice age – early 60’s” [Male, 65+, East of England]. From the 
qualitative elements of this research, these types of arguments demonstrate scepticism about climate 
change and are more common reactions from the more elderly respondents. 
However, this argument and the earlier discussion regarding the interchange of the terms ‘climate 
change’ and ‘global warming’ are indicative issue of perception for the academic community to take 
on board going forward, since it can be argued that perception and reality are crucial influences on 
understanding varying forms of engagement. Should, for example climate change mitigation and 
adaptation strategies focus on communication of the issue of climate change using just one defining 
term, instead of several? It is already apparent that the interchanging of the terms has been and 
remains a breeding ground for climate scepticism. 
5.7. Uncertainty 
As discussed within preceding chapters of this thesis, climate change poses serious long-term global 
environmental damage and threats toward nature and humanity. The issue was discovered by the 
scientific community, which in turn defined the issue using scientific measurements, which is 
communicated through the media towards the public. However, since climate change is a slow onset 
disaster trajectory that is difficult or near impossible to be directly ‘seen’ or experienced over shorter 
time frames (rapid onset events are seen as exceptional), the scientific community become reliant on 
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the media [both traditional and social] to communicate these risks to the public. This process then 
becomes significant in driving an individual’s perception towards climate change, as to whether it is a 
serious and authentic threat. The previous sections of this chapter highlighted that the majority 
currently believe in anthropogenic climate change and that this threat is great, but there is 
heterogeneity in responses. This is similar to what has been described in the first three chapters of 
thesis, which recognised that there is still some disagreement on the causes and the threats of climate 
change within the scientific community and elected officials, in relation to which some respondents 
draw arguments consistent with the sceptics. 
In theory, it can be expected that visual evidence and overall opinion of those considered to be climate 
experts can stipulate to the public that anthropogenically induced climate change is verity. This is 
reinforced due to individual meteorological events that are now more clearly tending to be associated 
with climate change. This has already been demonstrated by Bibbings (2004, p.2) within Wales who 
highlighted that 85 per cent of the respondents believed that changes in weather patterns could be 
“proof of changing climate”. 
On the contrary, some people acknowledge that there are differences between the forms of evidence 
provided. This is demonstrated by respondent CCAB0021, who states that “more research required. 
Climate and weather are different, and I think that this difference is forgotten” [Male, 55-64, East of 
England]. Respondent [OLA048] stated something similar, when asked within the first questionnaire 
if being affected by an extreme meteorological condition changed their perception of climate change; 
they stated that “Single weather events cannot be representative of climate change, long-term 
regional and global trends are” [Male, 35-44, Unknown]. This is a point backed up by the scientific 
community who have in the past been very careful to try to communicate this. However, the imagery 
of the event that is fresh in the mind means psychologically that a respondent thinks it has just 
happened, and then by deduction that it could happen again. 
As Lewis and Gallant (2013, Online) stated “in science, the only certainty is uncertainty”. Despite all 
the research that has been conducted in the last thirty plus years about climate change, as highlighted 
within the latest IPCC report, there is a small degree of uncertainty. But, as highlighted in numerous 
studies there is overwhelming belief in anthropogenic climate change amongst the scientific 
community (Cook et al., 2013). Most of the uncertainty within the science of climate change is with 
regards to exact impacts on both humanity and the natural ecosystem at both the regional and local 
levels (Dessai and Hulme, 2007; Field et al., 2014). Despite all this supportive evidence that the 
educational sector has given in recent years, as demonstrated in earlier chapters, there are some 
media outlets that report on this uncertainty as disagreements about the cause and severity of the 
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current climate change amongst the scientific community, and this is used within the political world. 
This uncertainty has influenced the public perception of climate change. Chapter three demonstrated 
that these uncertainties by scientists and politicians get amplified through the media, which has 
created controversy about the issue. This has led some people amongst wider society to be confused 
about what to believe about climate change leading to respondents, such as CCAA0478, stating that 
there is “a lot of differing information and hard to know what to believe and it's very frustrating” 
[Male, 18-24, North East England]. This respondent is not alone, within the BEIS questionnaires in 
March 2020, it was found that 26.4 per cent overall agree strongly with the statement that “there is 
so much conflicting information about climate change, it is difficult to know what to believe”; this is 
an increase of 1.6 per cent from March 2019. These results are demonstrated in more detail in Figure 
5.14. It shows that this increase in responses that agree strongly to the fourth statement provided 
were not significant (χ2=1.708, p=0.191).  However, the science education sector is overall trying to 
send a clear and simple message about climate change, as it is seemingly being challenged by non-
experts, such as those listed in Chapter One and by some sections of the media. The residual 
uncertainty is likely to continue to confuse the public as to what they personally should be undertaking 
next to help mitigate against the threat that climate change is projected to have on the United 
Kingdom. 
 
Figure 5.14 – Overall Perception About Whether There Is Too Much Conflicting Information on 
Climate Change in Both March 2019 and March 2020 
Source: Data Adapted from BEIS (2019b) and BEIS (2020b) 
The results from BEIS (2019a) dataset were also used in Table 5.24 by merging the agree options and 
disagree options. The mean values, using five different options were converted into a Likert Scale for 
this exercise; with 1 meaning that they strongly agree and 5 meaning that they strongly disagree. It 
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should also be noted that those who had a response of ‘Don’t Know’ were not included in the mean 
score.  
Table 5.24 – Perception about whether there is too much conflicting information on climate 
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Table 5.24 – Perception about whether there is too much conflicting information on climate 





































































































* = Significant at the 90 per cent significance; ** = Significant at the 95 per cent significance; *** = Significant 
at the 99 per cent significance. Note – Not all columns add up exactly to 100 per cent due to rounding error. 
Source: Data Adapted from BEIS (2019b) 
Table 5.22 demonstrates that, except for the age group 35-44, the higher the age group, the more 
respondents believe that there is too much conflicting information about climate change. 
Those who are above 65, of white ethnicity, live in a rural area, are of social grade DE, and have a 
household income less than £16,000 are the most likely to believe there is too much conflicting 
information on climate change. Again, as highlighted earlier in the chapter, the over 65 age group, of 
social grade DE and living near the breadline are the most vulnerable to extreme meteorological 
events that climate change is expected to make frequent. This is concerning here as conflicting 
information leads to confusion about the level of threat. As highlighted within Table 5.11, similar 
groups are also amongst the lowest representing their views about the severity of the threat that 
climate change is having on the United Kingdom. Whilst no information about education was recorded 
within the BEIS datasets, those who are more elderly and are of social grade DE are typically individuals 
with lower levels of education. 
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The previous quote and these results are likely to be in part a product of manufactured uncertainty. 
Manufactured uncertainty is a tactic that has been used by industries to either delay or prevent 
regulations on environmental protection (Michaels and Monforton, 2005), such as climate change. 
This is a strategy that was first deployed by the tobacco industry and is now being used for other 
regulations to promote the fact that science has some uncertainty or is flawed (Michaels and 
Monforton, 2005). However, a potential further effect is that this inserts doubt amongst society about 
how the science behind climate change is being vindicated. An example of the contradictions that both 
fuel but also expose the uncertainly is demonstrated by ExxonMobil, who have been known to be 
aware of climate change and its severity as early as 1977, but who created Global Climate Coalition 
which have questioned the well-established science of climate change (Hall, 2015). 
 
5.8. Scientific Consensus 
As highlighted, uncertainty, especially manufactured uncertainty, can have an impact on trust and the 
public perception surrounding the scientific consensus on ‘controversial’ issues pertinent to civil 
society, such as climate change. This does not account for the scientific consensus on climate change. 
Scientific consensus about issues such as climate change is fundamental to being able to create a 
perception of such issues (Lewandowsky, Gignac and Vaughan, 2013), which in turn will give 
foundations for the civil society and politicians to start taking actions in either mitigating and/or 
adapting to the issue; this process is termed by some as the ‘The Gateway Belief Model’ (van der 
Linden et al., 2015). Recent research has shown that even a small dissent amongst the scientific 
community about scientific issues can enfeeble the support of civil society within the issue of concern. 
Past research has demonstrated that there are 97 per cent of climate scientists that agree 
anthropogenic activity is the main cause of the current change in the climate (Cook et al., 2013), but 
there a variation in this percentage depending on the study and this produces the risk of inaction.  
Despite this high level of scientific consensus, and reporting of climate change within the media, 
debate about the cause of current climate change persists (examples are given in Table 3.3 and 5.8). 
To gain in indication of proportions of the public that believe there is a scientific consensus on climate 
change respondents in the first questionnaire were asked “what do you think is the percentage of 
climate scientists that believe humans are causing climate change/global warming?”. The respondents 
were given five different options with 20 per cent intervals between the options. Figure 5.15 
demonstrates the breakdown of what the respondents felt climate scientists believed about 
anthropogenic climate change. 
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It was found that the most chosen response, was ‘80-100%’ (46.8 per cent). In addition, it was found 
that most of the respondents believed that there was majority consensus that climate change was 
occurring (74.5 per cent). A similar study was conducted by Leiserowitz et al. (2019a) within the United 
States, which found that only 33 percent went for 80-100 per cent. A part of the reason for this 
difference is due to the high level of respondents within the United States’ study which chose the 
‘Don’t Know’ option, with 22 per cent choosing this option, compared to 1.5 per cent within this study. 
This suggests that there was a significant difference between the two countries in the belief in a 
scientific consensus. However, the Leiserowitz et al. (2019a, p.9) study highlights that there has been 
an increasing level of respondents, showing that Americans believe that “most scientists think global 
warming is happening”. In the future, researchers of this type of scientific consensus data will need to 
monitor this information within the United Kingdom in a similar approach undertaken by the United 
States in recent years. It is important to note that the scientific consensus plays a fundamental role in 
the formation of climate change perception amongst civil society. 
A similar question was asked in a study by Steentjes et al. (2017), which it found that 30 per cent of 
respondents within the United Kingdom said the scientific consensus of climate change is above 80 
per cent. This represents a 16.1 per cent difference between the two results, which were taken roughly 
a year apart. This could be because of three possible reasons. The first reason may be due to the lack 
of ‘don’t know’ answers within this study compared to Steentjes et al. (2017), which was 11 percent 
compared to the 1.5 within the first questionnaire of this thesis. The second potential reason for the 
difference is due to a difference in the sampling method between the two studies. The final potential 
reason could be a real increase in the proportion of the public who thinks there is an ‘80+’ per cent 
consensus about climate change amongst the scientific community. This is possible, as Figure 5.15 
showed that the overall view on the seriousness of climate change has been increasing since 2013 
within the United Kingdom across all age groups. 
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Figure 5.15 – Perception in the UK of Scientific Consensus on Climate Change in 2017 
Source: Author 
This sub-section has exposed the differences in overall perception of scientific consensus amongst 
respondents and in comparison, to other studies. The following sub-sections will investigate this 
difference with respect to different socio-demographic groups. 
 
5.8.1. Socio-Economic Differences 
In terms of youth, it is found that 42.9 per cent of the respondents between the age of 18 and 24 
chose the 81-100 per cent consensus choice, below the level for other age groups. However, there is 
a trend beyond this age group, which suggests as the age groups increase, the overall belief of a ’81-
100’ per cent consensus declines, from 60.9 per cent for the ’25-34’ age group to 40.7 per cent within 
the ‘65+’ age group. The difference between the two youngest age group’s responses for the ’81-
100%’ option is 18 per cent and can be concluded as significant (χ2=10.149, p=0.001***). 
For the gender differences, demonstrated within Table 5.25, there was a significant difference at the 
99 per cent significance; with females less likely to believe in an overwhelming scientific consensus 
about climate change. Lastly, for the top option of 81 to 100 per cent scientific consensus, the 
perception rate falls when the household income increases, until after the £30,000 threshold when it 
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Table 5.25 – Perception in the United Kingdom of Scientific Consensus on Climate Change in 2017 
Based upon Different Socio-Economic Groups 







































































































































































































N = 1,134; Sig. = Significance; ** = 95 per cent significance; *** = 99 per cent significance; Note: All 
Percentages might not add up to 100 per cent due to rounding errors. 
Source: Author 
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5.9. Media 
As reviewed throughout Section 3.5, the media is important in communicating the science of climate 
change, as it is the most frequent way to disseminate the message. However, it has also become a 
way to disseminate misinformation about climate change. This has increasingly been the case with the 
advent of social media, which has given many people, including the climate sceptics and deniers, a 
more equal and vocal platform to air their opinions. This raised the question as to whether   the loudest 
media get heard the most. Arguably media can create an uncertainty amongst civil society within the 
United Kingdom and elsewhere, as demonstrated by public understanding of scientific consensus in 
Figure 5.13 and by data presented in Table 5.26. With the prospect of climate change bringing a ghastly 
world, ‘doom and gloom’ headlines may be considered by some as under or over-exaggerated. 
Another interpretation is that the impacts of climate change are presented in a way to catch the 
readers’ attention, along the lines of what was shown in Table 3.3. 
To better evaluate how respondents think the media is exaggerating climate change, in the BEIS 
questionnaires the respondents were asked whether they agree or disagree to whether they believe 
“the media exaggerates the impacts of climate change”. This question used a Likert Scale between 1 
and 5, with 1 meaning ‘Agree Strongly’ and 5 meaning ‘Disagree Strongly’. The overall results from 
March 2019 and March 2020 are demonstrated in Figure 5.16. The data suggests that within both 
March 2019 and 2020, there was a 1.4 percent increase in respondents that believed the media were 
exaggerating the impacts of climate change. However, the dataset provided by the Department for 
BEIS does not indicate which media respondents had been influenced by or which sources appear to 
over or under exaggerate climate change the most. 
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2019 N = 4,224; 2020 N = 1,851 
Figure 5.16 – Agreement that “the media exaggerates the impacts of climate change” 
Source: Data Adapted from BEIS (2019b) and BEIS (2020b) 
In this chapter, it has been determined that there are socio-economic differences in the perceptions 
of the respondents. Therefore, Table 5.24 presents data across the whole sample and is not limited to 
just the ’16-24’ age group, but with low number of respondents within this age group, there is a 
potential for a lack of strength in the results in this instance. 
Nonetheless data in Table 5.26 confirms that the youngest age group are the least likely to believe 
that the media are exaggerating the impacts of climate change (2.05 average); whereas the oldest 
(65+) are the most likely to believe this (1.72 average). The average gap response difference between 
the two age groups is 0.33, and there is a significant difference between these two, at the 99 per cent 
significance (t(821.6)=7.668, p=0.000***). In addition, it can be observed that there is a significant 
difference between each of the socio-economic factors considered here, apart from the area in which 
they reside (urban vs rural). 
In summary these results show that those who think that the media is exaggerating the impacts of 
climate change are those who are over the age of 65, male, of white ethnicity, living in a rural area 
and of social grade C2, having an income of less than £16,000 a year. 
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Table 5.26 – Proportion of Response to the Question “the media exaggerates the impacts of 
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Table 5.26 – Proportion of Response to the Question “the media exaggerates the impacts of 





































































































*** = Significant at the 99 percent significance. Note – Not all columns add up exactly to 100 percent due to 
rounding error. 
Source: Data Adapted from BEIS (2019b) 
 
5.10. Trust 
The uncertainties that have been raised, lead to the related issue of who the public trust in relation to 
climate change communication. Individuals and groups are wary of certain groups, meaning they are 
unlikely to trust messages those sources are trying to portray. Consequently, the respondents within 
the first survey of this thesis were asked: 
“How trustworthy do you think different people and organisations are in terms of 
communicating the truth about climate change?” 
Figure 5.17 shows the mean trust scores on a 5-point scale (1=not trustful at all, 5=very trustful) 
assigned by the respondents in relation to each source of information about climate change.  
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Figure 5.17 indicates an expected outcome that scientists and researchers are considered the most 
trusted source of information on climate change, with an average score of 4.08 out of 5, which is 0.58 
greater than the wider education sector. These findings are consistent with other studies reporting 
high levels of trust in scientists (Funk and Kennedy, 2020). However, the standard deviation score for 
scientists and researchers is the third highest (0.56); this indicates there is some variation in 
perceptions amongst the respondents on the trustworthiness of information from scientists. This 
variation is likely to have its origins in those who either believe that climate change is not such a 
problem or have the belief that it is of natural origins, as had also been suggested by details in Section 
5.2. 
 
Figure 5.17 – Trust in Sources of Climate Change Information (Source: Author) 
When examining the trust levels for the different age groups, Table 5.25 shows that across all age 
groups, ‘Scientists and Researchers’ are ranked as the most trustful of all the listed individuals or 
organisations. However, the level of trust in ‘Scientists and Researchers’, on average, declines with an 
increase in age.  Table 5.27 also demonstrates that for the most part, the ‘education sector’ are the 
second most trusted in relation to communicating climate change, with ‘environmental groups’ third, 
the only exception being the age group ’55-64’, which had these the other way around. In terms of 
the least trusted for the age groups encompassing those over 35, are ‘celebrities’. However, the 
averages for ‘celebrities’ are greater for the older generations compared to the two youngest age 
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climate change are ‘religious leaders’. This is partly expected as the number of young people within 
the United Kingdom that have an irreligion belief45 has been increasing in recent years. 
Lastly, it is found that the average level of trust amongst the youngest age group within the survey 
was the lowest average amongst all nine different groups that were listed, with an average of 2.87. 
This compares with the most trustful generation, the 55-64 age group, who had an average of 3.12. 
The framing of trust applied will depend on whether related to good or bad forms of communicating 
climate change to younger people. Whilst this age group is the least trustful overall, they are the most 
trusting of ‘scientists and researchers’, who are theoretically the most likely to have detailed 
knowledge of the subject. This means, that scientists and researchers are important in delineating the 
issue of climate change, which could be done through varied mediums, such as television, public 
lectures, and social media. 
Table 5.27 – Trust in sources of climate change information across age groups 
 18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+ All 
Celebrities 2.15 2.17 2.27 2.22 2.38 2.23 2.24 
Education Sector 3.53 3.70 3.62 3.43 3.48 3.41 3.50 
Environmental Groups 3.51 3.47 3.43 3.36 3.51 3.39 3.44 
Family 2.53 2.81 2.95 2.83 3.11 3.12 2.92 
Friends 2.60 2.83 2.89 2.80 3.08 3.03 2.90 
Local Government 2.77 2.96 3.06 2.95 3.27 3.23 3.07 
National Government 2.75 2.81 2.81 2.73 2.90 2.83 2.81 
Police 2.60 2.74 2.81 2.84 2.90 2.83 2.80 
Religious Leaders 1.80 2.12 2.41 2.54 2.61 2.68 2.41 
Scientist and Researchers 4.42 4.40 4.22 3.97 3.97 3.83 4.08 
All 2.87 3.00 3.05 2.97 3.12 3.06  




5.10.1. Comparison to Past Trust Studies 
As highlighted in section 3.2.4 of the thesis, a similar type of study was previously conducted in the 
city of Norwich in 1995 by Marris, Longford and O’Riodan (1996). whilst this study examined trust of 
institutions in the communication of environmental risk; it is arguable that climate change could be 
viewed as one of the greatest environmental risk of this current generation. Therefore, a comparison 
 
 
45 - This includes those with the belief of atheism, agnosticism and antitheism. 
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of the 1995 study with data collected within this thesis can provide a partial insight of how trust in 
different institutions has changed in the intervening two decades in relation to communicating 
environmental risks. 
To achieve this analysis, the results from the trust question in the 2017 data were compiled into three 
different groups. The respondents who scored an institution with a trust score of either ‘1’ or ‘2’ were 
classified as ‘Not Trustful’. The responses which received a trust score of either ‘4’ or ‘5’ were classified 
as ‘Trustful’. Those that were classified truthful are demonstrated in Figure 5.18. 
Figure 5.18 indicates that scientists were viewed as the most truthful source for climate change, for 
77.3 per cent of the respondents. This compares with Figure 3.1, which demonstrates that in 1995 
come over truthfulness of scientists being 60%. This demonstrates a 17.3% increase during the 
intervening period, this is despite an increasing level of attacks on the credibility of science within 
recent years [both within climate change and other scientific research as highlighted in section 3.2.4 
and 3.3], which has led some scientists to state that is science creditability is under attack (Alexander, 
2018; Boykoff, 2019). 
 
Figure 5.18 - The trustfulness in communicating climate change by different individuals and 
institutions according to respondents (Source: Author) 
It is worth noting that the two biggest reductions in truthfulness in the intervening 22-year period is 
both friends and family, which in this study scored a trustfulness of only 20.2 and 20.3 percent, 
respectively. This is a stark difference when comparing to the 1995 study, with these two being the 
most trustworthy groups. It is arguable that this could be a demonstration of what Maibach et al., 
(2016, p.1) termed the “climate spiral of silence”. Since the 2017 survey, United Kingdom has seen the 
outbreak of civil disobedience by extinction rebellion, and school children striking in protest of a lack 
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of action in relation to climate change by the national government. This combined with the increased 
media attention in recent years is due to the increasing urgent tone by climate scientists, could have 
resulted in greater trust amongst friends and family as conversations about issue of climate change 
will have increased. Therefore, there will be an even greater scope of research in this field in the years 
to come. 
Whilst this section demonstrates that there has been a change in the nature of who the general public 
believes in communicating environmental risks, the relative low levels of trust in the national 
government is likely to have an impact on the perception of climate change policy that is set out by 
the national government. Therefore, researching the public perception of climate change and climate 
change policy interlinkages is very necessary. 
 
 
5.11. Climate Change Policy 
To effectively mitigate against the effects of climate change, legislation is important at all levels, from 
the global to local authority level. As chapter three highlights, the United Kingdom has policy 
agreements both at the national and international level to combat climate change in either a direct or 
indirect approach. However, politicians often find themselves battling with small margins between 
policy popularity and policy necessity. However, despite the importance of public reactions to climate 
change policy, research to understand the level of support amongst the British public is lacking. 
 
5.11.1. Net Zero Policy 
Within the last two years, an increasingly used term within policy on climate change within the United 
Kingdom is ‘Net Zero’, also known as carbon neutrality. This is due to the then Prime Minister, Theresa 
May, announcing a change to the Climate Change Act 2008, which legally increased the reductions of 
greenhouse gases emissions in the atmosphere from 80 per cent reduction by 2050, to 100 per cent 
reduction in the same time frame. This should therefore be a key terminology in relation of climate 
change within the United Kingdom. However, with it being such as new scheme in the United Kingdom, 
it has raised questions as to whether the public have heard or understand this scheme. Using the BEIS 
dataset that were collected in March 2020, just shortly before the COVID-19 pandemic induced 
lockdown, participants were asked “The Government promotes the concept of ‘Net Zero’. Before 
today, how much if anything, did you know about this concept?”. The respondents were given five 
options, with the results of this also been demonstratable in terms of the age groups. 
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Table 5.28 shows that a majority 66.5 per cent of respondents had not heard of the scheme previously. 
When exploring the age groups, it can be found that there is an 8.8 per cent significant difference 
between the lowest age group [55-64] and the highest [35-44] in having heard of the term ‘Net Zero’ 
(χ2=4.8601, p=0.025**). 
Table 5.28 – How many respondents in March 2020 have heard of the concept ‘Net Zero’ 
 16-24 35-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+ Total 






































































Total 257 288 250 247 268 527 1,837 
Data Adapted from BEIS (2020b) 
This demonstrates that the current communication of the government’s new strategy in combatting 
climate change is not working. Consequently, this is likely to be fuelling the idea that the government 
is not doing enough in tackling climate change, which has recently led to further support for climate 
activism via a form of post-normal engagement that will be further explored in Chapter 7. 
 
5.11.2. Fuel Duty 
As in Chapter Three, Fuel Duty has been active since 1908 as a fuel tax. However, the British 
Government has been using it since 1992 as a method to increase efficiency of vehicles; by introducing 
the Fuel Price Escalator at three per cent, with the aim of reducing pollution from road transportation 
and improving the efficiency of vehicles. However, in recent years due to political pressures and 
financial recession, the rate of fuel duty has not been keeping up with inflation and it is now the 
responsibility of the Chancellor to determine the rise in Fuel Duty. 
In relation to this, the respondents were asked the following question: 
Currently, 57.95p per litre of petrol and diesel sold at petrol stations goes to the 
government in terms of Fuel Duty. In the past, it has been suggested that rises in Fuel Duty 
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has resulted in increased efficiency of vehicles. How supportive would you be if the 
Government would want to increase Fuel Duty again in the next 12 months? 
The question highlights how much they are currently paying in fuel duty and why fuel duty rises in the 
past have been good in terms of greenhouse gas emissions. They were given this information, as it is 
likely the public would not know how much fuel duty they were currently paying, and they might not 
know the previous relationship between fuel duty and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
Figure 5.19 – Perception of potential increase in fuel duty (Source: Author) 
As highlighted in Figure 5.19, the age group that are most in favour of raising of fuel duty within the 
next 12 months are the “25-34” age group, with the “35-44” age group been the least in favour. 
Nevertheless, this study was undertaken in 2017, since then the United Kingdom has entered a 
recession triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. Further studies would be needed to see if this has had 
an impact on the public’s perception of the merits of raising fuel duty due to climate change. 
 
5.12. Summary 
Overall, this chapter has demonstrated that there is an extremely high level of belief that the climate 
is changing [98.5 per cent in 2019]. In addition to this, it has been found that it is getting ranked as the 
greatest societal issues that the United Kingdom is currently facing. These high levels of perception 
that climate change is happening is ranked above other societal issues, demonstrating that findings 
from these respondents is highly likely to reflect that, across the country the public are generally taking 
the threat of climate change seriously. This chapter then demonstrated that not only do the public, 
particularly youth believe that the climate is changing, but only 10 per cent believe that it is purely 
down to natural causes. This means that a sizeable majority demonstrate that the public acknowledge 
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that anthropogenic activity is playing a role in the changing climate. Despite this, only a small 
proportion of those surveyed believe that climate change is impacting in both their local area and at 
a national level; a greater focus in these samples is being placed on the global repercussions. 
Nonetheless, the main focus has being placed upon the impacts of the heatwaves and flooding, which 
have been witnessed as sizeable changes each year in the United Kingdom and depending on the 
weather just before the survey was undertaken, this reflects the here and now view of climate change 
that a population can have. 
The view that climate change is a serious problem has been growing since roughly 2013, suggesting a 
social tipping point taking place. Consequently, this also brought to light that there was a social tipping 
point away from climate concerns before 2009; research suggests various influencing factors for the 
change including the economic climate or the lasting effects of climate change Despite this rise in 
concern, the United Kingdom, both overall and amongst youth, is still below average in terms of its 
scoring compared to the average showing for other parts of the European Union. 
When exploring how the public views the impacts of climate change, their perceptions seem to be 
changing in response to recent extreme meteorological events that have occurred, conforming to past 
research. For example, during early 2019 the most chosen option was rising temperatures, with the 
survey occurring just after the winter temperature record had occurred roughly a fortnight previous. 
The following year, the most chosen option was flooding, which occurred after months of flooding 
that occurred in south/central England and Wales. The other major factor is that the most vulnerable 
in society [over 65s and poorest] are the least likely to believe that the impacts of climate change are 
currently occurring and also the least likely to believe that they are going to occur in the future. 
In communicating climate change, this chapter has demonstrated that the respondents have very 
different beliefs about climate change, and that communication towards the public therefore needs 
to be done in various ways if it is to get a wider range of people engaged with the issue. It is suggested 
here that the scientific community could carry out more of the communication of climate change, as 
there are the most trusted group of individuals for climate change communication, whilst there is a 
widespread view that the media tends to exaggerate impacts of climate change. 
Lastly, in terms of climate change policy, this chapter explored two strategies. For Fuel Duty, a 
contentious policy in the past, as demonstrated in 2000 or in 2017 in France, the majority of the 
respondents were in favour of raising Fuel Duty. However, the survey for this aspect was undertaken 
in 2017. With the economic instability that likely to persist even when the world returns to some sort 
of normality post-COVID-19 pandemic, the appetite of the public to policy schemes that raises their 
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taxes will be likely be unpopular. For the ‘Net Zero’ scheme, a main UK goal in combatting climate 
change for the next thirty years, most of the respondents had not yet heard of it. 
  
238 | P a g e  
 
 
Chapter Six - Engagement of 
Climate Change 
©Jeremy Segrott (2018) 
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“Save the Planet! What!? Are these f***** people kidding me!? … The planet isn’t going 
anywhere? We Are! We are going away, so pack your s**t, folks. We wouldn’t leave 
much of a trace either. Just another failed mutation, just another closed end biological 
mistake. The planet will shake us off like a base case of fleas. A surface nuisance.” 
George Carlin, Comedian 
Cited in Marshall (2014, p. 207) 
 
Whilst the quote above has a very fatalist attitude towards climate change and environmentalism, it 
highlights an important point. Without action orientated engagement towards climate change, the 
very long-term effect is a potential threat to the survival of humanity and the environment, but not 
the planet. This highlights the importance of human engagement with climate change to both mitigate 
against climate change and adapt to it. This chapter examines levels of engagement towards climate 
change within the United Kingdom. Major themes include findings on mitigation, which includes sub-
themes about responsibility of mitigation, how individual behaviours are already helping mitigate, 
how perceptions influence behaviours, and the case of transportation. The other main findings relate 
to education. This is further explored regards climate change as a sub-theme of education within the 
United Kingdom, public views about climate change being included in the national curriculum, and 
how a participatory education strategy, exemplified here by the ‘Yonmenkaigi System Method,’ can 
increase knowledge. It further considers whether the public want public lectures and workshops about 
climate change and engagement to integrate social issues with climate change. 
 
6.1. Mitigation 
As mentioned earlier in the glossary of this thesis, mitigation refers to the actions that can be 
undertaken to limit the magnitude and pace of climate change over the long-term period (Fisher et 
al., 2007). Mitigation is to reduce the impacts and vulnerability of people toward extreme 
meteorological events. This is a positive action compared to adaptation, as the results of mitigation 
effects are felt globally; whereas the effects of adaptation can only be felt and observed at a local 
scale (Tol, 2003). However, the benefits of adaptation are going to be increasingly important, to 
decrease the vulnerabilities of people and increase their capacity to recover. When compared to 
climate mitigation in this way, mitigation is often invoked through the reduction of anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas emissions. Mitigation can be achieved in two different ways. The first is natural, 
through carbon sinks, and can be achieved through adaptations that increase these carbon sink 
capacities, as described within Section 2.1 of this thesis. Within the United Kingdom, there have been 
240 | P a g e  
 
projects to achieve this through the restoration of peatland bogs and replanting of forests in the 
upland regions. 
The driver is that it is critical for the population to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions, as there is 
only so much carbon that can be absorbed through carbon sinks, even with increasing capacity to 
reduce some emissions in recent years. It further raises an argument regarding who civil society think 
should be responsible for leading the efforts being made in combatting climate change. 
 
6.1.1. Responsibility 
Human activities that create greenhouse gas emissions contributing towards climate change are 
prevalent through Google searches, which provide evidence that explains that human activities 
contribute to greenhouse gas emissions. This also includes information about how individuals can 
change their behaviours, in an effort to reduce their greenhouse gas emission (Fibieger Byskov, 2019), 
as explored further in the next section. This seemly puts the emphasis of the problem on civil society 
in general. However, is it really the case that individuals are to blame?  For example, a report by CDP 
(2017) highlights that since 1988, 71 per cent of all global greenhouse gas emissions have been caused 
by just 100 companies, a large proportion being coal and oil companies. Whilst many of these 
companies are producing goods that are particularly in public demand, these companies have the 
ability to transform their organisation to being more carbon neutral. For example, oil companies could 
diversify a new carbon neutral energy source, such as hydrogen or other forms of renewable energy. 
This raises a question as to whether widespread individual behaviour can really cause significant 
enough change to limit greenhouse gas emissions. Cynically, it could be believed that for high polluting 
global businesses, the emphasis on what individuals can do to limit greenhouse gases has become 
convenient for major corporations. It is almost arguable that the term ‘human made’ climate change 
is incorrect, but ‘corporation made’ climate change would be a better fit. 
Therefore, the respondents to a survey for this thesis were asked “which of these do you think should 
have the most responsibility for tackling the effects of climate change in the UK?” guided by the 
following four options: 
1. The general public, by making changes to their lifestyle. 
2. Businesses, by doing more to reduce their impact on the environment. 
3. Government, by introducing more policies to reduce the levels of carbon emissions. 
4. Can’t choose, all/more than one equal. 
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Figure 6.1 demonstrates the public’s perception in both March 2019 and March 2020 of who they feel 
should be held most responsibility for tackling the effects of climate change within the United 
Kingdom. Within both surveys, it has been found that the most popular response is the government. 
However, the percentage increased by 2.9 per cent within the intervening one-year period, from 44 
per cent to 46.9 per cent. Despite this increase between 2019 and 2020, there is no significant 
difference between the two samples (χ2=1.206, p=0.272). Antagonistically, whilst there is no 
significant difference, there are two potential differences to why this difference occurred. Firstly, the 
sample for the March 2020 was disrupted due to the COVID-19 pandemic, meaning that the 
proportion of the sample population might be slightly different compared to the March 2019 sample. 
The second, and a more plausible reason, is that the increased action been demanded by both 
Extinction Rebellion and the School Strike for Climate Change groups by the government to reduce 
the impacts of climate change via process of mitigation may have influenced public opinion. 
 
Figure 6.1 - Public perception of the responsibility to mitigate against climate change (Source: 
Data Adapted from BEIS, 2019b; BEIS 2020b). 
As Figure 6.2 demonstrates, most of the increase has its origins amongst the young people [16-24], 
which has shown to have risen by 10.4 per cent in the same intervening period for the choice of 
government, significantly from 42.5 per cent to 52.9 per cent (χ2=7.246, p=0.007***). 
At the same time, the level of belief that businesses should take the most responsibility has reduced 
by 2.8 per cent from 14.3 per cent to 11.5 per cent. This makes the response the least of the main 
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(from their perspective) of avoiding responsibility. However, the rise in expectation on government 
could in part be a result of the public wanting the government to legislate against big businesses. 
 
Figure 6.2 – Young People’s perception on the responsibility to mitigate against climate change 
(Source: Data Adapted from BEIS, 2019b; BEIS 2020b). 
 
6.1.2. Individual Behaviours 
As highlighted earlier, mitigation orientated engagement is crucial if the world is going to meet the 
Paris Agreement’s 2oC goal. As also demonstrated within the previous section, a number of people 
(24.3 per cent in March 2020) think that individuals in the general public are the most responsible for 
tackling the effects of climate change within the United Kingdom by making changes to their lifestyle. 
However, this raises questions as to whether the public are already starting the challenge of changing 
their lifestyle to help mitigate climate change. 
Regarding lifestyle change, respondents within the first questionnaire of this thesis, between March 
and September 2017, were asked “which of the following have you undertaken in the last three years, 
which have reduced your contribution towards climate change?”. The respondents were given 
nineteen different options to choose from, including having an electric vehicle to eating less meat. 
When coming to the analysis of the responses, each of the nineteen responses that were provided to 
the respondents can be split into three overall categories. There are three different types of 
mitigation, being “behavioural changes with no capital investment”, highlighted in yellow; 
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with major capital investment”, highlighted in green. The overall responses to each of the different 
mitigation strategies are shown in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1 – Mitigation strategies being undertaken in the last three years, from the survey 
undertaken in 2017 
Mitigation Number of Responses 
Recycle Waste 994 87.7% 
Switch off lights 929 81.9% 
Install low energy light bulbs 889 78.4% 
Turn down heating 763 67.3% 
Buy food with less packaging 654 57.7% 
Buy locally grown food 599 52.8% 
Reduce personal waste production 588 51.9% 
Unplug appliance when not used 585 51.6% 
Usage of Public Transport (e.g. Bus, Train) 547 48.2% 
Use water sparingly 527 46.5% 
Install house insulation 497 43.8% 
Making fewer car journeys 450 39.7% 
Walk or Cycle to work 430 37.9% 
Eat less meat 414 36.5% 
Buy second hand products 337 29.7% 
Grow your own food 301 26.5% 
Install renewable energy 191 16.8% 
Car share to work 101 8.9% 
Driving an electric/hybrid car 74 6.5% 
Source: Author. 
It can be observed within Table 6.1 that easy to implement behavioural changes, such as recycling 
waste and switching off lights, are the two most undertaken mitigation responses amongst the 
respondents. It is likely that these two actions scored highly due to ease of habit, such that the 
switching off lights is a behavioural mitigation strategy that is taught to many young children from an 
early age, either at home or at school. It is apparent that most people do it naturally, such that they 
do not necessarily think about it. However, it also could be due a practicality choice confronting people 
and requiring changed behaviour. In addition, an individual might want to undertake behavioural 
mitigation strategies such as ‘switch off lights’ and ‘turn down lights’ due to the fact these mitigation 
strategies can save the respondent some money each year. In terms of recycling, some councils in 
recent years have moved toward fortnightly bin collections, meaning an increased necessity to make 
use of this recycling service provided and nudging behaviour change to makes use of the recycling 
service. Naturally, these types of strategies will be more successful, as for the majority of the public, 
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saving money and making use of something they pay for in any case, will always be attractive, 
particularly to those who are financially not as well off. 
In addition, there is a difference between the average response rates between behavioural change 
with no capital investment and behavioural change with major capital investment within Table 6.2. 
This is demonstrated as average response rates for behavioural change was 51.0 per cent, whereas 
behavioural change with major capital investment averaged at 22.4 per cent. As a result, there is a 
significant difference between these two groups at the 99 per cent significance (χ2=865.960 
p=0.000***). 
It has been highlighted so far, that the most undertaken mitigation strategies are those either of 
behavioural changes or those strategies that will in the short to medium term save the respondents 
money. This is especially observed for the “install low energy light bulbs” which is ranked third overall 
at 78.4 per cent. In addition, this is the highest in the group that requires minor capital investment. 
This is due to the low cost of the mitigation strategy, despite low energy light bulbs, such as LED, being 
more expensive to buy at first. However, when applying a cost benefit analysis, it is found that after a 
few years, they have paid back this cost and are saving money. 
When exploring these differing levels of engagement between the different age groups, it is found 
that in terms of behavioural changes only, the two youngest age groups are much more likely to 
undertake the behavioural changes that require either no or minor capital investment, as these are 
the only groups ranking above 50 per cent. After these two age groups, there is no discernible pattern 
or significant differences between the age groups. However, when observing the differences between 
the age groups that need both minor and major capital investment, there is an increase for each age 
group. A 10.9 per cent increase between the age groups ’18-24’ and 65+’ reflects how the older 
respondents have a higher reserve of capital to invest in these mitigation strategies. 
The thesis so far has addressed in what way there are differences between respondents based upon 
their age. Therefore, Table 6.3 demonstrates the most and least undertaken mitigation strategy based 
upon differing age groups in 2017. It is found that for all age groups, except for the age group ’18-24’, 
the most popular choice was recycling waste. The exception of that age group in this ranking was in 
part due to the very high percentage response in the number of young people undertaking the 
mitigation strategy of switching off lights when not in use. This is a clear demonstration of the earlier 
mentioned mitigation behaviour strategies that are adopted in early education. It has also been 
demonstrated that apart from the age group ’55-64’ and ‘65+’, the least undertaken mitigation 
strategy in 2017 is driving an electric or hybrid car. There are two potential reasons for this; firstly, 
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that this type of investment is high, and it is more likely that more elderly respondents are going to 
potentially have the level of financial capital necessary to buy these vehicles. Secondly, car shares to 
work are lower in these categories, as these are the two age categories that have lower proportions 
that will be working, as they are nearing or past retirement age. 




















18-24 55.8% 42.6% 11.7% 32.3% 44.7% 
25-34 52.5% 51.8% 10.8% 38.1% 48.2% 
35-44 47.6% 47.2% 19.7% 38.1% 43.1% 
45-54 50.7% 49.7% 23.0% 40.8% 46.0% 
55-64 50.2% 50.4% 28.2% 43.0% 46.8% 
65+ 47.2% 49.6% 30.3% 43.2% 45.3% 
Overall 51.0% 48.9% 22.4% 40.1% 45.8% 
Source: Author 
 
Table 6.3 – Most and least undertaken mitigation strategies in 2017 depending on age group 
Age Group Most Undertaken Least Undertaken 
18-24 Switch Off Lights 
93.3% 
Driving an electric/hybrid Car 
4.3% 
25-34 Recycling Waste/Switch Off Lights 
87.4% 
Driving an electric/hybrid Car 
6.0% 
35-44 Recycling Waste 
83.5% 
Driving an electric/hybrid Car 
6.1% 
45-54 Recycling Waste 
85.1% 
Driving an electric/hybrid Car 
3.6% 
55-64 Recycling Waste 
89.6% 
Car Share to Work 
5.7% 
65+ Recycling Waste 
87.8% 




So far, this section has determined that the uptake of certain mitigation strategies varies by age group, 
especially due to financial capability. The conceptual framework within Section 3.10 highlighted that 
engagement behaviour in association with climate change mitigation and adaption can also be 
influenced by an individual’s perception towards climate change. The theory is that the more serious 
the perception of the impacts of climate change, the more engaged people will be in reducing it. The 
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remainder of this sub-section examines the extent to which engagement behaviour of a wider sample 
of the public and the respondents within the primary data surveys of this thesis is influenced by their 
perception of climate change. To undertake this, the data from the 2019 Eurobarometer has been 
used. This data has been used because the seriousness score, as used within Section 5.5 of this thesis 
is a good measure to determine how much of a threat the respondents believe climate change poses. 
The results are ranked using a Likert Scale between 1 and 10, with 1 meaning ‘not at all a serious 
problem’ to 10 meaning ‘an extremely serious problem’. To be able to make a meaningful comparison, 
the data about the seriousness needs to be combined into smaller groups; accordingly, three groups 
have been created, as demonstrated within Table 6.4. Those respondents within the Eurobarometer 
(2019) that scored climate change seriousness between 1 and 4, are grouped within the ‘not a serious 
problem’ group, between 5 and 6 ‘a fairly serious problem’ and between 7 and 10 ‘a very serious 
problem’. Those respondents who recorded not knowing in the seriousness score are excluded from 
this analysis. 
For the different mitigation changes that the respondents were questioned about, they were again 
divided by whether they needed a financial investment to undertake these strategies or not. The 
mitigation strategies are broken up into three groups, with blue meaning products or services for 
which the majority of the public regularly (within every ten years) make an investment. For example, 
householders will buy food or switch energy suppliers frequently compared to buying an electric car 
or installing insulation in their home. 
Table 6.4 demonstrates that for all groups that make behavioural changes [yellow], those who view 
climate change ‘a very serious problem’ are more likely to undertake these mitigation strategies 
compared to the other two seriousness groups. Also, the top three most carried out mitigation actions 
within Table 6.4 are repetitive behavioural changes for day-to-day life. Whilst people find these the 
easiest to change, they show there are some large differences between the ‘not a serious problem’ 
and ‘a very serious problem’ groups, with a 29.8 per cent gap between the two for the mitigation 
strategy of regularly using environmentally friendly alternatives to cars (99 per cent significant). 
Only 31.6 per cent of respondents agreed that they had adopted the behavioural change mitigation 
strategy ‘installed equipment in your home to control and reduce your energy consumption’. There is 
a 10.7 per cent difference between those indicating ‘not a serious problem’ and ‘a very serious 
problem’, and that is significant again, but only at the 90 per cent level, whereas all other behavioural 
changes show a 99 per cent significant difference. There are two potential reasons for this, the first 
being the inclusion of this mitigation strategy within the behavioural change [yellow] category, which 
might be contested, as some of this change required a small financial investment beyond behaviour. 
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However, it is included within this behavioural change section, as smart meters were listed within the 
questionnaire, and smart meters within the United Kingdom are free to every household, being 
designed to change people’s behaviour by informing them as to how much energy they are consuming 
throughout the day. The other potential reasons for this difference are that usage of smart meters 
within the United Kingdom and numerous other countries has raised potential security issues through 
cyber-attacks (Anderson and Fuloria, 2010), data privacy in relation to behavioural patterns of 
occupants (Chadwick, Butt and Cook, 2012), fire risks being reported within Canada and the United 
States (CBC News, 2014; Sickinger, 2014) and health issues related to pulsed radiofrequency radiation 
(Hess and Coley, 2014).  
In terms of mitigation strategies that require small amounts of financial capital, it was found that 
similar differences between the levels of seriousness groups occurred, with the ‘a very serious 
problem’ group scoring significantly higher (99 per cent level in all cases). The likelihood is that these 
were significantly higher as they usually do not cost much and are the respondents that are likely to 
have needed to invest in these mitigation strategies within the near future, and in the most part will 
likely lead to financial savings in the medium to long term future. 
For the mitigation changes that require a large amount of a financial investment, the results are more 
variable. This is demonstrated in two different ways. Firstly, it is found that none of these strategies 
reveal significant differences between the different seriousness groups. Further, for two of the four 
mitigation strategies [‘installation of insulation’ and ‘buying an electric car’] a higher proportion 
indicate ‘not a serious problem’ than ‘a very serious problem’. 
These results throughout this section are suggesting that perception does influence engagement 
towards more environmental, climate conscious behaviour. They are consistent with there being a 
linkage between perception and engagement within the conceptual framework (Section 3.10). 
However, results in this thesis have also demonstrated that there are external factors missing from 
the conceptual framework, specifically in this case ‘household income’ or economic influences. The 
results within this section already show that some of the best methods in reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions are expensive and limit the ability of society to engage those strategies, even though 
significant proportions of people demonstrate a willingness to change their behaviour. 
As highlighted, there are at least nineteen different mitigation strategies within this thesis that could 
be reported. For focus and brevity, the theme of transport is examined further here. 
Table 6.4 – Mitigation strategy changes in relation to views about the seriousness of climate 
change, 2019 
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such as walking, cycling, taking public 
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which offers a greater share of energy 












You consider the carbon footprint of 
your transport when planning your 
holiday and other longer distance travel 












You have bought a new car and its low 
fuel consumption was an important 




























Total number of Respondents 84 164 793 1,041  
Yellow Cells = Behavioural Changes; Green Cells = Behavioural Changes with Large Capital Investments; Blue 
Cells = Behavioural Changes with Small Capital Investments or Investments Frequently Required; Sig. = 
Significant; * = 90 per cent significance; *** = 99 per cent significance. 
Source: Data Adapted from Eurobarometer (2019) 
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6.1.3. Transport 
During the research for this thesis, a common theme of transportation cropped up, not surprisingly, 
as transportation makes up such a high per cent of the United Kingdom’s greenhouse gas emissions. 
In 2018 this was 27.2 per cent. Therefore, the reductions of these emissions will be important if the 
United Kingdom is going to meet its 2050 target of being net zero. 
As demonstrated within Figure 6.3, the overall movement of people using motorised transportation 
in the United Kingdom has increased nearly every year since records began in 1952. Between 1952 
and 2018, passenger numbers on trains, buses and coaches declined by 62 per cent; at the same time 
cars, vans and taxis for person transportation have increased (DfT, 2018). 
 
Figure 6.3 – Passenger Kilometres by Mode within Great Britain between 1952 to 2017 (DfT, 2018, 
p.4) 
In order to reduce carbon emissions from the transportation sector, changes will have to be in part 
the responsibility of the public. There are varying ways in which civil society will be able to reduce 
their own personal emissions from transportation, including: walking more, taking public 
transportation and buying less carbon pollutant vehicles. Despite all this, it raises questions 
surrounding what do the public believe is the biggest overall contributor to climate change within the 
United Kingdom from the transportation section. Therefore, using the National Travel Attitudes Study 
[England], the respondents were asked “which of the following do you believe is the biggest 
contributor to climate change?” (DfT, 2020). As demonstrated within Figure 6.4, the respondents 
within England believed that ‘Vans and Lorries’ was the largest contributor [29 per cent], with cars 
following with 23 per cent. This is despite official figures from DfT (2019) highlighting that the cars, 
within 2018, completed 186.9 billion more vehicle miles compared to Vans and Lorries [or 274.4 per 
cent more]. 
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Figure 6.4 – Proportion of respondents that felt each mode of transportation was the biggest 
contributor to climate change (Source: Data Adapted from DfT, 2019) 
 
6.1.3.1. Cost of Public Transportation 
The most common discussion point surrounds the usage of public transportation is the costs. This is 
demonstrated by respondent OLB025 who gives the opinion that “current costs are ridiculous and not 
competitive with private car use. A train ticket from Laurence Kirk to Aberdeen is £16” [Female, 35-
44, Scotland]. The distance between Laurencekirk and Aberdeen is roughly 30 miles and is roughly a 
half an hour journey. The problems surround the cost of public transportation has been raised in the 
last few years by the media (Stone, 2015; Wyporska, 2017). In one extreme case highlighted in 2019 
by The Independent, a return ticket between Stockport [Manchester] to London was £287.50, which 
was £2.50 more expensive for a return flight between London and New York (Coffey, 2019). 
The issue of train costs is due to the above inflation rises that have happened year on year for the last 
few years. In a report by the Department for Transport [DfT] (2017a) it was highlighted that the Rail 
Fare Index has increased between 1995 and 2017 by 121.3 per cent; with long-distances journey fares 
rising at the fastest rate of 150.9 per cent during this period. This means with inflation accounted, 























251 | P a g e  
 




Figure 6.5 – RPI compared to Rail Fares between 1996 and 2017 (DfT, 2017a) 
In a joint study by Voucher and the Daily Mirror in 2017, it was found that the cost of trains within the 
United Kingdom were the most expensive in Europe. For example, it was found that the average cost 
£0.50 per mile within the United Kingdom; whilst the next nearest is Austria at £0.41 per mile; with 
Italy the cheapest at £0.15 per mile (Munbodh, 2017). 
These perceptions about the affordability of trains are not limited to the questionnaire in this study. 
Using data collected from the DfT (2020) within the national travel attitudes study [England], the 
respondents, between August and September 2019, were asked ‘how affordable or unaffordable do 
you think the following forms of transport are?’. As demonstrated within Figure 6.6, that the train was 
ranked as the least affordable mode of transportation, with a net affordability of 36 per cent. This 
compares to the personal vehicle [the most pollutant on the list], which had a net affordability of 72 
per cent. This demonstrates that despite the majority of the public perceive trains to be the form of 
transport least contributing to climate change, it is unaffordable to many. This is especially so for 
younger people, who tend to be the least affluent in society. As earlier in the chapter suggests, young 
 
 
46 - Retail Price Index is a measurement of inflation and uses the change in cost of goods and services from a 
represented sample 
 
252 | P a g e  
 
people tend to be the most concerned within society, but without the disposable income of the older 
generations have, they are limited in their choices in the mode of transportation. 
 
Figure 6.6 – Perception of Affordability of Transportation in England between August and 
September 2019 (Source: Data Adapted from DfT, 2020) 
Despite this, it has been found by the DfT (2017b) that the number of rail journeys within England has 
been increasing since 2002, with an increase of 56 per cent between 2002 and 2016. This means that 
on average people within the United Kingdom now take 21 trains journeys each year. In addition, on 
average the public are now traveling 23 per cent more on trains in 2016 than in 2002. 
The issue of public transport is not just limited to trains; the respondents have raised some issues with 
bus services as well. Again, the issue of cost is seemingly a major issue. For example, one respondent 
[OLA228] states that “the local bus service costs more than £5 for a return (3 miles), therefore much 
more expensive for a family of 4 to use than a car” [Female, 35-44, North East England]. This 
demonstrates that people are willing to change but still use their car more, which will increase 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
Within England, the average prices of bus fares have risen by 66 per cent between March 2005 and 
March 2017, at the same time, the RPI only rose by 41 per cent during the same time period (DfT, 
2017c). This is demonstrated in Figure 6.7, which shows that the Local Bus Fares index47 was constantly 
 
 
47 - Local Bus Fares Index provides a measurement of change in fares that charged by bus companies 
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higher than the RPI. However, since the first quarter of 2016, the Local Bus Fares index has fallen 
behind the RPI. It is also noted that since 2012, the Local Bus Fares index has been falling, which means 
that the amount that bus fares have been raising, is less in 2016 compared to 2012. It should be noted 
that the Local Bus Fares index is only for England, whereas the RPI is for the United Kingdom as a 
whole. 
 
Figure 6.7 – 12 Month Average Percentage Change of the Local Bus Fare Index [England] 
Compared to the Retail Price Index [UK] between 2011 and 2017 (Source: DfT, 2017c, Online) 
It is also demonstrated in DfT (2017c) that the bus fare increases are not constant across England, with 
bus fares in metropolitan areas, such as Birmingham and Manchester, increasing by 80 per cent. This 
compares to an increase of 53 per cent in non-metropolitan areas. 
 
6.2. Education 
As highlighted within Section 3.4, it is important that the education sector teaches and explains the 
dangers of climate change and how best to mitigate against and adapt to future climate change. This 
is especially so for young people under the 18 years old. It is possible that they will be the first in which 
all young people will learn in detail about the changes that are suspected of being behind many of the 
extreme meteorological events seen on television news. 
With climate change expected to have the largest impact on the youngest in society, it would be 
expected that this issue should be an important topic for the education sector within the United 
Kingdom to tackle. 
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Currently, the government set out a curriculum for Key Stage 3, which states climate a couple of times 
including “weather and climate, including the change in climate from the Ice Age to the present” and 
“understand how human and physical processes interact to influences, and change … the climate; and 
how human activity relies on effective function of natural systems” [DfE, 2013b, p. 2]. These 
statements mention elements of climate change within the specification, but do not mention it in 
name and do not mention that the students will be taught best practice behaviour. However, with 
increasing number of schools within the United Kingdom, especially in England, becoming academies, 
they are not required to follow the national curriculum set out by the government (DfE, No Date), 
meaning that these schools might be teaching more than the national curriculum sets out. 
Alternatively, it also increases the possibility of schools not teaching any element of climate change or 
even being influenced by stances on climate denial. The actual levels of teaching of climate change at 
younger ages are not very well determined. 
When the students get to Key Stage 4 and 5, they are required to follow the specification of teaching 
that the exam boards set. Upon examining the specification laid out by the examination boards, the 
students are expected to have detailed knowledge of the carbon cycle, how humans are interfering 
with it due to cause climate change, how to best mitigate against and adapt to climate change, and 
how international climate change policy is determined via COP climate conferences. This 
demonstrates that those who end up taking geography for GCSE and A-level within England will have 
a detailed knowledge of climate change. 
Despite these examples of climate change in the national curriculum, opinion pieces in The Guardian 
(Harvey, 2020) and respondents within both surveys do not believe that climate change is taught 
enough within the national curriculum. Respondent OLA017, calls for “more education about exactly 
what might happen, why we should care and how it might affect us personally” [Female, 18-24, East 
Midlands].  
This is backed up by a survey conducted by YouGov for Oxfam, which found that 69 per cent of 
teachers within the United Kingdom believe that climate change should be taught more on the 
national curriculum. Twenty-five per cent say that it is the right amount and 3 per cent believe that it 
should be taught less (Taylor, 2019). 
Despite teachers, members of the media and more generally amongst the public calling for more 
teaching, the inclusion of climate change has been controversial for over the past decade (see Section 
3.4). As demonstrated throughout Chapter 5, there are still some people that do not believe climate 
change is happening. Consequently, there will be always be a cohort of people who do not think it 
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should be taught at school. In January 2020, YouGov asked respondents “do you think learning about 
climate change should be part of the school curriculum?”. As demonstrated within Table 6.5, the 
majority [77 per cent] believe that climate change should be a part of the national curriculum taught 
in schools. The youngest surveyed [18-24 year olds] were the least likely to believe that it should [72 
per cent]. Whilst they are still part of the majority of those supporting teaching climate change, a 
question is raised as to why young people were 7 per cent less likely to believe that climate change 
should be taught in schools compared the oldest in society [65+]. As the survey did not asked any 
follow up questions, this remains unknown.  
Table 6.5 – Should climate change be taught more in the national curriculum 
 16-24 25-49 50-64 65+ Overall 
It should 72% 77% 78% 79% 77% 
It should not 16% 9% 11% 11% 11% 
Don’t Know 12% 14% 11% 10% 12% 
N= 2,579; Survey Collection = 22nd January 2020 
Data Adapted from YouGov (2020c) 
It is demonstrated within Table 6.6 that the majority of the respondents believe that climate change 
should be taught in secondary school [83.2 per cent]. Overall, there seem to be a slight gulf between 
compulsory education and voluntary, with college and university levels being 15.5 per cent and 18.6 
per cent lower respectively compared to secondary school. Whilst, the survey does not ask why they 
have made these choices, it is likely to be due to people thinking that further and higher education 
should be focused on the qualification they are trying to achieve, rather than issues such as climate 
change. 
Table 6.6 – What level should climate change be taught at in formal education. 
 Primary School Secondary School College University 
Overall 896 (79.0%) 943 (83.2%) 768 (67.7%) 733 (64.6%) 
 
18-24 137 (84.0%) 150 (92.0%) 125 (76.7%) 105 (64.4%) 
25-34 128 (84.8%) 130 (86.1%) 110 (72.8%) 106 (70.2%) 
35-44 92 (80.0%) 97 (84.3%) 74 (64.3%) 72 (62.6%) 
45-54 125 (74.4%) 128 (76.2%) 100 (59.5%) 102 (60.7%) 
55-64 184 (80.0%) 190 (82.6%) 152 (66.1%) 142 (61.7%) 
65+ 226 (74.8%) 246 (81.5%) 205 (67.9%) 203 (67.2%) 
 
Male 511 (75.5%) 555 (82.0%) 438 (64.7%) 420 (62.0%) 
Female 377 (84.2%) 382 (85.3%) 325 (72.5%) 307 (68.5%) 
Source: Author 
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6.3. Yonmenkaigi System Method for Education 
As highlighted so far in this thesis, the education of climate change is felt to be somewhat limited in 
the curriculum, especially at the secondary levels and colleges. In addition, when being taught, there 
is evidence that student discussion is being stifled (Seow and Ho, 2016). This was also highlighted by 
Interviewee 1, who recalls an incident when being taught about climate change at school, where a 
fellow student asked about natural climate change. The teacher of the class was very dismissive of the 
argument and they remember that the student “did not have much more to say on the issue for the 
rest of that semester, did not really participate at all”, as they “think that maybe it was a case that 
they embarrassed them” [18-24, Female, Scotland]. 
Education in the United Kingdom is broadly provided in a way which either uses a video or is about 
being talked to by a teacher. Consequently, it could be that the student is taught about climate change 
but is not necessarily participating in learning of climate change. Therefore, the research for this thesis 
engaged a participatory method called ‘Yonmenkaigi System Method’ as a potential way for future 
education to create debate about climate change within the education system. As introduced earlier 
in chapter four as a method, the Yonmenkaigi System Method experiment was undertaken with 
sixteen first year Environmental Management students on their first week of university on the 8th 
October 2018. 
 
6.3.1. Why Use Yonmenkaigi System Method in Climate Change Education? 
The Yonmenkaigi System Method is highlighted in Section 4.7 as multi-step approach which allows the 
students/participants to engage with climate change. It needs to be acknowledged that there are 
many different participatory methods that could have been used. However, this method was chosen 
for various reasons. 
Firstly, this method was designed with the idea of mitigating and adapting to disaster on a local scale 
in mind; especially since it was first designed in the mid-1980s and became more prominent post-
Great Hanshin Earthquake in January 1995. Whilst it could be debated whether climate change is a 
hazard or a driving force of a hazard, it can be asserted that climate change is slow onset disaster with 
often rapid onset impacts. As highlighted earlier, this method has been used in disaster affected 
communities in the past to study what can be done better (i.e., build-back-better). There are examples 
of it being used in Mumbai, India (Samaddar et al., 2015); Kyoto, Japan (Okada et al., 2013); and 
Garisan-ri, South Korea (Na, 2016). 
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The second reason is the process of the accompanying workshop allows for more engagement of more 
disinclined speakers. In every classroom situation, students have varying levels of confidence. Due to 
the nature of splitting the group into much smaller sizes of only 4, this gives the student more 
confidence to speak. This process in which the students are broken down into small groups of four 
students to discuss and debate the best approach in certain timescales is a participatory teaching 
approach called ‘think-pair-share’. Think-pair-share was originally developed as a co-operative 
learning technique in 1981 by Dr. Frank Lyman. However, in this case, it is more like ‘think-square-
share’, as the ‘pair’ in the title usually suggests two, whereas there are four people (square) within 
this exercise for each of the four elements of the Yonmenkaigi Chart. 
Lastly, is as highlighted earlier, this method has its origins in Japan. Traditionally, Japanese culture has 
been viewed to be at one with nature, in which people view nature as source of beauty and to be 
appreciated, rather than the destructive force in which it is viewed sometimes in western culture 
(Crossley-Baxter, 2020). Cyranoski (2010) states this is demonstrated through ‘The Great Wave off 
Kanagawa’, in which people in the picture do not look panicked by the tsunami whilst riding the wave. 
The nature of the Yonmenkaigi System Method is that it allows the participants to be reflecting on the 
focal issue being considered in terms of causation and impacts on human livelihoods and surrounding 
nature. This is especially useful in terms of analysing climate change engagement, as it is not just the 
human livelihood that the issue is having negative impact upon, but also pernicious impacts on natural 
world at a local, national and international scale. 
 
6.3.2. Results from the Yonmenkaigi System Method 
The following sections demonstrate some of results of the Yonmenkaigi System Method, including the 
themes and ideas in which the students engaged with to help reduce the impact of climate change 
within Newcastle, but also based on their perception of climate change. 
 
6.3.2.1. Yonmenkaigi Chart 
Overall, 32 actions were brought up by the students for which a council, such as Newcastle, needed 
to be doing something in terms of combatting climate change48. The breakdown of the number of 
actions for each category depending on different timeframes can observed within Table 6.7, with more 
 
 
48 - The process of the Yonmenkaigi System Method in creating this Yonmenkaigi chart is explored in Section 
4.7. 
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detailed analysis in Table 6.8. It is demonstrated that most of actions are likely to occur within the first 
two years. 
Table 6.7 – The number of cards within the Yonmenkaigi Chart for each role 






After 5 Years 
Roles↓ 
Resources and Logistics 3 1 2 1 
Communication and Engagement 3 4 3 2 
Mitigation 1 2 1 2 
Research and Data 5 1 1 0 
Source: Author 
Table 6.7 demonstrates that the majority of ideas thought up by the students concerned how best to 
adapt Newcastle and its citizens to the effects of climate change. However, what it also highlighted is 
that the students felt that climate change is a multi-organisation issue, involving firefighters; local 
authorities; national government; National Health Service (NHS); police; and universities. When 
comparing this student interaction with what is being taught in schools, it demonstrates that the 
students are taking a further step on from the science of climate change, which is predominantly being 
taught, and are starting to think and talk about the human interactions involved in adapting to and 
mitigating the effects of climate change. 
Table 6.8 also demonstrates that the students recognise that the changes that are required for climate 
change are not going to occur in the short-term and that organisations and society need to think about 
the more medium- and long-term scenarios of both mitigation against and adaptation to climate 
change. 
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Table 6.8 – The Yonmenkaigi Chart after debating appropriate activities 
 Within 6 Months Within 2 Years Within 5 Years After 5 Years 
Resources and Logistics • More training for police 
in disaster response 
 




• Budgets for local 
councils to address 
green issues 
• Emergency Food 
Supplies 
• More pedestrianised 
areas in city for better 
air quality around 
densely populated areas 
 
• Prepare safe zones 




• Increase public / local 
awareness 
 
• Extreme Weather 
Information e.g. snow 
storms and heatwaves 
 
• Inform/protect elderly 





• Online Resources 
 
• Knowledge based on 
prediction from data 
 
• Local Authorities - 
Preparedness 
• Preparation e.g. Disaster 
Plans 
 
• New layout proposals to 
prevent damage from 
floods 
 
• Make public health 
system aware of future 
changes 
• Full national awareness 
and preparation plans 
for worst case 
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Table 6.8 – The Yonmenkaigi Chart after debating appropriate activities (Continued) 
 Within 6 Months Within 2 Years Within 5 Years After 5 Years 
Mitigation • Penalise non-green 
behaviours / incentives 
for green behaviours 
such as cheaper parking 
for electric cars 
• Train people in disaster 
recovery in preparation 
for a disaster/extreme 
weather event 
 
• Ban vehicles from 
certain area, congestion 
charging 
• General legislation 
against climate change, 
such as taxations on 
business in terms of 
emissions 
• Flood / sea level barriers 
along the River Tyne and 
surround bodies of 
water 
 
• Pass laws on poor 
behaviour/ 
environmental issues. 
e.g. banning plastics 
straws 
Research and Data • Question people on 
their knowledge of 
climate change -> NHS, 
police and public etc. 
 
• Checking & testing 
air/land and water 
quality 
 
• Questionnaire's for local 
population to see what 
they want & need 
 
• Research on other past 
successful schemes 
 
• Flora + Fauna 
• Begin education people 
on effects of climate 
change 
• Check monthly climate 
for 2-5 years to act on 
 
Source: Author
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6.3.2.2. Perceived Worriedness of Different Issues 
The first question within the questionnaire attached to the Yonmenkaigi Exercise asked the participant 
how worried they were about a series of perceived issues. They were given a list of ten perceived 
issues and were asked to rate their worry out of “Not at all Worried”, “Not Very Worried”, “Somewhat 
Worried”, “Very Worried” and “Extremely Worried”. Each of these categories was then converted into 
a rating, with “Not at all Worried” being rated as 1; and “Extremely Worried” being rated as 5. The 
results of these changes in perceived worriedness within both questionnaire 1 (before the exercise) 
and 2 (after) is demonstrated within Table 6.9. 




















Air Pollution 3.438 0.629 3.438 0.892 0.000 0.000 1.000 3.297 -1.174 
Climate 
Change 
































2.375 0.885 2.375 0.806 0.000 0.000 1.000 
0.027 0.000 
Migration 



















As demonstrated within Table 6.9, before the respondents participated within the Yonmenkaigi stated 
they were most worried about climate change, with an average rating of 4.25. This compares to the 
second most worried about issue, which was deforestation at an average worriedness rating of 3.88. 
This represents a worriedness difference of 0.375. This is the largest difference between any two 
issues that were listed. This demonstrates that the sample was already very worried about climate 
change, even before completing a Yonmenkaigi System exercise. However, it was found that there 
 
 
49 - Standard Error of Kurtosis is 0.564 
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was an average increase of worry about climate change of 0.188. This increase is significant at the 90 
per cent, but not at either the 95 or 99 per cent. It should also be noted that there were changes that 
were also observed to be significant at the 90 per cent significance, such as economic instability and 
espionage. The most likely reason why espionage had the largest change, and the most significant p-
value, is that most students did not know what espionage was when they filled out the first 
questionnaire. 
It is also noted that the standard deviation for climate change is slightly reduced from 0.683 to 0.629. 
This demonstrates that the students were becoming more homogeneous in worriedness about 
climate change. 
 
6.3.2.3. Perception Change on Differing Themes 
Table 6.10 demonstrates changes that the students experienced in their thinking on four differing 
themes. Within the third question the students were asked to rank their own personal responsibility 
on a Likert scale from 1, meaning “not at all”, and 10, meaning “a great deal”. For the fourth and fifth 
questions, the students were asked how bad or good that they think that impacts of climate change 
will have on people globally and within the United Kingdom, respectively. This was again done on a 
Likert scale from 1, meaning “Very Good”, to 10, meaning “Very Bad”. The final question, asked the 
students “how likely are you to take personal action to fight climate change in the next six months?” 
This used a Likert scale with 1 meaning “unlikely” to 10 meaning “very likely”. 
Table 6.10 – Perception change on differing themes before and after the Yonmenkaigi System 
Method 











Personal Responsibility 7.375 1.500 7.750 1.528 0.375 0.054 
Global Impact 7.625 2.778 8.250 2.176 0.625 0.129 
UK Impact 6.813 2.287 7.125 1.962 0.313 0.208 
Likely to take Personal 
Action 
8.000 1.789 8.063 1.564 0.063 0.855 
Source: Author 
It can be found that by participating in the exercise, the personal responsibility towards climate change 
of the students increased by 0.375. However, the standard deviation amongst the students has slightly 
increased by 0.028, which means there an increase spread in the responses that the student gave 
back. However, when referring to Table 6.9, it can be observed that a p-value of 0.054, when rounded 
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up, means that there is a significant difference between the first and second questionnaire, at the 95 
per cent level of significance. 
Table 6.10 also demonstrates the belief amongst the students that climate change is more likely to 
have greater impact on people outside the United Kingdom compared to those within the United 
Kingdom, but the UK is still likely to experience negative impacts. Research demonstrates that the 
students were right to believe this, with increased emigration from coastal areas and places that 
already are suffering from high temperatures and water shortages being likely. 
It is also observed that students increased their belief that climate change will impact people within 
both the United Kingdom and globally, with the greatest difference being observed for the global 
impact which increased 0.625 compared to 0.313 for the United Kingdom. However, it is observed 
that despite this large increase in perception for both questions, neither was significant. This is likely 
due to a few students experiencing a large change in their perceptions, whilst the majority did not 
change their perception in relation to these questions. 
Lastly, a clear majority of the students stated that they were highly likely to undertake personal action 
in the next six months to help combat climate change. It is noted that there is very little difference 
(non-significant) before and after the Yonmenkaigi System Method. This is likely due to the already 
high value of 8.000 to start with, meaning little opportunity for change. 
 
6.3.2.4. Views on Responsibility for Tackling Climate Change 
In question eight of the surveys, the students were asked which of six groups should be responsible 
for tacking climate change. The groups that were chosen within the survey were “national 
government”, “local authorities”, “business and industry”, “environmental groups”, “researchers”, 
and “you personally”. 
As demonstrated within Figure 6.8, it was found that number of students that felt they have a 
responsibility for tacking climate change increased from 9 to 11. This represents the equal largest 
response increase between the two questionnaires, the other being “researchers”. Consequently, out 
of these six groups, the “you personally” response was notably a greater change than responses 
indicating “environmental groups”. 
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Figure 6.8 – Views of who is responsible in combatting climate change before and after the 
Yonmenkaigi System Method 
Source: Author 
 
6.3.3. Observation of the Yonmenkaigi System Method Process 
As mentioned earlier, the students that participated within the Yonmenkaigi exercise were in their 
first full week of university, and consequently they knew little about each of their fellow cohort. This 
was felt as the best approach, as if these students that were still unknown to each other can start to 
communicate with each other about such an important and ‘controversial’ issue, it would mean that 
it could be possible to replicate it in the college and possible school atmosphere, where the fellow 
students would know each other much better; meaning that they are more likely to communicate with 
each other freely in a classroom setting. 
It was found that the students at first were very hesitant to be open with the group about their 
knowledge and feeling about climate change. It could be due to the irrational fear that interviewee 2 
described, when they stated that they “do not talk about climate change openly, as I am afraid of 
being labelled” [Male, 18-24, North West England]. This seemly is a major problem, previously talking 
about such a big issue that would affect their adulthood could have been viewed as ‘uncool’. However, 
old belief systems have been challenged within the last 18 to 24 months, with the school strikes for 
climate change raising awareness and giving a voice for children and young people to talk about such 
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As the students started to settle down to the work, they started to become more open and 
conversational about the issue. Consequently, there were more ideas about the topic and how best 
to approach climate change in Newcastle, and it was observed that all students were participating. 
This demonstrates that the think-square-share system works in this context, as many of the students 
were observed to be much more relaxed, laid back, compared to initial discussions about groups and 
timescales at the beginning of the exercise. 
Whilst the students became more engaged and conversational about climate change in the classroom, 
there is no guarantee that this will be case outside of the classroom. However, even if one of the 
students becomes more willing to speak up about climate change, it will have achieved elements of 
its objective to become open about their beliefs on climate change. 
 
6.3.4. Reflection on Yonmenkaigi as a System for Engagement with Climate Change 
As demonstrated within both Tables 6.8 and 6.9, participant’s responses indicate some degree of 
change in their responses to questions about climate change pre- and post-the Yonmenkaigi System 
Method exercise. The data demonstrates that after the questionnaire, the students show signs that 
they were increasingly concerned about climate change. However, there are differing levels of 
significance of the change depending on the individual question. Whilst this provides some opening in 
terms of a viable learning and engagement methodology, the results are not being used here to fully 
prove through this one analytical method a change of perception, albeit this is likely to have occurred. 
The intention was that it would allow the students to feel that they can talk freely about climate 
change without the teacher ‘shooting down’ discussion, as in the case given by an interviewer earlier 
in the chapter. It also enabled students to learn how it is okay to actively talk about important social 
issues, such as climate change, outside of the classroom. It should be noted that since this 
experimental exercise ran in October 2018, with the school strike movements (see chapter seven for 
further discussion), it is evident that many younger people are already engaging with the issue, and 
that this type of exercise would serve to deepen the understanding of what strategies could be applied 
beyond active protest. 
One of the biggest limitations of the experiment was that only two hours were allocated to complete 
a full Yonmenkaigi System Method during this pilot study. On reflection this was not enough time to 
allow a full discussion amongst the stakeholders. Going forward, a minimum of two and half to three 
hours would be recommended to run each time to facilitate the full approach. 
266 | P a g e  
 
Overall, the Yonmenkaigi System Method has demonstrated that relatively simple exercises, can 
change student’s perception of climate change although more applications will need to be carried out, 
to extend the effect further and to see if there is true and sustainable change in perception as a result 
of engagement with the Yonmenkaigi System Method or other similar approaches. 
One of the potential drawbacks on trying to implement this within the British education system is that 
currently most classes will have between 28 and 32 students, which is too big for an effective 
Yonmenkaigi System Method to be undertaken. The solution would be the use of two sets of teachers 
and breaking the size of class down; given the scale of the issue being addressed this additional 
investment would seem appropriate. 
 
6.3.5. Yonmenkaigi System Method and the Pedagogical Action Research 
It has become increasingly recognised throughout this thesis that the British educational curriculum 
is quite restrictive in its nature. It is therefore important to explore different ways in which climate 
change can be taught at different age group levels and in a way that is inclusive to all students. 
Therefore, the partial purpose of Yonmenkaigi System Method in this thesis is also to explore how 
students both react and engage to this method of education, in relation to pedagogical action 
research. 
Pedagogical action research is defined by Norton (2018, p.1) as a “type of research that aims to 
improve teaching and learning practice in the higher education sector”. However, it is arguable that 
these practises for the higher education sector can trickle down to secondary education. One way of 
looking at pedagogical action research is to look at what Waring an Evans (2015) highlight as full 
approaches to pedagogical action research, as demonstrated in Figure 6.9. This viewpoint has four 
different approaches in exploring if the approach is truly successful. 
The case of the Yonmenkaigi System Method application to views of climate change allows for 
students to openly express their faults on the subject based on a narrative cognition that they have 
built through personal experiences of climate change, or via interactive engagement through either 
conversations or consumption of the media. Since the focus of the Yonmenkaigi System Method is 
about building resilience against climate change at the local level (in their own community), it means 
that students will be able to build a narrative around personal experiences, extending even to personal 
experience of being directly impacted by a major event or having witnessed the disruption and 
damaged these events calls. 
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Figure 6.9 – The four approaches to pedagogical action research (Waring and Evans, 2015, p.28) 
In terms of curriculum development, it is arguable that the usage of the Yonmenkaigi System Method 
provides multiple aspects of life skills that the students are going to need in the outside world, not 
just knowledge of climate change. The method means that students have to adopt a more critical 
analysis to a given problem, instead of being told of solutions to the problem which is common in 
secondary education. This leads to another important life skill being developed, based on the 
importance of being able to debate with your peers and acceptance that individuals will disagree on 
how to best approach a problem. 
In terms of ethics, it is arguable that the usage of Yonmenkaigi System Method actually means that all 
opinions can be discussed and debated instead of a narrative being developed by a teacher; in this 
case that was highlighted by interviewee number one earlier in this chapter. This means that students 
understand that not everyone fully agrees with the accepted scientific consensus and will be less likely 
to question why certain information wasn't portrayed to them whilst growing up and learning at 
school about the issue. However, a potential ethical issue in using the Yonmenkaigi System Method is 
that having students discuss the impacts they have personally had experienced due to climate change 
and extreme weather events might bring on psychological issues, as research previously has disclosed 
that children significantly impacted by extreme weather events have been impacted by post-traumatic 
stress disorder [PTSD] and anxiety in general (Cruz et al., 2020). Naturally, this psychological trauma 
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is not uniquely limited to just extreme weather events but to all types of disasters including those of 
COVID-19. 
Lastly in terms of approaches to theories, this method could allow for other such issues to be taught 
and discussed which does not need to be exclusively via the Yonmenkaigi System Method approach 
but could take elements of the approach. For example, issues surrounding religious beliefs could utilise 
the debating elements of this method. But the use of the approach adds more confidence into this 
process.  
 
6.4. Public Workshops 
As highlighted in Section 3.4, climate change only came into the national curriculum in 1995. This can 
be demonstrated by 37.1 per cent of the respondents to the first survey of this thesis having not had 
any formal education on the issue. This means that a large proportion of the population have not had 
any education on climate change and appear to be relying on the media and reading of the internet 
to gather information about climate change. The next section of this chapter addresses the number 
of people that are engaging with social media to find information about climate change. The current 
section first considers people who are learning from experts in the climate change field via the medium 
of public workshops. As demonstrated in the last section, workshop activities can give people the 
unique opportunities to give their points of view about climate change, which hopefully will allow the 
individuals to understand that there is more than one way to deal with climate change. However, it 
also allows the public to learn and personally speak with individuals that are studying within the 
climate field. A similar process has been undertaken during the Climate Assembly, which is outlined 
within Section 7.6, of this thesis. However, one respondent of the Climate Assembly stated that “I 
knew very little about climate change when starting this journey … I have learnt so much about climate 
change [with the climate assembly], I realise the importance of making changes to our lives” (UK 
Parliament, 2020). This quote demonstrates that public workshops about climate change with 
academics and other members of the public is a good way facilitating learning amongst the public 
about climate change, and a way of potentially breaking down existing barriers between the scientific 
community and civil society through post-normal science. This theme is explored further in Section 
7.2. 
Despite there being proven benefits of public workshops, as referred to within the previous section 
and as consolidated later in this thesis, there are debates about their use going forward. Firstly, who 
are going to be fund them, and secondary do the public want these. The respondents within the first 
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survey [March to September 2017] were asked “Do you think that workshops and presentations 
should be offered freely to the public to explain the science and effects of climate change?”. 
It was found that most of the respondents [79.5 per cent] agreed that workshops should be offered 
freely to the public about climate change. However, Table 6.11 demonstrates that the levels of support 
for these workshops vary between the differing age groups and the genders. In general, the 
proportions that are supportive declines from 90.2 per cent for the 18-24 age group to 74.8 per cent 
for the 65+ age group. The one notable exception is the 35-44 age group, which has the same level of 
support as the 65+ age group. However, there is no significant difference between the age groups ’35-
44’ and ’45-54’ (χ2=0.446, p=0.504), meaning that it is possible that these differences could have 
occurred by chance. 
In terms of gender, it is found that females are 9.9 per cent more likely to believe that workshops 
about climate change should be freely offered to the public compared to their male counterparts, with 
this difference been significant (χ2=16.126, p=0.000***). 
Table 6.11 – The proportion of respondents who think workshops about climate change should be 
freely offered to the public 
 Yes No Don’t Know Refused 
Overall 901 (79.5%) 111 (9.8%) 118 (10.4%) 4 (0.4%) 
 
18-24 147 (90.2%) 7 (4.3%) 9 (5.5%) 0 (0.0%) 
25-34 128 (84.8%) 10 (6.6%) 12 (7.9%) 1 (0.7%) 
35-44 86 (74.8%) 15 (13.0%) 14 (12.2%) 0 (0.0%) 
45-54 132 (78.6%) 17 (10.1%) 17 (10.1%) 2 (1.2%) 
55-64 178 (77.4%) 27 (11.7%) 24 (10.4%) 1 (0.4%) 
65+ 226 (74.8%) 35 (11.6%) 41 (13.6%) 0 (0.0%) 
 
Male 512 (75.6%) 82 (12.1%) 80 (11.8%) 3 (0.4%) 
Female 383 (85.5%) 28 (6.3%) 36 (8.0%) 1 (0.2%) 
 
High Trust of SR 752 (85.7%) 40 (4.6%) 83 (9.5%) 2 (0.2%) 
Low Trust of SR 63 (45.7%) 58 (42.0%) 15 (10.9%) 2 (1.4%) 
Data Collection: March – September 2017; SR = Scientists and Researchers 
Source: Author 
Overall, it demonstrates that the public are accepting of workshops and potentially demonstrates that 
there is an underlining willingness of the public to further understand climate change, partially from 
scientists and researchers working in this field, as the level of trust as demonstrated in Section 5.10 is 
still high. This is further demonstrated within Table 6.11 when exploring the levels of support for 
workshops amongst those with a high trust of scientists and researchers, which is 40.0 per cent higher 
than those with low trust of scientists, which is a very significant difference (χ2=121.152, p=0.000***). 
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With the lack of free workshops, as highlighted within Section 3.4, the public will use the media to 
explore information about climate change. 
 
6.5. Social Media 
Within recent years, there has been a wholesale rise in the number of people using social media. For 
some people, this type of media has taken over from the conventional news. Whilst it helps spread 
more information about climate change wider than conventional news, it also produces fundamental 
problems of “fake news” and “echo chambers”, as demonstrated within Section 3.5 of this thesis. This 
can lead to polarisation of public views on climate change and the spread of false information that 
might lead to increased levels of mistrust towards certain groups of scientists or politicians. It should 
be noted that this issue does not contain itself to just climate change, but towards all scientific and 
political issues. This has recently been seen during the COVID-19 pandemic, which has led to 
misinformation being spread across various social media sites (Frenkel, Alba and Zhong, 2020; 
Pennycook et al., 2020; Russonello, 2020; Weismueller et al., 2020). Consequently, it is important to 
gauge the proportional impact of a potential increased exposure to climate sceptic narratives. 
Within the first questionnaire between March and September 2017, the respondents were asked; “do 
you gather information about climate change from social media sites?”. Table 6.12 demonstrates the 
overall response as the proportion of the respondents that do and do not use social media to gather 
information about climate change. It is found that the majority of responses [56.0 per cent] who 
answered the question do not gather information about climate change on the diverse range of social 
media platforms. There is a significant difference between those who do and those who do not use 
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Table 6.12 – Proportion of respondents who actively seek climate change information from social 
media platforms 
Response Proportion of Response with Social Media 
Proportion without or 
declined to indicate if 
use Social Media 
Yes – actively seek CC 
info 
387 34.1% 39.9% 
No – not actively seek 
CC info 
544 48.0% 56.0% 
Don’t Know 40 3.5% 4.1% 
Refused 163 14.4%  
Total 1,134 971 
CC = Climate Change 
Source: Author 
Whilst a considerable number of the respondents use newly emerging platforms to gain information 
about climate change, Table 6.13 demonstrates different age group’s usage. It is found that apart from 
the ’35-44’ age group, increasing age groups are less likely to use social media for climate change 
information and with young people [18-24] being the only age group that is over 50 per cent. This is 
expected as increasingly young people are turning to social media sites to consume news (Griffin, 
2020).  
Table 6.13 – Proportion of respondents that use social media to gather information about climate 
change 
 18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+ 
Yes 87 (53.4%) 63 (41.7%) 36 (31.3%) 63 (37.3%) 75 (32.6%) 61 (20.2%) 
No 69 (42.3%) 70 (46.4%) 65 (56.2%) 83 (49.1%) 110 (47.8%) 144 (47.7%) 
Don’t Know 6 (3.7%) 8 (5.3%) 4 (3.5%) 4 (2.4%) 8 (3.5%) 10 (3.3%) 
Refused 1 (0.6%) 10 (6.6%) 10 (8.7%) 18 (10.7%) 37 (16.1%) 87 (28.8%) 
Total 163 151 115 169 230 302 
N= 1,130; Sample Collection = March to September 2017 
Source: Author 
These results are not surprising confirming data from Ofcom (2018 and 2020) as demonstrated within 
Table 6.14. It is found that as of 2020; the majority of young people now use social media to consume 
news about current affairs [70.8 per cent], and this has increased 0.8 per cent between 2018 and 2020. 
Table 6.13 also demonstrate that for a sizeable proportion of the young people, use social media 
replaces instead of being an addition to more traditional news [such as television, radio and printed 
newspapers]. It clearly implied that if the scientific community want to engage young people with 
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climate change and educate them with the facts and current events of climate change, then a focus 
on social media is needed. Whilst, as highlighted within Section 3.5.3 of this thesis and earlier in this 
section, social media can fuel scepticism and confusion about climate change amongst civil society, 
social media also gives scientists and academics that research climate change a platform to share 
research and discuss climate change with the public. By contrast, the wider community would 
otherwise have to rely on traditional media to mostly convey this work. 
It is worth noting that it is not just young people that are using social media, overall, 45.7 per cent of 
the respondents are now using social media to gain information, which represents a 1.8 per cent 
increase between 2018 and 2020, this increase over even this short timespan being significant at the 
90 per cent level. 
Table 6.14 also highlights a trend that more people [2.2 per cent increase between 2018 and 2020] 
are not using any of the listed methods to gather information about news and current affairs; with the 
most been amongst the youngest [7.6 per cent]. This raises the question as to from where these 
respondents are gathering their information about current affairs and whether these individuals are 
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Table 6.14 – Where do the public gather information about news and current affairs from in 2020 
and comparisons with 2018 
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Podcasts50 12.0% 12.5% 7.0% 4.4% 4.6% 2.0% 6.9% 


































N=4,618 (2018); 4,576 (2020); * = 90 per cent significance; ** = 95 per cent significance; *** = 99 per cent 
significance. 
Source: Data reworked from Ofcom (2018) and Ofcom (2020) 
 
 
50 - Percentage change is not possible for ‘podcasts’ as it is new category for 2020 survey 
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6.6. Summary 
This chapter has demonstrated that civil society within the United Kingdom can engage with climate 
change via numerous different means; these include with different mitigation strategies. It has been 
found that financial capability to be able to apply some of the critical mitigation strategies is the 
barrier, and these are strategies that would reduce the greenhouse gas emission levels. Financial 
barriers are particularly prevalent within the youngest in civil society, despite this part of society being 
those who overall want to do more to reduce their and other’s greenhouse gas emissions. The 
research has found that the majority of the public believe that the government are responsible for 
combatting climate change, which would explain why they have been the main focus of Extinction 
Rebellion’s and other campaign attention, increasingly over the last 18 months. 
In terms of education, climate change exists within the national curriculum in secondary schools and 
colleges and is referred to by a range of other outlets that can be accessed by the public. However, 
with the academicization of the education sector within the United Kingdom, schools, especially at 
Key Stage 3, are being left to teach what they feel like. In general, most people engaging with the 
research believe that education about climate change in the formal education sector needs to 
increase, with most believing that it should be more focussed in primary and secondary schools. 
One way of potentially improving the education of climate change is through a more participatory 
form of education around critical issues, such as demonstrated by the application of the Yonmenkaigi 
System Method. It has been found that even in quite brief encounters of participants in the UK, and 
as suggested by its application for other risk related issues elsewhere, this can improve the perception 
of climate change amongst the students that took part in the experiment. It was found that students 
were actively engaging the exercise, rather than simply being taught climate change. 
Entire sections of society, particularly older groups, have had no formal education on climate change; 
the science of climate change is relatively new and constantly updating, such that what the public 
were taught at school [if taught, depending on their age] is likely to be outdated. Consequently, they 
are reliant on the media, and increasingly social media, to gather information about climate. One 
possible way of updating the understanding of climate change amongst the public is through 
workshops, and it was found that the majority of those responding to this research would prefer this. 
However, until the Climate Assembly, held in January-March 2020, there were no regular or national 
climate change workshops for the general public. This demonstrates a real divide between climate 
science and its advocates and civil society more widely. 
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“My friends, love is better than anger. Hope is better than fear. Optimism is better than 
despair. So let us be loving, hopeful and optimistic. And we’ll change the world.” 
Jack Layton (2011) 
Leader of the Canadian Opposition  
 
7.1. Introduction 
As the previous two chapters have demonstrated, the overall level of perception about climate change 
within the United Kingdom is that it is happening and is a serious issue. However, there is uncertainty 
about the nature of current and future impacts it will have on the United Kingdom. Chapter Six showed 
that there are varied ways in which the public are already engaging with climate change concerns; also 
demonstrating that behavioural changes are likely with shifting perception. However, the inter-
communication between the scientific community, politicians and civil society remains weak. 
This demonstrates the need for partnership between the differing stakeholders in finding the best way 
forward in both mitigating against and adapting to climate change, whereby science advises 
government on more complex and uncertain issues. Kaiser (2019, Online) highlights four major 
challenges in building a framework for science to advice governments. These are the following: 
1. The holistic challenge: 
a. Complex issues call for radical interdisciplinarity. 
 
2. The pragmatic challenge: 
a. There is no easy balance between the wants of the recipient and the 
scientific advice given with integrity. 
 
3. The post-normal challenge: 
a. Integrate uncertainties, values and alternative knowledge sources. 
b. Provide knowledge quality assessments. 
 
4. The trust challenge: 
a. Threats not only from the outside, but significantly also from science: a 
crisis. 
b. Good knowledge requires context and historical reflection 
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These issues have become a major challenge in trying to achieve progression in combatting climate 
change through mitigation. The following four sub-sections critiques and expands each of these 
challenges in exploring their interlinkage with climate change reaction and responses. 
 
7.1.1. The Holistic Challenge 
Climate change is known to be a complex challenge as the climate system itself is highly complex. It 
could also be described as a ‘wicked problem’ as it is a problem that has a unique set of characteristics 
that make them problematic to tackle (Rittel and Webber, 1973) [see Rittel and Webber, 1973 for 
more in depth describe of the main characteristics of ‘wicked problems’]. However, the issue around 
engagement goes beyond this statement. To fully understand on how best deal with complex issues, 
such as climate change, research communities need a truly interdisciplinary approach. Climate change 
research is associated with physical scientists who quantify climate changes. But, to truly fix the issue, 
climate change research and communication needs to go beyond that. It could go as far as saying that 
you can do all the climate research you want, but if you do not know how to communicate your 
findings to the public (informed in particular by psychology and sociology) and can figure out the best 
practice and policy approaches to solving the issue, the accumulated science generated is of little real 
use. However, the science is of use, as it provides researchers and the public the chance to look at the 
past climate and consider the implications for the future. The argument is that physical and social 
sciences need to work together more closely to tackle climate change with governments and all 
stakeholders. This argument for a more interdisciplinary research environment has been discussed for 
many years (Heberlein, 1988; Lu, 2016). It was also demonstrated earlier in Chapter Five, in showing 
that the perception of climate change is homogenous within the borders of a sovereign nation, 
meaning that scientists are going to need to communicate the science and potential ways forward in 
and integrated and different way. 
Currently, research confirms a funding gap between physical and social sciences. Overland and 
Sovacool (2020) show that between 1990 and 2018, the physical sciences work on climate change 
received 770 per cent more funding compared to the social sciences. This demonstrates a significant 
imbalance in funding between the two types of scholarly activity with consequent deficits in relation 
to dealing with the all-important reaction and response aspects of climate change research. 
It is arguable that the IPCC are however tacking the interdisciplinary issue to some extent. This is 
demonstrated within the next round of IPCC reports that are due in early 2022. There are set to be 
three working groups called ‘The Physical Science Basis’, ‘Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability’, and 
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‘Mitigation of Climate Change’ (IPCC, No Date b) and as already reflected in some of the earlier reports 
from that source. These however appear to lack the requisite reactions and responses implied.  
 
7.1.2. The Pragmatic Challenge 
There is no magic bullet when combatting climate change. Contemporary infrastructure has been 
designed in such a way that is not sustainable in limiting the effects of climate change and adapting 
toward project climate change. This is the case for example whether building homes on floodplains 
(Rowlatt, 2019; Halliday and O’Carroll, 2020) or in the usage of fossil fuels in the energy sector. 
Projections are that to limit temperature increases to the 1.5oC target, set within the Paris Agreement 
in 2015, would mean that every country in the world will need to achieve net zero carbon dioxide 
levels by 2050 (Allen et al., 2018). This is despite, as shown in Section 5.11.1, only 35.5 per cent of the 
respondents in the research for this thesis having any awareness of this term. 
Currently, only a few countries and territories have set some form of targets to be net zero by 2050, 
including Ireland and the United Kingdom. However, those who are emitting the most have not set 
similar targets, with the highest polluter, China, planning to continue raising emissions for at least 
another ten years (den Elzen et al., 2016). It has become an increasingly difficult issue for the United 
Kingdom to get some to engage with climate change, when other countries are still carrying on 
polluting large quantities of greenhouse gas emissions. A typical response indicated here by 
respondents OLC067, states that the United Kingdom is “only a very small country and cannot affect 
a lot in the world.  Until China agrees to combat pollution what the UK does is immaterial” [Male, 45-
54, East Midlands]. Respondent OLC012 stated that the “UK [reduction in emissions] is meaningless; 
[the] USA, China, and India are vital if we are to achieve any change” [Male, 65+, North West England]. 
This backs up with what has been observed within Section 6.1, which demonstrates that 26.3 per cent 
of the respondents who stated that it is not worth doing things to help reduce climate change if others 
do not do the same. Consequently, it is not surprising that some of the respondents also have a feeling 
that the United Kingdom government should be either “encouraging large countries” [Male, 45-54, 
Wales] or “putting pressure on China & India” [OLC157, Female, 65+, East Midlands] to do more. 
Despite of all of this, over the years, the United Kingdom has deployed a number of techniques in the 
form of policies and statutory instruments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions of both business and 
of individuals through either changing behaviour or developing more efficient technologies. One 
which has been frequently been cited within this thesis is fuel duty, which has been shown to be a 
way to reduce emissions from vehicles. It was noted in Section 5.11.2 that 42.8 per cent of the 
respondents in 2017 were supportive of an increase in fuel duty. However, the issue is that it could 
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result in strikes, protests, disobedience and maybe even riots. Elements of these have been seen 
previously in both the United Kingdom [Autumn 2000] and internationally [France 2018]. 
This has demonstrated that the United Kingdom has great difficulty in balancing guidance of the 
scientific community with the practicalities of action. Whichever government is in charge, climate 
change is likely to be a scientific and political hot potato. Consequently, a view expressed is that civil 
society should be “demand[ing] government action to address causes” [OLD172, Male, 55-64, 
Scotland]. 
Beyond climate change, other recent scientifically informed threats face similar issues, such as 
regarding the advice of the scientific community for COVID-19. In this case, if the government followed 
the advice of the scientific community fully, it is likely that lockdowns would last for longer and 
probably damage the economy further, drawing large criticism due to unemployment. However, if the 
government listens to economists, then the country is likely to have entered a partial lockdown or no 
lockdown, which would have spared the economy extreme unemployment figures, but would result 
in many more deaths and would draw criticism for allowing people to die. A group of researchers in 
the immediate outbreak of COVID-19 within the United Kingdom argued that this is a clear example 
of post-normal science. In many ways, COVID-19 has very many similar traits to the post-normal 
climate change science dilemma. 
 
7.1.3. The Trust Challenge 
When trying to get anybody to do something, first they need to have trust in what is been said to 
them. A similar scenario is needed for climate change. If the public do not trust either the scientists 
and/or politicians about the messages on climate change, then the likelihood is that the public will not 
undertake any engagement strategies to either mitigate against or adapt to climate change. 
Therefore, both elements [scientists and politicans] need to build rapport with the civil society such 
as regards fuel duty. The right ideas were brought forward, but with little public communication about 
the reasoning behind the measure. The speed in which fuel duty was rising, meant that it became 
deeply unpopular amongst the public, as demonstrated with a survey at the beginning of the protest 
highlighting that 78 per cent supported a fuel blockage (BBC, 2000b). 
As highlighted in Chapter 5.10, the overall trust amongst groups of scientists in relation to climate 
change has remained high, with this group ranking first overall for trust in the climate messages [with 
a score of 4.08 out of 5], despite disruptive stories [as highlighted within Table 5.3] and a general push 
back by climate sceptics over the years. 
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Kaiser (2019) highlights that the scientific community needs to be careful of trust threats from within 
the scientific community itself, especially researchers that are sceptical of the scientific consensus of 
climate change, such as Lennart Bengtsson, Don Easterbrook, Wibjörn Karlén, Roger A. Pielke Jr. and 
Fred Singer. As highlighted earlier, scientific scepticism can be productive, as it helps refine science to 
make the research more thorough. However, when this scepticism is aired with the public via the 
medium of media that can distort, it can lead to reactions based on believing that the science is not 
settled. 
 
7.2. Post-Normal Science 
As highlighted earlier within the work by Kaiser (2019), there are four main challenges in creating a 
potential framework for science to advise government. The fourth of these, ‘the post-normal 
challenge’, is also an outcome of this thesis.  
The concept of ‘Post-Normal Science’ was developed by Funtowicz and Ravetz (1993) but has its 
origins in the mid-1980s (Petersen et al., 2011). Post-normal science is when scientific issues have high 
system uncertainty and/or the decision stakes are also high, as demonstrated within Figure 7.1, but 
also when the decision for action is needed urgently (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993). The concept of 
‘Post-Normal Science’ is a spin-off from the concept by Kuhn (1962) known as ‘Normal Science’. Kuhn 
(1962, p. 10) stated that normal science is the ‘research [which is] firmly based upon one or more past 
scientific achievements, achievements that some particular scientific community acknowledges for a 
time as supplying the foundation for its further practice”. This approach is based upon science as a 
process, which is debated about via the differing rules of science (Turnpenny, Jones and Lorenzoni, 
2011). Throughout this process of debating, some scientific knowledge can periodically undergo a shift 
in paradigm. However, when this paradigm cannot be accepted, then it can lead to revolutionary 
science, in which the rules of science are examined and changed for a new set of paradigms (Kuhn, 
1962). However, this work especially around revolutionary science was criticised by Ravertz (1986, p. 
419), who states that the concept of asseverating science in practice was “an essentially myopic and 
anti-critical activity”. They go on further by giving a list of examples which at the time could be viewed 
as complex scientific issues, such as acid rain, toxic waste and greenhouse gases. Ravertz (1971) 
believed that part of the issue was that science had become increasingly industrialised, with a sole 
focus on report writing for the purpose of attaining funding for future projects and personal 
promotion. This led science to be become too focused on one issue and scientists were unable to see 
the bigger picture (Ravertz, 1986). It led to questions as to whether government were becoming too 
reliant on science (Turnpenny, Jones and Lorenzoni, 2011). As highlighted by Turnpenny, Jones and 
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Lorenzoni (2011) the science started to develop in the mid-1980s, when more complex scientific 
matters started to come to the forefront in terms of when the issue was complex in nature, had 
degrees of uncertainty, but the potential harm to both humanity and local/global ecosystems were 
high, especially if they were not addressed with some urgency. Ravertz (1986, p. 422) highlights that 
under the old ‘normal science’ approach, it was woefully insufficient to deal with these issues where 
“facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high and decisions urgent”. Consequently, Funtowicz 
and Ravetz (1991) created the concept of Second Order Science, which would be called ‘Post-Normal 
Science’. They stated that the new approach to science should be “developed [upon] to make our 
ignorance usable” (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1991, p. 141). Forrester, Gerger Swartling and Lonsdale 
(2008) highlight the difference between the approaches being three fractions of post-normal science, 
as demonstrated in Figure 7.1. 
 
Figure 7.1 – Post-Normal Science Diagram (Forrester, Gerger Swartling and Lonsale, 2008, p.11) 
The first is the ‘applied science’ element, which is purely about informing civil society and politicians 
about the issue. This could be undertaken in different ways, but a perfect example given for this would 
be the IPCC reports. The second step is the ‘professional consultancy’ this is when the scientific 
community goes out to seek the opinions of the public about set issue. This could be undertaken in 
varied ways, such as for example, through surveys, focus groups, public gatherings, and simulation 
games. It is arguable that this thesis asking public/respondents about their perception of and 
engagement with the issue of climate change is an example of this approach. The final step is the 
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actual ‘post-normal science’ where engagement with the issue is usually between the scientists, the 
politician and civil society. This is achieved in numerous ways, such as workshops, citizen jury, expert 
committee, public hearings, and even referendums. It is arguable that the usage of post-normal 
science within the climate change sector could help as a way of building trust amongst civil society 
and breaking down the invisible barriers that have seemingly existed between the academic 
community and civil society on this issue. This problem was discussed in a documentary on BBC Radio 
4 released in August 2020 called ‘How They Made Us Doubt Everything’. Within this radio 
documentary, the issue surrounding the lexicon that scientists are using, can be very confusing to the 
general public and has been used in the past and even today by climate sceptics to confuse and 
mislead the public (How They Made Us Doubt Everything, 2020). Susan Hassol [Director of Climate 
Communication] who highlights the terms ‘uncertainty’ as a perfect example of how the lexicon being 
used by the climate and scientific community, can be confusing for civil society to understand and lead 
to mistrust and scepticism. In the documentary, Susan states that “to the public, [the term] 
‘uncertainty’ means we just don’t know … [whereas] … the scientists use ‘uncertainty’ to talk about a 
range around the particular measurements or projections” (How They Made Us Doubt Everything, 
2020, 13:45). This is not the only term that has a different meaning depending on the user, with Table 
7.1 giving further examples of different meanings between scientists and the public. 
Table 7.1 – Example of terms that have different meaning for scientists and civil society 
Scientific Term Public Meaning 
Enhance Improve 
Aerosol Spray can 
Theory Hunch, speculation 
Uncertainty Ignorance 
Error Mistake, wrong, incorrect 
Bias Distortion, political motive 
Manipulation Illicit tampering 
Adapted from Somerville and Hassol, 2011, p.51.  
So far, this chapter has in detail discussed post-normal science and the issues of potential frameworks 
in which scientists and politicians can communicate to achieve the best possible result in responding 
to complex issues, such as climate change. But this does not resolve what happens when post-normal 
science does not exist in practise. Pre-2019, the United Kingdom had seemly lacked the capacity to 
allow the general public to get involved in having a say on climate change and what they think could 
be undertaken at a local and national level to combat climate change. This has the hallmarks of what 
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this thesis is concluding is ‘post-normal engagement’. This is similar to ‘post-normal science’ in many 
respects but is when the public are forcefully going out to make their voices heard through the 
medium of activism. It is therefore arguable that the definition of ‘post-normal engagement’ in the 
context of climate change is when the civil society feel that at an individual level, they are doing their 
bit to mitigate against and adapt to climate change but feel that a lack of credible action is being taken 
at government level to back up what they are doing. It includes being able to have a say in the future 
action about climate change, and when not, they embark on a form of activism, whether it is through 
protest or civil disobedience. Figure 7.2 demonstrates this ‘post-normal engagement’, in the outer 
zone of Forrester et. al’s concentric arcs, the boundary to it being a barrier requiring transitioning in 
the United Kingdom and elsewhere; the push from the inner circles is via a push from the public 
through activism and civil discordance to make their voice heard and force the government to change. 
The following sections explore the year 2019, when post-normal engagement with climate change 
issues took off within the United Kingdom. It explores two main groups of activists that were 
demonstrating during this period, and the overall perception of these groups and types of activism 
that they undertook. It should be noted that the monitoring of the demographic composition of 
climate protests has helped here to assess the nature of likely reactions and resistance to the content 
of COP26 being hosted in Glasgow, Scotland in November 2021. 
 
7.3. Background to the 2019 Climate Activism 
The year 2019 has seen climate change increasingly in the public discourse, as demonstrated by a 
124.8 per cent increase in the number of climate change articles within newspapers within the first 
six months of 2019 compared to the same period of 2018 (Boykoff et al., 2020). This increase in 
attention is due to varied reasons. 
Firstly, in terms of meteorology, the United Kingdom broke two temperature records within 2019. The 
first was on the 26th February, when the United Kingdom experienced its warmest winter day on 
record, with temperature being recorded at 21.2oC in Kew Gardens, London (BBC News, 2019d). The 
other record occurred on the 25th July, when the United Kingdom experienced its warmest day on 
record, with temperature recorded at the Cambridge Botanic Garden at 38.7oC, which beat the 
previous record by 0.2oC (Met Office, 2019). In addition to this, the United Kingdom experienced its 
equal warmest summer in 2018 (Met Office, 2018). 
In terms of political responses, the United Kingdom became the first country to declare a climate 
emergency on the 1st May; with both regional governments of Scotland (Baynes, 2019) and Wales also 
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declaring a climate emergency in both April and May. However, the legislation is not legally 
enforceable, and means the government is not obliged to undertake any action (BBC News, 2019e). 
However, in the wake of this climate emergency, the then Prime Minister, Theresa May, announced 
that the United Kingdom agreed to alter the United Kingdom’s carbon emission reductions from 80 
per cent by 2050 to become net carbon neutral by 2050 (BEIS and Skidmore, 2019). 
These climate emergencies come after the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change announced in 
October 2018, that society only has twelve years to stop the worst of climate change (Watts, 2018). 
This was after a report, which states that instead of keeping temperatures under 1.5oC, the planet was 
heading for 3oC of warming (IPCC, 2018). Because of this increase in warming, it would experience 
more extreme weather events, both within the United Kingdom and across the planet. 
Lastly, it has been noted that there has been an increase in the number of protests that are aimed at 
mitigating against climate change within the United Kingdom during 2019, including via “Extinction 
Rebellion” and “School Strike for Climate”. It is possible that this increase in protest is due in part to 
the warning given by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. However, the protests raise 
questions on who comprises these groups, what are their overall aims, whether the public are 
supportive of these reactions and are motivated to join future protests. 
 
7.4. Extinction Rebellion 
Extinction Rebellion, founded in May 2018, is a political and social movement orientated to mass civil 
disobedience and non-violent behaviour within cities around the world, to confront climate change 
induced ecological collapse (Extinction Rebellion, No Date). The group have cited other past grassroots 
movements, including suffragettes and the civil rights movements (Taylor and Gayle, 2018). These 
movements have previously used civil disobedience to achieve attention and support for their cause. 
Extinction Rebellion supports some of its members in actively getting arrested to attract attention 
(Extinction Rebellion: Last Chance to Save the World?, 2019; Smoke, 2019). Despite these actions, it 
has attracted a large amount of support from academics and celebrities (Extinction Rebellion, 2019). 
The largest protest that Extinction Rebellion have organised occurred for eleven days between the 
15th and 25th April 2019 in Central London.  The groups protest shut down parts of central London, 
including Marble Arch, Oxford Circus, Piccadilly Circus, Parliament Square and Waterloo Bridge. In 
addition, the group’s members were responsible for criminal damage to the headquarters of ‘Royal 
Dutch Shell’, and glued themselves to trains at Canary Wharf. Consequently, Metropolitan Police 
estimate that 1,130 people were arrested during the eleven-day protest. These protests were the 
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main news stories for numerous days throughout the two week period that they occurred, and as such 
the group succeeded in drawing attention towards climate change; there was a 39 per cent increase 
in newspaper reports on climate change in April compared to the previous month, and further 
increases in May (Boykoff et al., 2020). Since then, Extinction Rebellion declared a “summer uprising”, 
which expanded out of London to the cities of Bristol (Walker, 2019), Cardiff (Murray and Storer, 
2020), Edinburgh (Spowart, 2018), Leeds (Sheridan, 2020) and Newcastle (MacFarlane, 2019); and 
even to the Crown Dependency of Jersey (ITV, 2019). 
During the April 2019 protests in London, two surveys were conducted amongst the public which 
asked of how supportive they were during the event. The first was conducted during the first two days 
of the protest (Kenward, 2019), and the second was taken during the third day of protests (YouGov, 
2019b). The results show that the overall level of support declined from 46 per cent (Kenward, 2019) 
to 36 per cent by the third day of the protest (YouGov, 2019b). This decline in support for the protests 
coincided with the disruption of public transportation within London. Two activists had climbed on 
top of a Dockland Light Railway train; whilst another glued himself to a train at Canary Wharf (Hartley-
Parkinson, 2019). This drop-in support is likely to be in part influenced by the alienation of commuters 
who were trying to get to work. In addition to this, the headline figure of £7 million being spent on 
policing for these protests within London in April 2019 (Jarvis, 2019), is likely to have also undermined 
the support for the group. 
Since these protests that Extinction Rebellion undertook in London, its actions have moved to a more 
international focus; with protests in both 2019 and 2020 in Australia (Webb, 2019), France (BBC, 
2019f), Germany (Nasr, 2019), New Zealand (Webb, 2019), Netherlands (BBC, 2019f) and the United 
States (Tracy, 2019). 
 
7.4.1. Awareness of Extinction Rebellion 
Despite the media attention that Extinction Rebellion achieved throughout 2019, especially during the 
London protests in April, there are non-consumers of news who may not know who this group are. 
Within the second questionnaire, the respondents were asked “Have you heard of "Extinction 
Rebellion" before today?”. In which the respondents were given three options, ‘yes’, ‘no’ and ‘don’t 
know’. If they either answered ‘no’ or ‘don’t know’, they were asked to not complete any further 
questions about Extinction Rebellion within this survey, to stop them giving an uninformed opinion on 
the group. 
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Table 7.2 records that the majority of the respondents [63.1 per cent] had heard of the group before 
the day of been questioned. However, due to the level of the media interest in the group as mentioned 
earlier, it would be expected that this number would be higher. This seems to suggest that there is a 
fairly large proportion of the public that are not readily connected to current events which others 
regard as being nationally or globally newsworthy. The implications of this going forward in terms of 
climate change could be significant, where it is going to be increasingly more difficult to rely on major 
communication channels for the latest information about climate change, which is the basis of a 
significant proportion of societies reactions to it.  
When observing the socio-demographic differences, it can be observed that there are significant 
differences within each socio-demographic group regard the direct action represented by Extinction 
Rebellion, some trends standing out. The first is the differences between the different age groups. It 
was observed that young people (18-24) are the only age group without a majority having heard of 
Extinction Rebellion.  Secondly, males are 20.4 per cent more likely to have heard of Extinction 
Rebellion compared to females. As for the case of age group, this raises questions about the 
differences in which men and women are consuming news about environmental issues. Thirdly, it is 
noted that London had a much higher proportion of respondents having heard of Extinction Rebellion 
compared to the overall average [85.2 per cent versus 63.1 per cent respectively]. This is not 
surprising, as the largest protests organised by Extinction Rebellion took place in central London, 
affecting the way in which the people of London were going about their business. 
However, London is not the most likely region to have heard of Extinction Rebellion, with South West 
England being the highest at 87.1 per cent. The reason for why this region both has such a high 
knowledge score and is above London which has been the most effected by the protest is somewhat 
surprising. Some potential reasons include that Bristol, which is the largest city in the region, had a 
large protest in July 2019, including the blocking of the M32 causing major traffic delays throughout 
the nearby region (BBC News, 2019g). These delays resulted in somebody being unable to get the 
bedside of his dying father in time, which caused anger towards the group in the region as reported 
within the media at that time (Buck, 2019; Keay, 2019; Morrison, 2019). The other potential reason 
for the high knowledge of Extinction Rebellion score could be partly because, as demonstrated with 
Table 7.2, individuals who have a centre politics identification, including the Liberal Democrats, are 
the most likely to have higher knowledge score in this context. The South West of England traditionally 
is a region within which Liberal Democrats have scored highly in general elections. 
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Despite of these difference being suggested in explaining why the South West result was highest in 
the UK, there is nonetheless not a significantly significant difference between the proportion that have 
heard of Extinction Rebellion within London and the South West England (χ2=0.222, p=0.637). 
Overall, it the data suggested that those who are over the age of 65 years, male, of white ethnicity, 
with a centre political identification and from the South West of England were more likely to have 
heard about Extinction Rebellion than other groups. 
Table 7.2 –Proportion of respondents that had heard of Extinction Rebellion in the summer 2019 
 Yes No Don’t 
Know 
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Table 7.2 –Proportion of Respondents that had Heard of Extinction Rebellion in the summer 2019 
(Continued) 
 
Yes No Don’t 
Know 





































































































































































Sig. = Significant; *** = 99 per cent significance; Note: All Percentages might not add up to 100 per cent due 
to rounding errors 
Source: Author 
 
7.4.2. Support for Extinction Rebellion 
It is arguable that any action group wanting to achieve the support that will make their cause heard, 
needs to have the support of the general public. Out of those who have heard of Extinction Rebellion, 
the respondents were then asked; “are you overall supportive of the views of “Extinction Rebellion”?”. 
The responses to this question were measured using a Likert Scale between 1 and 5, with ‘1’ meaning 
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‘not supportive’ and ‘5’ ‘supportive’. Within Table 7.3, the scores of 1 and 2 were merged in the output 
for ‘not supportive’, with 4 and 5 meaning ‘supportive’. 
The resultant data shows that the level of support for Extinction Rebellion declines for older age 
groups. It is arguable that this is to be expected, as it roughly follows a similar trend compared with 
the seriousness of climate change, as demonstrated within Figure 5.12. The exception in this trend is 
with the age group ’45-54’. Firstly, this may be because responses from this age group are more 
homogeneous around the supportive category compared to any other age group [including the ’18-
24’ age group], as this age group achieved a 75.3 per cent for the ‘supportive’ response.  
Probably, the most salient within supportiveness of Extinction Rebellion based on socio-demographic 
data is the political identification of the respondents. It is highlighted that both the left and centre 
voter respondents are overwhelming supportive of the Extinction Rebellion goals with 82.1 per cent 
and 80.8 per cent, respectively. This compares to those who are either from a right-wing party or the 
Brexit Party, which are 26.2 supportive and 20.0 per cent supportive. When comparing the difference 
between the centre voting respondents to the right voting respondents, it was found that there was 
a significant difference between sets of respondents, at a 99 per cent significance (χ2=92.607, 
p=0.000***). This striking difference is almost reminiscent of differences in climate change perception 
within the United States. It remains to be seen if Extinction Rebellion protests could result in growing 
political divides in climate change perception in the future, but as Chapter Five demonstrates there 
are divides within the United Kingdom. 
Overall, the results in Table 7.3 demonstrate that: 
• Respondents who are female, between the ages of 18 and 24, that are typically a more left-
wing voter, of white ethnicity, and are from East of England are typically the most supportive 
of Extinction Rebellion’s beliefs and goals. 
• Respondents who are male, over the age of 65, that are typically more likely to be a voter of 
the Brexit Party and are an ethnic minority are typically the least supportive of Extinction 
Rebellion’s belief and goals. Scotland and Northern Ireland show slightly lower levels of 
support. 
This overall evaluation of perception of Extinction Rebellion then raises questions as to why people 
are supportive or not supportive of the movement. Within the questionnaire, after given the score 
about Extinction Rebellion, the respondents were given the opportunity to justify the score given. 
Some of these points are to be explored in the remainder of this sub-section. 
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Sig. = Significant; *** = 99 per cent significance; Note: All Percentages might not add up to 100 per cent due 
to rounding errors 
Source: Author. 
When exploring why Extinction Rebellion has a general level of support amongst the respondents, a 
common theme arose concerning government urgency in tackling the issue of climate change. This is 
demonstrated by respondent CCAA0067 who said that “climate change is a serious issue that the 
government isn’t engaging with to the extent that it should” [Female, 18-24, West Midlands], and 
respondent CCAA0048 who said that “Governments and large global companies just don’t care about 
the environment, they say they do but barely anything ever changes until there is unrest” [Male, 18-
24, North East England]. These are clear case respondents that care about climate change and think 
that if the government will not respond to it more urgently, they will support a group that will help 
make this happen. 
Respondent CCAA0107 similarly states that they “mostly support the views of Extinction Rebellion 
based on their views that enough is enough with regards to climate change politics [and that] for years 
…  government policies with regards to the issue have never really reflected the severity of the 
problem” [Male, 18-24, North East England]. However, they go further and explain how they 
understand the reasoning behind “Extinction Rebellion's attitude that if politicians won't choose to 
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listen to the science, we shall have to make them listen through the use of public outcry”. This is an 
example of the previously introduced ‘post-normal engagement’, where the public are feeling that 
they are doing their bit to reduce their personal carbon emissions, but government are not legislating 
to focus others to make their contribution. 
However, some are worried about Extinction Rebellion potential tactics to bring the message to the 
public. For example, respondent CCAA0126 state that they “would have been ‘fully supportive’ [5] had 
the news not mentioned ER [Extinction Rebellion] using drones to disrupt flights to Heathrow” [Male, 
35-44, Scotland]. It should be noted that this questionnaire was taken in early June 2019, when a 
splinter group from Extinction Rebellion called ‘Heathrow Pause’ have adapted to shut down 
Heathrow Airport using the drones within the Heathrow exclusion zone. Whilst it is debated the level 
of involvement of Extinction Rebellion in the Heathrow Pause protest, it is known that there was an 
arrest in September 2019, for alleged attempting to fly a drone near Heathrow Airport (Hockaday, 
2019). These types of actions have, for some, turned them away from supporting the group. 
Respondent CCAA1378 stated that they did not “like the extreme way they are tackling the issue, for 
example Heathrow shut-down plan” [Male, 65+, Unknown]. They go on by stating “this will only anger 
the public and we should be getting them on board!”. This respondent raises a point, that there is a 
very real danger that the very nature of civil disobedience protest, could lead to major disruption in 
the lives of many individuals who are concerned about issues of climate change, but frustration and 
anger of having their lives being disrupted could lead to a backlash against climate movements. 
A further prominent event that occurred during 2019 via Extinction Rebellion outside of the Easter 
London Protest which led to anger amongst the public exemplifies how the very nature of protests 
will cause disruption. 
During the protest that took place 17th October 2019, an 83-year-old man glued himself to the side of 
a train and others jumped on the top of the train to try and stop it moving at Canning Town tube 
station, London (Gayle and Quinn, 2019). This led to scuffles as commuters attempted to drag off 
protesters from trains in attempt to stop disruption. Whilst, this protest gathered a lot of media 
attention to their group and the cause, it is arguable that most of this was negative. The protest had 
taken place after the closure of the activism survey for this thesis, and so there is no data available 
from the survey. However, media outlets facilitated debates about the appropriateness of this protest, 
including through media programmes such as ‘Good Morning Britain’, ‘This Morning’ and ‘Loose 
Women’. Extinction Rebellion admitted, in a Facebook Post, that they were wrong for targeting public 
transportation. However, from the respondents, there were already concerns about Extinction 
Rebellion targeting public transportation before this event. Respondent CCAA0107 had referred to the 
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“light irony that these protests have often affected those using public transport, a method of 
transportation which is often regarded as a 'cleaner' alternative to using cars” [Male, 18-24, North 
East England]. This response is supported by respondent CCAA1614 who stated that they think that 
“nearly all their actions are brilliant but one or two have been own goals such as stopping public 
transport systems that have to be part of the solution” [Male, 55-64, South West England]. , 
respondent CCAA1409 stated that “delaying [and/or] preventing commuters from using buses and 
trains was contradictory to the aim of getting people out of private cars and into public transport to 
reduce pollution” [Female, 45-54, South East England]. This belief was also held by respondent 
CCAA1485 who stated that “obstructing public transport actively undermines carbon reduction” 
[Male, 35-44, South West England]. 
This is probably one the biggest issues that Extinction Rebellion have faced, what and who are they 
targeting by way of protest. In this case, the targeting of public transportation in London has two main 
issues. The first is that if the group want people to be greener, the use of public transport is needed; 
on this day, it was reported that several commuters had to either jump into a car or taxi, which in turn 
resulted in more greenhouse gas emissions being emitted. The other is that in this case they are 
targeting working class people, which need to get to work to be able to pay the bills, and this action 
could detrimentally impact on these individual’s ability to do so.  These types of actions led to one 
respondent [CCAB0061] stating that they “believe in what they stand for (as a general principle) but 
their actions make me doubt their integrity” [Male, 25-34, South East England]. This is the problem 
that Extinction Rebellion could face in future years, as if the group loses integrity amongst the public, 
the group could be looked down upon. 
 
7.4.3. Supportive of Extinction Rebellion’s London Protest 
A change in the level of support for Extinction Rebellion in the aftermath of the more substantive 
protest in April 2019 within the centre of London across the United Kingdom might be expected.  
To test the level of support Extinction Rebellion achieved for the London Protest, the respondents 
were asked “How supportive are you of "Extinction Rebellion" protests in central London during April 
2019?”. As with the previous question, the respondents were given the same scale of 1 to 5. Given the 
questions are similar, it means that a direct comparison can be made to determine whether there is 
any difference and whether this difference is significant. Figure 7.2 demonstrates the overall level of 
support for Extinction Rebellions protest in London in April 2019. This also includes the proportion of 
respondents not answering, as they had not heard of the group before the survey. 
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Figure 7.2 demonstrates that the most selected category was ‘have not heard’. After that, the most 
popular choice is the option 5, showing that there was still a high level of support for the action that 
the group undertook despite the media reports of anger and concerns about Extinction Rebellion’s 
actions that were raised in the previous section. 
 
Figure 7.2 – Respondents Support of Extinction Rebellion’s Protest in April 2019 Between May and 
August, 2019. 
Source: Author. 
Figure 7.2 and Table 7.4 both demonstrate that there is still a majority that support Extinction 
Rebellion protests in Central London in April 2019, with 57.8 per cent of these respondents having 
heard of the group. However, as demonstrated with Table 7.5, there has been a significant increase 
(10.1 per cent) in the overall number of people who are not supportive of the group’s actions in April 
2019 (χ2=, p=0.000***). 
The supportiveness of Extinction Rebellion as a group was the highest amongst the young people. 
However, this age group’s support declines to third place in supportiveness of Extinction Rebellion’s 
actions during the April 2019 protest in London. This is, as demonstrated within Table 7.5, due to the 
decline in overall support within age group ’18-24’, with a mean decline score of 0.44 or a 15.9 per 
cent decline in the supportive category. This demonstrates that it is the young people who know of 
the group who are welcoming of Extinction Rebellion and their goals. However, they are not 
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and politicians’ attention to the group and issue it represents. Going forward, Extinction Rebellion has 
signalled that they would like to attract more young people to the movement. This demonstrates that 
if they do want to get the support of this targeted group, then they will have to change their approach 
to protesting. 
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Sig. = Significant; *** = 99 per cent significance; Note: All Percentages might not add up to 100 per cent due 
to rounding errors. Note: Significance scores are between the three groups of supportiveness and 
each of the socio factors. 
Source: Author 
The data suggests overall that: 
• Respondents who are aged between 45 and 54, are female, have a more left-wing political 
identification, are of white ethnicity and from the East of England are the most likely to be 
supportive of Extinction Rebellion’s London Protests in April 2019. 
• Respondents who are over the age of 65, are male, are typically Brexit Party voters, are an 
ethnic minority and who are from Northern Ireland are the least likely to be supportive of 
Extinction Rebellion’s London Protest in April 2019. 
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Because of low respondent numbers, those who are from the Crown Dependences are not being 
included in the individual break-down. 
Table 7.5 – Difference in support for Extinction Rebellion’s beliefs and Extinction Rebellion’s 
London protest 




Overall +10.1%*** +2.2% -12.4%*** -0.35 
Age Group 
18-24 +10.3%** +5.7% -15.9%*** -0.44 
25-34 +8.1%*** +5.2%*** -13.3%** -0.33 
35-44 +10.0%** =0.0% -10.0%* -0.29 
45-54 +7.9%** +1.0% -8.8%** -0.24 
55-64 +12.4%*** -1.3% -11.1%** -0.38 
65+ +12.8%** +4.8% -17.6%*** -0.48 
Gender 
Male +11.0%*** +0.9% -11.8%*** -0.37 
Female +9.3%*** +3.6% -12.8%*** -0.33 
Political Identification 
Left +5.4%*** +3.8%* -9.1%*** -0.23 
Centre +11.0%*** +9.9%** -21.2%*** -0.45 
Right +18.5%*** -6.1% -12.5%** -0.54 
Brexit Party +24.2%* -14.7% -9.5% -0.47 
Ethnicity 
White +10.2%*** +2.8%* -13.1%*** -0.36 
Ethnic Minority +6.4% -4.0% -2.0% -0.08 
Hometown 
North East England +11.8%** +5.1% -16.8%*** -0.47 
North West England +8.8%* -0.7% -7.9% -0.29 
Yorkshire & the Humber +8.3% +1.2% -9.4% -0.25 
East Midlands +9.1% +4.5% -13.6% -0.34 
West Midlands +6.7% =0.0% -6.7% -0.31 
East of England +5.9% +9.0% -14.9%* -0.22 
London +8.3%* +4.9% -13.1%** -0.31 
South East England +14.7%*** -1.1% -13.7%** -0.43 
South West England +9.6%** +4.1% -13.6%** -0.36 
Wales +21.3% +4.6% -12.9% -0.39 
Scotland +12.6%** =0.0% -12.7%* -0.63 
Northern Ireland +4.2% +13.0% -16.6% -0.50 
Crown Dependencies =0.0% =0.0% =0.0% 0.00 
* = 90 per cent significance; ** = 95 per cent significance; *** = 99 per cent significance; Note: All 
Percentages might not add up to 100 per cent due to rounding errors. 
Source: Author 
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This data indicated that the respondents who: 
• Indicate the least decline in support due to the protest action that were carried out in the 
centre of London in April 2019 are amongst those who are aged between 45 and 54, are 
female, have a left-wing political identification, are of an ethnic minority and are from the East 
of England. 
• Have the largest decline in support due to the protest action in the centre of London in April 
2019 are those over the age of 65, male, who have a more right-wing political identification, 
who have a white ethnicity, and are from Scotland. 
As demonstrated in Table 7.5, there have been significant changes across a multitude of differing 
social factors when comparing the levels of support for Extinction Rebellion as a whole and the support 
for their actions during the London Protests in April 2019. Table 7.5 suggests that those who either 
ranked their level of support of the group overall at ‘4’ or ‘5’ on a Likert Scale moved their support 
levels to either a ‘1’ or ‘2’ due to the London action. However, when examining the Sankey diagram in 
Figure 7.3, it is found that when the level of support was falling, it usually only fell either to the 1 or 2 
levels. Within each of the five levels of support for Extinction Rebellion overall roughly 50 per cent or 
more maintained the same level of support for the actions Extinction Rebellion undertook through 
the April 2019 protests. It is also found that only a very few people increased their level of support 
between the surveys, with most of the increases being from support level ‘3’ or ‘4’, and these generally 
only increased by one level. 
A reduced level of support for Extinction Rebellion following the London Protest in April 2019 may be 
explained by a common theme amongst the respondents concerning the disruption to the lives of 
workers and residents in the vicinity of the protests. This is demonstrated by respondent CCAA0618 
who stated that “the protests inconvenienced many regular people and were easily ignored by those 
who actually have the power to change” [Male, 25-34, South West England]. This is backed up by 
respondent CCAA0714 who stated that the protest was simply an “inconvenience for innocent 
commuters going about their business [and it] is not the way to go. It’s the government that needs to 
be inconvenienced” [Female, 45-54, West Midlands]. These two quotes raise an issue as to what stage 
a protest becomes a disruption that reinforces anger and the government ignoring them (CCAA0618). 
If so, the Extinction Rebellion protests cannot achieve much good. However, a month after these 
protests, new targets set out in the Climate Change Act 2008 were proposed and passed by the 
government. It is not possible to prove the protests played an active role, but if they did would this 
fully justify the protests? 




Figure 7.3 – Sankey Diagram Demonstrating Changing Support for Extinction Rebellion (Source: 
Author) 
Whether the responses indicated by these protests achieve change, actions that disrupt people have 
other negative issues associated. The biggest issue, which has been raised repeatedly throughout 
responses to the questionnaire, is the increased carbon emissions and air pollution that the disruption 
was causing. This disruption occurred in two different ways, the first by the protesting on public 
transportation and the other through blocking the roads. In terms of public transportation, it has 
already been raised throughout this section by numerous respondents who questioned whether 
forcing interruptions to public transportation is actually counter intuitive. A moral issue is raised as to 
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the trade off in delaying public transportation for impact but resulting in the short-term a greater 
amount of carbon emissions being emitted. This is symptomatic of the wider consideration of what 
reactions are justified in focusing the government to legislate on the population to reduce their carbon 
emissions in the medium to long term. Research that was conducted by automotive market 
researchers [Sophus3] found that during the Extinction Rebellion protest in central London, there was 
a 56 per cent increase in the online traffic seeking electric vehicles (AM, 2019). Whilst this does not 
necessarily mean that the protest resulted in more people buying electric vehicles, it does suggest 
people being nudged51 into their own research for the means to cleaner private transportation. By 
blocking the roads, it has been argued by one media pundit, that Extinction Rebellion have 
demonstrated what the future cities would look like with less vehicles in terms of cleaner air and the 
quieter streets (Chatterton, 2019), instead of the increasing the negative impact on people’s physical 
health including through hypertension and cardiovascular diseases (Basner et al., 2014). These 
conditions result in 12,000 people dying each year prematurely within the European Union with 
48,000 new cases of heart disease (EEA, 2020) as a consquence of air pollution.  
However, other outcomes of the protests may aim to promote a more climate scepticism/denier 
viewpoint. For example, Respondent CCAA0235 believes that the action of “causing inconvenience to 
the everyday human doesn't help to further the argument that we need to address climate change, 
only allowing parties in the media to drag the discourse through the mud by demonising them” [Male, 
18-24, North East England]. This has been demonstrated through various media outlets in the 
aftermath of this protest. Examples include the interview on Sky News by Adam Boulton during these 
protests which lead to Extinction Rebellion’s spokesperson to walk out mid interview (Griffin, 2019); 
or the opinion piece in the Daily Express titled “Protests such as Extinction Rebellion show we’ve lost 
the plot” (Ferrari, 2019). Both of these pieces have tried to paint the group in a negative light and 
make them look like hypocrites. The potential effect that this could have on the general public is that 
those who already have some degree of scepticism of climate change will see these type of news 
stories in a way that potentially further seeds doubt, or counter-resistance, in their mind. This is 
demonstrated by respondent CCAA0163, who stated that the protests were “layered in hypocrisy, 
demonstrated by Emma Thompson who made the trip – first class – on a jumbo jet from LA [Los 
Angeles, United States]” [Male, 18-24, North East England]. 
 
 
51 - Nudged theory is the concept that propounds the idea of positive reinforcement and indirect suggestion as 
a method of influencing behaviour and the decision making of either an individual or a group (Simon and 
Tagliabue, 2018). 
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However, not all the respondents changed their perception with elements of negative undertones; 
some were complementary of the protests. For example, respondent CCAB0027 stated that “the 
impact of the protest was the media coverage & getting this issue out their” [Female, 55-64, South 
West England]. Other respondents such as CCAB0031 stated that “these protests successfully brought 
attention to the subject” [Female, 55-64, North West England]. Despite what has been highlighted 
earlier, are consistent with a view that ‘all publicity is good publicity’. 
 
7.4.4. Likely to Join Extinction Rebellion Protest 
As highlighted in the previous section, the London Protests had influenced increasing numbers of 
respondents to believe that this is not the ideal way to approach the issue of climate change. However, 
a majority still believe it is the right or only way. That then raises a query as to whether belief is 
followed by action indicated by whether these respondents would join the group in protesting. 
Accordingly, the respondents of the second survey, were asked “How likely are you to join "Extinction 
Rebellion" on a protest in the future?”. The question was deliberately worded vaguely, especially given 
the time scale, as it gave a greater understanding of the level of support amongst the respondents 
about the actions of the group. Using the Likert scale Table 7.6 provides the outcome with ‘3’ meaning 
a ‘medium likelihood’ and a score of ‘4’ or ‘5’ meaning that the respondent was ‘likely’ to take action. 
It was found within Table 7.6 that there is some degree of polarisation in the responses, but in general 
the respondents stated that they were not likely to join a future Extinction Rebellion protest, with a 
mean score of 2.48 out of 5, giving a value ‘3’ as the middle point. This also demonstrates a lack of 
appetite to join an Extinction Rebellion type protest by many. 
However, in terms of young people, it was found that they are more likely to join the protests 
compared to any other age group, with a response of likely 6.7 per cent higher than any other age 
group. It should also be noted that in terms of different socio-demographic factors that are considered 
within the survey, the age group ’18-24’ were the second most likely to join these protests if they had 
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Table 7.6 – How likely are respondents to join an Extinction Rebellion protest 
 Not Likely Medium 
Likelihood 
Likely Mean Sig. 
Overall 572 (53.7%) 212 (19.9%) 282 (26.5%) 2.48  
Age Group 
18-24 66 (42.6%) 32 (20.6%) 57 (36.8%) 2.85 
0.001*** 
25-34 82 (47.4%) 39 (22.5%) 52 (30.1%) 2.66 
35-44 91 (53.5%) 40 (23.5%) 39 (22.9%) 2.37 
45-54 118 (53.9%) 40 (18.3%) 61 (27.9%) 2.53 
55-64 123 (58.6%) 32 (15.2%) 55 (26.2%) 2.43 
65+ 90 (66.7%) 27 (20.0%) 18 (13.3%) 1.98 
Gender 
Male 309 (59.2%) 99 (19.0%) 114 (21.8%) 2.29 
0.003*** 
Female 256 (47.9%) 112 (21.0%) 166 (31.1%) 2.68 
Political Identification 
Left 233 (40.3%) 131 (22.7%) 214 (37.0%) 2.91 
0.000*** 
Centre 103 (53.4%) 48 (24.9%) 42 (21.8%) 2.46 
Right 107 (86.3%) 11 (8.9%) 6 (4.8%) 1.43 
Brexit Party 18 (90.0%) 1 (5.0%) 1 (5.0%) 1.30 
Ethnicity 
White 528 (53.8%) 196 (20.0%) 258 (26.3%) 2.48 
0.796 
Ethnic Minority 25 (51.0%) 9 (18.4%) 15 (30.6%) 2.55 
Hometown 
North East England 61 (51.3%) 22 (18.5%) 36 (30.3%) 2.61 
0.788 
North West England 57 (48.7%) 28 (23.9%) 32 (27.4%) 2.56 
Yorkshire & the 
Humber 
38 (53.5%) 11 (15.5%) 22 (31.0%) 2.55 
East Midlands 26 (59.1%) 7 (15.9%) 11 (25.0%) 2.25 
West Midlands 28 (62.2%) 8 (17.8%) 9 (20.0%) 2.40 
East of England 33 (50.0%) 15 (22.7%) 18 (27.3%) 2.53 
London 52 (43.3%) 30 (25.0%) 38 (31.7%) 2.74 
South East England 67 (55.8%) 23 (19.2%) 30 (25.0%) 2.42 
South West England 74 (50.0%) 33 (22.3%) 41 (27.7%) 2.57 
Wales 17 (63.0%) 4 (14.8%) 6 (22.2%) 2.30 
Scotland 56 (58.9%) 20 (21.1%) 19 (20.0%) 2.31 
Northern Ireland 16 (66.7%) 2 (8.3%) 6 (25.0%) 2.17 
Crown Dependencies 1 (100.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 2.00 
Sig. = Significant; *** = 99 per cent significance; Note: All Percentages might not add up to 100 per cent due 
to rounding errors. 
Source: Author. 
One reason why respondents are overall reluctant to join an Extinction Rebellion protest relates to 
their targeting. Respondent CCAA0765 stated that they would not join them as they think the group 
is “targeting the wrong people when they discuss preventing access to Heathrow airport to have a 
long awaited and much saved for holiday. How many didn’t get to job interviews or other important 
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engagements” [Female, 45-54, East of England]. Although many responses may be mirroring what is 
reported in the media, another respondent [CCAA0856] may be indicative of many in stating that they 
would prefer to engage with the issue in a different way. They stated that they are “happy to listen, 
to take notes on how I can make a difference” [Female, 35-44, East Midlands]. Whilst this individual 
does not want to participate in activism sense, the very actions of the group Extinction Rebellion 
means that they are listening and making informed decisions and choices about climate change 
engagement strategies through both mitigation and adaption from the individual level. 
It therefore can be concluded that the respondents: 
• Who are the more likely to join the Extinction Rebellion are those between 18 and 24 years 
old, are female, who have a more left-wing political identification, are of an ethnic minority 
and are from London. 
• Who are the least likely to join the Extinction Rebellion are those over the age of 65 years, 
are male, are more likely to vote for the Brexit Party, are white and from Northern Ireland. 
[Crown Dependencies not included in survey due to low response rate from these areas]. 
 
7.4.5. What Next? 
Since this information on reactions to Extinction Rebellion was undertaken for this thesis, the group 
have continued carrying out major operations and protests with regular frequency in London and 
other major cities within the United Kingdom and around the world. A further dynamic has therefore 
been whether the protests are considered more or less acceptable to the public in the COVID-19 
context. During the initial first few months of the COVID-19 pandemic, Extinction Rebellion reduced 
actions, to allow the population to focus on an immediate threat to society. However, as the initial 
wave of COVID-19 passed within the United Kingdom, the level of activity of Extinction Rebellion has 
been steadily increasing, with protests being observed in late August and early September. This is 
despite warnings from the police and other governmental authorities not to stage these protests due 
to the ongoing threat that COVID-19 pandemic raises. Ethical and moral questions relate to the 
appropriateness of civil disobedience protests during the COVID-19 pandemic world. Table 7.5 and 
Figure 7.3 indicate that the protests in London during April 2019 resulted in some negative attitudes 
to the group, which could result in negative attitudes towards the climate change movement during 
this period. It is arguable that if hosting a protest during a pandemic, when many people are still not 
able to return to work properly, might host some resentment and negative attitudes to the group and 
might have an impact on the public perception of climate change. This could especially be the case if 
any cases or cluster of cases of COVID-19 can directly be attributed to these protests. 
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However, with this mind, COVID-19 may make people begin to realise that there are some connections 
between climate change impacts and zoonotic disease events, due to the destruction of 
environmental stability and encroachment of human’s into new habitations, which have zoonotic 
diseases that humanity is susceptible to. This has been observed in recent years outside of COVID-19, 
for example for the cases of Ebola52; and Dengue Fever53.  
It should be noted that Extinction Rebellion are not purely about climate change, despite the 
messaging within media. The Extinction Rebellion focus is about risk of a social [humans] and 
ecological collapse due to anthropogenic activities. Within this framework, it is arguable that zoonotic 
disease events, such as COVID-19, are a clear example of what Extinction Rebellion has been warning 
the public about in recent years. 
 
7.5. School Strike for Climate Change 
“School Strike for Climate Change” is an international action being carried out by children who are 
missing class to demand action on climate change. It should be noted that student’s striking for climate 
change is not a new concept. In 2015, over 50,000 students in 100 countries demonstrated on the first 
day of the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris. 
The current wave of “School Strike for Climate Change” was started by the then 15-year-old Swedish 
school student, Greta Thunberg, who held school boycotts and protested outside the Swedish Riksdag 
[Parliament] in August 2018 (Crouch, 2018). The concept amongst young people grew, and as of the 
end of January 2019, around 100,000 have striked from school, with strikes occurring in at least 20 
countries. This includes Australia (Albeck-Ripka, 2018; Wilkinson, 2018; Zhou, 2018), Belgium (Roth 
 
 
52 - Ebola is a viral haemorrhagic fever that affects humans and other eutherian mammals which is caused by the 
ebolaviruses; it has a fatality rate of between 25 and 90 per cent, with the average being 50 per cent (WHO, 
2014). Ebola was first discovered in 1976 in Yambuku, Zaire [now Democratic Republic of the Congo] (WHO, 
2014). Since then, there have been numerous minor outbreaks throughout Sub-Sahara Africa. However, in 
recent years, there have been two major outbreaks, in 2013-16; and 2018-20. The 2013-16 outbreak was the 
biggest outbreak, with 28,646 cases and 11,323 fatalities (WHO, 2020a). In all outbreaks, it has been started by 
the consumption of infected bush meat (WHO, 2014). 
 
53  - Dengue fever is a mosquito-borne disease, which infects roughly up to 400 million people per year (WHO, 
2020b). It is expected that as the planet continues to warm due to climate change, the mosquitos that carry both 
strains of dengue fever will encroach into new territories, increasing the number of people exposed and 
vulnerable to contracting Dengue Fever. This change in the location of Dengue Fever, due to a changing climate, 
has already been observed. In 2014, Japan recorded its first case of nationally obtained in over 70 years, and an 
outbreak occurred in Tokyo, resulting in 160 people becoming infected during the late summer (Kutsuna et al., 
2015). Both Rogers (2015) and Kraemer et al. (2015) are both reporting a small change in the latitude distribution 
of Dengue Fever since 1960 has moved slightly outwards towards the poles. 
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and Salhi, 2019), Canada (Larsen, 2018), Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden (Crouch, 2018), 
Switzerland and the United Kingdom (Henderson, 2019; Singleton, 2019). 
In comparison to Extinction Rebellion, School Strike for Climate Change is a more traditional striking 
method, and which usually only occurs on a Friday. Ahead of the first major meeting its founder Greta 
Thunberg stated that: 
“We, the young, are deeply concerned about our future. … We are the voiceless future of 
humanity. We will no longer accept this injustice. … We finally need to treat the climate 
crisis as a crisis. It is the biggest threat in human history and we will not accept the world’s 
decision-makers’ inaction that threatens our entire civilisation. … Climate change is 
already happening. People did die, are dying and will die because of it, but we can and will 
stop this madness. … United we will rise until we see climate justice. We demand the 
world’s decision-makers take responsibility and solve this crisis. You have failed us in the 
past. If you continue failing us in the future, we, the young people, will make change 
happen by ourselves. The youth of this world has started to move and we will not rest 
again”. 
Greta Thunberg (2019, Online) 
This speech published in the Guardian highlights a call to action based on young people having been 
left without a voice on climate change, whilst it is perceived the problem is that the governments 
around the world have lacked the leadership to make decisions and take actions to mitigate against 
climate change. 
 
7.5.1. Awareness of the School Strikes for Climate Change 
Following from differences highlighted between the differing socio groups that had heard of Extinction 
Rebellion further data can compare the case of ‘School Strike for Climate Change’. Participants during 
the second questionnaire from this thesis in the Spring and Summer of 2019, were asked ‘Have you 
ever heard of "School Strike for Climate" before today?’. 
As demonstrated within Table 7.7 the overall number of respondents that had heard of ‘School Strike 
for Climate Change’ is 79.4 per cent, which differ in comparison to Extinction Rebellion at 63.1 per 
cent, as demonstrated within Table 7.1. However, the increases in percentages are variable across the 
different socio-demographics groups. 
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Table 7.7 – Respondents who have heard of the School Strike for Climate Change group 
 Yes No Don’t 
Know 
Refused Total 











Age Group (0.000***) 
18-24 262 (65.8%) +26.9%*** 
130 
(32.7%) 
5 (1.3%) 1 (0.3%) 398 
25-34 202 (69.4%) +9.9%*** 83 (28.5%) 5 (1.7%) 1 (0.3%) 291 
35-44 213 (81.9%) +16.5%*** 45 (17.3%) 1 (0.4%) 1 (0.4%) 260 
45-54 258 (85.7%) +12.3%*** 41 (13.6%) 1 (0.3%) 1 (0.3%) 301 
55-64 248 (90.5%) +13.1%*** 22 (8.0%) 0 (0.0%) 4 (1.5%) 274 
65+ 163 (95.9%) +16.5%*** 6 (3.5%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (0.6%) 170 
Gender (0.005***) 
Male 588 (84.0%) +9.0%*** 
102 
(14.6%) 
4 (0.6%) 6 (0.9%) 700 
Female 747 (76.1%) +24.5%*** 
222 
(22.6%) 
8 (0.8%) 4 (0.4%) 981 
Political Identification (0.006***) 
Left 720 (81.7%) +16.0%*** 
149 
(16.9%) 
8 (0.9%) 4 (0.5%) 881 
Centre 230 (83.9%) +13.1%*** 37 (13.5%) 2 (0.7%) 5 (1.8%) 274 
Right 157 (79.3%) +16.7%*** 41 (20.7%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 198 








8 (0.5%) 9 (0.6%) 1,562 
Ethnic Minority 66 (67.3%) +17.3%** 28 (28.6%) 4 (4.1%) 0 (0.0%) 98 
Hometown (0.000***) 
North East England 159 (63.1%) +15.5%*** 89 (35.3%) 3 (1.2%) 1 (0.4%) 252 
North West England 176 (86.3%) +28.9%*** 26 (12.7%) 0 (0.0%) 2 (1.0%) 204 
Yorkshire & the 
Humber 
105 (77.8%) +24.5%*** 29 (21.5%) 1 (0.7%) 0 (0.0%) 135 
East Midlands 61 (85.9%) +23.9%*** 9 (12.7%) 1 (1.4%) 0 (0.0%) 71 
West Midlands 48 (81.4%) +5.1% 10 (16.9%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (1.7%) 59 
East of England 77 (82.8%) +10.8%* 15 (16.1%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (1.1%) 93 
London 122 (85.9%) +0.7% 17 (12.0%) 2 (1.4%) 1 (0.7%) 142 
South East England 143 (80.8%) +13.0%*** 34 (19.2%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 177 
South West England 152 (89.4%) +2.3% 14 (8.2%) 1 (0.6%) 3 (1.8%) 170 
Wales 28 (87.5%) +3.1% 3 (9.4%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (3.1%) 32 
Scotland 125 (94.0%) +22.6%*** 8 (6.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 133 
Northern Ireland 39 (60.0%) +23.1%*** 26 (40.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 65 
Crown Dependencies 2 (100.0%) +50.0% 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 2 
XR = Extinction Rebellion; * = 90 per cent significance; ** = 95 per cent significance; *** = 99 per cent 
significance. 
Source: Author 
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The spread observed between the different age groups within Table 7.2 is 40.5 per cent for the 
Extinction Rebellion compared to 30.1 per cent within Table 7.7. There is a gulf between young people 
and older people in their knowledge of the ‘School Strike for Climate Change’. This is highlighted by a 
12.5 per cent difference between the age groups ‘25-34’ and ‘35-44’, which is significant at the 95 per 
cent level (χ2=6.528, p=0.011**). 
One potential reason behind the large difference amongst the youngest respondent age group within 
the survey is that they are of the same age of those joining the protest or are more likely to know 
people from school/college that have joined the protest. Also, those who are aged between 25 and 
34, are probably the most unlikely to have any connection to these protests, due to being at least 
seven years older than the upper age expected for these protests and less likely to have a relative 
involved compared to the other age groups. 
Lastly, it is demonstrated that there are significant differences (99 per cent level) between the ways 
in which the respondents have knowledge of this protest group compared to Extinction Rebellion 
across each of the socio-demographic factors. 
 
7.5.2. Supportive of Children Striking for Climate Change 
Whilst the majority of the respondents have heard of the School Strike for Climate Change protest 
movement, this raises the question as to the level of support from the public/respondents for children 
striking to raise attention for climate change. Therefore, all the respondents within the second survey, 
were asked “How supportive are you of children striking for climate change during a school day?”. The 
phrasing of this question includes ‘during a school day’, for two reasons; firstly, most of the protests 
take place during a Friday in term time; the second is that given children missing school to strike is 
contentious, it gives more emphasis. 
Table 7.8 demonstrates that overall, the respondents are supportive of children missing school to 
strike for climate change, with 63.5 per cent being supportive with a mean score of 3.68 out of 5. 
When examining the level of support amongst young people, it was found that it was above the 
average support score, with a score of 4 out 5. However, this is slightly lower compared to the 25 to 
34 age group, that has a supportive score of 4.03 out of 5, with 1.9 per cent more respondents being 
supportive of students striking. This does not represent a significant difference between the two age 
groups (χ2=0.230, p=0.632). 
More left-wing leaning voters (58.2 per cent) were likely to support children striking for climate change 
compared to right-wing leaning voters mirroring the thoughts of politicians in Westminster during the 
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same time of the survey. For example, the then prime minister, Theresa May of the Conservative Party 
[right-wing] criticised pupils who were missing lessons, stating the consequence of their actions will 
“increases teachers' workloads and wastes lesson time" (McGuinness, 2019, Online). This compares 
to the Leader of the Opposition at the time, Jeremy Corbyn of the Labour Party [left-wing] who at the 
time tweeted “I support the young people striking today and thank them for taking action” (Corbyn, 
2019, Online). These polarised feelings about children striking in the name of climate change is not 
just being observed within the United Kingdom, with similar divides are being observed within, for 
example, Australia and New Zealand. 
One of the themes in the criticism that was observed within the survey was that the students were 
using a school day to protest. An example of this is respondent CCAA0489 who stated that it would be 
“much more sensible to have such protests on a Saturday then young people can protest and still have 
a valuable education” [Female, 55-64, Northern Ireland]. This view is mirrored by respondent 
CCAA1158 who stated that “The same message could be set with a march/gathering at a weekend or 
in school holidays”, however, they go on further to say that “many 'strikers' simply treated this as a 
chance to miss school and this in itself dilutes the integrity and thereby strength of the message” 
[Male, 35-44, South East England]. On the first point of this, it is probably argued by many that in an 
ideal world the protests should be taken when the children are not supposed to be in school. But, as 
James Shaw, the New Zealand Minister for Climate Change, at the time of the initial criticism stated, 
“when you’re fighting for your future, and you are trying to get the attention of those whom you feel 
have let you down, following the rules and marching on the weekend isn’t going to cut it” (Daly, 2019). 
On the point from the second respondent about the strikers are only taking part to skip school, this 
view is also indicated by CCAA0117 who stated that “the kids just use it as an excuse to skip school” 
and who went on to inform that they “know a few people who have actually done that” [Male, 18-24, 
North East England]. Whilst there is no way to back up what the respondent is claiming here there is 
a question as to how serious some of the strikers view the issue, there being a lack of research on it.  
Within the survey another major criticism is that the children do not really understand what they are 
protesting about. This is demonstrated with respondent CCAA0177 who states that “Many of these 
children don’t fully understand the issues at hand and instead are being used as good PR on behalf of 
parents and teachers who do support climate change action” [Male, 18-24, Yorkshire and the 
Humber]. 
Respondent CCAA0526 stated that “awareness is raised through education not through missing 
education” [Male, 35-44, Northern Ireland] with a comment from respondent CCAA0860 that 
“children need to be taught about the importance of this but not be out of school disrupting learning” 
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[Male, 45-54, West Midlands]. These two latter statements were also highlighted in Section 6.2, 
whereby the education of climate change within the United Kingdom is shown to be lacking. This 
response raises the point that maybe educating the students about the causation of and the threats 
that climate change poses, is another way of awareness raising more widely. Respondent CCAA0660 
from the survey, thought to be a teacher, stated about the protests that “if conducted as part of the 
managed curriculum in school, it works well”, and then goes on to explain that they combined the 
protest with “part of our Literacy work and it reached the local paper that weekend” [Male, 45-54, 
North West England]. This raises that trying to combine important social issues with other subjects 
outside of the conventional geography and science subjects, potentially has helped the student to 
understand more about the issue of climate change and develop other important education skills and 
tools. 
Respondent CCAA0811 stated that they do not believe “children should have the responsibility for 
direct action nor the worry of things beyond their years” [Female, 45-54, South East England]. Some 
believe that it is important to allow children to grow carefree and not to worry about big societal 
issues when growing up, being important for a happy childhood, especially since the increase in young 
people that are suffering from eco or climate anxiety (see section 1.3). However, it can alternatively 
be argued that these respondents are failing to recognise that young people want a voice. Until these 
protests, there was no real mechanism that gives young people a chance to have a say about what 
should be done in climate change, despite their being the people who are most likely to be affected 
by climate change in a significant way. It is argued through this thesis that this lack of voice is another 
example of a lack of post-normal science within the United Kingdom needed to tackle climate change. 
This is the reasoning that respondent CCAA0326 draws upon in being supportive of the movement, as 
they believe “it’s their future, they will have to suffer the consequences of climate change the longest 
so it is appropriate that they are passionate about the issue” [Male, 18-24, North East England]. 
Table 7.8 affirms that most of the respondents are supportive of these protests. This is for various 
reasons, but the main reason, which is highlighted by respondent CCAB0020, is that they believe that 
the student strikes shows that young people “care about the climate, and that everyone - schools, 
government, companies, adults, peers - can do something about it.” [Male, 25-34, Refused]. 
This data suggests that: 
• Those who are the most supportive of children striking for climate change are those 
between the ages of 25 and 34, are female, have a left-wing political identification, are of 
ethnic minority and are from London. 
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• Those who are the least supportive of children striking for climate change are those over the 
age of 65, are male, would vote for the Brexit Party, are of white ethnicity, and are from 
Northern Ireland. 






Overall 308 (22.9%) 183 (13.6%) 853 (63.5%) 3.68 
Age Group (0.000***) 
18-24 39 (14.9%) 31 (11.8%) 192 (73.3%) 4.00 
25-34 28 (13.9%) 22 (10.9%) 152 (75.2%) 4.03 
35-44 53 (24.9%) 31 (14.6%) 129 (60.6%) 3.65 
45-54 64 (25.0%) 35 (13.7%) 157 (61.3%) 3.64 
55-64 71 (29.0%) 39 (15.9%) 135 (55.1%) 3.40 
65+ 52 (31.9%) 24 (14.7%) 87 (53.4%) 3.28 
Gender (0.000***) 
Male 175 (29.9%) 66 (11.3%) 345 (58.9%) 3.47 
Female 128 (17.2%) 116 (15.6%) 500 (67.2%) 3.85 
Political Identification (0.000***) 
Left 76 (10.6%) 77 (10.7%) 564 (78.7%) 4.19 
Centre 40 (17.5%) 40 (17.5%) 149 (65.1%) 3.80 
Right 101 (64.7%) 23 (14.7%) 32 (20.5%) 2.15 
Brexit Party 18 (69.2%) 3 (11.5%) 5 (19.2%) 2.00 
Ethnicity (0.820) 
White 286 (23.0%) 168 (13.5%) 790 (63.5%) 3.68 
Ethnic Minority 13 (19.7%) 9 (13.6%) 44 (66.7%) 3.79 
Hometown (0.532) 
North East England 37 (23.3%) 22 (13.8%) 100 (62.9%) 3.69 
North West England 34 (19.5%) 31 (17.8%) 109 (62.6%) 3.72 
Yorkshire & the Humber 20 (19.4%) 11 (10.7%) 72 (69.9%) 3.81 
East Midlands 15 (24.6%) 9 (14.8%) 37 (60.7%) 3.67 
West Midlands 10 (20.8%) 6 (12.5%) 32 (66.7%) 3.69 
East of England 23 (29.9%) 8 (10.4%) 46 (59.7%) 3.55 
London 19 (15.6%) 17 (13.9%) 86 (70.5%) 3.90 
South East England 42 (29.4%) 17 (11.9%) 84 (58.7%) 3.44 
South West England 38 (25.3%) 19 (12.7%) 93 (62.0%) 3.65 
Wales 5 (17.9%) 2 (7.1%) 21 (75.0%) 3.82 
Scotland 27 (21.6%) 20 (16.0%) 78 (62.4%) 3.73 
Northern Ireland 13 (33.3%) 7 (17.9%) 19 (48.7%) 3.28 
Crown Dependencies 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0) 2 (100.0%) 5.00 
N = 1,344 
Source: Author 
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7.5.3. What Next? 
At the time of writing this thesis, society is in the middle of the COVID-19 pandemic, causing major 
disruptions to society and how it goes about its business. One of the greatest disruptions that has 
been felt is the closing of schools in March 2020, in some cases for six months. Whilst, during the 
closure of schools, students were set work by the teachers, many will have fallen behind, and students 
have not been given an adequate and comparative learning experience as they experienced before 
the pandemic. In addition, research from this period is suggesting that many of the students have not 
completed the work set by the teachers (Sellgren, 2020). Consequently, all students are behind in their 
work and at a national level there have been discussions about how best students can catch up. The 
question of child development is important when looking at the School Strike for Climate protests. As 
highlighted through the previous three sections, the group were gathering a sizeable momentum in 
getting their message about climate change across. They have tried to keep some of that momentum 
by a form of virtual strikes (Murray, 2020). However, it is likely not to have been as effective as the 
original protests. 
Going forward, whilst some students will be influenced by an argument based on why they need to 
learn anything from school when their future is at risk, few, if any, will doubt the importance of the 
education of children. It will be harder to justify when students are far behind already, that they skip 
school to protest about climate change. It is possible that the children could strike at the weekend in 
their own time, but that then raises whether the impact of these protests would be as great; a concern 
particularly if not all students were really committed to the cause of climate change.  
 
7.6. Climate Assembly 
As introduced earlier within this chapter, the United Kingdom decided to increase its commitment to 
mitigating climate change through reducing greenhouse gases emission. This was achieved through 
increasing the cuts expected to be achieved from an 80 per cent reduction by 2050 compared to 1990 
levels, legislated in the Climate Change Act 2008, to 100 per cent reduction in the same time frame, 
as set out through an amendment in mid-2019. Despite, this pledge to make the United Kingdom ‘net 
zero’ by 2050, it has been demonstrated within Section 5.11.1 of this thesis, that only 35.5 per cent of 
the population have heard of the term to which this policy is applied (Adapted from BEIS, 2020d). 
However, it is arguable that the pressure from the protests by ‘Extinction Rebellion’ and the ‘School 
Strike for Climate Change’ has played some impact on the government’s willingness in bring the United 
Kingdom’s pioneering legislation goals. Whilst Forrester, Gerger Swartling and Lonsale (2008) do not 
highlight the importance of this in their work, it is tenable that ‘civil disobedience’ and ‘activism’ is a 
low-level form of post-normal science, reconstituted by this thesis as post-normal engagement. As 
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during the early 2019, the United Kingdom had seen more of the general population and academics 
coming together than previous in “engaging” feelings towards the government to bring new legislation 
to help achieve carbon emission reductions. 
Because of this building pressure on the government through the public, academia and the media 
about climate change, in June 2019, six Select Committees from the Houses of Parliament called for a 
citizens’ assembly on climate change (Climate Assembly, No Date). Due to this, the assembly was 
created just before the then current sitting parliament was dissolved for the December 2019 election, 
and were given the title/slogan of ‘Climate Assembly UK: the path of net zero’. The aim of this 
assembly was for representatives from the general public to come together, and with guidance and 
collaboration of academics, raise ideas on how the United Kingdom can change its infrastructure and 
the way it does business to achieve the goal of net carbon zero by 2050 (Climate Assembly, No Date). 
The assembly workshops had taken place between January and May 2020, originally taking place in 
Birmingham, but as the COVID-19 pandemic started to ravage the way in society worked, it moved to 
being virtual. The Climate Assembly was originally chosen when 30,000 random households were 
contacted and asked if they were interested in taking part, out of this 1,500 people wanted to take 
part, then out of this pool of people 110 were selected by computer, in this respect considered to be 
a rough proportion of the United Kingdom population (Murray, 2020), which will mean that all 
different socio-demographic groups will have a chance to have their voices heard due to this process. 
This is the first time in which members of the public were actively asked to discuss climate change and 
give ideas and thoughts about climate change. When referring to Figure 7.2, this type of exercise 
resembles a form of ‘post-normal science’ engagement, as defined by Forrester, Gerger Swartling and 
Lonsale (2008). Whilst a direct link cannot be made between the role of the protests that had taken 
place in early 2019 and the Climate Assembly, it can be gainsay that the post-normal engagement 
represented by the protests had played a role in this post-normal science taking place. 
Whilst, at the time of writing this chapter, the Climate Assembly is yet to report and is expected to in 
either September or October 2020. These findings when published will be presented to the 
government. Time will see whether the government will act on any of the findings within the report. 
Whilst the Climate Assembly is a good first step towards a full scale ‘post-normal science’ approach in 
trying to combat climate change; it still does not go far enough. As mentioned earlier, for a full ‘post-
normal science’ approach to be undertaken, it needs all three stakeholders [civil society, academia 
AND politicians] operating in an open learning environment. Currently, whilst the politicians are 
receiving the reports and potentially could be debating them in parliament and/or at Select 
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Committees during the autumn and winter of 2020, the process of the Climate Assembly might be 
more advantageous if a representation of politicians had taken part as well throughout the process. 
This means that politicians could give their expertise about politics when discussing such matters 
about climate change. 
In addition, going forward, further questions surround whether there will be any more Climate 
Assemblies or other such opportunities for acting out engagement processes that actively engage with 
civil society on climate change, or whether this Climate Assembly was a one off. In this case, it could 
construe as a tokenistic response, being still far from the paradigmatic shift implied as necessary in 
this thesis.  
 
7.7. Summary 
There are multiple different challenges governments face in trying to combat climate change. 
However, one potential way in which this can begin to be overcome is through a post-normal science 
approach. Until early 2019, this was not an approach considered within the United Kingdom. This led 
to barriers in communication between the scientists, politicians and the public itself. Consequently, 
with increasingly extreme weather being observed within both the United Kingdom and the rest of 
the planet, combined with the warnings from scientists via the IPCC special report in late 2018, there 
is now further warning of there being only about 12 years left to stop dangerous and potential 
runaway climate change. This situation is resulting in a post-normal engagement movement. The post-
normal engagement is when people are confronted with a lack of action and create increased 
opportunities to make their voices heard outside of formal elections that target many issues. As 
examples of this consequence, ‘Extinction Rebellion’ and the ‘School Strike for Climate Change’ were 
formed. Whilst each of these groups have different ways in which they protest, and impact variously, 
they both have the common aim of trying to raise awareness of the threat of climate change to present 
and future generations, and to put pressure on the government to legislate more in trying to get both 
the public and organisations to mitigate against climate change. 
Extinction Rebellion are a non-violent civil disobedience group that uses the approach of disrupting 
people’s daily lives to raise awareness, which the media are more than willing to report, thus bringing 
attention to climate change. Despite the media attention the group have been receiving over the 
course of the last two years, only 63.1 per cent of the sample of 1,700 had ever heard of the group by 
the time of the survey on this movement for this thesis. In terms of the proportion of young people 
[18-24] that had heard of this group, this figure was much lower being only 38.9 per cent. Whilst they 
are overall raising awareness of climate change, this had less impact than expected on the younger 
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population (the group Extinction Rebellion are assumed to have wanted to attract). Despite this, the 
levels of support for Extinction Rebellion of those who have heard of the group is generally strong. 
However, when examining the levels of support for Extinction Rebellion’s London protest, it was found 
there was a reduced level of mean support of 0.35 on the Likert scale across all age groups, with young 
people having being observed to have an above average decline of 0.44. This suggests that the 
Extinction Rebellion route to post-normal engagement, based on major civil disobedience, may be less 
effective as it would continue including young people. 
Regards the other major protest group to come out of 2018/2019 era, ‘School Strike for Climate 
Change’ founded and led international by Swedish teenage activist Greta Thunberg, the research for 
this chapter found that respondents were more likely to have heard of it in comparison to Extinction 
Rebellion [79.4 per cent], despite the latter group having had more media attention. This seems to 
suggest that the school strike is having a more widespread grassroots attention. It is found that that 
young people [18-24] were much more likely to have heard of this protest compared to Extinction 
Rebellion compared to other age groups. When it came to levels of support for the group, the majority 
of those who had heard of it were supportive of children skipping classes to protest climate change 
[63.5 percent], with the respondents giving reasons of the youngest in society needing to have the 
ability to have their voices heard and that it shows they care about their environment around them. 
However, critics argue that they are disrupting themselves and other students, with some students 
using the strikes as an excuse to get out of classes for the day. This has led to some arguing that the 
protests should be moved to a Saturday, but others believe that the impact will be greatly reduced if 
compromises are made. Going forward, the short-term future of these protests is in doubt due to the 
COVID-19 pandemic, leading to the moral and ethical debate about losing more education when the 
students are already so far behind in their learning. Alternatively, COVID-19 may be seen as a new 
opportunity for youth to reassert their awareness of what is happening to the planet and how radical 
shifts in the way society has lived in and alternative way in recent months could provide the insight 
needed into how to offset further damage.  
As highlighted at the beginning of this chapter, one of potential ways to move forward collectively as 
a country to combat climate change is through a post-normal science framework. The government 
seemingly tried to do this during late 2019/early 2020, with the Climate Assembly, which invited 
selected respondents to participate in a number of debates to gather thoughts and ideas from 
members of public with support of academics. It is arguably the case that this has occurred on the 
back of the ‘post-normal engagement’ that occurred through the medium of the protests by Extinction 
Rebellion and the School Strikes for Climate Change; and that this Climate Assembly is the real 
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demonstration by the United Kingdom government of attempts to engage with post-normal science. 
However, the assembly is yet to report and with the complexity that the COVID-19 pandemic is posing 
to the United Kingdom on a social, health and economic fronts. This Climate Assembly could run the 
risk of being reduced to a tokenistic exercise, ironically just when climate and COVID-19 linkages 
through natural resources issues would suggest the approach should be further intensified. 
The results of this chapter indicate political divides. These divides emerge larger than any past 
research undertaken related to climate change within the United Kingdom, resembling more of the 
United States perception differences. As introduced in Section 3.1, political divide in perception on 
climate change within the United Kingdom has been generally not so extreme, but with divides of 58.2 
per cent in support of children striking between the left-wing respondents and right-wing 
respondents. It raises questions as to whether these political divides in effect determine climate 
activism and protest, a form of polarised cultural persuasion linked to political orientations similar in 
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“the only thing we have to fear is … fear itself – nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror 
which paralyzes needed efforts to convert return into advance.” 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, 32nd President of United States 
Roosevelt (1933) 
 
This thesis set out to explore and develop potential answers to five main questions that are presented 
at the end of Chapter 3 to test the conceptual framework reflected by Figure 3.10. Outcomes of the 
research, summarised within this chapter, prompt evaluative revision of the conceptual framework 
and climate related research and engagement directions for the post-COVID-19 pandemic world. 
 
8.1. Influences of Climate Change Perception 
The first research question of this thesis concerned; “What influences perception of current and future 
adverse climate change impacts?”. This question was explored by first considering different socio-
economic factors that might be having an influence on perception and second the role of the media 
and how it might also be having an influence. 
 
8.1.1. Socio-economic factors 
As highlighted in the conceptual framework and within Chapter 3.2, there are varied factors that might 
influence the perception of climate change within the United Kingdom and the Crown Dependences, 
of which the influence of four are summarised as follows below. 
 
8.1.1.1. Age 
Youth participation, as highlighted in this thesis meant comparing those under the age of 25 years old 
with other age groups. It has been found that in general young people believe that climate change is 
a greater threat to society compared to any other issues. This included the coronavirus during the 
middle period of the COVID-19 pandemic, though this group was the only group to rate it as such, as 
demonstrated in Section 5.1. It has also been found that whilst they have a similar belief compared to 
the rest of the population in terms of their perception of climate change having an impact at the local 
level, they are more likely, compared to other age groups, to believe that climate change is having an 
impact at the national and international level [Figure 5.6 and 5.7]. Other age groups also take have 
the wider perspective on climate change impacts but to a lesser extent than the young. 
318 | P a g e  
 
However, when exploring the individual impacts due to climate change on the United Kingdom, the 
youngest age group only ranked these highest for two of the impacts compared to the other age 
groups [Table 5.11]. 
In addition, for three of these impacts, young people were the least likely to believe they would impact 
the United Kingdom in the medium future. The older generation [65+] were regularly the least likely 
to acknowledge these impacts. 
In terms of perception, it is concluded here that levels of scepticism and lack of concern about climate 
change tends to increase with age [Sections 5.3 and 5.5], which has also been observed within the 
United States (Ballew et al., 2019). Despite this, young people are unable to name the impacts that 
climate change will unleash on the United Kingdom in the future.  As explored in 5.4.1, young people 
have a lower level of life experience and therefore will have observed fewer changes in their lifetime 
compared to somebody in their 40s and 50s. In contrast, the oldest in society have been exposed to 
more conflicting information about the state of the climate during their lifetime, for example the 
‘global cooling’ theory in the 1970s, meaning that their exposure to conflicting ideas and realities 
leaves them more sceptical, despite observing changes to the climate in their lifetime. 
As such, despite a complex array of explanatory influences, it can be concluded that age influences 
perception of climate change amongst these respondents. 
 
8.1.1.2. Social Groups and Household Income 
Whilst people differentiated by social group and household income are not necessarily the same, 
there is often a strong correlation between the two (NRS, No Date) and these were considered 
together. 
The findings in Chapter 5 generally found a relationship between a higher social grade and a more 
environmentally conscious perception of climate change. For example, in Table 5.7, social grade AB is 
less likely to believe that climate change is caused by natural processes or think that there is no such 
thing as climate change compared to social grade DE (0.0 per cent versus 9.3 per cent respectively 
amongst 16- to 24-year-olds). The social grade AB identify eight of the eleven impacts that might be 
happening more frequently compared to other social groups, whereas social group ‘DE’ identified 
none of the eleven impacts more so than other social groups. This is concerning, as social group ‘DE’ 
are more likely to be the most vulnerable to current and future climate change impacts. This is due to 
being the least likely to have any disposable income, many barely having enough to live on. This group 
is also the least likely to have any insurance against the threat of extreme meteorological events. This 
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means their capacity to rebuild is low. They are not only vulnerable to climate change impacts within 
the United Kingdom, but also to impacts globally. As the projected impacts of climate change slowly 
ramps up, the amount of damaged crops will likely increase the cost of fresh food within British 
supermarkets by 20 per cent (Harvey, 2019). This increased unpredictability in crop growth means 
that food prices within both the United Kingdom and globally will be higher, meaning that those on 
the lowest income will face the highest risk of ‘food insecurity’. COVID-19 already provides an example 
of how global disaster events can disrupt food supplies within the United Kingdom. Research has 
shown that when there is an increase in ‘food insecurity’, it is the most vulnerable in society who are 
at the highest risk due to combined lack of finance to buy more produce and the lack of availability of 
cheaper produce on supermarket shelves (Loopstra, 2020). 
Varying perceptions are therefore not confined to scepticism of the science or to caring about the 
impacts of climate change. The issue of a lack of engagement with the crisis is more complex. Past 
research has demonstrated that during a period of economic instability, for example between 2008 
and 2012, the concern about climate change issues declines, as individuals have to focus on the more 
immediate issues that are likely to threaten livelihoods and lives. This phenomenon has been termed 
a ‘finite pool of worry’ in the context of this thesis, but it is interested with the way that those in the 
lowest social grade generally have least income in society, whereby immediate financial concerns may 
be greater than more distant ones like climate change. 
Consequently, it can be concluded that income and social status have an impact on the perception of 
climate change, with people with higher household incomes and of higher social grades being more 
concerned about the threat of climate change. 
 
8.1.1.3. Political Identification 
In terms of political identification, research in this thesis shows a divide (though relatively smaller than 
might be expected) between left- and right-wing voters, with right-wing being less concerned and 
more sceptical about climate change. These results are consistent with past research that has been 
undertaken on the issue of political identification within the United Kingdom in terms of climate 
perception (Whitmarsh, 2011). This is observed especially when exploring the level of support for the 
climate change protests of 2019, with those who are of a right-wing political identification being 
significantly more likely to be against this style of climate action. However, there is currently no recent 
data available to make definitive suggestions that there is an ever-increasing split between left-wing 
and right-wing voters in their level of acceptance of climate change. These results from the 2019 
survey from this thesis show the greatest divide identified yet. This raises questions as to whether this 
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was unique to the activism issues that have taken place in the United Kingdom [Tables 7.2 and 7.4], 
exposing greater societal polarisation over climate change and as such heading in a similar direction 
to how the United States started to go about twenty years ago. 
 
8.1.1.4. Gender 
It has been apparent in this research that there are potentially discernible differences between males 
and females in terms of climate change perception. Females were more likely to believe that there 
was no such thing as climate change or that it was caused by natural causes, but notably not 
significantly so. However, females were slightly more likely to believe that potential impacts were 
going to affect the United Kingdom in the medium term due to climate change. From this data, it can 
be concluded that there is no evidence that gender plays a significant role in the formation of 
perception of climate change within the United Kingdom. This was important to confirm since, as 
demonstrated within Section 3.2.1.2, there had been an existing debate in the literature about 
whether females or males are more environmentally concerned. 
 
8.1.2. Other Factors 
In addition to the socio-demographic factors, there are two other potential factors that arose within 
this thesis research that could have an impact on individual perception of climate change. These are 
adaptation so of the ‘finite pool of worry’ theory, in which past research by Weber (2006, p.115) 
suggests it is psychologically that people only have a ‘finite pool of worry’, and the ‘media’, which are 
summarised as follows. 
 
8.1.2.1. Finite Pool of Worry 
Within the latest report about climate change perception within the United States, Leiserowitz et al. 
(2020) found that the belief and worry about climate change has not reduced in times of the COVID-
19 pandemic and lockdown. This means in this case, it would be expected that as concern for 
infectious diseases increases, concern for climate change would start to decrease. Whilst this thesis 
does not state that this theory definitely is correct or incorrect, it was recorded in Chapter 5 that a 
similar lack of concern for climate change occurred in the aftermath of the immediate Brexit crisis of 
2016 within the United Kingdom. However, as climate change has become viewed by many as a 
fundamental issue that is going to have increasingly larger impacts on livelihoods and well-being in 
the future, other short to medium term issues will not impact on climate change beliefs overall. 
Evidence to date is that it is more likely that society has become so concerned about climate change 
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that it is beginning to rank up amongst the shorter-term crisis issues. The ‘finite pool of worry’ theory 
can continue to be tested in the months and years ahead in the context of impacts of the COVID-19 
pandemic on perceptions of climate change. 
 
8.1.2.2. Media 
As highlighted within this thesis, two types of media, traditional media and social media, are key 
influences on climate change communication and consequent perception. This research has 
demonstrated that the usage of traditional media in terms of finding out information about news is 
declining in recent years across all age groups, with more lured by social media. In addition, there has 
been a small steady increase in recent years in the proportion of the population that is consuming any 
media regularly. This might help to explain why there are respondents that had not heard of either 
‘School Strikes for Climate Change’ and/or ‘Extinction Rebellion’. These results are indicative of greater 
communication and media implications going forward. 
Firstly, it is argued that it is important to understand how the scientific community has tried to 
communicate the dangers and newest information about climate change to those who do not 
regularly use the media to gather information about current affairs. It is arguable that those who do 
not know about the potential dangers in the short, medium and long term, increases the impact of 
extreme meteorological events associated with climate change as not knowing contributes to 
increasing vulnerability to these events. An example of this is demonstrated by Bichard and 
Kazmierczak (2012) who found that in England and Wales there was a significant relationship between 
climate change awareness and willingness in the adoption of flood protection at the local/domestic 
level.  
Secondly, social media poses a threat to climate change narratives. Research has shown that ever 
increasingly the population, especially young people, are relying on social media to communicate 
about climate change. However, as highlighted by Björnberg et al. (2017) and Lazer et al. (2018), fake 
news via social media is a strategy being used by sceptics who lack qualifications in this field causing 
the propagation of misinformation about the risk and causation of climate change. Going forward, the 
scientific community are going to need to research and experiment with the ways to counter fake 
news, or society would continue to become more divided over the issue, especially across political 
ideological lines, as has been the case in the United States. 
On the question as to whether media, and especially social media, is influencing the perception of 
climate change, as with the rest of this thesis, there needs to be a recognition of the complexity 
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involved in interconnected phenomena of perception, engagement and reactions. If social media 
generates fake news, then young people, as the most prominent user of social media, are 
comparatively the most exposed to it, but not necessarily the most affected by it. It is noted here that 
the results through Chapter Five highlight that this generation is the most likely to believe in the 
severity of climate change. As such, social media-based scepticism about climate change is not 
generating a vast number of climate sceptics, although it could be argued that the concern about 
climate change might be higher without fake news. Further highly intricate research would need to be 
applied to prove this definitely in real time settings. However, it is likely that as research has 
demonstrated previous, and highlighted within Chapter Three, social media is likely to be a self-
enforcing echo chamber facility for information about climate change, as there is likely to be an 
entrenchment of people with similar views and ideologies gathering around particular stances on it. 
Consequently, those people who believe in climate change are unlikely to read or to engage with 
people who are orientated to denial or who are sceptical about the significance of climate change and, 
though there may be fake or confused information, it is not helpful to lack understanding as to from 
where and in what way these perceptions are originating. 
Lastly, it is arguable that social media has been a driving force for climate activism that has been 
observed within the United Kingdom during the last two years. Groups of activists use these platforms 
to promote protests and other activities. The importance of social media for climate activism has 
continued during the COVID-19 pandemic, as school strikes for climate change became virtual, also 
with the objective of flooding social media with protest messages about climate change (Murray, 
2020). 
 
8.2. Importance of Climate Change Education 
During this research it was found that some educational institutions are not educating their students 
about natural processes, instead focusing on the anthropogenic activity as demonstrated in Section 
6.3. The reason they have provided for this is not wanting to confuse students about such a complex 
issue. It is not deniable that climate change is a complex issue, for which individuals will have varying 
difficulty to fully understand. As demonstrated by past research, many students view greenhouse 
gases as an environmental issue instead of being a natural process (Koulaidis and Christidou, 1999; 
Myers, Boyes and Stanisstreet, 2004); as such students are not able to differentiate between the 
greenhouse effect, that is important for life on Earth, and the enhanced greenhouse effect, which is 
human induced environmental issue (Lambert, Lindgren and Bleicher, 2012). The lesson here is with 
respect to the importance of building an accurate picture of climate change for the students. This 
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underpins fundamental influences on engagement in the short, medium and long-term future. If 
educators ignore and/or deny natural processes, it promotes distrust when the students later find out 
about the processes and consider why they were not taught about that before. The other reason is 
that without a full picture of climate change, students are becoming over pessimistic and defeatist 
about the future of the planet, when they do not have a full knowledge (Jonsson, Sarri and Alerby, 
2012; Tan, 2013; Özdem et al., 2014; Chang and Pascua, 2016). 
 
8.3. Engagement and Disengagement Factors 
In terms of willingness to engage with mitigation strategies, the age of the respondents was an 
influential factor. As demonstrated in Section 6.1, the levels of engagement amongst young people 
for mitigation strategies that required behaviour changes were high, whilst it was lower through the 
other age groups. However, when significant financial investment was required to undertake these 
engagement factors, it was found that the inverse was true, with the oldest in society most likely to 
undertake these mitigation strategies. A similar pattern was true for those with a high concern versus 
those with a low concern about climate change. For basic behaviour changes, those with a high level 
of concern for climate change were significantly more likely to undertake these strategies compared 
to those with lower levels of concern. When financial investments were needed, there was no 
significant difference between the two groups, with a slightly higher proportion for two of the 
strategies for those who do not believe that climate change is a serious problem [electric cars and 
insulation of houses]. These findings show engagement for these types of strategies as limited by 
household income. It is arguable that the low-income aspect is slowing down progress for the United 
Kingdom to become net zero, as strategies requiring higher incomes are likely to make the biggest 
difference in reducing the greenhouse gas emissions of individuals. Going forward, if the government 
are serious about their net zero ambitions, this financial divide in the accessibility of the highest 
reduction mitigation strategies will need reducing via government investment. Signs of this having 
been recognised are by way of, for example, the green home scheme that was introduced in 
September 2020, to help restart the economy after the COVID-19 lockdown. 
 
8.4. Environmental Activism 
At the start of this process of this thesis, environmental activism focussed specifically on climate 
change was not particularly mainstream within the United Kingdom. This was demonstrated in 
Appendix AD, for which less than five per cent of the respondents from the first survey stated that 
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they were members of an environmental organisation in 2017. Initially, environmental activism was 
not being considered as a key ingredient of this PhD thesis. 
However, since the prominence of Greta Thunberg and Extinction Rebellion in late 2018, 
environmental activism had rapidly grown as a form of response within both the United Kingdom and 
around the world. Consequently, it became a driver of climate change intervention in terms of bringing 
attention to the public as to the issue via the media, which was likely to have an impact on public 
perception and engagement of the issue.  
Therefore, this thesis included an exploration of responses to the following question: 
“Why do UK youth and other parts of society become supportive of environmental 
activism? And, in what way are UK youth and other parts of society likely to continue to 
participate in environmental activism?” 
In looking to the root causes of these protests, it can be noted that in the United Kingdom, as in many 
countries, addressing climate change has been mostly a top-down approach, with little engagement 
of the public. However, as demonstrated in Chapter 7, there was growing public dissatisfaction with 
the lack of action being taken by the government regarding legislation on causes of climate change. 
This occurred against a backdrop of warnings coming from the scientific community, IPCC and images 
of extreme weather on television, and a lack of voice for civil society. 
The policy environment demonstrated a distinct lack of a post-normal science that would appeal and 
engage more widely. Activism observed in 2019 is arguably an act of post-normal engagement, which 
is when the civil society feels that the top-down approach is not working and want their voice to be 
heard on how to bring about change. It is arguable that changes to the Climate Change Act of 2008 
during May 2019 became one of the first signs that the top-down approach is being reconsidered. 
Since then, a climate change assembly has been formed with its recommendations being presented 
to parliament on what the government should be doing in its bid to tackle climate change. 
It remains to be seen if this activism for step changes is going to continue in the future in the post-
COVID-19 pandemic era. There are signs that activism is likely to continue for many years to come, as 
demonstrated with the protest in London in September 2020, despite the COVID-19 pandemic 
restrictions still being in place. This theme of what next for activism groups is reflected upon further 
in Section 8.8.1. 
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8.5. Extreme Meteorological Events and Climate Change Perception 
Whilst extreme meteorological events were not core to the new knowledge provided in this thesis, 
Chapter 5.4 has demonstrated there is a growing perception during heatwaves [2019] experienced 
within the United Kingdom being the result of climate change. This builds upon the results that suggest 
the majority of the public believe that climate change is already having an impact. However, the results 
suggest that the public are also being short-slighted regards the probable impact. The February/March 
2019 heatwave was seen as context for every impact, but the proportion of those believing that this 
impact was occurring dropped significantly the following intervening year, whereas flooding rose as 
the prime impact. What occurred during these two time periods was that in 2019 the United Kingdom 
came out of a very unusual winter heatwave, when temperatures reached 21.2oC in Cambridge in 
February, whereas, one year later, the United Kingdom had just come out of one of the wettest 
winters, with widespread flooding impacts on large areas of Southern England and Wales. Changing 
public understanding of these events is explained in part by Radvansky and Zacks (2011) who stated 
that the public build their beliefs in real time depending on local and national events. 
 
8.6. Revisiting the Conceptual Framework 
The findings of this thesis across its five research questions broadly support the updated conceptual 
framework shown in Figure 8.1, though strengths of the relationships between elements can now be 
commented on further. For example, as demonstrated within Section 5.3 and 8.1.1, the results do not 
seem to confirm that certain worldviews have a significant impact of an individual’s perception of 
climate change within the United Kingdom beyond the influence of social status and age. 
However, the analysis suggests that there are additional factors that previously were not considered 
within the conceptual framework. The first is how household incomes impact on levels of engagement 
with climate change. The results throughout Chapter Five have demonstrated that those with a higher 
social status grading, in the vast majority of cases higher earners, are more concerned about and 
aware of climate change compared to those with a lower social status. However, Chapter Six 
demonstrated that engagement through mitigation, that requires behavioural changes, is not 
impacted by household incomes, with the largest factor in the undertaking of these mitigation 
strategies being the individual’s perception of climate change. This is because, mitigation strategies 
that require a significant financial investment have a low uptake, as demonstrated within Table 6.2. 
This is especially so amongst the youngest within society. This is a consequence of the fact that young 
people generally tend to have a lower income compared to other age groups. In addition, household 
income does not just directly affect perception [Tables 5.7, 5.12, and 5.14] and engagement [Table 
6.2] with climate change in terms of mitigating against climate change, but also increases their 
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vulnerability and exposure to climate change associated disaster events. This route to the impact of 
extreme meteorological events has been observed previously, during the Hurricane Katrina impact on 
New Orleans (Elliott and Pais, 2006; Sharkey, 2007). Within a United Kingdom context, flooding is the 
most frequent extreme meteorological event. Further, research by Sayers, Penning-Rowsell and 
Horritt (2018) found that whilst most householders have some form of insurance, only 85 per cent of 
the poorest 10 per cent of householders have insurance compared to the national average of 93 per 
cent. When further exploring content insurance, less than half of the poorest 10 per cent have this 
form of insurance, and even less so amongst tenants. It is arguable that this is also then a 
demonstration of the poorest within society not having financial capital for insurance to help with the 
“bounce back” from the event, let alone the ability of individuals to have the capacity to “bounce 
forward” from the potential disaster. This is likely to be increasingly important in the face of the 
changing magnitude and frequency of meteorological disasters within the United Kingdom, especially 
flooding. 
Lastly, there is an inclusion of an emphasised link (red line in Figure 8.1) between “reaction and 
response to risk” and “climate policy”. This refers, in part to the ‘post-normal engagement’ which is 
explored in Sections 7.2 and 7.3. Whilst there is a connection between “reaction and response to risk” 
and “climate policy”, via the medium of “engagement”, this thesis has demonstrated that activism is 
due to the perceived lack of engagement/action of government and corporate industry within the 
United Kingdom and globally. This is emphasising that the public have a greater say and that increased 
action is critical in combatting climate change at both a national and international level. Whilst there 
is no direct link between climate activism (in terms of school strikes and Extinction Rebellion) and 
Theresa May government’s changes to the Climate Change Act 2008, a causative link between the two 
cannot be ruled out. It is concluded that this is a likely sign that the United Kingdom is gradually 
changing to a more bottom-up approach to climate change policy and action. 
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Figure 8.1 – Updated Conceptual Framework. (Source: Author) 
Note: Numbers in the Figure link to related sections within this thesis
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8.7. Limitations of Study and Recommendations 
All research has limitations, and what follows is a reflexive comment at the close of this thesis. 
Firstly, the questionnaire surveys were mostly distributed via social media and targeted emails, to 
reach areas and groups. A single researcher undertaking a national study would find it too difficult in 
terms of labour intensiveness and cost to reach the full sampling scope.   
Consequently, the researcher had restricted control over who completed the surveys, this resulted in 
a self-selection bias within the results, with the implication that the results might not be fully balance 
in terms of social demographics. Having climate change in both the title and study rationale may have 
led to a greater tendency for climate-aware individuals to complete the surveys. Efforts were 
undertaken to reduce this impact through the usage of secondary comparative data, such as the BEIS 
and Eurobarometer datasets. In addition, people who do not use social media were significantly less 
likely to find the survey to complete, resulting in a section of the population being in effect excluded. 
During the first survey, attempts were made to offset this through use of a paper survey, though the 
limited resources led to only a much more limited number of respondents using that method. Even if 
not entirely representative of the population as a whole, this experience serves to inform us in a new 
way about the perception, engagement and reaction of a large group of individuals within the United 
Kingdom and the Crown Dependencies. 
In addition, to reduce the issue of sample size bias in both surveys, a large sample was conducted. For 
example, the first survey had 1,134 respondents and the second survey had 1,700 respondents. As 
with any other study, the aim of his study was to reduce the margin of error within the data to between 
2% and 3%. The main reason why the second study had a much larger sample was due to the new type 
of data that this survey was researching, meaning that there were no other studies for comparative 
purposes. Despite these large sample sizes, there were socio-economic biases, for example an under 
representation of BAME groups. Consequently, it was even more important to use secondary studies 
for comparative reasons. 
A further limitation may be with regards to narrowness of research findings. When starting out this 
thesis, it aimed at looking at a deliberately broad spectrum of issues relating to climate change 
perception and engagement; however, due to limitation in the word count, a number of themes were 
not explored further in the write up. Whilst representing themes important to the issue of climate 
change, they were considered fewer integral elements of the findings and thesis developed. Results 
related to these elements left out can be found in Appendix S and will be drawn up within other 
publications. In this sense the thesis has prioritised depth over breadth. 
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Lastly, the sample size for the Yonmenkaigi System Method is relatively small, with only one study 
with 16 students. There were two main purposes for such a small study size. Firstly, the Yonmenkaigi 
System Method was only planned to be a demonstration of how participatory education could benefit 
understanding of climate change amongst young people; It was not intended to be a major focal point 
of this study, albeit it is acknowledged there is considerable interest in it. Secondly, as an independent 
researcher, there are limited resources available to implement multiple case examples;  it was not 
possible to spare further finance and time to both plan and execute another Yonmenkaigi System 
Method set of exercises. However, relationships observed between some indicators from the 
Yonmenkaigi questionnaire suggest that there was indeed transformation of perception amongst the 
respondents of that study. It is recommended that studies into the Yonmenkaigi System Method 
should continue and be expanded out into a wider range of students. 
 
8.8. Looking Forward on Direction of Climate Change Action 
Due to the ever-changing nature of climate change threats, the direction of climate change related 
research within the social sciences will also be ever changing. It is important that within the United 
Kingdom, climate change perception tracking should be regularly undertaken, such as through 
application of the BEIS datasets to this purpose, and as undertaken by ‘Yale Program on Climate 
Change Communication’ within the United States. However, unlike the studies within the United 
States, once surveys have been carried out, limited levels of analyses have been undertaken, with a 
basic analysis being undertaken by the BEIS department in a summary document. This dataset has the 
potential of being used in an informative research driven way in the future to keep track of the United 
Kingdom civil society’s perception of climate change. 
Within recent years, there was a growing lacuna of action being undertaken by the government, in 
which climate activism groups of both ‘Extinction Rebellion’ and the ‘School Strikes for Climate 
Change’ materialised. It is arguable that these groups are a form of ‘post-normal engagement’ which 
only rose due to the lack of ‘post-normal science’ within the United Kingdom in response of climate 
change. As highlighted throughout Chapter 7, there was an overall level of support for the philosophy 
of the groups, despite there been less support for the actions being undertaken, especially by 
Extinction Rebellion. It is highly likely that once the main brunt of the COVID-19 pandemic has passed, 
both Extinction Rebellion and the School Strikes for Climate Change’ are probably going to return to 
protesting on the streets again. Consequently, the monitoring of the demographic composition of 
these protests in terms of perception and differing engagement drives will help assess the nature of 
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reactions towards future climate policy. This is especially important to that associated with the 
content of the COP26 which is being hosted in Glasgow, Scotland in November 2021. 
 
8.8.1. COVID-19 and Climate Change 
During the late stages of writing this thesis, the COVID-19 pandemic has fundamentally changed the 
way in which society can operate. As countries and groups of people around the world recover from 
the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, both socially and financially, analysis of the pandemic’s impact 
on climate change perception and engagement warrants detailed attention. For example, societal 
perception of climate change, in terms of its seriousness and urgency, declined due to the COVID-19 
pandemic, as postulated by the theory of ‘finite pool of worry’. Currently, it is too early to tell what 
the impacts of the pandemic are on longer-term public perception, as it will take probably a year or 
two to fully observe the changes in societal perception of climate change in relation to pandemic 
impact. 
However, it is already clear that there is a direct impact via changes in usage of public transportation. 
As highlighted in Section 6.1.3, there had already been some decline in the usage of public 
transportation in recent years, especially buses, but not accentuated. The COVID-19 pandemic has 
highlighted the vulnerability and susceptibility of the public to contracting colds, influenza and other 
infectious viruses, which is leading to more people driving in their own personal transportation 
[maintaining a personal bubble]. As societies within both the United Kingdom and around the world 
recover the COVID-19 pandemic, it is likely that public transportation will take much longer to recover 
its usage numbers. It will also take the companies and authorities a much greater effort to ensure the 
safety of passengers who use public transportation. Demand for public transport may be offset by 
changing work patterns with and an increased realisation of the feasibility of working from home, 
resulting in fewer emissions from office blocks and the commute to and from work. 
In conclusion, the COVID-19 pandemic will impact climate change perception and engagement, but 
questions will remain as to how similar the COVID-19 pandemic [and potentially other pandemic] 
impacts are with climate change in the socio-engagement framing of this thesis. Despite looking 
different on the outside, the COVID-19 pandemic and climate change share similarities. The main way 
to examine the similarities is to examine how both climate change and the COVID-19 pandemic 
disruptions have been approached by the population using the three pillars of this thesis [perception, 
engagement and reaction]. 
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In terms of getting the public to engage with the measures to mitigate against contracting the SARS-
CoV-2 virus [such as physical distancing54, wearing of facemasks and regularly washing hands], a high 
level of belief of the threat of the virus [perception] has been needed. This sheds light on, or mirrors, 
the thought processes that are needed to undertake engagement with climate change. The reaction 
and response are different in the case of the COVID-19 pandemic in terms of demanding more action 
to protect the population from the virus [as most people will not protest due to the risks], but they 
can undertake this outpouring of belief in other ways, such as through social media. This has been 
observed for the case of climate change in recent months with the school strike for climate change, 
who instead of protesting on the streets, protest on social media by flooding social media feeds with 
images and messages about the risks and dangers of climate change, with a demand for action here 
and now (Murray, 2020). 
A difference between COVID-19 and climate change perception, engagement and reaction is in the 
speed of interventions by governments, academia and the general public both within the United 
Kingdom and by most countries around the world. COVID-19 was first discovered in December 2019 
and roughly a month later the first lockdown of the public took place in Wuhan, China, and by the end 
of March 2020, there were lockdowns in place for the majority of the world citizens. These decisive 
actions undertaken by governments, came with a great financial cost (Chan, 2020), but were generally 
publicly accepted (Wright, 2020; YouGov, 2020). 
When reaction to COVID-19 is compared to the government action on climate change, engagement is 
very slow with governments globally having been discussing how to respond to the threat of climate 
change since the 1980s. Despite this, the COVID-19 pandemic has raised one point in that respect that 
could already be viewed as a lesson. Societies which have been slow to prepare and put in place 
actions to reduce COVID-19, had to place their populations into greater lockdown resulting in greater 
economic damage and more prolonged disruption and ill-being. This was the case for the United 
Kingdom (Harnett, 2020). It is arguable that there are parallels to climate change thought the need for 
greater preparedness to reduce inevitable impacts. It has long been argued that the longer it takes to 
enforce action to combat and prepare for climate change, the greater the action that will be needed 





54 - Commonly referred to in the media and everyday conversation as ‘social distancing’. 
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Appendix A – Climate Public Perception Overview within the United Kingdom 
Table A.1 – Papers that examine public perception of climate change, climate activism, mitigation and adaption within the United Kingdom 
Authors Title Geographic Focus Method Sample Size 
Abrahamson et al. 
(2009) 
“Perceptions of heatwave risks to health: interview-




Interview N = 73 
Bellamy and Hulme 
(2011) 
“Beyond the Tipping Point: Understand Perceptions of 
Abrupt Climate Change and Their Implications” 
East Anglia Survey 
Focus Group 
N = 287 
N = 15 
Bertoldo et al. 
(2019) 
“Scientific truth or debate: On the link between 
perceived scientific consensus and belief in 





Survey N = 1,010 
N = 1,001 
N = 1,004 
N = 1,033 
Bichard and 
Kazmierczak (2012) 
“Are homeowners willing to adapt to and mitigate the 
effects of climate change?” 
England and Wales Survey N = 961 
Bradford et al. 
(2012) 
“Risk perception – issues for flood management in 
Europe” 
Europe Survey N = 1,375 
Burningham, 
Fielding and Thrush 
(2008) 
“’It’ll never happen to me’: understand public 
awareness of local flood risk” 
England and Wales Survey 
Focus Groups 
Interviews 
N > 1,000 
N = ? 
N = ? 
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Table A.1 – Papers that examine public perception of climate change, climate activism, mitigation and adaption within the United Kingdom (Continued) 
Authors Title Geographic Focus Method Sample Size 
Butler and Pidgeon 
(2011) 
“From `flood defence' to `flood risk management': 
exploring governance, responsibility, and blame” 
Gloucester (Gloucestershire) 
Oxford (Oxfordshire) 




N = 50 
N = 45 
N = 1,000 
N = 2,850 
N = 3,393 
Capstick et al. 
(2015) 
“Public perception of climate change in Britain following 
the winter 2013/2014 flooding” 
United Kingdom 2x Survey N = 1,002 
N = 995 
Capstick and 
Pidgeon (2014b) 
“What is climate change scepticism? Examination of the 
concept using a mixed methods study of the UK public” 
United Kingdom Interview 
Survey 
N = 47 
N = 500 
Corner et al. (2011) “Nuclear power, climate change and energy security: 
Exploring British public attitudes” 
United Kingdom Survey N = 1,822 
Corner et al. (2020) “Engaging the public on climate risk and adaptation: A 
briefing for UK communicators” 




“Optimism and the perceptions of new risk” United Kingdom Survey N = 1,547 
Demski, Spence and 
Pidgeon (2013) 
“Transforming the UK Energy System: Public Values, 
Attitudes and Acceptability: Summary findings from a 
survey conducted August 2012” 
United Kingdom Survey N = 2,441 
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Table A.1 – Papers that examine public perception of climate change, climate activism, mitigation and adaption within the United Kingdom (Continued) 
Authors Title Geographic Focus Method Sample Size 
Dessai and Sims 
(2010) 
“Public perception of drought and climate change in 
southeast England” 
South East England Focus Group 
Survey 
N = 14 
N = 102 
Doran et al. (2019) “Consequence evaluations and moral concerns about 
climate change: insights from nationally representative 





Survey N = 1,010 
N = 1,001 
N = 1,004 
N = 1,033 
Few, Brown and 
Tompkins (2007) 
“Public participation and climate change adaptation: 
Avoiding the illusion of inclusion” 





N = ? 
N = ? 
Fielding (2012) “Inequalities in exposure and awareness of flood risk in 
England and Wales” 
England and Wales Survey N = 1034 
Fischer et al. (2012) “Climate Change? No, Wise Resource Use is the Issue: 
Social Representation of Energy, Climate Change and 
the Future” 
Europe Interview N = 202 
Glenk and Fischer 
(2010) 
“Insurance, prevention or just wait and see? Public 
preference for water management strategies in the 
context of climate change” 
Scotland Survey N = 1,033 
Harries (2008) “Feeling secure or being secure? Why it can seem better 
not to protect yourself against a natural hazard” 
United Kingdom Focus Group 
Interviews 
N = 40 
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Table A.1 – Papers that examine public perception of climate change, climate activism, mitigation and adaption within the United Kingdom (Continued) 
Authors Title Geographic Focus Method Sample Size 
Harries (2012) “The anticipated emotional consequences of adaptive 
behaviour-impacts on the take-up of household flood-
protection measures” 
England Survey N = 555 
Harris and Corner 
(2011) 
“Communicating Environmental Risks: Clarifying the 
Severity Effect in Interpretations of Verbal Probability 
Expressions’ 
England and Wales 3x Experiment N = 101 
N = 83 
N = 191 
Harvatt, Petts and 
Chilvers (2011) 
“Understanding householders responses to natural 






N = 35 
N = 77 
Howell (2011) “Lights, camera … action? Altered attitudes and 
behaviour in response to the climate change film The 
Age of Stupid” 
Edinburgh 2x Survey N = 212 
N = 162 
Howgate and 
Kenyon (2009) 
“Community cooperation with natural flood 
management: a case study in the Scottish Borders” 








“Accessibility of flood risk insurance in the UK: 
confusion, competition and complacency” 
United Kingdom Survey N = 403 
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Table A.1 – Papers that examine public perception of climate change, climate activism, mitigation and adaption within the United Kingdom (Continued) 
Authors Title Geographic Focus Method Sample Size 
Lorenzoni et al. 
(2006) 
“Cross-national comparison of image associations with 
“global warming” and “climate change” among 






N = 316 




“Barriers perceived to engaging with climate change 
among the UK public and their policy implications” 
United Kingdom Focus Group 
Survey 
N = ? 
N = 200 
Lorenzoni and 
Pidgeon (2006) 
“Public views on climate change: European and USA 
perspectives” 




Lowe et al. (2006) “Does tomorrow ever come? Disaster narrative and 
public perception of climate change” 
Norwich (Norfolk) Focus Group 
Survey 
N = ? 




“Political ideology and views about climate change in 
the European Union” 
European Union Survey N = 25,150 
Morton et al. (2011) “The future that may (or may not) come: How framing 
change responses to uncertainty in climate change 
communication” 
United Kingdom 2x Experiment N = 88 
N = 120 
Niemeyer, Petts and 
Hobson (2005) 
“Rapid climate change and society: Assessing responses 
and thresholds” 
West Midlands Interview N = 29 
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Table A.1 – Papers that examine public perception of climate change, climate activism, mitigation and adaption within the United Kingdom (Continued) 




““Fear Won’t Do It” Promoting Positive Engagement 
With Climate Change Through Visual and Iconic 
Representations” 
United Kingdom Focus Group 
Interview 
Survey 
N = 27 
N = 30 
N = 63 
Palutikof, Agnew 
and Hoar (2004) 
“Public perception of unusually warm weather in the 
UK: impacts, responses and adaptations” 
Scotland 
South of England 
Survey N = 295 
Parker, Priest and 
McCarthy (2011) 
“Surface water flood warning requirements and 
potential in England and Wales” 
Rotherham (South Yorkshire) 
Wealdstone Brook (Greater 
London) 
2x Focus Groups N = 33 
N = 31 
Parker, Tapsell and 
McCarthy (2007) 
“Enhancing the human benefits of flood warnings. 
Natural Hazards” 





Partridge et al. 
(2017) 
“Seeing futures now: Emergent US and UK views on 
shale development, climate change and energy 
systems” 
London and Cardiff (United 
Kingdom) 
 
Los Angeles and Santa Barbara 
(United States) 
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Table A.1 – Papers that examine public perception of climate change, climate activism, mitigation and adaption within the United Kingdom (Continued) 




“Public Perceptions Of Nuclear Power, Climate Change 
And Energy Options In Britain: Summary Findings Of A 
Survey Conducted During October and November 2005” 
United Kingdom Survey N = 1,491 
Poortinga et al. 
(2003) 
“Public Perception of Risk, Science and Governance: 
Main findings of a British survey of five risk cases” 
United Kingdom Survey N = 1,547 
Poortinga et al. 
(2011) 
“Uncertain climate: An investigation into public 
scepticism about anthropogenic climate change” 
United Kingdom Survey N = 1,822 
Poortinga et al. 
(2013) 
“Public Attitudes to Nuclear Power and Climate Change I 
Britain Two Years after the Fukushima Accident” 
United Kingdom Survey N = 961 
Poortinga et al. 
(2019) 
“Climate change perception and their individual-level 
determinants: A cross-European analysis” 
United Kingdom and 
22 European Countries 





N = 1,959 
N = 44,387 
Rabinovich and 
Morton (2012) 
“Unquestioned answers or unanswered questions: 
beliefs about science guide responses to uncertainty in 
climate change risk communication” 
United Kingdom and 
Worldwide 
2x Experiment N = 108 
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Table A.1 – Papers that examine public perception of climate change, climate activism, mitigation and adaption within the United Kingdom (Continued) 
Authors Title Geographic Focus Method Sample Size 
Rundblad, Knapton, 
and Hunter (2010) 
“Communication, perception and behaviour during a 
natural disaster involving a ‘Do Not Drink’ and a 
subsequent ‘Boil Water’ notice: a postal questionnaire 
study” 
Gloucestershire Survey N = 195 
Sharples (2010) “Communicating Climate Science: Evaluating the UK 
Public’s Attitude to Climate Change” 
United Kingdom 2x Survey N = 109 




“Climate Science, the Public and the News Media” United Kingdom Survey 
6x Focus Groups 
N = 2,000 
N = 48 
Soane et al. (2010) “Flood perception and mitigation: the role of severity, 
agency, and experience in the purchase of flood 
protection, and the communication of flood 
information” 
United Kingdom Survey N = 1,732 
Spence and Pidgeon 
(2010) 
“Framing and communicating climate change: The 
effects of distance and outcome frame manipulations” 
United Kingdom Experiment N = 161 
Spence et al. (2011) “Perceptions of climate change and willingness to save 
energy related to flood experience” 
United Kingdom Survey N = 1,822 
Spence, Poortinga 
and Pidgeon (2012) 
“The Psychological Distance of Climate Change” United Kingdom Survey N = 1,822 
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Table A.1 – Papers that examine public perception of climate change, climate activism, mitigation and adaption within the United Kingdom (Continued) 
Authors Title Geographic Focus Method Sample Size 
Steentjes et al. 
(2017) 
“European Perception of Climate Change (EPCC): 
Topline finding of a survey conducted in four European 





Survey N = 1,010 
N = 1,001 
N = 1,004 
N = 1,033 
Thomas et al. (2018) “The impact of parenthood on environmental attitudes 
and behaviour: a longitudinal investigation of the legacy 
hypothesis” 
United Kingdom Survey N = 18,176 
van der Linden 
(2015) 
“The social-psychological determinants of climate 
change risk perceptions: Towards a comprehensive 
model” 
United Kingdom Survey N = 808 
Whitmarsh (2008) “Are flood victims more concerned about climate 
change than other people? The role of direct experience 
in risk perception and behavioural response” 
South of England Interview 
Survey 
N = 24 
N = 589 
Whitmarsh (2009) “What’s in a name? Commonalities and differences in 
public understanding of “climate change” and “global 
warming”” 
South of England Survey N = 589 
Whitmarsh (2011) “Scepticism and uncertainty about climate change: 
Dimensions, determinants and change over time” 
Hampshire 
Hampshire and Norfolk 
Survey 
Survey 
N = 589 
N = 551 
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Table A.1 – Papers that examine public perception of climate change, climate activism, mitigation and adaption within the United Kingdom (Continued) 
Authors Title Geographic Focus Method Sample Size 
Whitmarsh and 
Corner (2017) 
“Tools for a new climate conversation: A mixed-
methods study of language for public engagement 
across the political spectrum” 
United Kingdom Mixed N = 2,088 
Whitmarsh, Seyfang 
and O’Neill (2011) 
“Public engagement with carbon and climate change: To 
what extent is the public ‘carbon capable’?” 
Hampshire and Norfolk Survey N = 551 
Whitmarsh, Xenias 
and Jones (2019) 







Survey N = 5,406 
Wolf, Adger and 
Lorenzoni (2010) 
“Heat waves and cold spells: an analysis of policy 
response and perceptions of vulnerable populations in 
the UK” 
Norwich (Norfolk) Interview N = 15 
Wolf et al. (2010) “Social capital, individual responses to heat waves and 




Interview N = 105 
Source: Adapted and Updated from Taylor, Dessai and Bruine de Bruin, 2014; Capstick et al., 2015 
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Appendix B – Climate Public Perception Overview outside the United Kingdom 
Table B.1 – Papers that examine public perception of climate change, climate activism, mitigation and adaption outside the United Kingdom 
Authors Title Geographic Focus Method Sample Size 
Aitken, Chapman 
and McClure (2011) 
“Climate change, powerlessness and the commons 
dilemma: Assessing New Zealanders’ preparedness to 
act” 
New Zealand Survey N = 192 
Akter and Bennett 
(2011) 
“Household perception of climate change and 
preferences for mitigation action: The case of the 
Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme in Australia” 
Australia Survey N = 634 
Arbuckle Jr., Morton 
and Hobbs (2013) 
“Farmer beliefs and concerns about climate change and 
attitudes towards adaptation and mitigation: Evidence 
from Iowa” 
Iowa (United States) Survey N = 1,276 
Arbuckle Jr. et al. 
(2013) 
“Climate change beliefs, concerns, and attitudes 
towards among farmers in the Midwestern United 
States” 
Mid-West (United States) Survey N = 4,778 
Bostrom et al. 
(2012) 
“Causal thinking and support for climate change 






Survey N = 286 
N = 25 
N = 19 
N = 145 
N = 171 
Braun et al. (2018) “Public perception of climate engineering and carbon 
capture and storage in Germany: survey evidence” 
Germany Survey N = 3,526 
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Table B.1 – Papers that examine public perception of climate change, climate activism, mitigation and adaption outside the United Kingdom (Continued) 




““Natural cycles” in lay understandings of climate 
change” 
Hunter Valley (Australia) Survey 
Interview 
N = 1,162 
N = 467 
Demski et al. (2018) “National context is a key determinant of energy 
security concerns across Europe” 
Europe Survey 
(Secondary) 
N = 44,38755 
Douenne and Fabre 
(2020) 
“French attitudes on climate change, carbon taxation 
and other climate policies” 
France Survey N = 3,002 
Gustafson et al. 
(2020b) 
“Climate Change in the Minds of U.S. News Audiences” United States 3x Survey N = 3,623 
Leiserowitz, Smith 
and Marlon (2011) 
“American Teens’ Knowledge of Climate Change” United States Survey N = 2,030 
Leiserowitz et al. 
(2013) 
“Extreme Weather and Climate Changes in the 
American Mind: April 2013” 
United States Survey N = 1,045 
Leiserowitz et al. 
(2014) 




55 - The sample sizes for each of the countries are: Austria = 2,010; Belgium = 1,766; Czech Republic = 2,269; Estonia = 2,019; Finland = 1,925; France = 2,070; Germany = 
2,852; Hungary = 1,614; Iceland = 880; Ireland = 2,757; Israel = 2,557; Italy = 2,626; Lithuania = 2,122; Netherlands = 1,681; Norway = 1,545; Poland = 1,694; Russia = 2,430; 
Slovenia = 1,307; Spain = 1,958; Sweden = 1,551; Switzerland = 1,525; United Kingdom = 1,959. 
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Table B.1 – Papers that examine public perception of climate change, climate activism, mitigation and adaption outside the United Kingdom (Continued) 
Leiserowitz et al. 
(2018) 
“Politics & Global Warming, March 2018” United States Survey N = 1,067 
Leiserowitz et al. 
(2019a) 
“Climate Change in the American Mind: April 2019” United States Survey N = 1,291 
Maibach et al. 
(2016) 
“Is there a climate “spiral of silence” in America: March, 
2016” 
United States Survey N = 1,204 
Mildenberger et al. 
(2016) 
“The Distribution of Climate Change Opinion in Canada” Canada 4x Survey 
(Secondary) 
N = 1,214 (2011) 
N = 1,502 (2013) 
N = 1,401 (2014) 
N = 1,014 (2015) 
Nisbet (2009) “Communicating Climate Change: Why Frames Matter 
for Public Engagement” 




Nisbet and Myers 
(2007) 
“Trends: Twenty Years of Public Opinion about Global 
Warming” 






“‘A diabolical challenge’: public opinion and climate 





Shi, Visschers and 
Siegrist (2015) 
“Public Perception of Climate Change: The Importance 
of Knowledge and Cultural Worldviews” 
Switzerland Survey N = 1,065 
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Table B.1 – Papers that examine public perception of climate change, climate activism, mitigation and adaption outside the United Kingdom (Continued) 
Tranter and Booth 
(2015) 




N = 19,99156 
Visschers (2018) “Public Perception of Uncertainties Within Climate 
Change Science” 




56 - The sample sizes for each of the countries are: Australia = 1,946; Austria = 1,019; Canada = 985; Denmark = 1,305; Finland = 1,211; France = 2,253; Germany = 1,407; 
Great Britain = 928; New Zealand = 1,172; Norway = 1,382; Spain = 2;560; Sweden = 1,181; Switzerland = 1,212; United States = 1,430. 
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Appendix C – Percentage of the British Public that believe the World’s Climate is changing 
 
Table C.1 - Percentage of the British Public between 2005 and 2019 that believe the World’s 
Climate is changing 
Date of Study Yes No Don’t Know Source 
November 2005 91% 4% 5% Poortinga et al. (2006) 
November 2009 83% 15% 2% BBC (2010) 
January-March 2010 78% 15% 6% Spence et al. (2010) 
March 2011 80% 13% 7% Shuckburgh, Robison and 
Pidegon (2012) 
August 2012 79% 11% 11% Demski, Spense and 
Pidgeon (2013) 
March 2013 72% 19% 9% Poortinga et al. (2013) 
October 2014 88% 6% 6% Chapstick et al. (2015) 
June 2016 86% 12% 2% Steentjes et al. (2017) 
February-September 
2017 
95.6% 1.3% 3.1% Author [This Thesis] 
May-July 2019 98.47% 0.59% 0.94% Author [This Thesis] 
Note: All Percentages might not add up to 100 per cent due to rounding errors 
Source: Author 
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Appendix D – Eurobarometer Data on Climate Change 
 
Table D.1 – Overview Details of the Eurobarometer Surveys 
Year Survey  Number Survey Date 
UK Survey Size 
Overall 15-24 
2008 Standard 300 25th March – 4th May 646 N/A 
2009 Special 322 August – September 1,306 210 (16.1%) 
2011 Special 372 4th June – 19th June 1,342 214 (15.9%) 
2013 Special 408 23th November – 2nd December 1,331 210 (15.8%) 
2015 Special 435 30th May – 8th June 1,306 206 (15.8%) 
2017 Special 459 18th March – 27th March 1,347 209 (15.5%) 
2019 Special 490 9th April – 26th April 1,052 164 (15.6%) 
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Question: Which of the following do you consider to be the single most serious problem facing the world as a whole? 
Table D.2 – The British public’s perception, between 2008 and 2019, of what is the most serious issue facing the world 
 2008 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 
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Source: Data Adapted from Eurobarometer (2008); Eurobarometer (2009); Eurobarometer (2011); Eurobarometer (2013); Eurobarometer (2015); 
Eurobarometer (2017); Eurobarometer (2019) 
 
 
57 - Known as ‘Global Warming’ in the 2008 survey only. 
58 - Change of wording from “A major global economic downturn” to “The Economic Situation” in the 2011 Eurobarometer. 
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Question: “And how serious a problem do you think climate change is at this moment? Please use a scale from 1 to 10, with '1' meaning it is "not at all a 
serious problem" and '10' meaning it is "an extremely serious problem".” 
Table D.3 – Overall European public’s perception, in 2017, how serious a problem they think climate change is currently 
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Table D.3 – European public’s perception, in 2017, how serious a problem they think climate change is currently (Continued) 
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Table D.3 – European public’s perception, in 2017, how serious a problem they think climate change is currently (Continued) 




















































































No. = Number; N = Number of Respondents; Note: All Percentages might not add up to 100 per cent due to rounding errors 




59 - EU27 means all European Union countries in 2019 excluding the United Kingdom 
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Table D.4 – Overall European public’s perception, in 2019, how serious a problem they think climate change is currently 
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Table D.4 – Overall European public’s perception, in 2019, how serious a problem they think climate change is currently (Continued) 
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Table D.4 – Overall European public’s perception, in 2019, how serious a problem they think climate change is currently (Continued) 
































































No. = Number; N = Number of Respondents; Note: All Percentages might not add up to 100 per cent due to rounding errors 





60 - EU27 means all European Union countries in 2019 excluding the United Kingdom 
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Table D.5 –European public’s perception, between the age of 16 and 24 in 2017, of how serious a problem they think climate change is currently 
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Table D.5 –European public’s perception, between the age of 16 and 24 in 2017, of how serious a problem they think climate change is currently 
(Continued) 
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Table D.5 –European public’s perception, between the age of 16 and 24 in 2017, of how serious a problem they think climate change is currently 
(Continued) 























































































No. = Number; N = Number of Respondents; Note: All Percentages might not add up to 100 per cent due to rounding errors 






61 - EU27 means all European Union countries in 2019 excluding the United Kingdom 
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Table D.6 –European public’s perception, between the age of 16 and 24 in 2019, of how serious a problem they think climate change is currently 
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Table D.6 –European public’s perception, between the age of 16 and 24 in 2019, of how serious a problem they think climate change is currently 
(Continued) 
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Table D.6 –European public’s perception, between the age of 16 and 24 in 2019, of how serious a problem they think climate change is currently 
(Continued) 





























































































No. = Number; N = Number of Respondents; Note: All Percentages might not add up to 100 per cent due to rounding errors 




62 - EU27 means all European Union countries in 2019 excluding the United Kingdom 
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Table D.7 – Overall European public’s perception, in 2019, of how serious a problem they think climate change is currently, based upon NUTS1 regions 
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Table D.7 – Overall European public’s perception, in 2019, of how serious a problem they think climate change is currently, based upon NUTS1 regions 
(Continued) 
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Table D.7 – Overall European public’s perception, in 2019, of how serious a problem they think climate change is currently, based upon NUTS1 regions 
(Continued) 















































































































































































Småland and the islands 
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Table D.7 – Overall European public’s perception, in 2019, of how serious a problem they think climate change is currently, based upon NUTS1 regions 
(Continued) 




























































Comunidad de Madrid 



















































































































































































































































































366 | P a g e  
 
Table D.7 – Overall European public’s perception, in 2019, of how serious a problem they think climate change is currently, based upon NUTS1 regions 
(Continued) 
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Table D.7 – Overall European public’s perception, in 2019, of how serious a problem they think climate change is currently, based upon NUTS1 regions 
(Continued) 
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Table D.7 – Overall European public’s perception, in 2019, of how serious a problem they think climate change is currently, based upon NUTS1 regions 
(Continued) 
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Table D.7 – Overall European public’s perception, in 2019, of how serious a problem they think climate change is currently, based upon NUTS1 regions 
(Continued) 























































































Sud – Muntenia 
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Table D.7 – Overall European public’s perception, in 2019, of how serious a problem they think climate change is currently, based upon NUTS1 regions 
(Continued) 
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Table D.7 – Overall European public’s perception, in 2019, of how serious a problem they think climate change is currently, based upon NUTS1 regions 
(Continued) 








































































































































































București – Ilfov 
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Table D.7 – Overall European public’s perception, in 2019, of how serious a problem they think climate change is currently, based upon NUTS1 regions 
(Continued) 
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Table D.7 – Overall European public’s perception, in 2019, of how serious a problem they think climate change is currently, based upon NUTS1 regions 
(Continued) 








































































































































































































































Pohjois- ja Itä-Suomi 
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Table D.7 – Overall European public’s perception, in 2019, of how serious a problem they think climate change is currently, based upon NUTS1 regions 
(Continued) 






















































































































Nisia Aigaiou, Kriti 
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Table D.7 – Overall European public’s perception, in 2019, of how serious a problem they think climate change is currently, based upon NUTS1 regions 
(Continued) 










































































































































































































No. = Number; N = Number of Respondents; Note: All Percentages might not add up to 100 per cent due to rounding errors 
N = 27,299 
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Appendix E – Greenhouse Gas Emissions in the Atmosphere 
Table E.1 – Quantity of greenhouse gas emissions in 2005 and 2011, in ppt, and the GWP of these gases over 100 years 
Greenhouse Gas 
Parts per Trillion (ppt) GWP over 100 
years [AR5] 2005 2011 Change 
Water Vapour (H2O) 18,000,000,000  - - 
Carbon Dioxide (CO2) 379,000,000 391,000,000  +3.2% 1 
Methane (CH4) 1,774,000 1,893,000  +6.7% 25-34 
Nitrous Oxide (N2O) 319,000 324,000 +5,000 +1.6% 298 
Ozone (O3) 337,000  - - 
Sulfuryl Fluoride (SO2F2) 1.35 1.71 +0.36 +26.7% 4,000-5,000 
1,1,1-Trichloroethane (Ch3CCl3) 18.32 6.32 -12.00 -65.5% 124 
Carbon Tetrachloride (CCl4) 93.1 85.8 -7.3 -7.8% 1,730 
Chlorofluorocarbons 
[CFCs] 
Trichlorofluromethane [CFC-11] (CCl3F) 251 238 -13 -5.2% 4,660 
Dichlorodifluoromethane [CFC-12] (CCl2F2) 542 528 -14 -2.6% 10,200 
Chlorotrifluoromethane [CFC-13] (CClF3) - 2.7 - - 13,900 
1,1,2-Trichlorotrifluoroethane [CFC-113] (C2Cl3F3) 78.6 74.3 -4.3 -5.5% 5,820 
Chloropentafluoroethane [CFC-115] (C2ClF5) 8.36 8.37 +0.01 +0.1% 7,670 
Hydrochlorofluorocarbons 
[HCFCs] 
Chlorodifluoromethane [HCFC-22] (CHClF2) 169 213 +44 +26.0% 1,760 
1,1-Dichloro-1-fluoroethane [HCFC-141b] (C2H3Cl2F) 17.7 21.4 +3.7 +20.9% 782 
1-Chloro-1,1-difluoroethane [HCFC-142b] (C2H3ClF2) 15.5 21.2 +5.7 +36.8% 1,980 
Hydrofluorocarbons [HFCs] 
Fluoroform [HFC-23] (CHF3) 18.8 24.0 +5.2 +27.7% 12,400 
Difluoromethane [HFC-32] (CH2F2) 1.15 4.92 +3.77 +327.8% 677 
Pentafluoroethane [HFC-125] (C2HF5) 3.69 9.58 +5.89 +159.6% 3,170 
1,1,1,2-Tetrafluoroethane [HFC-134a] (CF3CH2F) 34.3 62.7 +28.4 +82.8% 1,300 
1,1,1-Trifluoroethane [HFC-143a] (C2H3F3) 5.6 12.0 +6.4 +114.3% 4,800 
1,1-Difluoroethane [HFC-152a] 3.4 6.4 +3.0 +88.2% 138 
Perfluorocarbons [PFCs] 
Sulfur Hexafluoride (SF6) 5.64 7.28 +1.64 +29.1% 23,500 
Nitrogen Trifluoride (NF3) 0.4 0.9 +0.5 +125.0% 16,100 
Carbon Tetrafluoride (CF4) 75.0 79.0 +4.0 +5.3% 6,630 
Hexafluoroethane (C2F6) 3.66 4.16 +0.5 +13.7% 11,100 
Source: Adapted from Papadimitriou et al. (2008); Andersen et al., (2009); Mühle et al. (2009); Myhre et al. (2013); and EPA (No Date)
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Appendix F – Annual Global Carbon Dioxide Emissions 




Change Per cent 
change Year 
on Year 
 Year CO2 
Emissions 
(ppm) 
Change Per cent 
change Year 
on Year 
1959 315.97   1990 354.39 + 1.27 ↑ 12.16% 
1960 316.91 + 0.94 ↑ 0.30% 1991 355.61 + 1.22 ↑ 12.55% 
1961 317.64 + 0.73 ↑ 0.53% 1992 356.45 + 0.84 ↑ 12.81% 
1962 318.45 + 0.81 ↑ 0.78% 1993 357.10 + 0.65 ↑ 13.02% 
1963 318.99 + 0.54 ↑ 0.96% 1994 358.83 + 1.73 ↑ 13.56% 
1964 319.62 + 0.63 ↑ 1.16% 1995 360.82 + 1.99 ↑ 14.19% 
1965 320.04 + 0.42 ↑ 1.29% 1996 362.61 + 1.79 ↑ 14.76% 
1966 321.38 + 1.34 ↑ 1.71% 1997 363.73 + 1.12 ↑ 15.12% 
1967 322.16 + 0.78 ↑ 1.96% 1998 366.70 + 2.97 ↑ 16.06% 
1968 323.04 + 0.88 ↑ 2.24% 1999 368.38 + 1.68 ↑ 16.59% 
1969 324.62 + 1.58 ↑ 2.74% 2000 369.55 + 1.17 ↑ 16.96% 
1970 325.68 + 1.06 ↑ 3.07% 2001 371.14 + 1.59 ↑ 17.46% 
1971 326.32 + 0.64 ↑ 3.28% 2002 373.28 + 2.14 ↑ 18.14% 
1972 327.45 + 1.13 ↑ 3.63% 2003 375.80 + 2.52 ↑ 18.94% 
1973 329.68 + 2.23 ↑ 4.34% 2004 377.52 + 1.72 ↑ 19.48% 
1974 330.18 + 0.50 ↑ 4.50% 2005 379.80 + 2.28 ↑ 20.20% 
1975 331.11 + 0.93 ↑ 4.79% 2006 381.90 + 2.10 ↑ 20.87% 
1976 332.04 + 0.93 ↑ 5.09% 2007 383.79 + 1.89 ↑ 21.46% 
1977 333.83 + 1.79 ↑ 5.65% 2008 385.60 + 1.81 ↑ 22.04% 
1978 335.40 + 1.57 ↑ 6.15% 2009 387.43 + 1.83 ↑ 22.62% 
1979 336.84 + 1.44 ↑ 6.61% 2010 389.90 + 2.47 ↑ 23.40% 
1980 338.75 + 1.91 ↑ 7.21% 2011 391.65 + 1.75 ↑ 23.95% 
1981 340.11 + 1.36 ↑ 7.64% 2012 393.85 + 2.20 ↑ 24.65% 
1982 341.45 + 1.34 ↑ 8.06% 2013 396.52 + 2.67 ↑ 25.49% 
1983 343.05 + 1.60 ↑ 8.57% 2014 398.65 + 2.13 ↑ 26.17% 
1984 344.65 + 1.60 ↑ 9.08% 2015 400.83 + 2.18 ↑ 26.86% 
1985 346.12 + 1.47 ↑ 9.54% 2016 404.24 + 3.41 ↑ 27.94% 
1986 347.42 + 1.30 ↑ 9.95% 2017 406.55 + 2.31 ↑ 28.67% 
1987 349.19 + 1.77 ↑ 10.51% 2018 408.52 + 1.97 ↑ 29.29% 
1988 351.57 + 2.38 ↑ 11.27% 2019 411.43 + 2.91 ↑ 30.21% 
1989 353.12 + 1.55 ↑ 11.76%     
Source: Data Adapted from NOAA (2020) 
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Appendix G – Atlantic Thermohaline Circulation 
The Atlantic thermohaline circulation, also known as a Gulf Stream, is the movement of the ocean 
from the Caribbean Sea to the Nordic Sea (Broecker, 1991). This circulation is driven by temperature 
(thermo) and salt (haline) forcing over the surface of the ocean (Stommel, 1961; Holden, 2008b). 
However, the melting of Arctic sea ice can reduce the intensity of the Gulf Stream (Vellinga and Wood, 
2002; Sévellec, Fedorov and Liu, 2017). This is because the influx of freshwater from this ice and 
increasing precipitation that occurs in warmer climates can interfere with Atlantic thermohaline 
circulation. This is done as the evaporation of the ocean water in increased levels of salinity of the 
North Atlantic Ocean, but it also cools the ocean. This action causes the water to become heavy, and 
will sink (NSIDC, No Date). After the dense water sinks it travels in a southerly direction back to the 
Caribbean, as demonstrated in Figure G.1. This process is known as the ‘Atlantic Meridional Overturn 
Circulation’ (Bryden, Longworth and Cunningham, 2005). 
 
Figure G.1 – The vertical structures of water bodies within the Atlantic Ocean (Krom, 2008, p.62) 
Therefore, the freshwater entering this loopback cycle will mean that there will be a decline in the 
strength of the Gulf Stream. It was noted by British researchers that at the northern part of the Gulf 
stream strength has decreased by 30 per cent between 1957 and 2004 (Bryden, Longworth and 
Cunningham, 2005); with further evidence to suggest that in the last 200 years, the intensity of the 
Gulf Stream has decline between 15 and 20 per cent overall (Rahmstorf et al., 2015). Further research 
conducted by Caesar et al. (2018) that demonstrates that the Atlantic meridional overturning 
circulation is at its weakest for over 1,000 years. 
It has been predicted by Wood, Vellinga and Thorpe (2003) that the complete collapse of the Atlantic 
thermohaline circulation would result in temperatures within Scandinavia and the United Kingdom to 
be between one and three degrees Celsius cooler, with cooling of up to twelve degrees Celsius in 
northern Norway. In addition, it is expected by Vellinga and Wood (2008) that precipitation in the 
Northern Hemisphere would decline, with the largest decline in the high latitudes. Similar events have 
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occurred previously during the Younger Dryas63 and the Heinrich event64 (Boyle and Keigwin, 1987; 
Stouffer et al., 2006; Lynch-Stieglitz, 2017). 
 
   
 
 
63 - The Younger Dryas was an abrupt climate change event that occurred c.12,900 to c.11,600 years ago 
(Rasmussen et al., 2006; Carlson, 2010), and is a time when the climate underwent a short and significant cold 
event (Holden, 2008a); with temperatures in Greenland declining by between 4oC and 10oC (Buizert et al., 2014). 
 
64 - The Heinrich event was a phenomenon of global environment change due to the iceberg’s breaking from the 
Laurentide Ice Sheet, based on the North American continent (MacAyeal, 1993). 
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Appendix H – List of Powering Past Coal Alliance States 
 
Table H.1 – List of National Governments that are members of the ‘Powering Past Coal Alliance’ 
National Governments 
 Angola  Finland  Lithuania  Portugal 
 Austria  France  Luxembourg  Senegal 
 Belgium  Germany  Marshall Islands  Slovakia 
Canada  Greece  Mexico  Sweden 
 Costa Rica Ireland  Netherlands  Switzerland 
 Denmark  Israel New Zealand  Tuvalu 
 El Salvador  Italy  Niue United Kingdom 
Ethiopia Latvia  Peru  Vanuatu 
Fiji  Liechtenstein   
Source: PPCA (No Date) 
 
Table H.2 – List of Sub-national Governments that are members of the ‘Powering Past Coal 
Alliance’ 
Sub-national Governments 
Alberta, Canada [Province] New Jersey, United States [State] 
Australian Capital Territory, Australia [Federal 
Territory] 
New Taipei City, Taiwan [City] 
New York, United States [State] 
Baden-Württemberg, Germany [State] Ontario, Canada [Province] 
Balearic Islands, Spain [Autonomous 
Community] 
Oregon, United States [State] 
British Columbia, Canada [Province] Philadelphia, United states [City] 
California, United States [State] Puerto Rico [Unincorporated Territory] 
Connecticut, United States [State] Quebec, Canada [Province] 
Gyeonggi, South Korea [Province] Rotterdam, Netherlands [City] 
Hawaii, United States [State] Scotland, United Kingdom [Country] 
Honolulu, United States [City] Seoul, South Korea [City] 
Ilocos Norte, Philippines [Province] South Chungcheong, South Korea [Province] 
Kaohsiung City, Taiwan [City] Sydney, Australia [City] 
Los Angeles, United States [City] Taichung City, Taiwan [City] 
Melbourne, Australia [City] Vancouver, Canada [City] 
Minnesota, United States [State] Wales, United Kingdom [Country] 
Negros Oriental, Philippines [Province] Washington, United States [State] 
Source: PPCA (No Date) 
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Appendix I – OECD and EU countries 
Table I.1 – List of OECD and EU countries 
EU Only Countries OECD Only Countries Both EU and OECD Countries 
 Croatia  Australia  Austria 
 Cyprus  Canada  Belgium 
 Malta  Chile  Czech Republic 
 Romania  Colombia  Denmark 
  Iceland  Estonia 
  Israel  Finland 
  Japan  France 
  Mexico  Germany 
  New Zealand  Greece 
  Norway  Hungary 
  South Korea  Ireland 
  Switzerland  Italy 
  Turkey  Latvia 
  United Kingdom  Lithuania 
  United States  Luxembourg 
   Netherlands 
   Poland 
   Portugal 
   Slovakia 
   Slovenia 
   Spain 
   Sweden 
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Appendix J – European Union’s Greenhouse Gas Emissions Targets for Kyoto Protocol 
 
Table J.1 – List of EU-15 Countries Kyoto Protocol Targets compared to Actual Emission Reductions 
Countries Kyoto Target [2008-2012] 
Compared to Baseline Year 
GHG [2012] (EEA, 2014) 
Compared to Baseline Year 
Target Met 
 Austria -13% +1.3% X 
 Belgium -7.5% -20% ✓ 
 Denmark -21% -25.5% ✓ 
 Finland 0% -14.1% ✓ 
 France 0% -13.1% ✓ 
 Germany -21% -23.8% ✓ 
 Greece +25% +3.7% ✓ 
 Ireland +13% +5.3% ✓ 
 Italy -6.5% -11% ✓ 
 Luxembourg -28% -10.1% X 
 Netherlands -6% -10% ✓ 
 Portugal +27% +14.3% ✓ 
 Spain +15% +17.6% X 
 Sweden +4% -20.2% ✓ 
 United Kingdom -12.5% -25.2% ✓ 
 EU-15 -8% -15.1% ✓ 
 
Table J.2 – Newly Joined EU Countries Kyoto Protocol Targets compared to Actual Emission 
Reductions 
Countries Kyoto Target [2008-2012] 
Compared to Baseline Year 
GHG [2012] (EEA, 2014) 
Compared to Baseline Year 
Target Met 
 Bulgaria -8% -54% ✓ 
 Croatia -5% -15.7% ✓ 
 Cyprus N/A N/A ✓ 
 Czech Republic -8% -32.3% ✓ 
 Estonia -8% -55% ✓ 
 Hungary -6% -46.3% ✓ 
 Latvia -8% -57.6% ✓ 
 Lithuania -8% -56.2% ✓ 
 Malta N/A N/A ✓ 
 Poland -6% -29.1% ✓ 
 Romania -8% -57.3% ✓ 
 Slovakia -8% -40.7% ✓ 
 Slovenia -8% -7.1% X 
 
Base year for all countries is 1990, expect for: 
• Bulgaria – 1998 
• Hungary – Average of 1985-1987 
• Slovenia – 1986 
• Poland – 1988 
• Romania - 198
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Appendix K – The Price of Fuel within the Europe 
Table K.1 – The Price of Fuel within the Europe between April and June 2017 
# Country Price in £ Price in Local 
Currency 
1  Norway £1.45 15.80 kr 
2  Netherlands £1.34 €1.52 
3  Italy £1.32 €1.50 
4  Greece £1.31 €1.49 
5  Denmark £1.27 10.74 kr. 
6 
 Finland £1.25 €1.42 
 Portugal £1.25 €1.42 
8  Sweden £1.24 13.62 kr 
9  Ireland £1.18 €1.34 
10 
 Belgium £1.17 €1.33 
 France £1.17 €1.33 
12  Germany £1.16 €1.32 
13  United Kingdom £1.15 £1.15 
14  Slovakia £1.09 €1.24 
15 
 Croatia £1.07 €1.22 
 Slovenia £1.07 €1.22 
17  Cyprus £1.04 €1.18 
18  Spain £1.03 €1.17 
19  Austria £1.02 €1.16 
20  Czech Republic £1.00 29.74 Kč 
21 
 Estonia £0.98 €1.12 
 Luxemburg £0.98 €1.12 
23  Hungary £0.96 337.86 Ft 
24 
 Latvia £0.95 €1.08 
 Lithuania £0.95 €1.08 
26  Poland £0.91 4.37 zł 
27  Bulgaria £0.89 1.97 leva 
28  Romania £0.87 4.52 lei 
Data Adapted from Bloomberg (2017) 
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Appendix L – Northern Ireland’s Greenhouse Gas Emission 
Table L.1 – Northern Ireland’s Total Greenhouse Gas Emissions (CO2e) between 1990 and 2018 


















Per cent change 
Yearly Overall 
1990 24.3    
1995 25.2 + 0.9  ↑ 3.7% 
1998 24.7 - 0.5  ↑ 1.6% 
1999 25.2 + 0.5 ↑ 2.0% ↑ 3.7% 
2000 24.9 - 0.3 ↓ 1.2% ↑ 2.5% 
2001 25.3 + 0.4 ↑ 1.6% ↑ 4.1% 
2002 22.9 - 2.4 ↓ 9.5% ↓ 5.8% 
2003 23.1 + 0.2 ↑ 0.9% ↓ 4.9% 
2004 23.0 - 0.1 ↓ 0.4% ↓ 5.3% 
2005 23.8 + 0.8 ↑ 3.5% ↓ 2.1% 
2006 24.2 + 0.4 ↑ 1.7% ↓ 0.4% 
2007 23.0 - 1.2 ↓ 5.0% ↓ 5.3% 
2008 22.6 - 0.4 ↓ 1.7% ↓ 7.0% 
2009 20.9 - 1.7 ↓ 7.5% ↓ 14.0% 
2010 21.5 + 0.6 ↑ 2.9% ↓ 11.5% 
2011 20.3 - 1.2 ↓ 5.6% ↓ 16.5% 
2012 20.4 + 0.1 ↑ 0.5% ↓ 16.0% 
2013 20.6 + 0.2 ↑ 1.0% ↓ 15.2% 
2014 19.8 - 0.8 ↓ 3.9% ↓ 18.5% 
2015 20.3 + 0.5 ↑ 2.5% ↓ 16.5% 
2016 20.6 + 0.3 ↑ 1.5% ↓ 15.2% 
2017 19.9 - 0.7 ↓ 3.4% ↓ 18.1% 
2018 19.4 - 0.5 ↓ 2.5% ↓ 20.2% 
Source: Data Adapted from DAERA (2020) 
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Table L.2 – Northern Ireland’s total carbon dioxide emissions [KtCO2e] from energy supply and 
business between 1990 and 2018 




































Per cent change 
Yearly Overall Yearly Overall 
1990 5309.1    1990 3039.5    
1995 6531.5 + 1222.4  ↑ 23.0% 1995 3056.7 + 17.2  ↑ 0.6% 
1998 6187.1 - 344.4  ↑ 16.5% 1998 2630.6 - 426.1  ↓ 13.5% 
1999 6282.7 + 95.6 ↑ 1.5% ↑ 18.3% 1999 2858.1 + 227.5 ↑ 8.6% ↓ 6.0% 
2000 6337.0 + 54.3 ↑ 0.9% ↑ 19.4% 2000 2910.1 + 52.0 ↑ 1.8% ↓ 4.3% 
2001 6651.1 + 314.1 ↑ 5.0% ↑ 25.3% 2001 2968.8 + 58.7 ↑ 2.0% ↓ 2.3% 
2002 5219.7 - 1431.4 ↓ 21.5% ↓ 1.7% 2002 2307.1 - 661.7 ↓ 22.3% ↓ 24.1% 
2003 5027.6 - 192.1 ↓ 3.7% ↓ 5.3% 2003 2458.3 + 151.2 ↑ 6.6% ↓ 19.1% 
2004 4878.6 - 149.0 ↓ 3.0% ↓ 8.1% 2004 2495.5 + 37.2 ↑ 1.5% ↓ 17.9% 
2005 5340.1 + 461.5 ↑ 9.5% ↑ 0.6% 2005 2837.1 + 341.6 ↑ 13.7% ↓ 6.7% 
2006 5729.0 + 388.9 ↑ 7.3% ↑ 7.9% 2006 2781.3 - 55.8 ↓ 2.0% ↓ 8.5% 
2007 4651.0 - 1078.0 ↓ 18.8% ↓ 12.4% 2007 2817.2 + 35.9 ↑ 1.3% ↓ 7.3% 
2008 4842.0 + 191.0 ↑ 4.1% ↓ 8.8% 2008 2557.3 - 259.9 ↓ 9.2% ↓ 15.9% 
2009 3688.2 - 1153.8 ↓ 23.8% ↓ 30.5% 2009 2412.7 - 144.6 ↓ 5.7% ↓ 20.6% 
2010 3961.7 + 273.5 ↑ 7.4% ↓ 25.4% 2010 2667.9 + 255.2 ↑ 10.6% ↓ 12.2% 
2011 3747.3 - 214.4 ↓ 5.4% ↓ 29.4% 2011 2404.2 - 263.7 ↓ 9.9% ↓ 20.9% 
2012 3876.1 + 128.8 ↑ 3.4% ↓ 27.0% 2012 2350.7 - 53.5 ↓ 2.2% ↓ 22.7% 
2013 4070.4 + 194.3 ↑ 5.0% ↓ 23.3% 2013 2356.5 + 5.8 ↑ 0.2% ↓ 22.5% 
2014 3835.6 - 234.8 ↓ 5.8% ↓ 27.8% 2014 2535.4 + 178.9 ↑ 7.6% ↓ 16.6% 
2015 3839.3 + 3.7 ↑ 0.1% ↓ 27.7% 2015 2614.7 + 79.3 ↑ 3.1% ↓ 14.0% 
2016 4027.7 + 188.4 ↑ 4.9% ↓ 24.1% 2016 2485.2 - 129.5 ↓ 5.0% ↓ 18.2% 
2017 3422.4 - 605.3 ↓ 15.0% ↓ 35.5% 2017 2442.7 - 42.5 ↓ 1.7% ↓ 19.6% 
2018 2926.8 - 495.6 ↓ 14.5% ↓ 44.9% 2018 2351.3 - 91.4 ↓ 3.7% ↓ 22.6% 
Source: Data Adapted from DAERA (2020) 
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Table L.3 – Northern Ireland’s total carbon dioxide emissions [KtCO2e] from transport and public 
between 1990 and 2018 




































Per cent change 
Yearly Overall Yearly Overall 
1990 3465.3    1990 483.5    
1995 3701.2 + 235.9  ↑ 6.8% 1995 320.1 - 163.4  ↓ 33.8% 
1998 3905.0 + 203.8  ↑ 12.7% 1998 223.0 - 97.1  ↓ 53.9% 
1999 4055.1 + 150.1 ↑ 3.8% ↑ 17.0% 1999 229.8 + 6.8 ↑ 3.0% ↓ 52.5% 
2000 4191.4 + 136.3 ↑ 3.4% ↑ 21.0% 2000 186.5 - 43.3 ↓ 18.8% ↓ 61.4% 
2001 4250.5 + 59.1 ↑ 1.4% ↑ 22.7% 2001 189.1 + 2.6 ↑ 1.4% ↓ 60.9% 
2002 4419.8 + 169.3 ↑ 4.0% ↑ 27.5% 2002 126.7 - 62.4 ↓ 33.0% ↓ 73.8% 
2003 4582.1 + 162.3 ↑ 3.7% ↑ 32.2% 2003 130.6 + 3.9 ↑ 3.1% ↓ 73.0% 
2004 4615.9 + 33.8 ↑ 0.7% ↑ 33.2% 2004 147.0 + 16.4 ↑ 12.6% ↓ 69.6% 
2005 4719.8 + 103.9 ↑ 2.3% ↑ 36.2% 2005 181.0 + 34.0 ↑ 23.1% ↓ 62.6% 
2006 4737.4 + 17.6 ↑ 0.4% ↑ 36.7% 2006 182.7 + 1.7 ↑ 0.9% ↓ 62.2% 
2007 4877.4 + 140.0 ↑ 3.0% ↑ 40.7% 2007 196.6 + 13.9 ↑ 7.6% ↓ 59.3% 
2008 4714.9 - 162.5 ↓ 3.3% ↑ 36.1% 2008 201.8 + 5.2 ↑ 2.6% ↓ 58.3% 
2009 4696.2 - 18.7 ↓ 0.4% ↑ 35.5% 2009 202.7 + 0.9 ↑ 0.4% ↓ 58.1% 
2010 4578.2 - 118.0 ↓ 2.5% ↑ 32.1% 2010 200.6 - 2.1 ↓ 1.0% ↓ 58.5% 
2011 4445.9 - 132.3 ↓ 2.9% ↑ 28.3% 2011 193.9 - 6.7 ↓ 3.3% ↓ 59.9% 
2012 4416.0 - 29.9 ↓ 0.7% ↑ 27.4% 2012 193.1 - 0.8 ↓ 0.4% ↓ 60.1% 
2013 4427.9 + 11.9 ↑ 0.3% ↑ 27.8% 2013 199.6 + 6.5 ↑ 3.4% ↓ 58.7% 
2014 4333.4 - 94.5 ↓ 2.1% ↑ 25.1% 2014 182.0 - 17.6 ↓ 8.8% ↓ 62.4% 
2015 4402.1 + 68.7 ↑ 1.6% ↑ 27.0% 2015 181.6 - 0.4 ↓ 0.2% ↓ 62.4% 
2016 4497.2 + 95.1 ↑ 2.2% ↑ 29.8% 2016 136.0 - 45.6 ↓ 25.1% ↓ 71.9% 
2017 4518.4 + 21.2 ↑ 0.5% ↑ 30.4% 2017 142.0 + 6.0 ↑ 4.4% ↓ 70.6% 
2018 4453.7 - 64.7 ↓ 1.4% ↑ 28.5% 2018 151.4 + 9.4 ↑ 6.6% ↓ 68.7% 
Source: Data Adapted from DAREA (2020)  
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Table L.4 – Northern Ireland’s total carbon dioxide emissions [KtCO2e] from residential and 
agriculture between 1990 and 2018 




































Per cent change 
Yearly Overall Yearly Overall 
1990 3676.8    1990 5279.5    
1995 2852.3 - 824.5  ↓ 22.4% 1995 5714.2 + 434.7  ↑ 8.2% 
1998 2880.1 + 27.8  ↓ 21.7% 1998 5782.8 + 68.6  ↑ 9.5% 
1999 2888.7 + 8.6 ↑ 0.3% ↓ 21.4% 1999 5715.7 - 67.1 ↓ 1.2% ↑ 8.3% 
2000 2860.3 - 28.4 ↓ 1.0% ↓ 22.2% 2000 5474.5 - 241.2 ↓ 4.2% ↑ 3.7% 
2001 2819.2 - 41.1 ↓ 1.4% ↓ 23.3% 2001 5450.9 - 23.6 ↓ 0.4% ↑ 3.2% 
2002 2899.0 + 79.8 ↑ 2.8% ↓ 21.2% 2002 5416.3 - 34.6 ↓ 0.6% ↑ 2.6% 
2003 2934.5 + 35.5 ↑ 1.2% ↓ 20.2% 2003 5476.0 + 59.7 ↑ 1.1% ↑ 3.7% 
2004 2918.8 - 15.7 ↓ 0.5% ↓ 20.6% 2004 5411.9 - 64.1 ↓ 1.2% ↑ 2.5% 
2005 2602.9 - 315.9 ↓ 10.8% ↓ 29.2% 2005 5406.0 - 5.9 ↓ 0.1% ↑ 2.4% 
2006 2777.1 + 174.2 ↑ 6.7% ↓ 24.5% 2006 5266.8 - 139.2 ↓ 2.6% ↓ 0.2% 
2007 2586.7 - 190.4 ↓ 6.9% ↓ 29.6% 2007 5147.0 - 119.8 ↓ 2.3% ↓ 2.5% 
2008 2750.0 + 163.3 ↑ 6.3% ↓ 25.2% 2008 5018.6 - 128.4 ↓ 2.5% ↓ 4.9% 
2009 2776.4 + 26.4 ↑ 1.0% ↓ 24.5% 2009 4988.8 - 29.8 ↓ 0.6% ↓ 5.5% 
2010 3161.7 + 385.3 ↑ 13.9% ↓ 14.0% 2010 5066.7 + 77.9 ↑ 1.6% ↓ 4.0% 
2011 2573.1 - 588.6 ↓ 18.6% ↓ 30.0% 2011 5092.0 + 25.3 ↑ 0.5% ↓ 3.6% 
2012 2622.7 + 49.6 ↑ 1.9% ↓ 28.7% 2012 5108.9 + 16.9 ↑ 0.3% ↓ 3.2% 
2013 2829.1 + 206.4 ↑ 7.9% ↓ 23.1% 2013 5118.8 + 9.9 ↑ 0.2% ↓ 3.0% 
2014 2488.4 - 340.7 ↓ 12.0% ↓ 32.3% 2014 5135.0 + 16.2 ↑ 0.3% ↓ 2.7% 
2015 2574.0 + 85.6 ↑ 3.4% ↓ 30.0% 2015 5212.3 + 77.3 ↑ 1.5% ↓ 1.3% 
2016 2725.0 + 151.0 ↑ 5.9% ↓ 25.9% 2016 5347.3 + 135.0 ↑ 2.6% ↑ 1.3% 
2017 2613.5 - 111.5 ↓ 4.1% ↓ 28.9% 2017 5415.1 + 67.8 ↑ 1.3% ↑ 2.6% 
2018 2748.7 + 135.2 ↑ 5.2% ↓ 25.2% 2018 5323.3 - 91.8 ↓ 1.7% ↑ 0.8% 
Source: Data Adapted from DAREA (2020) 
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Table L.5 – Northern Ireland’s total carbon dioxide emissions [KtCO2e] from industrial processes 
and waste management between 1990 and 2018 




































Per cent change 
Yearly Overall Yearly Overall 
1990 759.8    1990 1860.1    
1995 764.8 + 5.0  ↑ 0.7% 1995 2037.3 + 177.2  ↑ 9.5% 
1998 816.1 + 51.3  ↑ 7.4% 1998 2115.2 + 77.9  ↑ 13.7% 
1999 923.7 + 107.6 ↑ 13.2% ↑ 21.6% 1999 2112.7 - 2.5 ↓ 0.1% ↑ 13.6% 
2000 668.0 - 255.7 ↓ 27.7% ↓ 12.1% 2000 2117.8 + 5.1 ↑ 0.2% ↑ 13.9% 
2001 634.9 - 33.1 ↓ 5.0% ↓ 16.4% 2001 2101.9 - 15.9 ↓ 0.8% ↑ 13.0% 
2002 213.0 - 421.9 ↓ 66.5% ↓ 72.0% 2002 2089.1 - 12.8 ↓ 0.6% ↑ 12.3% 
2003 220.3 + 7.3 ↑ 3.4% ↓ 71.0% 2003 2059.0 - 30.1 ↓ 1.4% ↑ 10.7% 
2004 224.5 + 4.2 ↑ 1.9% ↓ 70.5% 2004 2041.7 - 17.3 ↓ 0.8% ↑ 9.8% 
2005 422.3 + 197.8 ↑ 88.1% ↓ 44.4% 2005 2000.9 - 40.8 ↓ 2.0% ↑ 7.6% 
2006 434.4 + 12.1 ↑ 2.9% ↓ 42.8% 2006 1958.3 - 42.6 ↓ 2.1% ↑ 5.3% 
2007 490.7 + 56.3 ↑ 13.0% ↓ 35.4% 2007 1922.6 - 35.7 ↓ 1.8% ↑ 3.4% 
2008 403.4 - 87.3 ↓ 17.8% ↓ 46.9% 2008 1813.1 - 109.5 ↓ 5.7% ↓ 2.5% 
2009 180.5 - 222.9 ↓ 55.3% ↓ 76.2% 2009 1601.2 - 211.9 ↓ 11.7% ↓ 13.9% 
2010 172.9 - 7.6 ↓ 4.2% ↓ 77.2% 2010 1310.8 - 290.4 ↓ 18.1% ↓ 29.5% 
2011 164.8 - 8.1 ↓ 4.7% ↓ 78.3% 2011 1250.5 - 60.3 ↓ 4.6% ↓ 32.8% 
2012 163.9 - 0.9 ↓ 0.5% ↓ 78.4% 2012 1170.8 - 79.7 ↓ 6.4% ↓ 37.1% 
2013 150.4 - 13.5 ↓ 8.2% ↓ 80.2% 2013 1062.8 - 108.0 ↓ 9.2% ↓ 42.9% 
2014 182.8 + 32.4 ↑ 21.5% ↓ 75.9% 2014 727.2 - 335.6 ↓ 31.6% ↓ 60.9% 
2015 230.8 + 48.0 ↑ 26.3% ↓ 69.6% 2015 828.5 + 101.3 ↑ 13.9% ↓ 55.5% 
2016 170.2 - 60.6 ↓ 26.3% ↓ 77.6% 2016 794.3 - 34.2 ↓ 4.1% ↓ 57.3% 
2017 165.0 - 5.2 ↓ 3.1% ↓ 78.3% 2017 714.6 - 79.7 ↓ 10.0% ↓ 61.6% 
2018 174.3 + 9.3 ↑ 5.6% ↓ 77.1% 2018 784.1 + 69.5 ↑ 9.7% ↓ 57.8% 
Source: Data Adapted from DAREA (2020) 
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Per cent change 
Yearly Overall 
1990 388.6    
1995 228.6 - 160.0  ↓ 41.2% 
1998 158.7 - 69.9  ↓ 59.2% 
1999 140.5 - 18.2 ↓ 11.5% ↓ 63.8% 
2000 161.5 + 21.0 ↑ 14.9% ↓ 58.4% 
2001 200.1 + 38.6 ↑ 23.9% ↓ 48.5% 
2002 217.3 + 17.2 ↑ 8.6% ↓ 44.1% 
2003 237.5 + 20.2 ↑ 9.3% ↓ 38.9% 
2004 273.4 + 35.9 ↑ 15.1% ↓ 29.6% 
2005 287.4 + 14.0 ↑ 5.1% ↓ 26.0% 
2006 292.1 + 4.7 ↑ 1.6% ↓ 24.8% 
2007 319.7 + 27.6 ↑ 9.4% ↓ 17.7% 
2008 333.9 + 14.2 ↑ 4.4% ↓ 14.1% 
2009 354.3 + 20.4 ↑ 6.1% ↓ 8.8% 
2010 362.9 + 8.6 ↑ 2.4% ↓ 6.6% 
2011 389.0 + 26.1 ↑ 7.2% ↑ 0.1% 
2012 544.1 + 155.1 ↑ 39.9% ↑ 40.0% 
2013 410.1 - 134.0 ↓ 24.6% ↑ 5.5% 
2014 423.4 + 13.3 ↑ 3.2% ↑ 9.0% 
2015 438.4 + 15.0 ↑ 3.5% ↑ 12.8% 
2016 444.3 + 5.9 ↑ 1.3% ↑ 14.3% 
2017 487.5 + 43.2 ↑ 9.7% ↑ 25.5% 
2018 514.8 + 27.3 ↑ 5.6% ↑ 32.5% 
Source: Data Adapted from DAREA (2020) 
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Appendix M – Scotland’s Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Table M.1 – Scotland’s Total Greenhouse Gas Emissions (CO2e) and CO2 emissions between 1990 
and 2018 




































Per cent change 
Yearly Overall Yearly Overall 
1990 58.2    1990 76.2    
1995 59.1 + 0.9  ↑ 1.5% 1995 76.8 + 0.6  ↑ 0.8% 
1998 58.0 - 1.1  ↓ 0.3% 1998 75.6 - 1.2  ↓ 0.8% 
1999 55.7 - 2.3 ↓ 4.0% ↓ 4.3% 1999 72.6 - 3.0 ↓ 4.0% ↓ 4.7% 
2000 57.3 + 1.6 ↑ 2.9% ↓ 1.5% 2000 73.9 + 1.3 ↑ 1.8% ↓ 3.0% 
2001 56.8 - 0.5 ↓ 0.9% ↓ 2.4% 2001 73.0 - 0.9 ↓ 1.2% ↓ 4.2% 
2002 53.2 - 3.6 ↓ 6.3% ↓ 8.6% 2002 68.8 - 4.2 ↓ 5.8% ↓ 9.7% 
2003 53.5 + 0.3 ↑ 0.6% ↓ 8.1% 2003 68.9 + 0.1 ↑ 0.1% ↓ 9.6% 
2004 51.6 - 1.9 ↓ 3.6% ↓ 11.3% 2004 66.4 - 2.5 ↓ 3.6% ↓ 12.9% 
2005 50.0 - 1.6 ↓ 3.1% ↓ 14.1% 2005 64.4 - 2.0 ↓ 3.0% ↓ 15.5% 
2006 52.9 + 2.9 ↑ 5.8% ↓ 9.1% 2006 66.6 + 2.2 ↑ 3.4% ↓ 12.6% 
2007 49.1 - 3.8 ↓ 7.2% ↓ 15.6% 2007 62.4 - 4.2 ↓ 6.3% ↓ 18.1% 
2008 47.5 - 1.6 ↓ 3.3% ↓ 18.4% 2008 60.3 - 2.1 ↓ 3.4% ↓ 20.9% 
2009 43.7 - 3.8 ↓ 8.0% ↓ 24.9% 2009 56.3 - 4.0 ↓ 6.6% ↓ 26.1% 
2010 46.5 + 2.8 ↑ 6.4% ↓ 20.1% 2010 58.9 + 2.6 ↑ 4.6% ↓ 22.7% 
2011 40.1 - 6.4 ↓ 13.8% ↓ 31.1% 2011 52.1 - 6.8 ↓ 11.5% ↓ 31.6% 
2012 40.8 + 0.7 ↑ 1.7% ↓ 29.9% 2012 52.5 + 0.4 ↑ 0.8% ↓ 31.1% 
2013 39.8 - 1.0 ↓ 2.5% ↓ 31.6% 2013 50.8 - 1.7 ↓ 3.2% ↓ 33.3% 
2014 36.2 - 3.6 ↓ 9.0% ↓ 37.8% 2014 47.3 - 3.5 ↓ 6.9% ↓ 37.9% 
2015 34.9 - 1.3 ↓ 3.6% ↓ 40.0% 2015 46.2 - 1.1 ↓ 2.3% ↓ 39.4% 
2016 31.0 - 3.9 ↓ 11.2% ↓ 46.7% 2016 42.0 - 4.2 ↓ 9.1% ↓ 44.9% 
2017 30.0 - 1.0 ↓ 3.2% ↓ 48.5% 2017 41.0 - 1.0 ↓ 2.4% ↓ 46.2% 
2018 30.9 + 0.9 ↑ 3.0% ↓ 46.9% 2018 41.6 + 0.6 ↑ 1.5% ↓ 45.4% 
Source: Data Adapted from Scottish Government (2020) 
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Table M.2 – Scotland’s total carbon dioxide emissions [KtCO2e] from energy supply and business 
between 1990 and 2018 




































Per cent change 
Yearly Overall Yearly Overall 
1990 22,728.5    1990 12,414.6    
1995 26,749.4 + 4,020.9  ↑ 17.7% 1995 10,491.4 - 1923.2  ↓ 15.5% 
1998 25,786.8 - 962.5  ↑ 13.5% 1998 10,403.5 - 87.9  ↓ 16.2% 
1999 23,359.9 - 2,426.9 ↓ 9.4% ↑ 2.8% 1999 10,650.2 + 246.6 ↑ 2.4% ↓ 14.2% 
2000 26,308.4 + 2,948.5 ↑ 12.6% ↑ 15.8% 2000 10,597.9 - 52.2 ↓ 0.5% ↓ 14.6% 
2001 25,636.1 - 672.3 ↓ 2.6% ↑ 12.8% 2001 10,940.4 + 342.4 ↑ 3.2% ↓ 11.9% 
2002 23,557.1 - 2,078.9 ↓ 8.1% ↑ 3.6% 2002 10,098.8 - 841.6 ↓ 7.7% ↓ 18.7% 
2003 23,727.4 + 170.2 ↑ 0.7% ↑ 4.4% 2003 10,364.4 + 265.6 ↑ 2.6% ↓ 16.5% 
2004 21,938.9 - 1,788.4 ↓ 7.5% ↓ 3.5% 2004 10,282.0 - 82.4 ↓ 0.8% ↓ 17.2% 
2005 20,792.7 - 1,146.3 ↓ 5.2% ↓ 8.5% 2005 10,157.2 - 124.8 ↓ 1.2% ↓ 18.2% 
2006 24,643.9 + 3,851.3 ↑ 18.5% ↑ 8.4% 2006 9,821.3 - 335.9 ↓ 3.3% ↓ 20.9% 
2007 21,400.8 - 3,243.2 ↓ 13.2% ↓ 5.8% 2007 9,346.1 - 475.2 ↓ 4.8% ↓ 24.7% 
2008 20,085.9 - 1,314.9 ↓ 6.1% ↓ 11.6% 2008 9,808.7 + 462.6 ↑ 4.9% ↓ 21.0% 
2009 18,692.0 - 1,393.9 ↓ 6.9% ↓ 17.8% 2009 8,769.0 - 1039.6 ↓ 10.6% ↓ 29.4% 
2010 20,897.6 + 2,205.5 ↑ 11.8% ↓ 8.1% 2010 9,010.5 + 241.4 ↑ 2.8% ↓ 27.4% 
2011 17,029.8 - 3,867.8 ↓ 18.5% ↓ 25.1% 2011 8,712.5 - 297.9 ↓ 3.3% ↓ 29.8% 
2012 17,425.3 + 395.5 ↑ 2.3% ↓ 23.3% 2012 8,628.4 - 84.2 ↓ 1.0% ↓ 30.5% 
2013 15,979.1 - 1,446.1 ↓ 8.3% ↓ 29.7% 2013 8,729.2 + 100.9 ↑ 1.2% ↓ 29.7% 
2014 13,882.5 - 2,096.6 ↓ 13.1% ↓ 38.9% 2014 8,179.6 - 549.6 ↓ 6.3% ↓ 34.1% 
2015 12,249.8 - 1,632.7 ↓ 11.8% ↓ 46.1% 2015 8,216.6 + 37.0 ↑ 0.5% ↓ 33.8% 
2016 7,437.8 - 4,811.9 ↓ 39.3% ↓ 67.3% 2016 8,248.8 + 32.2 ↑ 0.4% ↓ 33.6% 
2017 6,001.0 - 1,436.8 ↓ 19.3% ↓ 73.6% 2017 8,505.9 + 257.1 ↑ 3.1% ↓ 31.5% 
2018 6,803.8 + 802.8 ↑ 13.4% ↓ 70.0% 2018 8,413.2 - 92.7 ↓ 1.1% ↓ 32.2% 
Source: Data Adapted from Scottish Government (2020) 
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Table M.3 – Scotland’s total carbon dioxide emissions [KtCO2e] from transport and public between 
1990 and 2018 




































Per cent change 
Yearly Overall Yearly Overall 
1990 13,566.6    1990 1,686.4    
1995 14,352.2 + 785.6  ↑ 5.8% 1995 1,806.1 + 119.7  ↑ 7.1% 
1998 14,760.8 + 408.6  ↑ 8.8% 1998 1,769.0 - 37.1  ↑ 4.9% 
1999 14,860.4 + 99.6 ↑ 0.7% ↑ 9.5% 1999 1,757.4 - 11.6 ↓ 0.7% ↑ 4.2% 
2000 14,314.1 - 546.3 ↓ 3.7% ↑ 5.5% 2000 1,645.0 - 112.4 ↓ 6.4% ↓ 2.5% 
2001 14,014.4 - 299.7 ↓ 2.1% ↑ 3.3% 2001 1,683.3 + 38.4 ↑ 2.3% ↓ 0.2% 
2002 14,528.5 + 514.1 ↑ 3.7% ↑ 7.1% 2002 1,432.6 - 250.7 ↓ 14.9% ↓ 15.0% 
2003 14,357.5 - 171.0 ↓ 1.2% ↑ 5.8% 2003 1,427.7 - 4.9 ↓ 0.3% ↓ 15.3% 
2004 14,266.1 - 91.4 ↓ 0.6% ↑ 5.2% 2004 1,552.7 +125.0 ↑ 8.8% ↓ 7.9% 
2005 14,350.2 + 84.1 ↑ 0.6% ↑ 5.8% 2005 1,526.7 - 26.0 ↓ 1.7% ↓ 9.5% 
2006 14,234.7 - 115.5 ↓ 0.8% ↑ 4.9% 2006 1,378.9 - 147.8 ↓ 9.7% ↓ 18.2% 
2007 14,502.7 + 268.1 ↑ 1.9% ↑ 6.9% 2007 1,279.8 - 99.0 ↓ 7.2% ↓ 24.1% 
2008 13,856.9 - 645.9 ↓ 4.5% ↑ 2.1% 2008 1,332.1 + 52.3 ↑ 4.1% ↓ 21.0% 
2009 13,307.6 - 549.3 ↓ 4.0% ↓ 1.9% 2009 1,196.2 - 136.0 ↓ 10.2% ↓ 29.1% 
2010 12,989.5 - 318.1 ↓ 2.4% ↓ 4.3% 2010 1,277.9 + 81.7 ↑ 6.8% ↓ 24.2% 
2011 12,436.3 - 553.2 ↓ 4.3% ↓ 8.3% 2011 1,056.9 - 221.0 ↓ 17.3% ↓ 37.3% 
2012 12,264.5 - 171.8 ↓ 1.4% ↓ 9.6% 2012 1,194.0 + 137.1 ↑ 13.0% ↓ 29.2% 
2013 12,095.1 - 169.5 ↓ 1.4% ↓ 10.8% 2013 1,199.0 + 5.0 ↑ 0.4% ↓ 28.9% 
2014 12,185.9 + 90.8 ↑ 0.8% ↓ 10.2% 2014 1,023.0 - 176.0 ↓ 14.7% ↓ 39.3% 
2015 12,433.5 + 247.7 ↑ 2.0% ↓ 8.4% 2015 1,093.3 + 70.3 ↑ 6.9% ↓ 35.2% 
2016 12,754.2 + 320.7 ↑ 2.6% ↓ 6.0% 2016 1,113.0 + 19.7 ↑ 1.8% ↓ 34.0% 
2017 13,042.5 + 288.3 ↑ 1.3% ↓ 3.9% 2017 1,047.0 - 66.0 ↓ 5.9% ↓ 37.9% 
2018 12,905.2 - 137.3 ↓ 1.1% ↓ 4.9% 2018 1,099.0 + 52.0 ↑ 5.0% ↓ 34.8% 




65 - Excluding International 
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Table M.4 – Scotland’s total carbon dioxide emissions [KtCO2e] from residential and agriculture 
between 1990 and 2018 




































Per cent change 
Yearly Overall Yearly Overall 
1990 8,005.0    1990 8,889.2    
1995 7,844.7 - 160.3  ↓ 2.8% 1995 8,902.9 + 13.8  ↑ 0.2% 
1998 8,068.2 + 223.5  ↑ 0.8% 1998 8,883.8 - 19.1  ↓ 0.1% 
1999 7,957.9 - 110.3 ↓ 1.4% ↓ 0.6% 1999 8,868.4 - 15.4 ↓ 0.2% ↓ 0.2% 
2000 7,818.5 - 139.4 ↓ 1.8% ↓ 2.3% 2000 8,574.8 - 293.6 ↓ 3.3% ↓ 3.5% 
2001 8,316.0 + 497.5 ↑ 6.4% ↑ 3.9% 2001 8,305.0 - 269.9 ↓ 3.1% ↓ 6.6% 
2002 7,612.1 - 703.9 ↓ 8.5% ↓ 4.9% 2002 8,319.0 + 14.1 ↑ 0.2% ↓ 6.4% 
2003 7,606.5 - 5.6 ↓ 0.1% ↓ 5.0% 2003 8,390.8 + 71.8 ↑ 0.9% ↓ 5.6% 
2004 7,764.4 + 157.9 ↑ 2.1% ↓ 3.0% 2004 8,331.3 - 59.5 ↓ 0.7% ↓ 6.3% 
2005 7,708.4 - 56.1 ↓ 0.7% ↓ 3.7% 2005 8,227.7 - 103.6 ↓ 1.2% ↓ 7.4% 
2006 7,504.0 - 204.4 ↓ 2.7% ↓ 6.3% 2006 8,024.9 - 202.8 ↓ 2.5% ↓ 9.7% 
2007 7,268.9 - 235.0 ↓ 3.1% ↓ 9.2% 2007 8,170.9 + 145.9 ↑ 1.8% ↓ 8.1% 
2008 7,473.8 + 204.9 ↑ 2.8% ↓ 6.6% 2008 7,721.9 - 449.0 ↓ 5.5% ↓ 13.1% 
2009 7,183.5 - 290.3 ↓ 3.9% ↓ 10.3% 2009 7,703.2 - 18.7 ↓ 0.2% ↓ 13.3% 
2010 8,016.0 + 832.5 ↑ 11.6% ↑ 0.1% 2010 7,748.6 + 45.4 ↑ 0.6% ↓ 12.8% 
2011 6,489.4 - 1,526.6 ↓ 19.0% ↓ 18.9% 2011 7,721.6 - 27.0 ↓ 0.3% ↓ 13.1% 
2012 7,030.3 + 540.8 ↑ 8.3% ↓ 12.2% 2012 7,679.5 - 42.1 ↓ 0.5% ↓ 13.6% 
2013 7,069.9 + 39.6 ↑ 0.6% ↓ 11.7% 2013 7,600.1 - 79.4 ↓ 1.0% ↓ 14.5% 
2014 5,914.1 - 1,155.8 ↓ 16.3% ↓ 26.1% 2014 7,744.3 + 144.2 ↑ 1.9% ↓ 12.9% 
2015 6,107.4 + 193.4 ↑ 3.3% ↓ 23.7% 2015 7,617.1 - 127.2 ↓ 1.6% ↓ 14.3% 
2016 6,215.3 + 107.8 ↑ 1.8% ↓ 22.4% 2016 7,634.9 + 17.8 ↑ 0.2% ↓ 14.1% 
2017 6,024.7 - 190.5 ↓ 3.1% ↓ 24.7% 2017 7,603.6 - 31.4 ↓ 0.4% ↓ 14.5% 
2018 6,231.3 + 206.5 ↑ 3.4% ↓ 22.2% 2018 7,473.5 - 130.0 ↓ 1.3% ↓ 15.9% 
Source: Data Adapted from Scottish Government (2020) 
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Table M.5 – Scotland’s total carbon dioxide emissions [KtCO2e] from industrial processes and 
waste management between 1990 and 2018 




































Per cent change 
Yearly Overall Yearly Overall 
1990 1,923.6    1990 6,027.2    
1995 580.2 - 1,343.4  ↓ 69.8% 1995 6,248.5 + 221.2  ↑ 3.7% 
1998 646.0 + 65.8  ↓ 66.4% 1998 6,092.4 - 156.1  ↑ 1.1% 
1999 615.6 - 30.4 ↓ 4.7% ↓ 68.0% 1999 5,860.4 - 232.0 ↓ 3.8% ↓ 2.8% 
2000 598.0 - 17.6 ↓ 2.9% ↓ 68.9% 2000 5,737.4 - 123.0 ↓ 2.1% ↓ 4.8% 
2001 576.8 - 21.2 ↓ 3.5% ↓ 70.0% 2001 5,397.9 - 339.5 ↓ 5.9% ↓ 10.4% 
2002 612.1 + 35.3 ↑ 6.1% ↓ 68.2% 2002 5,210.4 - 187.5 ↓ 3.5% ↓ 13.6% 
2003 628.1 + 16.1 ↑ 2.6% ↓ 67.3% 2003 5,080.2 - 130.2 ↓ 2.5% ↓ 15.7% 
2004 634.7 + 6.5 ↑ 1.0% ↓ 67.0% 2004 4,450.5 - 629.7 ↓ 12.4% ↓ 26.2% 
2005 546.9 - 87.7 ↓ 13.8% ↓ 71.6% 2005 4,040.9 - 409.6 ↓ 9.2% ↓ 33.0% 
2006 558.4 + 11.5 ↑ 2.1% ↓ 71.0% 2006 3,619.9 - 421.0 ↓ 10.4% ↓ 39.9% 
2007 539.7 - 18.7 ↓ 3.4% ↓ 71.9% 2007 3,241.5 - 378.4 ↓ 10.5% ↓ 46.2% 
2008 529.2 - 10.5 ↓ 1.9% ↓ 72.5% 2008 3,090.8 - 150.7 ↓ 4.6% ↓ 48.7% 
2009 405.9 - 123.2 ↓ 23.3% ↓ 78.9% 2009 2,768.4 - 322.4 ↓ 10.4% ↓ 54.1% 
2010 391.9 - 14.0 ↓ 3.4% ↓ 79.6% 2010 2,529.1 - 239.3 ↓ 8.6% ↓ 58.0% 
2011 451.7 + 59.7 ↑ 15.2% ↓ 76.5% 2011 2,393.0 - 136.1 ↓ 5.4% ↓ 60.3% 
2012 449.3 - 2.4 ↓ 0.5% ↓ 76.6% 2012 2,048.0 - 345.0 ↓ 14.4% ↓ 66.0% 
2013 499.4 + 50.1 ↑ 11.2% ↓ 74.0% 2013 1,452.1 - 596.0 ↓ 29.1% ↓ 75.9% 
2014 541.8 + 42.4 ↑ 8.5% ↓ 71.8% 2014 1,477.3 + 25.3 ↑ 1.7% ↓ 75.5% 
2015 430.6 - 111.2 ↓ 20.5% ↓ 77.6% 2015 1,729.3 + 252.0 ↑ 17.1% ↓ 71.3% 
2016 522.4 + 91.8 ↑ 21.3% ↓ 72.8% 2016 1,646.3 - 83.0 ↓ 4.8% ↓ 72.7% 
2017 553.3 + 30.9 ↑ 5.9% ↓ 71.2% 2017 1,704.3 + 58.0 ↑ 3.5% ↓ 71.7% 
2018 536.2 - 17.0 ↓ 3.1% ↓ 72.1% 2018 1,675.8 - 28.5 ↓ 1.7% ↓ 72.2% 
Source: Data Adapted from Scottish Government (2020) 
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Table M.6 – Scotland’s total carbon dioxide emissions [KtCO2e] from international aviation and 
shipping and LULUCF between 1990 and 2018 





































Per cent change 
Yearly Overall Yearly Overall 
1990 1,312.6    1990 - 353.5    
1995 1,460.7 + 148.1  ↑ 11.3% 1995 - 1,603.2 - 1249.6  ↑ 353.5% 
1998 1,747.6 + 286.9  ↑ 33.1% 1998 - 2,512.7 - 909.5  ↑ 610.8% 
1999 1,579.8 - 167.7 ↓ 9.6% ↑ 20.4% 1999 - 2,866.9 - 354.2 ↑ 14.1% ↑ 710.9% 
2000 1,425.0 - 154.9 ↓ 9.8% ↑ 8.6% 2000 - 3,076.9 - 210.1 ↑ 7.3% ↑ 770.4% 
2001 1,548.6 + 123.7 ↑ 8.7% ↑ 18.0% 2001 - 3,456.5 - 379.6 ↑ 12.2% ↑ 877.7% 
2002 1,388.7 - 159.9 ↓ 10.3% ↑ 5.8% 2002 - 3,928.2 - 471.7 ↑ 13.6% ↑ 1,011.2% 
2003 1,327.7 - 61.0 ↓ 4.4% ↑ 1.1% 2003 - 3,995.1 - 66.9 ↑ 1.7% ↑ 1,030.1% 
2004 1,503.5 + 175.8 ↑ 13.2% ↑ 14.5% 2004 - 4,352.5 - 357.4 ↑ 8.9% ↑ 1,131.2% 
2005 1,612.3 + 108.8 ↑ 7.2% ↑ 22.8% 2005 - 4,584.8 - 232.3 ↑ 5.3% ↑ 1,196.9% 
2006 1,697.2 + 84.9 ↑ 5.3% ↑ 29.3% 2006 - 4,925.6 - 340.8 ↑ 7.4% ↑ 1,293.3% 
2007 1,746.7 + 49.5 ↑ 2.9% ↑ 33.1% 2007 - 5,096.1 - 170.5 ↑ 3.5% ↑ 1,341.5% 
2008 1,779.8 + 33.1 ↑ 1.9% ↑ 35.6% 2008 - 5,372.9 - 276.8 ↑ 5.4% ↑ 1,419.8% 
2009 1,632.1 - 147.8 ↓ 8.3% ↑ 24.3% 2009 - 5,379.5 - 6.6 ↑ 0.1% ↑ 1,421.7% 
2010 1,433.0 - 199.1 ↓ 12.2% ↑ 9.2% 2010 - 5,438.3 - 58.7 ↑ 1.1% ↑ 1,438.3% 
2011 1,555.0 + 122.0 ↑ 8.5% ↑ 18.5% 2011 - 5,732.0 - 293.7 ↑ 5.4% ↑ 1,521.4% 
2012 1,463.2 - 91.8 ↓ 5.9% ↑ 11.5% 2012 - 5,660.2 + 71.8 ↓ 1.3% ↑ 1,501.1% 
2013 1,539.4 + 76.2 ↑ 5.2% ↑ 17.3% 2013 - 5,412.7 + 247.5 ↓ 4.4% ↑ 1,431.1% 
2014 1,638.4 + 99.0 ↑ 6.4% ↑ 24.8% 2014 - 5,286.9 + 125.9 ↓ 2.3% ↑ 1,395.5% 
2015 1,703.3 + 64.9 ↑ 4.0% ↑ 29.8% 2015 - 5,388.6 - 101.7 ↑ 1.9% ↑ 1,424.3% 
2016 1,814.0 + 110.7 ↑ 6.5% ↑ 38.2% 2016 - 5,350.2 + 38.4 ↓ 0.7% ↑ 1,413.4% 
2017 1,926.4 + 112.4 ↑ 6.2% ↑ 46.8% 2017 - 5,419.6 - 69.5 ↑ 1.3% ↑ 1,433.1% 
2018 1,901.8 - 24.6 ↓ 1.3% ↑ 44.9% 2018 - 5,426.8 - 7.2 ↑ 0.1% ↑ 1,435.1% 
Source: Data Adapted from Scottish Government (2020) 
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Appendix N – Wales’s Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Table N.1 – Wales’s Total Greenhouse Gas Emissions (MtCO2e) between 1990 and 2018 


















Per cent change 
Yearly Overall 
1990 56.4    
1995 52.5 - 3.9  ↓ 6.9% 
1998 54.2 + 1.7  ↓ 4.0% 
1999 56.1 + 1.9 ↑ 3.6% ↓ 0.5% 
2000 58.1 + 2.0 ↑ 3.5% ↑ 2.9% 
2001 54.8 - 3.3 ↓ 5.6% ↓ 2.8% 
2002 47.9 - 6.9 ↓ 12.6% ↓ 15.0% 
2003 49.1 + 1.1 ↑ 2.4% ↓ 13.0% 
2004 52.9 + 3.8 ↑ 7.8% ↓ 6.2% 
2005 51.0 - 1.9 ↓ 3.7% ↓ 9.7% 
2006 52.1 + 1.2 ↑ 2.3% ↓ 7.6% 
2007 49.3 - 2.8 ↓ 5.4% ↓ 12.6% 
2008 50.7 + 1.3 ↑ 2.7% ↓ 10.2% 
2009 44.3 - 6.3 ↓ 12.5% ↓ 21.5% 
2010 47.5 + 3.2 ↑ 7.1% ↓ 15.9% 
2011 44.3 - 3.1 ↓ 6.6% ↓ 21.4% 
2012 46.1 + 1.8 ↑ 4.0% ↓ 18.3% 
2013 51.1 + 5.0 ↑ 10.8% ↓ 9.4% 
2014 46.9 - 4.2 ↓ 8.3% ↓ 16.9% 
2015 46.5 - 0.3 ↓ 0.7% ↓ 17.5% 
2016 48.8 + 2.3 ↑ 4.9% ↓ 13.5% 
2017 42.4 - 6.4 ↓ 13.1% ↓ 24.9% 
2018 38.9 - 3.5 ↓ 8.3% ↓ 31.1% 
Source: Data Adapted from StatsWales (2020) 
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Table N.2 – Wales’s total carbon dioxide emissions [KtCO2e] from energy supply and business 
between 1990 and 2018 




































Per cent change 
Yearly Overall Yearly Overall 
1990 18,015.2    1990 13,487.4    
1995 13,087.9 - 4,927.4  ↓ 27.4% 1995 14,266.2 + 778.8  ↑ 5.8% 
1998 13,918.6 + 830.8  ↓ 22.7% 1998 14,755.8 + 489.6  ↑ 9.4% 
1999 13,600.2 - 318.5 ↓ 2.3% ↓ 24.5% 1999 16,644.4 + 1,888.6 ↑ 12.8% ↑ 23.4% 
2000 16,433.8 + 2,833.6 ↑ 20.8% ↓ 8.8% 2000 16,538.4 - 106.1 ↓ 0.6% ↑ 22.6% 
2001 17,434.8 + 1,001.0 ↑ 6.1% ↓ 3.2% 2001 13,212.9 - 3,325.4 ↓ 20.1% ↓ 2.0% 
2002 15,825.5 - 1,609.3 ↓ 9.2% ↓ 12.2% 2002 9,204.4 - 4,008.6 ↓ 30.3% ↓ 31.8% 
2003 15,187.1 - 638.4 ↓ 4.0% ↓ 15.7% 2003 10,459.8 + 1,255.5 ↑ 13.6% ↓ 22.4% 
2004 17,892.8 + 2,705.7 ↑ 17.8% ↓ 0.7% 2004 11,155.0 + 695.2 ↑ 6.6% ↓ 17.3% 
2005 17,636.6 - 256.3 ↓ 1.4% ↓ 2.1% 2005 10,091.2 - 1,063.8 ↓ 9.5% ↓ 25.2% 
2006 18,840.5 + 1,204.0 ↑ 6.8% ↑ 4.6% 2006 10,536.9 + 445.6 ↑ 4.4% ↓ 21.9% 
2007 16,594.2 - 2,246.4 ↓ 11.9% ↓ 7.9% 2007 10,521.2 - 15.6 ↓ 0.1% ↓ 22.0% 
2008 19,446.1 + 2,851.9 ↑ 17.2% ↑ 7.9% 2008 9,859.9 - 661.3 ↓ 6.3% ↓ 26.9% 
2009 16,513.8 - 2,932.3 ↓ 15.1% ↓ 8.3% 2009 8,202.3 - 1,657.7 ↓ 16.8% ↓ 39.2% 
2010 16,927.0 + 413.2 ↑ 2.5% ↓ 6.0% 2010 9,982.0 + 1,779.8 ↑ 21.7% ↓ 26.0% 
2011 16,060.3 - 866.7 ↓ 5.1% ↓ 10.9% 2011 8,995.4 - 986.7 ↓ 9.9% ↓ 33.3% 
2012 19,433.0 + 3,372.7 ↑ 21.0% ↑ 7.9% 2012 7,891.1 - 1,104.3 ↓ 12.3% ↓ 41.5% 
2013 21,229.7 + 1,796.7 ↑ 9.2% ↑ 17.8% 2013 9,704.1 + 1,813.0 ↑ 23.0% ↓ 28.1% 
2014 17,402.8 - 3,827.0 ↓ 18.0% ↓ 3.4% 2014 9,559.4 - 144.7 ↓ 1.5% ↓ 29.1% 
2015 17,657.2 + 254.4 ↑ 1.5% ↓ 2.0% 2015 9,357.5 - 202.0 ↓ 2.1% ↓ 30.6% 
2016 20,192.7 + 2,535.5 ↑ 14.4% ↑ 12.1% 2016 9,374.5 + 17.0 ↑ 0.2% ↓ 30.5% 
2017 14,173.1 - 6,019.6 ↓ 29.8% ↓ 21.3% 2017 9,130.6 - 243.9 ↓ 2.6% ↓ 32.3% 
2018 11,455.1 - 2,718.0 ↓ 19.2% ↓ 36.4% 2018 8,500.0 - 630.6 ↓ 6.9% ↓ 37.0% 
Source: Data Adapted from StatsWales (2020) 
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Table N.3 – Wales’s total carbon dioxide emissions [KtCO2e] from transport and public between 
1990 and 2018 




































Per cent change 
Yearly Overall Yearly Overall 
1990 6,411.3    1990 769.2    
1995 6,431.4 + 20.1  ↑ 0.3% 1995 705.0 - 64.2  ↓ 8.3% 
1998 6,596.3 + 164.9  ↑ 2.9% 1998 566.5 - 138.4  ↓ 26.3% 
1999 6,597.3 + 0.9 ↑ 0.0% ↑ 2.9% 1999 576.8 + 10.2 ↑ 1.8% ↓ 25.0% 
2000 6,461.1 - 136.2 ↓ 2.1% ↑ 0.8% 2000 553.1 - 23.7 ↓ 4.1% ↓ 28.1% 
2001 6,475.2 + 14.2 ↑ 0.2% ↑ 1.0% 2001 543.0 - 10.1 ↓ 1.8% ↓ 29.4% 
2002 6,632.9 + 157.7 ↑ 2.4% ↑ 3.5% 2002 447.1 - 95.9 ↓ 17.7% ↓ 41.9% 
2003 6,585.6 - 47.3 ↓ 0.7% ↑ 2.7% 2003 444.9 - 2.1 ↓ 0.5% ↓ 42.2% 
2004 6,780.7 + 195.1 ↑ 3.0% ↑ 5.8% 2004 498.3 + 53.4 ↑ 12.0% ↓ 35.2% 
2005 6,782.5 + 1.8 ↑ 0.0% ↑ 5.8% 2005 516.9 + 18.7 ↑ 3.7% ↓ 32.8% 
2006 6,784.5 + 2.0 ↑ 0.0% ↑ 5.8% 2006 456.9 - 60.1 ↓ 11.6% ↓ 40.6% 
2007 6,901.4 + 116.8 ↑ 1.7% ↑ 7.6% 2007 413.4 - 43.5 ↓ 9.5% ↓ 46.3% 
2008 6,677.2 - 224.2 ↓ 3.2% ↑ 4.1% 2008 421.6 + 8.2 ↑ 2.0% ↓ 45.2% 
2009 6,405.1 - 272.1 ↓ 4.1% ↓ 0.1% 2009 377.6 - 44.0 ↓ 10.4% ↓ 50.9% 
2010 6,305.5 - 99.6 ↓ 1.6% ↓ 1.6% 2010 398.5 + 20.9 ↑ 5.5% ↓ 48.2% 
2011 6,223.6 - 81.9 ↓ 1.3% ↓ 2.9% 2011 323.6 - 74.9 ↓ 18.8% ↓ 57.9% 
2012 6,043.8 - 179.8 ↓ 2.9% ↓ 5.7% 2012 366.2 + 42.6 ↑ 13.2% ↓ 52.4% 
2013 6,018.8 - 25.0 ↓ 0.4% ↓ 6.1% 2013 368.3 + 2.1 ↑ 0.6% ↓ 52.1% 
2014 6,100.8 + 82.0 ↑ 1.4% ↓ 4.8% 2014 307.6 - 60.7 ↓ 16.5% ↓ 60.0% 
2015 6,183.5 + 82.7 ↑ 1.4% ↓ 3.6% 2015 329.3 + 21.7 ↑ 7.1% ↓ 57.2% 
2016 6,347.6 + 164.1 ↑ 2.7% ↓ 1.0% 2016 337.2 + 7.9 ↑ 2.4% ↓ 56.2% 
2017 6,241.3 - 106.3 ↓ 1.7% ↓ 2.7% 2017 310.7 - 26.5 ↓ 7.9% ↓ 59.6% 
2018 6,171.1 - 70.2 ↓ 1.1% ↓ 3.7% 2018 324.6 + 13.9 ↑ 4.5% ↓ 57.8% 




66 - Excluding International 
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Table N.4 – Wales’s total carbon dioxide emissions [KtCO2e] from residential and agriculture 
between 1990 and 2018 




































Per cent change 
Yearly Overall Yearly Overall 
1990 4,955.8    1990 6,321.8    
1995 5,135.3 + 179.5  ↑ 3.6% 1995 6,255.1 - 66.6  ↓ 1.1% 
1998 5,539.1 + 403.8  ↑ 11.8% 1998 6,273.0 + 17.9  ↓ 0.8% 
1999 5,451.9 - 87.2 ↓ 1.6% ↑ 10.0% 1999 6,391.5 + 118.5 ↑ 1.9% ↑ 1.1% 
2000 5,270.3 - 181.6 ↓ 3.3% ↑ 6.3% 2000 6,033.8 - 357.7 ↓ 5.6% ↓ 4.6% 
2001 5,373.3 + 103.0 ↑ 2.0% ↑ 8.4% 2001 5,878.3 - 155.5 ↓ 2.6% ↓ 7.0% 
2002 5,017.8 - 355.5 ↓ 6.6% ↑ 1.3% 2002 5,694.0 - 184.3 ↓ 3.1% ↓ 9.9% 
2003 5,029.0 + 11.2 ↑ 0.2% ↑ 1.5% 2003 5,897.1 + 203.0 ↑ 3.6% ↓ 6.7% 
2004 5,119.5 + 90.6 ↑ 1.8% ↑ 3.3% 2004 5,990.9 + 93.8 ↑ 1.6% ↓ 5.2% 
2005 4,788.5 - 331.0 ↓ 6.5% ↓ 3.4% 2005 5,788.4 - 202.5 ↓ 3.4% ↓ 8.4% 
2006 4,694.5 - 93.9 ↓ 2.0% ↓ 5.3% 2006 5,573.2 - 215.2 ↓ 3.7% ↓ 11.8% 
2007 4,441.2 - 253.4 ↓ 5.4% ↓ 10.4% 2007 5,437.3 - 136.0 ↓ 2.4% ↓ 14.0% 
2008 4,591.2 + 150.0 ↑ 3.4% ↓ 7.4% 2008 5,118.6 - 318.7 ↓ 5.9% ↓ 19.0% 
2009 4,388.9 - 202.2 ↓ 4.4% ↓ 11.4% 2009 5,131.8 + 13.2 ↑ 0.3% ↓ 18.8% 
2010 4,849.9 + 461.0 ↑ 10.5% ↓ 2.1% 2010 5,206.3 + 74.5 ↑ 1.5% ↓ 17.6% 
2011 3,898.8 - 951.2 ↓ 19.6% ↓ 21.3% 2011 5,211.7 + 5.4 ↑ 0.1% ↓ 17.6% 
2012 4,207.5 + 308.7 ↑ 7.9% ↓ 15.1% 2012 5,184.7 - 27.0 ↓ 0.5% ↓ 18.0% 
2013 4,244.6 + 37.1 ↑ 0.9% ↓ 14.4% 2013 5,227.4 + 42.7 ↑ 0.8% ↓ 17.3% 
2014 3,590.6 - 654.0 ↓ 15.4% ↓ 27.5% 2014 5,466.7 + 239.3 ↑ 4.6% ↓ 13.5% 
2015 3,650.1 + 59.5 ↑ 1.7% ↓ 26.3% 2015 5,317.0 - 149.6 ↓ 2.7% ↓ 15.9% 
2016 3,683.1 + 33.0 ↑ 0.9% ↓ 25.7% 2016 5,592.3 + 275.3 ↑ 5.2% ↓ 11.5% 
2017 3,610.9 - 72.2 ↓ 2.0% ↓ 27.1% 2017 5,634.1 + 41.9 ↑ 0.7% ↓ 10.9% 
2018 3,699.3 + 88.4 ↑ 2.4% ↓ 25.4% 2018 5,600.3 - 33.8 ↓ 0.6% ↓ 11.4% 
Source: Data Adapted from StatsWales (2020) 
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Table N.5 – Wales’s total carbon dioxide emissions [KtCO2e] from industrial processes and waste 
management between 1990 and 2018 




































Per cent change 
Yearly Overall Yearly Overall 
1990 2,989.9    1990 3,281.8    
1995 3,134.2 + 144.3  ↑ 4.8% 1995 3,447.7 + 165.9  ↑ 5.1% 
1998 2,980.7 - 153.5  ↓ 0.3% 1998 3,446.9 - 0.7  ↑ 5.0% 
1999 3,284.2 + 303.6 ↑ 10.2% ↑ 9.8% 1999 3,341.5 - 105.5 ↓ 3.1% ↑ 1.8% 
2000 3,319.4 + 35.2 ↑ 1.1% ↑ 11.0% 2000 3,252.5 - 89.0 ↓ 2.7% ↓ 0.9% 
2001 2,556.5 - 763.0 ↓ 23.0% ↓ 14.5% 2001 3,155.2 - 97.3 ↓ 3.0% ↓ 3.9% 
2002 1,983.8 - 572.7 ↓ 22.4% ↓ 33.6% 2002 3,095.7 - 59.5 ↓ 1.9% ↓ 5.7% 
2003 2,578.1 + 594.3 ↑ 30.0% ↓ 13.8% 2003 2,886.2 - 209.5 ↓ 6.8% ↓ 12.1% 
2004 2,669.2 + 91.1 ↑ 3.5% ↓ 10.7% 2004 2,769.4 - 116.7 ↓ 4.0% ↓ 15.6% 
2005 2,739.9 + 70.6 ↑ 2.6% ↓ 8.4% 2005 2,638.1 - 131.3 ↓ 4.7% ↓ 19.6% 
2006 2,731.4 - 8.4 ↓ 0.3% ↓ 8.6% 2006 2,499.3 - 138.8 ↓ 5.3% ↓ 23.8% 
2007 2,701.0 - 30.4 ↓ 1.1% ↓ 9.7% 2007 2,352.5 - 146.8 ↓ 5.9% ↓ 28.3% 
2008 2,444.6 - 256.5 ↓ 9.5% ↓ 18.2% 2008 2,003.4 - 349.1 ↓ 14.8% ↓ 39.0% 
2009 1,478.3 - 966.3 ↓ 39.5% ↓ 50.6% 2009 1,777.4 - 226.0 ↓ 11.3% ↓ 45.8% 
2010 2,093.6 + 615.3 ↑ 41.6% ↓ 30.0% 2010 1,662.6 - 114.8 ↓ 6.5% ↓ 49.3% 
2011 1,937.3 - 156.3 ↓ 7.5% ↓ 35.2% 2011 1,598.7 - 63.9 ↓ 3.8% ↓ 51.3% 
2012 1,439.7 - 497.6 ↓ 25.7% ↓ 51.8% 2012 1,490.2 - 108.5 ↓ 6.8% ↓ 54.6% 
2013 2,844.1 + 1,404.4 ↑ 97.5% ↓ 4.9% 2013 1,436.2 - 54.0 ↓ 3.6% ↓ 56.2% 
2014 3,034.3 + 190.2 ↑ 6.7% ↑ 1.5% 2014 1,298.0 - 138.2 ↓ 9.6% ↓ 60.4% 
2015 2,770.7 - 263.6 ↓ 8.7% ↓ 7.3% 2015 1,249.2 - 48.8 ↓ 3.8% ↓ 61.9% 
2016 1,969.9 - 800.8 ↓ 28.9% ↓ 34.1% 2016 1,259.6 + 10.4 ↑ 0.8% ↓ 61.6% 
2017 2,005.1 + 35.2 ↑ 1.8% ↓ 32.9% 2017 1,258.2 - 1.5 ↓ 0.1% ↓ 61.7% 
2018 1,867.1 - 138.0 ↓ 6.9% ↓ 37.6% 2018 1,244.1 - 14.0 ↓ 1.1% ↓ 62.1% 
Source: Data Adapted from StatsWales (2020) 
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Table N.6 – Wales’s total carbon dioxide emissions [KtCO2e] from international aviation and 
shipping and LULUCF between 1990 and 2018 





































Per cent change 
Yearly Overall Yearly Overall 
1990 619.0    1990 - 424.4    
1995 576.7 - 42.2  ↓ 6.8% 1995 - 521.9 - 97.5  ↑ 23.0% 
1998 694.2 + 117.5  ↑ 12.2% 1998 - 580.3 - 58.4  ↑ 36.7% 
1999 542.4 - 151.8 ↓ 21.9% ↓ 12.4% 1999 - 295.1 + 285.2 ↓ 49.2% ↓ 30.5% 
2000 521.5 - 20.9 ↓ 3.9% ↓ 15.7% 2000 - 295.6 - 0.5 ↑ 0.2% ↓ 30.4% 
2001 544.9 + 23.4 ↑ 4.5% ↓ 12.0% 2001 - 349.1 - 53.5 ↑ 18.1% ↓ 17.7% 
2002 444.5 - 100.4 ↓ 18.4% ↓ 28.2% 2002 - 409.8 - 60.7 ↑ 17.4% ↓ 3.4% 
2003 437.1 - 7.4 ↓ 1.7% ↓ 29.4% 2003 - 435.3 - 25.5 ↑ 6.2% ↑ 2.6% 
2004 505.2 + 68.1 ↑ 15.6% ↓ 18.4% 2004 - 467.2 - 31.8 ↑ 7.3% ↑ 10.1% 
2005 469.7 - 35.4 ↓ 7.0% ↓ 24.1% 2005 - 479.0 - 11.8 ↑ 2.5% ↑ 12.9% 
2006 536.6 + 66.9 ↑ 14.2% ↓ 13.3% 2006 - 513.2 - 34.2 ↑ 7.1% ↑ 20.9% 
2007 517.5 - 19.1 ↓ 3.6% ↓ 16.4% 2007 - 562.5 - 49.3 ↑ 9.6% ↑ 32.6% 
2008 650.8 + 133.3 ↑ 25.8% ↑ 5.1% 2008 - 549.9 + 12.6 ↓ 2.2% ↑ 29.6% 
2009 629.8 - 20.9 ↓ 3.2% ↑ 1.8% 2009 - 590.8 - 40.8 ↑ 7.4% ↑ 39.2% 
2010 634.5 + 4.7 ↑ 0.7% ↑ 2.5% 2010 - 577.4 + 13.3 ↓ 2.3% ↑ 36.1% 
2011 696.3 + 61.9 ↑ 9.8% ↑ 12.5% 2011 - 607.6 - 30.2 ↑ 5.2% ↑ 43.2% 
2012 551.5 - 144.8 ↓ 20.8% ↓ 10.9% 2012 - 483.7 + 123.9 ↓ 20.4% ↑ 14.0% 
2013 553.7 + 2.2 ↑ 0.4% ↓ 10.5% 2013 - 515.2 - 31.5 ↑ 6.5% ↑ 21.4% 
2014 525.3 - 28.4 ↓ 5.1% ↓ 15.1% 2014 - 416.9 + 98.4 ↓ 19.1% ↓ 1.8% 
2015 482.9 - 42.4 ↓ 8.1% ↓ 22.0% 2015 - 452.5 - 35.6 ↑ 8.5% ↑ 6.6% 
2016 495.5 + 12.6 ↑ 2.6% ↓ 20.0% 2016 - 438.3 + 14.2 ↓ 3.1% ↑ 3.3% 
2017 478.6 - 16.9 ↓ 3.4% ↓ 22.7% 2017 - 441.7 - 3.4 ↑ 0.8% ↑ 4.1% 
2018 473.6 - 5.0 ↓ 1.0% ↓ 23.5% 2018 - 443.7 - 2.0 ↑ 0.5% ↑ 4.6% 
Source: Data Adapted from StatsWales (2020) 
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Appendix O – United Kingdom’s Greenhouse Gas Emissions Between 1990 and 2019 
 
Table O.1 – United Kingdom’s Total Greenhouse Gas Emissions (CO2e) and CO2 emissions between 
1990 and 2019 




































Per cent change 
Yearly Overall Yearly Overall 
1990 595.7    1990 793.8    
1991 603.2 + 7.5 ↑ 1.3% ↑ 1.3% 1991 802.7 + 8.9 ↑ 1.1% ↑ 1.1% 
1992 586.9 - 16.3 ↓ 2.7% ↓ 1.5% 1992 781.1 - 21.6 ↓ 2.7% ↓ 1.6% 
1993 572.2 - 14.7 ↓ 2.5% ↓ 3.9% 1993 761.2 - 19.9 ↓ 2.5% ↓ 4.1% 
1994 568.2 - 4.0 ↓ 0.7% ↓ 4.6% 1994 752.0 - 9.2 ↓ 1.2% ↓ 5.3% 
1995 559.8 - 8.4 ↓ 1.5% ↓ 6.0% 1995 745.4 - 6.6 ↓ 0.9% ↓ 6.1% 
1996 580.5 + 20.7 ↑ 3.7% ↓ 2.6% 1996 766.4 + 21.0 ↑ 2.8% ↓ 3.5% 
1997 554.0 - 26.5 ↓ 4.6% ↓ 7.0% 1997 740.6 - 25.8 ↓ 3.4% ↓ 6.7% 
1998 558.4 + 4.4 ↑ 0.8% ↓ 6.3% 1998 738.4 - 2.2 ↓ 0.3% ↓ 7.0% 
1999 552.1 - 6.3 ↓ 1.1% ↓ 7.3% 1999 708.6 - 29.8 ↓ 4.0% ↓ 10.7% 
2000 558.5 + 6.4 ↑ 1.2% ↓ 6.2% 2000 707.9 - 0.7 ↓ 0.1% ↓ 10.8% 
2001 566.8 + 8.3 ↑ 1.5% ↓ 4.9% 2001 710.2 + 2.3 ↑ 0.3% ↓ 10.5% 
2002 549.9 - 16.9 ↓ 3.0% ↓ 7.7% 2002 689.7 - 20.5 ↓ 2.9% ↓ 13.1% 
2003 561.2 + 11.3 ↑ 2.1% ↓ 5.8% 2003 696.6 + 6.9 ↑ 1.0% ↓ 12.2% 
2004 561.9 + 0.7 ↑ 0.1% ↓ 5.7% 2004 692.3 - 4.3 ↓ 0.6% ↓ 12.8% 
2005 558.1 - 3.8 ↓ 0.7% ↓ 6.3% 2005 683.9 - 8.4 ↓ 1.2% ↓ 13.8% 
2006 555.1 - 3.0 ↓ 0.5% ↓ 6.8% 2006 676.0 - 7.9 ↓ 1.2% ↓ 14.8% 
2007 546.2 - 8.9 ↓ 1.6% ↓ 8.3% 2007 663.5 - 12.5 ↓ 1.8% ↓ 16.4% 
2008 531.4 - 14.8 ↓ 2.7% ↓ 10.8% 2008 642.7 - 20.8 ↓ 3.1% ↓ 19.0% 
2009 481.0 - 50.4 ↓ 9.5% ↓ 19.3% 2009 586.8 - 55.9 ↓ 8.7% ↓ 26.1% 
2010 498.5 + 17.5 ↑ 3.6% ↓ 16.3% 2010 600.9 + 14.1 ↑ 2.4% ↓ 24.3% 
2011 455.7 - 42.8 ↓ 8.6% ↓ 23.5% 2011 553.1 - 47.8 ↓ 8.0% ↓ 30.3% 
2012 473.9 + 18.2 ↑ 4.0% ↓ 20.5% 2012 570.1 + 17.0 ↑ 3.1% ↓ 28.2% 
2013 463.8 - 10.1 ↓ 2.1% ↓ 22.1% 2013 556.2 - 13.9 ↓ 2.4% ↓ 29.9% 
2014 425.0 - 38.8 ↓ 8.4% ↓ 28.7% 2014 516.0 - 40.2 ↓ 7.2% ↓ 35.0% 
2015 408.3 - 16.7 ↓ 3.9% ↓ 31.5% 2015 497.9 - 18.1 ↓ 3.5% ↓ 37.3% 
2016 385.1 - 23.2 ↓ 5.7% ↓ 35.4% 2016 472.4 - 25.5 ↓ 5.1% ↓ 40.5% 
2017 373.8 - 11.3 ↓ 2.9% ↓ 37.3% 2017 461.0 - 11.4 ↓ 2.4% ↓ 41.9% 
2018 365.7 - 8.1 ↓ 2.2% ↓ 38.6% 2018 451.5 - 9.5 ↓ 2.1% ↓ 43.1% 
20191 351.5 - 14.2 ↓ 3.9% ↓ 41.0% 201967 435.2 - 16.3 ↓ 3.6% ↓ 45.2% 
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Table O.2 – United Kingdom’s total carbon dioxide emissions [MtCO2e] from energy supply and 
business between 1990 and 2019 


































Per cent change 
Yearly Overall Yearly Overall 
1990 242.1    1990 111.8    
1991 239.4 - 2.7 ↓ 1.1% ↓ 1.1% 1991 117.3 + 5.5 ↑ 4.9% ↑ 4.9% 
1992 228.4 - 11.0 ↓ 4.6% ↓ 5.7% 1992 114.5 - 2.8 ↓ 2.4% ↑ 2.4% 
1993 212.7 - 15.7 ↓ 6.9% ↓ 12.1% 1993 112.7 - 1.8 ↓ 1.6% ↑ 0.8% 
1994 211.1 - 1.6 ↓ 0.8% ↓ 12.8% 1994 111.9 - 0.8 ↓ 0.7% ↑ 0.1% 
1995 210.2 - 0.9 ↓ 0.4% ↓ 13.2% 1995 109.1 - 2.8 ↓ 2.5% ↓ 2.4% 
1996 212.5 + 2.3 ↑ 1.1% ↓ 12.2% 1996 111.2 + 2.1 ↑ 1.9% ↓ 0.5% 
1997 198.4 - 14.1 ↓ 6.6% ↓ 18.1% 1997 107.8 - 3.4 ↓ 3.1% ↓ 3.6% 
1998 203.6 + 5.2 ↑ 2.6% ↓ 15.9% 1998 107.1 - 0.7 ↓ 0.6% ↓ 4.2% 
1999 193.4 - 10.2 ↓ 5.0% ↓ 20.1% 1999 109.6 + 2.5 ↑ 2.3% ↓ 2.0% 
2000 204.0 + 10.6 ↑ 5.5% ↓ 15.7% 2000 109.1 - 0.5 ↓ 0.5% ↓ 2.4% 
2001 214.9 + 10.9 ↑ 5.3% ↓ 11.2% 2001 106.4 - 2.7 ↓ 2.5% ↓ 4.8% 
2002 212.9 - 2.0 ↓ 0.9% ↓ 12.1% 2002 95.8 - 10.6 ↓ 10.0% ↓ 14.3% 
2003 220.3 + 7.4 ↑ 3.5% ↓ 9.0% 2003 98.4 + 2.6 ↑ 2.7% ↓ 12.0% 
2004 218.4 - 1.9 ↓ 0.9% ↓ 9.8% 2004 97.8 - 0.6 ↓ 0.6% ↓ 12.5% 
2005 219.1 + 0.7 ↑ 0.3% ↓ 9.5% 2005 97.2 - 0.6 ↓ 0.6% ↓ 13.1% 
2006 224.3 + 5.2 ↑ 2.4% ↓ 7.4% 2006 94.3 - 2.9 ↓ 3.0% ↓ 15.7% 
2007 219.3 - 5.0 ↓ 2.2% ↓ 9.4% 2007 92.3 - 2.0 ↓ 2.1% ↓ 17.4% 
2008 213.0 - 6.3 ↓ 2.9% ↓ 12.0% 2008 89.8 - 2.5 ↓ 2.7% ↓ 19.7% 
2009 190.0 - 23.0 ↓ 10.8% ↓ 21.5% 2009 76.7 - 13.1 ↓ 14.6% ↓ 31.4% 
2010 197.3 + 7.3 ↑ 3.8% ↓ 18.5% 2010 78.4 + 1.7 ↑ 2.2% ↓ 29.9% 
2011 182.9 - 14.4 ↓ 7.3% ↓ 24.5% 2011 71.7 - 6.7 ↓ 8.5% ↓ 35.9% 
2012 193.4 + 10.5 ↑ 5.7% ↓ 20.1% 2012 73.1 + 1.4 ↑ 2.0% ↓ 34.6% 
2013 181.5 - 11.9 ↓ 6.2% ↓ 25.0% 2013 73.5 + 0.4 ↑ 0.5% ↓ 34.3% 
2014 157.0 - 24.5 ↓ 13.5% ↓ 35.2% 2014 71.2 - 2.3 ↓ 3.1% ↓ 36.3% 
2015 137.6 - 19.4 ↓ 12.4% ↓ 43.2% 2015 69.6 - 1.6 ↓ 2.2% ↓ 37.7% 
2016 115.2 - 22.4 ↓ 16.3% ↓ 52.4% 2016 66.8 - 2.8 ↓ 4.0% ↓ 40.3% 
2017 105.7 - 9.5 ↓ 8.2% ↓ 56.3% 2017 67.1 + 0.3 ↑ 0.4% ↓ 40.0% 
2018 98.4 - 7.3 ↓ 6.9% ↓ 59.4% 2018 65.9 - 1.2 ↓ 1.8% ↓ 41.1% 
20192 90.1 - 8.3 ↓ 8.4% ↓ 62.8% 201968 64.7 - 1.2 ↓ 1.8% ↓ 42.1% 
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Table O.3 – United Kingdom’s total carbon dioxide emissions [MtCO2e] from transport and public 
between 1990 and 2019 


































Per cent change 
Yearly Overall Yearly Overall 
1990 125.4    1990 13.4    
1991 123.6 - 1.8 ↓ 1.4% ↓ 1.4% 1991 14.3 + 0.9 ↑ 6.7% ↑ 6.7% 
1992 124.8 + 1.2 ↑ 1.0% ↓ 0.5% 1992 15.0 + 0.7 ↑ 4.9% ↑ 11.9% 
1993 126.2 + 1.4 ↑ 1.1% ↑ 0.6% 1993 13.7 - 1.3 ↓ 8.7% ↑ 2.2% 
1994 127.4 + 1.2 ↑ 1.0% ↑ 1.6% 1994 13.4 - 0.3 ↓ 2.2% = 0.0% 
1995 126.8 - 0.6 ↓ 0.5% ↑ 1.1% 1995 13.2 - 0.2 ↓ 1.5% ↓ 1.5% 
1996 131.2 + 4.4 ↑ 3.5% ↑ 4.6% 1996 14.2 + 1.0 ↑ 7.6% ↑ 6.0% 
1997 132.3 + 1.1 ↑ 0.8% ↑ 5.5% 1997 13.8 - 0.4 ↓ 2.8% ↑ 3.0% 
1998 131.6 - 0.7 ↓ 0.7% ↑ 4.9% 1998 12.9 - 0.9 ↓ 6.5% ↓ 3.7% 
1999 132.7 + 1.1 ↑ 0.8% ↑ 5.8% 1999 12.8 - 0.1 ↓ 0.8% ↓ 4.5% 
2000 131.0 - 1.7 ↓ 1.3% ↑ 4.5% 2000 12.1 - 0.7 ↓ 5.5% ↓ 9.7% 
2001 130.7 - 0.3 ↓ 0.2% ↑ 4.2% 2001 12.2 + 0.1 ↑ 0.8% ↓ 9.0% 
2002 133.3 + 2.6 ↑ 2.0% ↑ 6.3% 2002 10.3 - 1.9 ↓ 15.6% ↓ 23.1% 
2003 132.6 - 0.7 ↓ 0.5% ↑ 5.7% 2003 10.2 - 0.1 ↓ 1.0% ↓ 23.9% 
2004 133.6 + 1.0 ↑ 0.8% ↑ 6.5% 2004 11.2 + 1.0 ↑ 9.8% ↓ 16.4% 
2005 134.3 + 0.7 ↑ 0.5% ↑ 7.1% 2005 11.1 - 0.1 ↓ 0.9% ↓ 17.2% 
2006 134.4 + 0.1 ↑ 0.1% ↑ 7.2% 2006 10.1 - 1.0 ↓ 9.0% ↓ 24.6% 
2007 136.0 + 1.6 ↑ 1.2% ↑ 8.5% 2007 9.4 - 0.7 ↓ 6.9% ↓ 29.9% 
2008 130.1 - 5.9 ↓ 4.3% ↑ 3.7% 2008 9.7 + 0.3 ↑ 3.2% ↓ 27.6% 
2009 125.2 - 4.9 ↓ 3.8% ↓ 0.2% 2009 8.8 - 0.9 ↓ 9.3% ↓ 34.3% 
2010 123.4 - 1.8 ↓ 1.4% ↓ 1.6% 2010 9.5 + 0.7 ↑ 8.0% ↓ 29.1% 
2011 121.2 - 2.2 ↓ 1.8% ↓ 3.3% 2011 8.0 - 1.5 ↓ 15.8% ↓ 40.3% 
2012 120.3 - 0.9 ↓ 0.7% ↓ 4.1% 2012 8.9 + 0.9 ↑ 11.3% ↓ 33.6% 
2013 118.8 - 1.5 ↓ 1.2% ↓ 5.3% 2013 9.1 + 0.2 ↑ 2.2% ↓ 32.1% 
2014 120.1 + 1.3 ↑ 1.1% ↓ 4.2% 2014 7.8 - 1.3 ↓ 14.3% ↓ 41.8% 
2015 122.2 + 2.1 ↑ 1.7% ↓ 2.6% 2015 8.0 + 0.2 ↑ 2.6% ↓ 40.3% 
2016 124.6 + 2.4 ↑ 2.0% ↓ 0.6% 2016 8.1 + 0.1 ↑ 1.3% ↓ 39.6% 
2017 124.8 + 0.2 ↑ 0.2% ↓ 0.5% 2017 7.7 - 0.4 ↓ 4.9% ↓ 42.5% 
2018 123.0 - 1.8 ↓ 1.4% ↓ 1.9% 2018 8.0 + 0.3 ↑ 3.9% ↓ 40.3% 
20192 119.6 - 3.4 ↓ 2.8% ↓ 4.6% 201969 8.0 = 0.0 = 0.0% ↓ 40.3% 
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Table O.4 – United Kingdom’s total carbon dioxide emissions [MtCO2e] from residential and 
agriculture between 1990 and 2019 


































Per cent change 
Yearly Overall Yearly Overall 
1990 78.3    1990 6.5    
1991 87.0 + 8.7 ↑ 11.1% ↑ 11.1% 1991 6.5 = 0.0 = 0.0% = 0.0% 
1992 84.4 - 2.6 ↓ 3.0% ↑ 7.8% 1992 6.5 = 0.0 = 0.0% = 0.0% 
1993 88.4 + 4.0 ↑ 4.7% ↑ 12.9% 1993 6.1 - 0.4 ↓ 6.2% ↓ 6.2% 
1994 84.0 - 4.4 ↓ 5.0% ↑ 7.3% 1994 6.5 + 0.4 ↑ 6.6% = 0.0% 
1995 79.6 - 4.4 ↓ 5.2% ↑ 1.7% 1995 6.5 = 0.0 = 0.0% = 0.0% 
1996 90.8 + 11.2 ↑ 14.1% ↑ 16.0% 1996 6.6 + 0.1 ↑ 1.5% ↑ 1.5% 
1997 83.6 - 7.2 ↓ 7.9% ↑ 6.8% 1997 5.8 - 0.8 ↓ 12.1% ↓ 10.8% 
1998 85.5 + 1.9 ↑ 2.3% ↑ 9.2% 1998 6.0 + 0.2 ↑ 3.4% ↓ 7.7% 
1999 85.3 - 0.2 ↓ 0.2% ↑ 8.9% 1999 6.2 + 0.2 ↑ 3.3% ↓ 4.6% 
2000 85.6 + 0.3 ↑ 0.4% ↑ 9.3% 2000 5.5 - 0.7 ↓ 11.3% ↓ 15.4% 
2001 87.8 + 2.2 ↑ 2.6% ↑ 12.1% 2001 5.4 - 0.1 ↓ 1.8% ↓ 16.9% 
2002 84.4 - 3.4 ↓ 3.9% ↑ 7.8% 2002 5.5 + 0.1 ↑ 1.9% ↓ 15.4% 
2003 85.3 + 0.9 ↑ 1.1% ↑ 8.9% 2003 6.2 + 0.7 ↑ 12.7% ↓ 4.6% 
2004 86.9 + 1.6 ↑ 1.9% ↑ 11.0% 2004 6.2 = 0.0 = 0.0% ↓ 4.6% 
2005 82.4 - 4.5 ↓ 5.2% ↑ 5.2% 2005 6.1 - 0.1 ↓ 1.6% ↓ 6.2% 
2006 79.8 - 2.6 ↓ 3.2% ↑ 1.9% 2006 5.9 - 0.2 ↓ 3.3% ↓ 9.2% 
2007 76.3 - 3.5 ↓ 4.4% ↓ 2.6% 2007 5.7 - 0.2 ↓ 3.4% ↓ 12.3% 
2008 78.2 + 1.9 ↑ 2.5% ↓ 0.1% 2008 5.5 - 0.2 ↓ 3.5% ↓ 15.4% 
2009 75.0 - 3.2 ↓ 4.1% ↓ 4.2% 2009 5.4 - 0.1 ↓ 1.8% ↓ 16.9% 
2010 84.5 + 9.5 ↑ 12.7% ↑ 7.9% 2010 5.4 = 0.0 = 0.0% ↓ 16.9% 
2011 67.3 - 17.2 ↓ 20.4% ↓ 14.0% 2011 5.6 + 0.2 ↑ 3.7% ↓ 13.8% 
2012 73.6 + 6.3 ↑ 9.4% ↓ 6.0% 2012 5.4 - 0.2 ↓ 3.6% ↓ 16.9% 
2013 74.5 + 0.9 ↑ 1.2% ↓ 4.9% 2013 5.2 - 0.2 ↓ 3.7% ↓ 20.0% 
2014 62.0 - 12.5 ↓ 16.8% ↓ 20.8% 2014 5.6 + 0.4 ↑ 7.7% ↓ 13.8% 
2015 64.5 + 2.5 ↑ 4.0% ↓ 17.6% 2015 5.5 - 0.1 ↓ 1.8% ↓ 15.4% 
2016 65.8 + 1.3 ↑ 2.0% ↓ 16.0% 2016 5.7 + 0.2 ↑ 3.6% ↓ 12.3% 
2017 63.8 - 2.0 ↓ 3.0% ↓ 18.5% 2017 5.8 + 0.1 ↑ 1.8% ↓ 10.8% 
2018 66.4 + 2.6 ↑ 4.1% ↓ 15.2% 2018 5.7 - 0.1 ↓ 1.7% ↓ 12.3% 
20192 65.2 - 1.2 ↓ 1.8% ↓ 16.7% 201970 5.7 = 0.0 = 0.0% ↓ 12.3% 
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Table O.5 – United Kingdom’s total carbon dioxide emissions [MtCO2e] from industrial processes 
and waste management between 1990 and 2019 


































Per cent change 
Yearly Overall Yearly Overall 
1990 19.4    1990 1.3    
1991 16.8 - 2.6 ↓ 13.4% ↓ 1.4% 1991 1.3 = 0.0 = 0.0% = 0.0% 
1992 15.8 - 1.0 ↓ 6.0% ↓ 18.6% 1992 1.3 = 0.0 = 0.0% = 0.0% 
1993 15.5 - 0.3 ↓ 1.9% ↓ 20.1% 1993 1.2 - 0.1 ↓ 7.7% ↓ 7.7% 
1994 17.2 + 1.7 ↑ 11.0% ↓ 11.3% 1994 1.0 - 0.2 ↓ 16.7% ↓ 23.1% 
1995 17.8 + 0.6 ↑ 3.5% ↓ 8.2% 1995 1.0 = 0.0 = 0.0% ↓ 23.1% 
1996 18.3 + 0.5 ↑ 2.8% ↓ 5.7% 1996 1.0 = 0.0 = 0.0% ↓ 23.1% 
1997 17.5 - 0.8 ↓ 4.4% ↓ 9.8% 1997 0.6 - 0.4 ↓ 40.0% ↓ 53.8% 
1998 17.5 = 0.0 = 0.0% ↓ 9.8% 1998 0.6 = 0.0 = 0.0% ↓ 53.8% 
1999 17.6 + 0.1 ↑ 0.6% ↓ 9.3% 1999 0.6 = 0.0 = 0.0% ↓ 53.8% 
2000 17.0 - 0.6 ↓ 3.4% ↓ 12.4% 2000 0.6 = 0.0 = 0.0% ↓ 53.8% 
2001 15.7 - 1.3 ↓ 7.6% ↓ 19.1% 2001 0.6 = 0.0 = 0.0% ↓ 53.8% 
2002 14.9 - 0.8 ↓ 5.1% ↓ 23.2% 2002 0.5 - 0.1 ↓ 16.7% ↓ 61.5% 
2003 15.7 + 0.8 ↑ 5.4% ↓ 19.1% 2003 0.5 = 0.0 = 0.0% ↓ 61.5% 
2004 16.1 + 0.4 ↑ 2.5% ↓ 17.0% 2004 0.5 = 0.0 = 0.0% ↓ 61.5% 
2005 16.4 + 0.3 ↑ 1.9% ↓ 15.5% 2005 0.4 - 0.1 ↓ 20.0% ↓ 69.2% 
2006 15.6 - 0.8 ↓ 4.9% ↓ 19.6% 2006 0.3 - 0.1 ↓ 25.0% ↓ 76.9% 
2007 16.9 + 1.3 ↑ 8.3% ↓ 12.9% 2007 0.4 + 0.1 ↑ 33.3% ↓ 69.2% 
2008 15.3 - 1.6 ↓ 9.5% ↓ 21.1% 2008 0.3 - 0.1 ↓ 25.0% ↓ 76.9% 
2009 10.1 - 5.2 ↓ 34.0% ↓ 47.9% 2009 0.3 = 0.0 = 0.0% ↓ 76.9% 
2010 10.6 + 0.5 ↑ 5.0% ↓ 45.4% 2010 0.3 = 0.0 = 0.0% ↓ 76.9% 
2011 10.1 - 0.5 ↓ 4.7% ↓ 47.9% 2011 0.3 = 0.0 = 0.0% ↓ 76.9% 
2012 10.0 - 0.1 ↓ 1.0% ↓ 48.5% 2012 0.3 = 0.0 = 0.0% ↓ 76.9% 
2013 12.3 + 2.3 ↑ 23.0% ↓ 36.6% 2013 0.3 = 0.0 = 0.0% ↓ 76.9% 
2014 12.4 + 0.1 ↑ 0.8% ↓ 36.1% 2014 0.3 = 0.0 = 0.0% ↓ 76.9% 
2015 12.1 - 0.3 ↓ 2.4% ↓ 37.6% 2015 0.2 - 0.1 ↓ 33.3% ↓ 84.6% 
2016 10.0 -2.1 ↓ 17.4% ↓ 48.5% 2016 0.3 + 0.1 ↑ 50.0% ↓ 76.9% 
2017 10.2 + 0.2 ↑ 2.0% ↓ 47.4% 2017 0.2 - 0.1 ↓ 33.3% ↓ 84.6% 
2018 9.7 - 0.5 ↓ 4.9% ↓ 50.0% 2018 0.2 = 0.0 = 0.0% ↓ 84.6% 
20192 9.7 = 0.0 = 0.0% ↓ 50.0% 201971 0.2 = 0.0 = 0.0% ↓ 84.6% 
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Per cent change 
Yearly Overall 
1990 - 2.4    
1991 - 2.9 - 0.5 ↑ 20.8% ↑ 20.8% 
1992 - 3.7 - 0.8 ↑ 27.6% ↑ 54.2% 
1993 - 4.2 - 0.5 ↑ 13.5% ↑ 75.0% 
1994 - 4.4 - 0.2 ↑ 4.8% ↑ 83.3% 
1995 - 4.5 - 0.1 ↑ 2.3% ↑ 87.5% 
1996 - 5.3 - 0.8 ↑ 17.8% ↑ 120.8% 
1997 - 5.8 - 0.5 ↑ 9.4% ↑ 141.7% 
1998 - 6.5 - 0.7 ↑ 12.1% ↑ 170.8% 
1999 - 6.0 + 0.5 ↓ 7.7% ↑ 150.0% 
2000 - 6.3 - 0.3 ↑ 5.0% ↑ 162.5% 
2001 - 6.9 - 0.6 ↑ 9.5% ↑ 187.5% 
2002 - 7.8 - 0.7 ↑ 13.0% ↑ 225.0% 
2003 - 8.0 - 0.2 ↑ 2.6% ↑ 233.3% 
2004 - 8.7 - 0.7 ↑ 8.7% ↑ 262.5% 
2005 - 9.1 - 0.4 ↑ 4.6% ↑ 279.2% 
2006 - 9.6 - 0.5 ↑ 5.5% ↑ 300.0% 
2007 - 10.1 - 0.5 ↑ 5.2% ↑ 320.8% 
2008 - 10.6 - 0.5 ↑ 5.0% ↑ 341.7% 
2009 - 10.6 = 0.0 = 0.0% ↑ 341.7% 
2010 - 10.9 - 0.3 ↑ 2.8% ↑ 354.2% 
2011 - 11.4 - 0.5 ↑ 4.6% ↑ 375.0% 
2012 - 11.2 + 0.2 ↓ 1.8% ↑ 366.7% 
2013 - 11.3 - 0.1 ↑ 0.9% ↑ 370.8% 
2014 - 11.2 + 0.1 ↓ 0.9% ↑ 366.7% 
2015 - 11.4 - 0.2 ↑ 1.8% ↑ 375.0% 
2016 - 11.3 + 0.1 ↓ 0.9% ↑ 370.8% 
2017 - 11.5 - 0.2 ↑ 1.8% ↑ 379.2% 
2018 - 11.7 - 0.2 ↑ 1.7% ↑ 387.5% 
201972 - 11.7 = 0.0 = 0.0% ↑ 387.5% 
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Appendix P – England’s Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Table P.1 – England’s Total Greenhouse Gas Emissions (MtCO2e) between 1990 and 2018 


















Per cent change 
Yearly Overall 
1990 623.8    
1995 573.0 - 50.8  ↓ 8.1% 
1998 563.5 - 9.5  ↓ 9.7% 
1999 534.8 - 28.7 ↓ 5.1% ↓ 14.3% 
2000 532.1 - 2.8 ↓ 0.5% ↓ 14.7% 
2001 538.1 + 6.1 ↑ 1.1% ↓ 13.7% 
2002 529.9 - 8.2 ↓ 1.5% ↓ 15.1% 
2003 536.6 + 6.7 ↑ 1.3% ↓ 14.0% 
2004 531.8 - 4.8 ↓ 0.9% ↓ 14.7% 
2005 527.2 - 4.7 ↓ 0.9% ↓ 15.5% 
2006 516.9 - 10.3 ↓ 2.0% ↓ 17.1% 
2007 513.0 - 3.9 ↓ 0.8% ↓ 17.8% 
2008 494.5 - 18.5 ↓ 3.6% ↓ 20.7% 
2009 450.4 - 44.1 ↓ 8.9% ↓ 27.8% 
2010 458.1 + 7.7 ↑ 1.7% ↓ 26.6% 
2011 423.4 - 34.7 ↓ 7.6% ↓ 32.1% 
2012 438.2 + 14.8 ↑ 3.5% ↓ 29.7% 
2013 421.4 - 16.8 ↓ 3.8% ↓ 32.4% 
2014 390.1 - 31.3 ↓ 7.4% ↓ 37.5% 
2015 372.2 - 18.0 ↓ 4.6% ↓ 40.3% 
2016 348.5 - 23.6 ↓ 6.3% ↓ 44.1% 
2017 344.7 - 3.9 ↓ 1.1% ↓ 44.7% 
2018 338.7 - 6.0 ↓ 1.7% ↓ 45.7% 
Source: Data Adapted from Thistlethwaite et al. (2020) 
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Table P.2 – England’s total carbon dioxide emissions [KtCO2e] from energy supply and business 
between 1990 and 2018 




































Per cent change 
Yearly Overall Yearly Overall 
1990 216,828.3    1990 84,863.1    
1995 171,756.7 - 45,071.6  ↓ 20.8% 1995 84,109.0 - 754.1  ↓ 0.9% 
1998 156,890.8 - 14,866.0  ↓ 27.6% 1998 84,113.4 4.5  ↓ 0.9% 
1999 147,477.5 - 9,413.3 ↓ 6.0% ↓ 32.0% 1999 85,075.1 961.7 ↑ 1.1% ↑ 0.2% 
2000 151,705.2 + 4,227.7 ↑ 2.9% ↓ 30.0% 2000 85,675.5 600.4 ↑ 0.7% ↑ 1.0% 
2001 160,503.5 + 8,798.3 ↑ 5.8% ↓ 26.0% 2001 86,871.2 1,195.7 ↑ 1.4% ↑ 2.4% 
2002 162,276.7 + 1,773.1 ↑ 1.1% ↓ 25.2% 2002 82,904.9 - 3,966.4 ↓ 4.6% ↓ 2.3% 
2003 170,124.5 + 7,847.9 ↑ 4.8% ↓ 21.5% 2003 85,084.9 2,180.1 ↑ 2.6% ↑ 0.3% 
2004 167,498.4 - 2,626.2 ↓ 1.5% ↓ 22.8% 2004 84,936.0 - 149.0 ↓ 0.2% ↑ 0.1% 
2005 168,101.6 + 603.3 ↑ 0.4% ↓ 22.5% 2005 86,079.6 1,143.7 ↑ 1.3% ↑ 1.4% 
2006 168,257.1 + 155.5 ↑ 0.1% ↓ 22.4% 2006 83,904.6 - 2,175.1 ↓ 2.5% ↓ 1.1% 
2007 169,659.3 + 1,402.1 ↑ 0.8% ↓ 21.8% 2007 83,281.8 - 622.7 ↓ 0.7% ↓ 1.9% 
2008 162,138.6 - 7,520.7 ↓ 4.4% ↓ 25.2% 2008 81,676.4 - 1,605.4 ↓ 1.9% ↓ 3.8% 
2009 144,358.7 - 17,779.9 ↓ 11.0% ↓ 33.4% 2009 72,071.2 - 9,605.3 ↓ 11.8% ↓ 15.1% 
2010 148,556.7 + 4,198.0 ↑ 2.9% ↓ 31.5% 2010 72,601.6 530.5 ↑ 0.7% ↓ 14.4% 
2011 140,525.8 - 8,030.9 ↓ 5.4% ↓ 35.2% 2011 65,943.3 - 6,658.3 ↓ 9.2% ↓ 22.3% 
2012 147,832.0 + 7,306.2 ↑ 5.2% ↓ 31.8% 2012 69,119.9 3,176.6 ↑ 4.8% ↓ 18.6% 
2013 134,518.3 - 13,313.7 ↓ 9.0% ↓ 38.0% 2013 67,980.2 - 1,139.7 ↓ 1.6% ↓ 19.9% 
2014 116,035.6 - 18,482.7 ↓ 13.7% ↓ 46.5% 2014 66,494.2 - 1,486.0 ↓ 2.2% ↓ 21.6% 
2015 96,639.3 - 19,396.3 ↓ 16.7% ↓ 55.4% 2015 65,042.7 - 1,451.5 ↓ 2.2% ↓ 23.4% 
2016 75,426.7 - 21,212.6 ↓ 22.0% ↓ 65.2% 2016 61,564.7 - 3,478.0 ↓ 5.3% ↓ 27.5% 
2017 73,295.2 - 2,131.5 ↓ 2.8% ↓ 66.2% 2017 61,022.7 -542.0 ↓ 0.9% ↓ 28.1% 
2018 68,545.7 - 4,749.5 ↓ 6.5% ↓ 68.4% 2018 59,771.5 - 1,251.2 ↓ 2.1% ↓ 29.6% 
Source: Data Adapted from Thistlethwaite et al. (2020) 
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Table P.3 – England’s total carbon dioxide emissions [KtCO2e] from transport and public between 
1990 and 2018 




































Per cent change 
Yearly Overall Yearly Overall 
1990 104,682.2    1990 10,529.5    
1995 105,221.4 539.2  ↑ 0.5% 1995 10,432.5 - 97.0  ↓ 0.9% 
1998 108,787.5 3,566.1  ↑ 3.9% 1998 10,352.1 - 80.4  ↓ 1.7% 
1999 109,576.2 788.7 ↑ 0.7% ↑ 4.7% 1999 10,316.2 - 35.8 ↓ 0.3% ↓ 2.0% 
2000 108,338.9 - 1,237.3 ↓ 1.1% ↑ 3.5% 2000 9,710.1 - 606.1 ↓ 5.9% ↓ 7.8% 
2001 108,070.1 - 268.8 ↓ 0.2% ↑ 3.2% 2001 9,798.9 88.7 ↑ 0.9% ↓ 6.9% 
2002 109,741.0 1,670.9 ↑ 1.5% ↑ 4.8% 2002 8,315.1 - 1,483.8 ↓ 15.1% ↓ 21.0% 
2003 108,885.0 -856.0 ↓ 0.8% ↑ 4.0% 2003 8,254.1 - 60.9 ↓ 0.7% ↓ 21.6% 
2004 109,675.1 790.1 ↑ 0.7% ↑ 4.8% 2004 8,990.7 736.5 ↑ 8.9% ↓ 14.6% 
2005 110,134.9 459.7 ↑ 0.4% ↑ 5.2% 2005 8,942.8 - 47.9 ↓ 0.5% ↓ 15.1% 
2006 110,237.0 102.1 ↑ 0.1% ↑ 5.3% 2006 8,082.8 - 859.9 ↓ 9.6% ↓ 23.2% 
2007 111,216.0 979.1 ↑ 0.9% ↑ 6.2% 2007 7,530.0 - 552.8 ↓ 6.8% ↓ 28.5% 
2008 106,150.4 - 5,065.7 ↓ 4.6% ↑ 1.4% 2008 7,784.1 254.0 ↑ 3.4% ↓ 26.1% 
2009 101,962.2 - 4,188.2 ↓ 3.9% ↓ 2.6% 2009 7,097.3 - 686.8 ↓ 8.8% ↓ 32.6% 
2010 100,645.3 - 1,316.9 ↓ 1.3% ↓ 3.9% 2010 7,638.4 541.2 ↑ 7.6% ↓ 27.5% 
2011 99,278.8 - 1,366.4 ↓ 1.4% ↓ 5.2% 2011 6,435.6 - 1,202.8 ↓ 15.7% ↓ 38.9% 
2012 98,690.3 - 588.5 ↓ 0.6% ↓ 5.7% 2012 7,188.5 752.8 ↑ 11.7% ↓ 31.7% 
2013 97,439.5 - 1,250.9 ↓ 1.3% ↓ 6.9% 2013 7,365.2 176.8 ↑ 2.5% ↓ 30.1% 
2014 98,712.9 1,273.5 ↑ 1.3% ↓ 5.7% 2014 6,280.5 - 1,084.7 ↓ 14.7% ↓ 40.4% 
2015 100,471.6 1,758.7 ↑ 1.8% ↓ 4.0% 2015 6,373.3 92.8 ↑ 1.5% ↓ 39.5% 
2016 102,292.0 1,820.3 ↑ 1.8% ↓ 2.3% 2016 6,492.5 119.2 ↑ 1.9% ↓ 38.3% 
2017 102,302.2 10.2 ↑ 0.0% ↓ 2.3% 2017 6,222.9 - 269.6 ↓ 4.2% ↓ 40.9% 
2018 100,817.3 - 1,484.9 ↓ 1.5% ↓ 3.7% 2018 6,435.5 212.6 ↑ 3.4% ↓ 38.9% 




73 - Excluding International 
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Table P.4 – England’s total carbon dioxide emissions [KtCO2e] from residential and agriculture 
between 1990 and 2018 




































Per cent change 
Yearly Overall Yearly Overall 
1990 63,446.3    1990 33,483.1    
1995 65,822.3 + 2,376.0  ↑ 3.7% 1995 32,023.7 - 1,459.3  ↓ 4.4% 
1998 72,365.7 + 6,543.4  ↑ 14.1% 1998 31,845.3 - 178.5  ↓ 4.9% 
1999 72,057.4 - 308.3 ↓ 0.4% ↑ 13.6% 1999 31,873.3 + 28.0 ↑ 0.1% ↓ 4.8% 
2000 72,718.1 + 660.7 ↑ 0.9% ↑ 14.6% 2000 30,221.9 - 1,651.4 ↓ 5.2% ↓ 9.7% 
2001 74,600.7 + 1,882.6 ↑ 2.6% ↑ 17.6% 2001 28,294.9 - 1,927.0 ↓ 6.4% ↓ 15.5% 
2002 71,837.0 - 2,763.8 ↓ 3.7% ↑ 13.2% 2002 28,197.3 - 97.7 ↓ 0.3% ↓ 15.8% 
2003 72,796.2 + 959.3 ↑ 1.3% ↑ 14.7% 2003 28,731.5 + 534.2 ↑ 1.9% ↓ 14.2% 
2004 74,176.1 + 1,379.8 ↑ 1.9% ↑ 16.9% 2004 28,713.3 - 18.2 ↓ 0.1% ↓ 14.2% 
2005 70,583.5 - 3,592.6 ↓ 4.8% ↑ 11.2% 2005 28,445.8 - 267.5 ↓ 0.9% ↓ 15.0% 
2006 68,089.6 - 2,493.9 ↓ 3.5% ↑ 7.3% 2006 27,724.9 - 720.9 ↓ 2.5% ↓ 17.2% 
2007 65,028.8 - 3,060.8 ↓ 4.5% ↑ 2.5% 2007 27,120.5 - 604.4 ↓ 2.2% ↓ 19.0% 
2008 66,531.2 + 1,502.4 ↑ 2.3% ↑ 4.9% 2008 26,851.9 - 268.6 ↓ 1.0% ↓ 19.8% 
2009 63,689.8 - 2,841.4 ↓ 4.3% ↑ 0.4% 2009 26,605.7 - 246.2 ↓ 0.9% ↓ 20.5% 
2010 71,494.7 + 7,804.9 ↑ 12.3% ↑ 12.7% 2010 26,592.5 - 13.2 ↓ 0.0% ↓ 20.6% 
2011 57,181.0 - 14,313.6 ↓ 20.0% ↓ 9.9% 2011 26,739.5 + 147.0 ↑ 0.6% ↓ 20.1% 
2012 62,754.9 + 5,573.9 ↑ 9.7% ↓ 1.1% 2012 26,495.2 - 244.3 ↓ 0.9% ↓ 20.9% 
2013 63,335.1 + 580.2 ↑ 0.9% ↓ 0.2% 2013 26,262.9 - 232.3 ↓ 0.9% ↓ 21.6% 
2014 52,843.7 - 10,491.5 ↓ 16.6% ↓ 16.7% 2014 27,262.8 + 999.9 ↑ 3.8% ↓ 18.6% 
2015 55,037.0 + 2,193.4 ↑ 4.2% ↓ 13.3% 2015 27,006.2 - 256.6 ↓ 0.9% ↓ 19.3% 
2016 56,113.4 + 1,076.4 ↑ 2.0% ↓ 11.6% 2016 26,828.5 - 177.7 ↓ 0.7% ↓ 19.9% 
2017 54,355.2 - 1,758.2 ↓ 3.1% ↓ 14.3% 2017 27,162.9 + 334.4 ↑ 1.2% ↓ 18.9% 
2018 56,455.7 + 2,100.5 ↑ 3.9% ↓ 11.0% 2018 27,005.6 - 157.4 ↓ 0.6% ↓ 19.3% 
Source: Data Adapted from Thistlethwaite et al. (2020) 
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Table P.5 – England’s total carbon dioxide emissions [KtCO2e] from industrial processes and waste 
management between 1990 and 2018 




































Per cent change 
Yearly Overall Yearly Overall 
1990 54,251.0    1990 55,460.7    
1995 46,456.4 - 7,794.5  ↓ 14.4% 1995 57,591.8 2,131.1  ↑ 3.8% 
1998 43,992.3 - 2,464.1  ↓ 18.9% 1998 56,497.3 - 1,094.5  ↑ 1.9% 
1999 25,148.7 - 18,843.6 ↓ 42.8% ↓ 53.6% 1999 54,123.0 - 2,374.4 ↓ 4.2% ↓ 2.4% 
2000 22,599.3 - 2,549.4 ↓ 10.1% ↓ 58.3% 2000 52,018.1 - 2,104.9 ↓ 3.9% ↓ 6.2% 
2001 20,828.7 - 1,770.6 ↓ 7.8% ↓ 61.6% 2001 50,375.7 - 1,642.4 ↓ 3.2% ↓ 9.2% 
2002 18,866.3 - 1,962.3 ↓ 9.4% ↓ 65.2% 2002 49,416.9 - 958.8 ↓ 1.9% ↓ 10.9% 
2003 18,598.2 - 268.1 ↓ 1.4% ↓ 65.7% 2003 46,008.4 - 3,408.5 ↓ 6.9% ↓ 17.0% 
2004 17,666.6 - 931.6 ↓ 5.0% ↓ 67.4% 2004 42,499.3 - 3,509.1 ↓ 7.6% ↓ 23.4% 
2005 16,949.2 - 717.4 ↓ 4.1% ↓ 68.8% 2005 40,407.5 - 2,091.8 ↓ 4.9% ↓ 27.1% 
2006 15,510.5 - 1,438.7 ↓ 8.5% ↓ 71.4% 2006 37,751.9 - 2,655.6 ↓ 6.6% ↓ 31.9% 
2007 16,887.3 + 1,376.8 ↑ 8.9% ↓ 68.9% 2007 35,237.4 - 2,514.5 ↓ 6.7% ↓ 36.5% 
2008 15,263.3 - 1,624.0 ↓ 9.6% ↓ 71.9% 2008 31,368.7 - 3,868.7 ↓ 11.0% ↓ 43.4% 
2009 9,839.4 - 5,423.9 ↓ 35.5% ↓ 81.9% 2009 28,081.0 - 3,287.7 ↓ 10.5% ↓ 49.4% 
2010 10,043.6 + 204.3 ↑ 2.1% ↓ 81.5% 2010 24,159.1 - 3,921.9 ↓ 14.0% ↓ 56.4% 
2011 8,776.1 - 1,267.5 ↓ 12.6% ↓ 83.8% 2011 22,356.3 - 1,802.7 ↓ 7.5% ↓ 59.7% 
2012 8,717.9 - 58.1 ↓ 0.7% ↓ 83.9% 2012 21,412.7 - 943.6 ↓ 4.2% ↓ 61.4% 
2013 9,497.8 + 779.9 ↑ 8.9% ↓ 82.5% 2013 19,293.3 - 2,119.4 ↓ 9.9% ↓ 65.2% 
2014 9,262.5 - 235.4 ↓ 2.5% ↓ 82.9% 2014 17,629.6 - 1,663.7 ↓ 8.6% ↓ 68.2% 
2015 9,296.8 + 34.3 ↑ 0.4% ↓ 82.9% 2015 16,860.7 - 768.9 ↓ 4.4% ↓ 69.6% 
2016 7,986.9 - 1,309.9 ↓ 14.1% ↓ 85.3% 2016 16,356.6 - 504.1 ↓ 3.0% ↓ 70.5% 
2017 8,307.9 + 321.0 ↑ 4.0% ↓ 84.7% 2017 16,724.9 + 368.3 ↑ 2.3% ↓ 69.8% 
2018 7,653.8 - 654.1 ↓ 7.9% ↓ 85.9% 2018 16,946.4 + 221.5 ↑ 1.3% ↓ 69.4% 
Source: Data Adapted from Thistlethwaite et al. (2020) 
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Per cent change 
Yearly Overall 
1990 256.5    
1995 - 418.2 - 674.7  ↓ 263.0% 
1998 - 1,349.5 - 931.3  ↓ 626.1% 
1999 - 818.9 530.5 ↑ 39.3% ↓ 419.3% 
2000 - 935.4 - 116.4 ↓ 14.2% ↓ 464.7% 
2001 - 1,234.7 - 299.4 ↓ 32.0% ↓ 581.4% 
2002 - 1,636.5 - 401.8 ↓ 32.5% ↓ 738.0% 
2003 - 1,843.0 - 206.5 ↓ 12.6% ↓ 818.5% 
2004 - 2,308.7 - 465.7 ↓ 25.3% ↓ 1,000.1% 
2005 - 2,468.6 - 159.9 ↓ 6.9% ↓ 1,062.4% 
2006 - 2,694.6 - 226.0 ↓ 9.2% ↓ 1,150.6% 
2007 - 3,000.8 - 306.2 ↓ 11.4% ↓ 1,270.0% 
2008 - 3,311.6 - 310.8 ↓ 10.4% ↓ 1,391.1% 
2009 - 3,323.2 - 11.6 ↓ 0.4% ↓ 1,395.6% 
2010 - 3,610.2 - 287.0 ↓ 8.6% ↓ 1,507.5% 
2011 - 3,840.6 - 230.4 ↓ 6.4% ↓ 1,597.3% 
2012 - 3,974.9 - 134.3 ↓ 3.5% ↓ 1,649.7% 
2013 - 4,252.9 - 278.0 ↓ 7.0% ↓ 1,758.1% 
2014 - 4,390.4 - 137.4 ↓ 3.2% ↓ 1,811.7% 
2015 - 4,570.4 - 180.1 ↓ 4.1% ↓ 1,881.9% 
2016 - 4,515.6 + 54.8 ↑ 1.2% ↓ 1,860.5% 
2017 - 4,718.7 - 203.1 ↓ 4.5% ↓ 1,939.7% 
2018 - 4,916.7 - 198.0 ↓ 4.2% ↓ 2,016.9% 
Source: Data Adapted from Thistlethwaite et al. (2020) 
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Appendix Q – Eurobarometer Data on Consumption of News 
QB1 – In which of the following news related issues are you most interested in…? (Maximum 3 Answers) 
Table Q.1 – Which news related issues are civil society most interested in [April/May 2007] 
 









Other Don’t Know 
 Austria 1,011 371 (36.7%) 457 (45.2%) 220 (21.8%) 330 (32.6%) 202 (20.0%) 540 (53.4%) 87 (8.6%) 16 (1.6%) 
 Belgium 1,011 323 (31.9%) 427 (42.2%) 453 (44.8%) 349 (34.5%) 274 (27.1%) 333 (32.9%) 60 (5.9%) 8 (0.8%) 
 Bulgaria  1,039 410 (39.5%) 333 (32.1%) 205 (19.7%) 215 (20.7%) 244 (23.5%) 446 (42.9%) 67 (6.4%) 82 (7.9%) 
 Cyprus 502 213 (42.4%) 182 (36.3%) 225 (44.8%) 161 (32.1%) 198 (39.4%) 170 (33.9%) 16 (3.2%) 11 (2.2%) 
 Czech Republic 1,043 230 (22.1%) 477 (45.7%) 141 (13.1%) 407 (39.0%) 260 (24.9%) 452 (43.3%) 16 (1.5%) 21 (2.0%) 
 Denmark 1,002 622 (62.1%) 391 (39.0%) 495 (49.4%) 392 (39.1%) 379 (37.8%) 353 (35.2%) 19 (1.9%) 1 (0.1%) 
 Estonia 1,005 457 (45.5%) 394 (39.2%) 293 (29.2%) 399 (39.7%) 444 (44.2%) 402 (40.0%) 29 (2.9%) 25 (2.5%) 
 Finland 1,038 408 (39.3%) 494 (47.6%) 450 (43.4%) 353 (34.0%) 476 (45.9%) 340 (32.8%) 20 (1.9%) 4 (0.4%) 
 France 1,013 390 (38.5%) 429 (42.3%) 470 (46.4%) 445 (43.9%) 370 (36.3%) 287 (28.3%) 24 (2.4%) 7 (0.7%) 
 Germany 1,513 794 (52.5%) 577 (38.1%) 521 (34.4%) 443 (29.3%) 472 (31.2%) 571 (37.7%) 45 (3.0%) 14 (0.9%) 
 Greece 1,000 392 (39.2%) 296 (29.6%) 511 (51.1%) 330 (33.0%) 387 (38.7%) 366 (36.6%) 6 (0.6%) 1 (0.1%) 
 Hungary 1,006 245 (24.4%) 370 (36.8%) 240 (23.9%) 339 (33.7%) 345 (34.3%) 457 (45.4%) 19 (1.9%) 31 (3.1%) 
 Ireland 1,000 290 (29.0%) 541 (54.1%) 189 (18.9%) 255 (25.5%) 296 (29.6%) 416 (41.6%) 66 (6.6%) 41 (4.1%) 
 Italy 1,010 220 (21.8%) 336 (33.3%) 320 (31.7%) 284 (28.1%) 176 (17.4%) 252 (25.0%) 80 (7.9%) 60 (5.9%) 
 Latvia 1,013 336 (33.2%) 379 (37.4%) 258 (25.5%) 412 (40.7%) 322 (31.8%) 383 (37.8%) 22 (2.2%) 22 (2.2%) 
 Lithuania 1,018 287 (28.2%) 355 (34.9%) 223 (21.9%) 300 (29.5%) 293 (28.8%) 407 (40.0%) 112 (11.0%) 50 (4.9%) 
 Luxembourg 511 205 (40.1%) 202 (39.5%) 232 (45.4%) 180 (35.2%) 162 (31.7%) 152 (29.7%) 17 (3.3%) 3 (0.6%) 
 Malta 500 150 (30.0%) 188 (37.6%) 139 (27.8%) 176 (35.2%) 126 (25.2%) 233 (46.6%) 17 (3.4%) 6 (1.2%) 
 Netherlands 1,009 539 (53.4%) 392 (38.9%) 416 (41.2%) 404 (40.0%) 386 (38.3%) 238 (23.6%) 55 (5.5%) 10 (1.0%) 
 Poland 1,000 275 (27.5%) 392 (39.2%) 175 (17.5%) 257 (25.7%) 307 (30.7%) 432 (43.2%) 26 (2.6%) 53 (5.3%) 
 Portugal 1,011 203 (20.1%) 457 (45.2%) 164 (16.2%) 272 (26.9%) 148 (14.6%) 420 (41.5%) 68 (6.7%) 51 (5.0%) 
 Romania 1,019 316 (31.0%) 395 (38.8%) 176 (17.3%) 218 (21.4%) 278 (27.3%) 581 (57.0%) 72 (7.1%) 43 (4.2%) 
 Slovakia 1,106 412 (37.3%) 490 (44.3%) 213 (19.3%) 427 (38.6%) 383 (34.6%) 551 (49.8%) 34 (3.1%) 13 (1.2%) 
 Slovenia 1,013 333 (32.9%) 490 (48.4%) 300 (29.6%) 237 (23.4%) 415 (41.0%) 3127 (31.3%) 80 (7.9%) 7 (0.7%) 
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Table Q.1 – Which news related issues are civil society most interested in [April/May 2007] (Continued) 
 









Other Don’t Know 
 Spain 1,000 193 (19.3%) 396 (39.6%) 227 (22.7%) 393 (39.3%) 176 (17.6%) 250 (25.0%) 140 (14.0%) 33 (3.3%) 
 Sweden 1,005 508 (50.5%) 456 (45.4%) 558 (55.5%) 338 (33.6%) 465 (46.3%) 265 (26.4%) 15 (1.5%) 4 (0.4%) 
 United Kingdom 1,319 361 (27.4%) 562 (42.6%) 383 (29.0%) 361 (27.4%) 351 (26.6%) 423 (32.1%) 29 (2.2%) 64 (4.9%) 
















Note: All Percentages might not add up to 100 per cent due to rounding errors 
Source: Data Adapted from Eurobarometer (2007)
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Appendix R – Socio-Economic Breakdown of Surveys from this Thesis 
 
Table R.1 – Respondent’s Nation Breakdown from Questionnaire 1 
Respondent’s Nation Number or 
Respondents 
Percentage United Kingdom Share 
England 886 78.1% 81.6% 83.9% 
Northern Ireland 21 1.9% 1.9% 2.8% 
Scotland 58 5.1% 5.3% 8.2% 
Wales 76 6.7% 7.0% 4.7% 
Crown Dependencies 45 4.0% 4.1% 0.4% 
International / Refused 48 4.2%  
Total 1,134  
Note: All Percentages might not add up to 100 per cent due to rounding errors 
Source: Author 
 
Table R.2 – Respondent’s Religion Breakdown from Questionnaire 1 
Respondent’s Religion Number of 
Respondents 
Percentage United Kingdom 
Population74 
Christianity 508 44.8% 47.9% 59.3% 
Islam 15 1.3% 1.4% 4.8% 
Hinduism 7 0.6% 0.7% 1.5% 
Sikhism 1 0.1% 0.1% 0.8% 
Judaism 5 0.4% 0.5% 0.5% 
Buddhism 9 0.8% 0.9% 0.4% 
Atheism 453 40.0% 42.7% 25.1% 
Others 63 5.6% 5.9% 0.4% 
Multiple Answers 
Given 2 0.2% 
  
Refused 71 6.3% 
Total 1,134  
Note: All Percentages might not add up to 100 per cent due to rounding errors 








74 - Based upon 2011 Census Data 
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Table R.3 – Respondent’s Sexuality Breakdown from Questionnaire 1 
Respondent’s Sexuality Number of Respondents Percentage 
Heterosexual 977 86.2% 92.6% 
Bisexual 37 3.3% 3.5% 
Homosexual 37 3.3% 3.5% 
Asexual 4 0.4% 0.4% 
Refused 79 7.0%  
Total 1,134  
Note: All Percentages might not add up to 100 per cent due to rounding errors 
Source: Author 
 
Table R.4 – Respondent’s Employment Breakdown from Questionnaire 1 
In Employment? Number of Respondents Percentage 
Yes 710 62.6% 63.5% 
No 408 36.0% 36.5% 
Refused 16 1.4%  
Total 1,134  
Note: All Percentages might not add up to 100 per cent due to rounding errors 
Source: Author 
 
Table R.5 – Respondent’s Ethnicity Breakdown from Questionnaire 1 
Respondent’s Ethnicity Number of Respondents Percentage 
White 1,031 90.92% 94.41% 
Asian [British] 28 2.47% 2.56% 
Mixed [British] 19 1.68% 1.74% 
Black 12 1.06% 1.10% 
Others 7 0.62% 0.64% 
Arab 2 0.18% 0.18% 
Refused 35 3.09%  
Total 1,134  
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Table R.6 – Respondent’s Home Region Breakdown from Questionnaire 2 
Respondent’s Home Region Number of 
Respondents 
Percentage 
North East England 252 14.8% 15.7% 
North West England 204 12.0% 12.7% 
Yorkshire and the Humber 135 7.9% 8.4% 
East Midlands 71 4.2% 4.4% 
West Midlands 59 3.5% 3.7% 
East of England 93 5.5% 5.8% 
London 142 8.4% 8.8% 
South East England 177 10.4% 11.0% 
South West England 170 10.0% 10.6% 
Wales 32 1.9% 2.0% 
Scotland 133 7.8% 8.3% 
Northern Ireland 65 3.8% 4.0% 
Crown Dependencies 2 0.1% 0.1% 
Others 73 4.3% 4.5% 
Refused 92 5.4%  
Total 1,700 100.0% 




Reference Number: ______________ 
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Appendix S – First Questionnaire [March to September 2017] 
SECTION 1 – Climate Change 
Question 1 – Which of the following do you think is the greatest threat that we currently face? 
(Please circle only one) 
1. Climate Change 
2. Diseases (e.g. Ebola and Zika Virus) 
3. Economic Instability 
4. Espionage (e.g. Governmental Spying) 
5. Migration 
6. Nuclear Weapons 
7. Political Tensions 
8. Terrorism (e.g. Al Qaeda and IS) 
Question 2 – Which of the following do you believe is the greatest environment issue we face? 
(Please circle only one)
1. Air Pollution 
2. Animal Extinction 
3. Climate Change 
4. Damage to the Ozone Layer 
5. Deforestation of Rainforests 
6. Genetic Engineering 
7. Overpopulation 
8. Radiation 
9. Resource Depletion 
10. Waste 
11. Water Pollution 
Question 3 – Do you believe that the world’s climate is changing? 
1. Yes 
2. No (Go to Question 5) 
3. Don’t Know (Go to Question 5) 
Question 4 – What do you believe is the cause of this change? (Please circle only one) 
1. Caused by natural processes, either mainly or entirely 
2. Caused by human processes, either mainly or entirely 
3. Caused by a combination of human and natural processes 
Question 5 – Finish the following sentences about United Kingdom and Global Temperatures. (Delete 
increase/describe as appropriate) 
1. The United Kingdom temperatures have [increased/decreased] by ____oC since 1915. 
2. Global temperatures have [increased/decreased] by ____oC since 1880. 
3. The United Kingdom temperatures will [increase/decrease] by ____oC by 2100. 
4. Global temperatures will [increase/decrease] by ____oC by 2100. 
 Question 6 – Finish the following sentences about global sea-level. (Delete increase/describe as 
appropriate) (Please note, there are no right or wrong answers) 
1. Global sea-level has [increased/decreased] by ____ meters since 1880. 
2. Global sea-level will [increased/decreased] by ____ meters by 2100. 
Question 7 – Which of the following terms do you use to describe the current perceived change in 
the climate? (Please circle only one) 
1. Climate Change 2. Global Cooling 3. Global Warming 
Reference Number: ______________ 
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Question 8 – How fearful are you of both climate change and global warming? (Please tick only one 













Climate Change      
Global Warming      
 
Question 9 – Is climate change and global warming a good thing for the environment and humanity? 











Climate Change      
Global Warming      
 
Question 10 – What do you think is the cause of both climate change and global warming? (Please 
tick only one response per row) 
 Natural Processes Human Processes Both Human and 
Natural 
Climate Change    
Global Warming    
 
Question 11 – With future climate change, how do you think the following issues are going to change 
within the United Kingdom? (Please tick only one response per row) 
 Lower Occurrence Same Rate of 
Occurrence 
Greater Occurrence 
Animal Extinctions    
Cold Waves    
Crop Losses    
Diseases    
Droughts    
Economic Losses    
Flooding    
Heat Wave    
Migration    
Insurance Premiums    
Poor Air Quality    
Rainfall    
Snowfall (+ Blizzards)    
Water Availability    
Wild Fires    
Wind Storms    
 
Reference Number: ______________ 
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Question 12 – What do you think is the percentage of climate scientists that believe humans are 






Question 13 – How trustworthy do you think different people and organisations are in relation in 













Celebrities      
Education Sector (Schools etc.)      
Environmental Groups      
Family      
Friends      
Local Government      
National Government      
Police      
Religious Leaders      
Scientists and Researchers      
 
SECTION 2 – Climate Change and Education 
Question 14 – Were you taught at school/college/university about climate change?  
1. Yes 
2. No (Go to Question 17) 
3. Don’t Know (Go to Question 17) 
Question 15 – Which level of education were you taught about climate change? (Circle all that apply) 
1. Primary School 
2. Secondary School 
3. College 
4. University 




Question 17 – What level of education should climate change be taught at? (Circle all that apply) 
1. Primary School 
2. Secondary School 
3. College 
4. University 
Question 18 – Do you think that workshops and presentations should be offered freely to the public 
to explain the science and effects of climate change? 
1. Yes 2. No 3. Don’t Know 
 
Reference Number: ______________ 
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SECTION 3 – Climate Change and You 
Question 19 – Have you previously been affected by an extreme weather event? 
1. Yes 2. No 3. Don’t Know 
Question 20 – Which of the following have you been significantly impacted by in the last five years? 
(Circle all that apply) 
1. Blizzard 
2. Cold Wave (Extreme Cold Temperatures) 
3. Drought 
4. Extreme Wind (70+ mph) 
5. Flooding 




Question 21 – Do you think experiencing these extreme weather conditions have changed your 
perception of climate change? 
1. Yes 
2. No (Go to Question 23) 
3. Don’t Know (Go to Question 23) 




Question 23 – Which of the following have you undertaken in the last three years, which have 
reduced your contributions towards climate change? (Circle all that apply) 
1. Driving an electric/hybrid car 
2. Making fewer car journeys 
3. Car share to work 
4. Walk or Cycle to work 
5. Public Transport 
6. Buy second hand produces 
7. Buy food with less packaging 
8. Buy locally grown food 
9. Eat less meat 
10. Grow your own food 
11. Install house insulation 
12. Install low energy light blubs 
13. Install renewable energy 
14. Unplug appliance when not used 
15. Switch off lights 
16. Turn down heating 
17. Use water sparingly 
18. Reduce personal waste production 
19. Recycle Waste 
Question 24 – Are you a member of an environmental organisation? 
1. Yes 2. No (Go to Question 27)




Reference Number: ______________ 
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SECTION 4 – Climate Change Policy 
Question 26 – Do you agree that the United Kingdom should be reducing its greenhouse gas 
emissions (e.g. carbon dioxide, methane etc.), which is believed to be the main cause of perceived 







     
 
Question 27 – In 2008, the United Kingdom passed legislation that stated greenhouse gas emissions 
should be cut by 80 per cent by the year 2050. How much are you in favour or opposed to this 







     
 
Question 28 – Currently, 57.95p per litre of petrol and diesel sold at petrol stations goes to the 
government in terms of Fuel Duty. In the past, it has been suggested that rises in Fuel Duty has 
resulted in increased efficiency of vehicles. How supportive would you be if the Government would 







     
 
Question 29 – In April 2017, the British Government is changing the Road Tax on new vehicles, which 
is aimed at promoting the sale of low emitting vehicles. It is estimated that 70 per cent of new cars 
will be subject to increases in Road Tax. For example, Road Tax for a Land Rover Discovery will see its 
increase from £1,100 to £2,000 in the first year. How supportive or opposed are you to this change 







     
 
Question 30 – Which of the following electricity supply do you think the UK should be using? (Circle 










Question 31 – On a scale of 1 to 5, do you think the British Government is doing enough about 







     
 
Question 32 – What do you think the Government should be doing in the future to combat against 
the effects of climate change? 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Reference Number: ______________ 
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SECTION 5 – Media and Climate Change 
Question 33 – How often do you watch, read and listen to the news each week? (Please Tick only 
one response per row) 
 I Don’t 1 or 2 Days a 
Week 
3 or 4 Days a 
Week 
5 or 6 Days a 
Week 
Daily 
Television News      
Radio News      
Newspapers      
 
Question 34 – Which of the following television news do you usually watch? (Circle all that apply) 
1. Al Jazeera 
2. BBC News 
3. Channel 4 News 
4. Channel 5 News 
5. ITV News 
6. RT (Russia Today) 
7. Sky News 
8. Others: 
_____________ 
Question 35 – Which radio news do you most frequently listen to? 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Question 36 – Which national newspaper (including online) do you read? (Circle all that apply) 
1. City A.M. 
2. Daily Express 
3. Daily Mail 
4. Daily Mirror 
5. Daily Record 
6. Daily Star 
7. Financial Times 
8. i 
9. Metro 
10. Morning Star 
11. The Daily Telegraph 
12. The Guardian 
13. The Herald 
14. The Independent 
15. The Irish News 
16. The National 
17. The Scotsman 
18. The Sun 
19. The Times 
20. Western Mail
Question 37 – If you were an editor of a major newspaper, what would be your main headline to 
describe climate change? 
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Question 38 – Do you use social media? 
1. Yes 2. No (Go to Question 40) 









9. Other Blogs/Forum Sites 
10. Other Video Sites
Question 40 – Do you gather information about climate change from social media sites? 
1. Yes 2. No 3. Don’t Know 
Reference Number: ______________ 
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Question 41 – In the past week, have you heard, seen or read any news about climate change? 
1. Yes 2. No 3. Don’t Know 
Question 42 – Do you think that news about effects of climate change is exaggerated? 
1. Yes 2. No 
Question 43 – Which of the following statements do you believe is true about climate change and 
the media? (Please circle only one) 
1. The media should be reporting less about human caused climate change 
2. The media are reporting the right amount about human caused climate change 
3. The media should be reporting more about human caused climate change 
SECTION 6 – Demographic Data 







Question 45 – Are you? 
1. Male 2. Female 3. Other: ________ 
Question 46 – What is your hometown and/or county? [Please be specific i.e. North Yorkshire instead 
of Yorkshire] 
Hometown:_______________________________   County:________________________________ 





c. Other White 
2. Mixed Race 
a. White and Black Caribbean 
b. White and Black African 
c. White and Asian 
d. Others Mixed Races 
3. Arab 
 





e. Others: ______________ 
5. Black or Black British 
a. Caribbean 
b. African 
c. Others: ______________ 
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7. None (Atheism) 
8. Other Religion: 
________________ 
Question 49 – Which of the following sexuality best describes you? 
1. Heterosexual (e.g. Straight) 
2. Bisexual 
3. Homosexual (e.g. Gay or Lesbian) 
4. Asexual 
Question 50 – Which is the highest academic education you have completed and currently 
undertaken? If other, please be specific. 
 Completed Currently Undertaken 
No Formal Qualifications   
GCSE   
A Levels/AS Levels   
First Degree (e.g. BA/BSc)   
Higher Degree (e.g. MSc/PGCE)   
Doctoral Degree (e.g. PhD)   
Other   




4. Liberal Democrats 
5. Plaid Cymru 
6. Scottish National Party (SNP) 
7. UK Independence Party (UKIP) 
8. Others: __________________ 
Question 52 – Which of the following categories best describes your household income? 
1. <£10,000 
2. £10,000 - £19,999 
3. £20,000 - £29,999 
4. £30,000 - £39,999 
5. £40,000 - £49,999 
6. >£49,999 
Question 53 – Are you employed? 
1. Yes (including self-employed) 2. No 
If yes, please specify: ________________________________________________________________ 
SECTION 7 – Further Information 
Would you be willing to potentially answer further questions in the future about climate change for 
this study? 
1. Yes 2. No 
If you wish to have a copy of the findings, then please leave an email address here: 
__________________________________________________________________________________
Reference Number: ______________ 
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Appendix T – Second Questionnaire [May to July 2019] 
SECTION 1 – Climate Change 
Question 1 – Do you believe that the world’s climate is changing? 
1. Yes 
2. No (Go to Question 3) 
3. Don’t Know (Go to Question 3) 
Question 2 – What do you believe is the cause of this change? (Please circle only one) 
1. Caused by natural processes, either mainly or entirely 
2. Caused by human processes, either mainly or entirely 
3. Caused by a combination of human and natural processes 
Question 3 – Have you ever heard of “Extinction Rebellion” before today? 
1. Yes 
2. No (Go to Question 7) 
3. Don’t Know (Go to Question 7) 
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Question 7 – Have you ever heard of “School Strike for Climate” before today? 
1. Yes 
2. No (Go to Question 9) 
3. Don’t Know (Go to Question 9) 







     
 















Reference Number: ______________ 
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SECTION 2 - Demographic Data 








Question 11 – Are you? 
1. Male 
2. Female 
3. Other: __________ 
Question 12 – What is your hometown and/or county? [Please be specific i.e. North Yorkshire instead 
of Yorkshire] 
Hometown:_______________________________   County:________________________________ 





c. Other White 
2. Mixed Race 
a. White and Black Caribbean 
b. White and Black African 
c. White and Asian 
d. Other Mixed Races 
3. Arab 





e. Others: __________ 
5. Black or Black British 
a. Caribbean 
b. African 
c. Others: __________ 
6. Others: __________ 
Question 14 – What is your political identification? (Please circle only one) 
1. Brexit Party 




6. Liberal Democrats 
7. Plaid Cymru 
8. Scottish National Party (SNP) 
9. UK Independence Party (UKIP) 
10. Others: __________________ 
 
SECTION 3 – Further Information 
If you wish to have a copy of the findings, then please leave an email address here: 
__________________________________________________________________________________  
Thank you again for completing this survey on climate change activism. 
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Appendix U – Interview Permission Form 
Climate Change Perception, Engagement and Reaction Interview Release Document 
You are been asked to participate in research designed to better understand the public’s perception, 
engagement and reaction towards climate change. You were selected due the response that you 
gave during your questionnaire flagged some interesting results and/or within the target age group 
for this study. The study is based upon that there is a consensus within the scientific community that 
current climate change is as a result of human-related activities. However, the level of acceptance 
amongst the public is much lower. This lower level of perception that human caused climate change 
is occurring, results in fewer people both reacting and engaging with climate change and its effects. 
Therefore, this interview will examine key themes of why people perceive climate change the way 
that they do. The findings of the research will be written up in my Doctoral Thesis and other future 
publications.   
Please contact me using the details above if: 
• you have any questions or comments about the research; 
• you wish to withdraw your responses from the research; 
• you would like to access the information you have given to the research. 
All information will be handled under the Data Protection Act: paper copies of questionnaires will be 
stored securely with names/identifiers kept separately from the content of the questionnaires; 
electronic data sheets and analysis will be stored securely on a password-protected computer. All 
data will be kept for future reference and be kept for a minimum of two years after the project has 
finished. 
All respondents are guaranteed anonymity unless otherwise agreed – no real names of individuals, 
businesses, organisations or places of work, or contact addresses/details will be used in reports or 
dissemination of research unless you request it. 
If you have any questions or would like additional clarification regarding this research, please 
contact me at your convenience at: +44 7511 413 677 or by e-mail at 
ashley.parry@northumbria.ac.uk. By completing this interview you are furthering the development 
of knowledge within topic of climate anthropology. 
Thank you for your participation. 
Mark Ashley Parry 
----------------------------------------------------- 
I give my permission to be interviewed and to have my voice recorded as a part of this research 
being conducted. 
__________________________      ___________________ 
Signature        Date  
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Appendix V – List of Data Sources Used within this Thesis 
 
Table V.1 – List of data sources used within this thesis 
Source Years of Publication 
BEIS 2012-2020 (x4) 
DfT 2020 
Eurobarometer 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015, 2017, 2019 
Ofcom 2018, 2020 
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Appendix W – Sample BEIS Questionnaire 
 
Energy Saving and Wasting 
Question 2 – How much thought, if any, would you say you give to saving energy in your home? 
1. A lot 
2. A fair amount 
3. Not very much 
4. None at all 
5. Don’t Know 
 
Question 4 – How often, if at all, do you personally do any of the following? 
a) Leaving the lights on when you are not in the room. 
b) Boil the kettle with more water than you are going to use. 
c) Wash clothes at 30 degrees or lower. 
d) Try to keep rooms that you are not using at a cooler temperature than those you are using. 
e) Leave the heating on when you go out for a few hours. 
 
1. Always 
2. Very often 
3. Quite often 
4. Occasionally 
5. Never 
6. Don’t Know 
7. Not Applicable 
 
Renewables 
Question 3 – The new question is about renewable. This covers a number of different forms, 
including wind power, solar energy and biomass. 
Do you support or oppose the use of renewable energy for providing our electricity, fuel and heat? 
1. Strongly support 
2. Support 
3. Neither support nor oppose 
4. Oppose 
5. Strongly oppose 
6. Don’t Know 
 
Question 12 – I’m now going to read out a number of statements about renewable energy. Please 
tell me how much you agree or disagree with each on. As mentioned earlier, renewable energy 
covers a number of different forms, including wind power, solar energy and biomass. 
a) Renewable energy industries and developments provide economic benefits to the UK 
b) I would be happy to have a large scale renewable energy development in my area 
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1. Strongly agree 
2. Slightly agree 
3. Neither agree not disagree 
4. Slightly disagree 
5. Strongly disagree 
6. Don’t Know 
 
Question 13 – Generally speaking, do you support or oppose the use of the following renewable 
energy developments: 
a) On-shore wind 
b) Biomass – this includes any plant or animal base material such as wood, specially grown 
energy crops, and other organic wastes that can be used in the process of creating energy 
c) Off-shore wind 
d) Wave and tidal 
e) Solar 
 
1. Strongly Support 
2. Support 
3. Neither support nor oppose 
4. Oppose 
5. Strongly Oppose 
6. Don’t Know 
 
Nuclear Energy 
Question 14 – I’m now going to ask you for your opinion on a number of issues in relation to nuclear 
energy. 
Please just tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements. (Letters have 
changed) 
a) Nuclear energy will help combat climate change in the UK (1) 
b) Nuclear energy provides a reliable source of affordable energy in the UK 
c) Nuclear energy generates economic benefits to the UK 
d) Nuclear energy is a cost effective way of meeting the UK’s energy needs 
e) Nuclear energy provides a reliable source of energy in the UK (17) 
f) Nuclear energy offers affordable energy for the UK (17) 
g) Nuclear energy provides a safe source of energy in the UK (17) 
 
1. Strongly agree 
2. Slightly agree 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Slightly disagree 
5. Strongly disagree 
6. Don’t Know 
 
Question 14a – From what you know, or have heard about using nuclear energy for generating 
electricity in the UK, do you support or oppose its use? 
1. Strongly Support 
2. Support 
3. Neither Support no Oppose 
4. Oppose 
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5. Strongly Oppose 6. Don’t Know/No Opinion 
 
Carbon Capture and Storage 
Question 15 – How much, if anything, do you know about carbon capture and storage? 
1. Know a lot about it 
2. Know a little about it 
3. Aware of it but don’t really know what it is 
4. Never heard of it 
 
Question 15ai – From what you know, or have heard about using carbon capture and storage in the 
UK, do you support or oppose its use? 
1. Strongly Support 
2. Support 
3. Neither Support nor Oppose 
4. Oppose 
5. Strongly Oppose 
6. Don’t Know/No Opinion 
 
Shale Gas 
The next question is about shale gas. Shale gas is natural gas found in shale, a non-porous rock which 
does not allow the gas to escape. 
Hydraulic fracturing or “fracking” is a process of pumping water at high pressure into shale to create 
narrow fractures which allow the gas to be released and captured. 
The gas can then be used for electricity and heating. 
Question 15a – Before today, how much, if anything, did you know about hydraulic fracturing for 
shale gas, otherwise known as ‘fracking’? 
1. Knew a lot about it 
2. Knew a little about it 
3. Aware of it but did not really know what it was 
4. Never heard of it 
 
Question 15b – From what you know, or have heard about, extracting shale gas to generate the UK’s 
heat and electricity, do you support or oppose its use? 
1. Strongly Support 
2. Support 
3. Neither Support nor Oppose 
4. Oppose 
5. Strongly Oppose 
6. Don’t Know/No Opinion 
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Question 15c – You said that you support hydraulic fracturing for shale gas, otherwise known as 
fracking. Why is this? (Only asked if Q15b = 1 or 2) 
1. Good for local jobs and investment 
2. Reduces dependence on other countries for UK’s energy supply 
3. Reduce dependence on other fossil fuels (coal, oil) 
4. Need to use all available energy sources 
5. Will have positive impact on climate change / meeting carbon reduction targets 
6. May result in cheaper energy bills 
7. Will have positive impact on UK economy 
8. Won’t affect me/my local area so no personal impact 
9. Positive reports in the media 
10. Community benefits 
11. Shale Wealth Fund 
12. No specific reason 
13. Other (specify) 
14. Don’t Know 
 
Question 15d – You said that you oppose hydraulic fracturing for shale gas, otherwise known as 
fracking. Why is this? (Only asked if Q15b = 4 or 5) 
1. Loss/destruction of natural environment 
2. Increased traffic/noise/disruption 
3. Local house prices will fall 
4. Use of chemicals in the process 
5. Should focus on developing renewable energy sources 
6. Should focus on developing other energy sources 
7. Risk of contamination to water supply 
8. Risk of earthquakes 
9. Negative impact on climate change / meeting carbon reduction targets 
10. Not a safe process 
11. Will not be regulated effectively 
12. Negative reports in the media 
13. Too much risk / uncertainty to support at present 
14. No Specific reason 
15. Other (specify) 
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Question 15e – You said that you either [don’t know whether your support or oppose] or [neither 
support nor oppose] hydraulic fracturing for shale gas, otherwise known as fracking. Why is this? 
1. Don’t know enough about it 
2. Not interested in it 
3. I can see the positives and negative  
4. Haven’t made up my mind yet 
5. Will have no impact on me 
6. There are many vocal campaigns and I don’t know what to believe 
7. Have never heard of it 
8. Other (specify) 
 
Electric Vehicles 
Question 10 – The next question is about electric cars and vans, that is, cars and vans that are 
recharged by plugging them directly into an electricity supply. Which of these statements best 
describes your attitude towards buying an electric car or van? 
1. I already own an electric car or van. 
2. I am thinking about buying an electric car or van quite soon. 
3. I am thinking about buying an electric car or van, but I haven’t thought about when I will buy 
it. 
4. I have thought about buying an electric car or van, but have decided not to at this stage. 
5. I haven’t really thought about buying an electric car or van. 
6. I have never heard of electric cars or vans. 
7. I don’t drive / don’t need a car. 
8. Don’t Know. 
 
Climate Change 
Question 21 – How concerned, if at all, are you about climate change, sometimes referred to as 
‘global warming’? 
1. Very concerned 
2. Fairly concerned 
3. Not very concerned 
4. Not at all concerned 
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Question 22 – Thinking about the causes of climate change, which, if any, o the following best 
describe your opinion? 
1. Climate change is entirely caused by natural processes 
2. Climate change is mainly caused by natural processes 
3. Climate change is partly caused by natural processes and partly caused by human activity 
4. Climate change is mainly caused by human activity 
5. Climate change is entirely caused by human activity 
6. I don’t think there is such a thing as climate change 
7. Don’t know 
8. No opinion 
 
And now a few more questions about climate change, also known as global warming. By climate 
change we mean a long-term shift in the planet’s weather patterns and rising average global 
temperatures. 
 
Question 180 – Which of these describes your views about the impact of climate change in the UK? 
(Only asked if Question 22 = 1 or 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 or 7 or 8) 
1. Climate change is already having an impact in the UK. 
2. Climate change is not yet having an impact, but will do in my lifetime. 
3. Climate will not have an impact in my lifetime, but will do for future generations in the UK. 
4. Climate change is not happening / will never have an impact in the UK. 
 
Question 181 – And how much, if at all, do you think climate change is currently affecting… (Only 
asked if Question 22 = 1 or 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 or 7 or 8) 
a) Your local area 
b) People in the UK as a whole 
c) People in other countries 
 
1. A great deal 
2. To some extent 
3. Not too much 
4. Not at all 
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Question 182 – Thinking just about the UK, have you noticed any impacts of climate change over the 
past few years? If so, which ones? (Only asked if Question 22 = 1 or 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 or 7 or 8) 
1. Rising sea levels / more flooding 
2. Reduced food availability / impact on farming 
3. Reduced water availability / droughts 
4. Changes in plants or wildlife / plants or animal extinction 
5. More health problems (e.g. asthma) 
6. Rising temperatures / heat / hotter summers 
7. More extreme events such as storms 
8. Increased pollution 
9. Increased wildfires 
10. Increased coastal erosion 
11. Other (specify) 
12. None/ have not noticed any impacts 
13. Don’t Know 
 
Question 183 – Which of these do you think are likely to occur in the UK in the next 15 to 20 years as 
a result of climate change? You can choose as many as you want. (Only asked if Question 22 = 1 or 2 
or 3 or 4 or 5 or 7 or 8) 
1. Rising sea levels / more flooding 
2. Reduced food availability / impact on farming 
3. Reduced water availability / droughts 
4. Changes in plants or wildlife / plants or animal extinction 
5. More health problems (e.g. asthma) 
6. Rising temperatures / heat / hotter summers 
7. More extreme events such as storms 
8. Increased pollution 
9. Increased wildfires 
10. Increased coastal erosion 
11. Other (specify) 
12. None/ have not noticed any impacts 
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Question 184 – Thinking now about your everyday life, do you do any of these things? 
1. Choose to walk, cycle or use public transport more instead of using a car. 
2. Avoid / Eat less meat. 
3. Avoid / Eat less dairy produce. 
4. Avoid / minimise throwing away food. 
5. Drive an electric or hybrid car. 
6. Think about the energy efficiency of products. 
7. Minimise the amount of energy you use at home (for example, washing at lower 
temperatures, switch off lights). 
8. Avoid / minimise air travel. 
9. None of the above 
10. Don’t Know 
 
Question 185 – You mentioned that you currently do [Question 184 – Response 1 to 8]. What would 
you say is the main reason for this? 
1. I do this mainly because I want to help limit the effects of climate change. 
2. I do this mainly for other reasons (e.g. lifestyle choice, cost, convenience, health, ethical 
reasons) 
3. A mixture of both 
4. No particular reason 
5. Don’t Know 
 
Question 186 – If everybody in the UK did the following, which three of these do you think would 
have the biggest impact on tackling climate change in the UK? (Only asked if Question 22 = 1 or 2 or 
3 or 4 or 5 or 7 or 8) 
1. Choose to walk, cycle or use public transport more instead of using a car. 
2. Avoid / Eat less meat. 
3. Avoid / Eat less dairy produce. 
4. Avoid / minimise throwing away food. 
5. Drive an electric or hybrid car. 
6. Think about the energy efficiency of products. 
7. Minimise the amount of energy you use at home (for example, washing at lower 
temperatures, switch off lights). 
8. Avoid / minimise air travel. 
9. None of the above 
10. Don’t Know 
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Question 187 – Which of these do you think should have the most responsibility for tackling the 
effects of climate change in the UK? (Only asked if Question 22 = 1 or 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 or 7 or 8) 
1. The general public, by making changes to their lifestyle. 
2. Businesses, by doing more to reduce their impact on the environment. 
3. Government, by introducing more policies to reduce the level of carbon emissions. 
4. Can’t choose, all / more than one equal. 
 
Question 188 – And now a few questions about trust in information sources. How much do you trust 
[INSERT ITEM] to provide accurate information about climate change? 
a) Newspapers or newspaper websites. 
b) TV news such as BBC, ITV, Sky. 
c) Social media such as Facebook, Twitter. 
d) TV and radio documentaries. 
e) UK Government. 
f) Scientists working at universities. 
g) Scientific organisation such as Royal Society, Met Office. 
h) Charities, Environmental or Campaign groups such as Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth. 
 
1. Trust a great deal. 
2. Trust to some extent. 
3. Do not have much trust. 
4. Do not trust at all. 
5. Not applicable. 
6. Don’t Know. 
7. It depends. 
 
Question 189 – How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
a) It’s not worth doing things to help reduce climate change if others don’t do the same. 
b) There is so much conflicting information about climate it is difficult to know what to believe. 
c) If everybody does their bit, we can reduce the effects of climate change. 
d) I have the ability to make changes in my life that could help reduce climate change. 
e) The media exaggerates the impacts of climate change. 
 
1. Agree strongly. 
2. Agree slightly. 
3. Neither agree nor disagree. 
4. Disagree slightly. 
5. Disagree strongly. 
6. Don’t Know. 
 
Energy Security 
Question 23 – And still thinking about the next 10-20 years, how concerned, it at all, are you about… 
c) The UK not investing fast enough in alternative sources of energy. 
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d) The UK not developing technology to use existing sources of fossil fuels sufficiently. 
 
1. Very concerned. 
2. Fairly concerned. 
3. Not very concerned. 
4. Not at all concerned. 
5. Don’t Know. 
 
Clean Growth 
Question 80 – Now a question on a different topic… The Government has recently begun to promote 
the concept of ‘Clean Growth’. Before today, how much, if anything, did you know about this 
concept? 
1. Hadn’t heard about this before now. 
2. Hardly anything but I’ve heard of this. 
3. A little. 
4. A fair amount. 
5. A lot. 
6. Don’t Know. 
 
Net Zero 
Question 220 – Now a question on a different topic… The Government promotes the concept of ‘Net 
Zero’. Before today, how much, if anything, did you know about this concept? 
1. Hadn’t heard about this before now. 
2. Hardly anything but I’ve heard of this. 
3. A little. 
4. A fair amount. 
5. A lot. 
6. Don’t Know. 
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Appendix X – Fieldwork Dates and Sample Sizes for BEIS Public Attitudes Tracker Questionnaires 
Table X.1 – Fieldwork Dates and Sample Sizes for the DECC/BEIS Questionnaires 
Waves Fieldwork Dates Sample Sizes Department 





2 June 2012 27th – 1st July 2012 2,100 
3 September 2012 26th – 30th September 2012 2,118 
4 December 2012 12th – 2nd January 2013 2,107 
5 March 2013 27th – 31st March 2013 2,051 
6 June 2013 3rd – 7th July 2013 2,124 
7 September 2013 25th – 29th September 2013 2,103 
8 December 2013 11th – 15th December 2013 2,110 
9 March 2014 26th – 30th March 2014 2,040 
10 June 2014 25th – 29th June 2014 2,087 
11 September 2014 24th – 28th September 2014 2,103 
12 December 2014 10th – 8th January 2015 2,119 
13 March 2015 18th – 29th March 2015 1,981 
14 June 2015 24th – 28th June 2015 2,118 
15 September 2015 23rd – 27th September 2015 2,121 
16 December 2015 9th – 13th December 2015 2,121 
17 March 2016 23rd – 27th March 2016 2,105 
18 June 2016 29th – 3rd July 2016 2,114 





20 December 2016 14th – 18th December 2016 2,138 
21 March 2017 29th – 2nd April 2017 2,180 
22 June 2017 30th – 4th July 2017 2,097 
23 September 2017 27th – 1st October 2017 2,105 
24 December 2017 13th – 17th December 2017 2,078 
25 March 2018 28th – 6th April 2018 2,102 
26 June 2018 11th – 17th July 2018 4,26875 
27 September 2018 19th – 30th September 2018 4,258 
28 December 2018 5th – 16th December 2018 4,273 
29 March 2019 13th – 24th March 2019 4,224 
30 June 2019 5th – 16th June 2019 4,231 
31 September 2019 11th – 22nd September 2019 4,201 
32 December 2019 4th – 22nd December 2019 4,212 
3376 March 2020 11th – 17th March 2020 1,851 
3477 June 2020 4th – 9th June 2020 4,011 
Source: Data Adapted from BEIS (2020b)  
 
 
75 - Sample size was increased from this wave to allow greater regional analysis 
 
76 - Fieldwork for this wave was finished early due to the COVID-19 pandemic and associated lockdown, 
resulting in a smaller sample size. 
 
77 - Unlike the rest of the surveys, this survey was collected via Kantur Online Omnibus Survey compared to 
face-to-face interviews. As a consequence, the socio-economic proportions within this study are slightly 
different compared to the previous studies, which are demonstrated within Table X.2. 
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Table X.2 – The Age Breakdown for the DECC/BEIS Questionnaires 
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Table X.2 – The Age Breakdown for the DECC/BEIS Questionnaires (Continued) 

































































































































































Note: All Percentages might not add up to 100 per cent due to rounding errors 
Source: Data Adapted from BEIS (2012a); BEIS (2012b); BEIS (2012c); BEIS (2013a); BEIS (2013b); 
BEIS (2013c); BEIS (2013d) ; BEIS (2014a); BEIS (2014b); BEIS (2014c); BEIS (2014d) ; BEIS (2015a); 
BEIS (2015b); BEIS (2015c); BEIS (2015d) ; BEIS (2016a); BEIS (2016b); BEIS (2016c); BEIS (2016d) ; 
BEIS (2017a); BEIS (2017b); BEIS (2017c); BEIS (2017d) ; BEIS (2018a); BEIS (2018b); BEIS (2018c); 
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Table X.3 – The Gender Breakdown for the DECC/BEIS Questionnaires 
Wave Date Male Female Total 
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Table X.3 – The Gender Breakdown for the DECC/BEIS Questionnaires (Continued) 
Wave Date Male Female Total 




























































Note: All Percentages might not add up to 100 per cent due to rounding errors 
Source: Data Adapted from BEIS (2012a); BEIS (2012b); BEIS (2012c); BEIS (2013a); BEIS (2013b); 
BEIS (2013c); BEIS (2013d) ; BEIS (2014a); BEIS (2014b); BEIS (2014c); BEIS (2014d) ; BEIS (2015a); 
BEIS (2015b); BEIS (2015c); BEIS (2015d) ; BEIS (2016a); BEIS (2016b); BEIS (2016c); BEIS (2016d) ; 
BEIS (2017a); BEIS (2017b); BEIS (2017c); BEIS (2017d) ; BEIS (2018a); BEIS (2018b); BEIS (2018c); 
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Table X.4 – The Social Grade Breakdown for the DECC/BEIS Questionnaires 
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Table X.4 – The Social Grade Breakdown for the DECC/BEIS Questionnaires (Continued) 













































































































































Note: All Percentages might not add up to 100 per cent due to rounding errors 
Source: Data Adapted from BEIS (2012a); BEIS (2012b); BEIS (2012c); BEIS (2013a); BEIS (2013b); 
BEIS (2013c); BEIS (2013d) ; BEIS (2014a); BEIS (2014b); BEIS (2014c); BEIS (2014d) ; BEIS (2015a); 
BEIS (2015b); BEIS (2015c); BEIS (2015d) ; BEIS (2016a); BEIS (2016b); BEIS (2016c); BEIS (2016d) ; 
BEIS (2017a); BEIS (2017b); BEIS (2017c); BEIS (2017d) ; BEIS (2018a); BEIS (2018b); BEIS (2018c); 
BEIS (2018d) ; BEIS (2019a); BEIS (2019b); BEIS (2019c); BEIS (2019d) ; BEIS (2020a); BEIS (2020b); 
BEIS (2020c) 
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Appendix Y – Results from the BEIS Questionnaires 
Question 22 – Thinking about the causes of climate change, which, if any, of the following best describe your opinion? 
























































105 152 257 854 559 215 774 84 54 28 
2,051 
5.1% 7.4% 12.5% 41.6% 27.3% 10.5% 37.7% 4.1% 2.6% 1.4% 
March 
2014 
116 161 277 905 513 203 716 74 52 16 
2,040 
5.7% 7.9% 13.6% 44.4% 25.1% 10.0% 35.1% 3.6% 2.5% 0.8% 
March 
2015 
78 174 252 823 533 225 758 65 57 26 
1,981 
3.9% 8.8% 12.7% 41.5% 26.9% 11.4% 38.3% 3.3% 2.9% 1.3% 
March 
2016 
79 144 223 875 622 253 875 81 36 15 
2,105 
3.8% 6.8% 10.6% 41.6% 29.5% 12.0% 41.6% 3.8% 1.7% 0.7% 
March 
2017 
83 142 225 943 594 290 884 84 26 18 
2,180 
3.8% 6.5% 10.3% 43.3% 27.2% 13.3% 40.6% 3.9% 1.2% 0.8% 
March 
2018 
81 155 236 813 633 281 914 70 48 21 
2,102 
3.9% 7.4% 11.2% 38.7% 30.1% 13.4% 43.5% 3.3% 2.3% 1.0% 
March 
2019 
115 210 325 1747 1290 620 1910 95 90 57 
4,224 
2.7% 5.0% 7.7% 41.4% 30.5% 14.7% 45.2% 2.2% 2.1% 1.3% 
March 
2020 
49 108 157 703 569 306 875 39 52 25 
1,851 
2.6% 5.8% 8.5% 38.0% 30.7% 16.5% 47.3% 2.1% 2.8% 1.4% 
Data Adapted from BEIS (2013b); BEIS (2014b); BEIS (2015b); BEIS (2016b); BEIS (2017b); BEIS (2018b); BEIS (2019b); BEIS (2020b) 
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10 17 27 120 89 25 114 10 7 5 
283 
3.5% 6.0% 9.5% 42.4% 31.4% 8.8% 40.3% 3.5% 2.5% 1.8% 
March 
2014 
15 19 34 122 98 43 141 9 8 5 
319 
4.7% 6.0% 10.7% 38.2% 30.7% 13.5% 44.2% 2.8% 2.5% 1.6% 
March 
2015 
5 17 22 84 93 42 135 9 11 3 
264 
1.9% 6.4% 8.3% 31.8% 35.2% 15.9% 51.1% 3.4% 4.2% 1.1% 
March 
2016 
8 14 22 84 99 34 133 9 8 1 
257 
3.1% 5.4% 8.6% 32.7% 38.5% 13.2% 51.8% 3.5% 3.1% 0.4% 
March 
2017 
1 12 13 101 95 33 128 10 4 6 
262 
0.4% 4.6% 5.0% 38.5% 36.3% 12.6% 48.9% 3.8% 1.5% 2.3% 
March 
2018 
9 18 27 92 108 31 139 3 8 6 
275 
3.3% 6.5% 9.8% 33.5% 39.3% 11.3% 50.5% 1.1% 2.9% 2.2% 
March 
2019 
7 14 21 142 191 91 282 9 12 9 
475 
1.5% 2.9% 4.4% 29.9% 40.2% 19.2% 59.4% 1.9% 2.5% 1.9% 
March 
2020 
5 18 23 64 101 54 155 3 11 1 
257 
1.9% 7.0% 8.9% 24.9% 39.3% 21.0% 60.3% 1.2% 4.3% 0.4% 
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17 23 40 132 100 39 139 12 4 5 
332 
5.1% 6.9% 12.0% 39.8% 30.1% 11.7% 41.9% 3.6% 1.2% 1.5% 
March 
2014 
14 24 38 154 113 38 151 14 9 5 
371 
3.8% 6.5% 10.2% 41.5% 30.5% 10.2% 40.7% 3.8% 2.4% 1.3% 
March 
2015 
9 31 40 141 86 37 123 8 10 5 
327 
2.8% 9.5% 12.2% 43.1% 26.3% 11.3% 37.6% 2.4% 3.1% 1.5% 
March 
2016 
6 22 28 142 109 53 162 13 7 5 
357 
1.7% 6.2% 7.8% 39.8% 30.5% 14.8% 45.4% 3.6% 2.0% 1.4% 
March 
2017 
6 20 26 138 99 42 141 17 2 5 
329 
1.8% 6.1% 7.9% 41.9% 30.1% 12.8% 42.9% 5.2% 0.6% 1.5% 
March 
2018 
11 20 31 121 132 40 172 13 9 4 
350 
3.1% 5.7% 8.9% 34.6% 37.7% 11.4% 49.1% 3.7% 2.6% 1.1% 
March 
2019 
15 32 47 230 216 103 319 16 21 16 
649 
2.3% 4.9% 7.2% 35.4% 33.3% 15.9% 49.2% 2.5% 3.2% 2.5% 
March 
2020 
3 15 18 105 105 47 152 2 9 5 
291 
1.0% 5.2% 6.2% 36.1% 36.1% 16.2% 52.2% 0.7% 3.1% 1.7% 
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10 14 24 132 97 38 135 6 11 4 
312 
3.2% 4.5% 7.7% 42.3% 31.1% 12.2% 43.3% 1.9% 3.5% 1.3% 
March 
2014 
16 19 35 153 75 24 99 7 8 0 
302 
5.3% 6.3% 11.6% 50.7% 24.8% 7.9% 32.8% 2.3% 2.6% 0.0% 
March 
2015 
9 22 31 133 88 34 122 2 10 4 
302 
3.0% 7.3% 10.3% 44.0% 29.1% 11.3% 40.4% 0.7% 3.3% 1.3% 
March 
2016 
10 18 28 123 101 31 132 11 3 3 
300 
3.3% 6.0% 9.3% 41.0% 33.7% 10.3% 44.0% 3.7% 1.0% 1.0% 
March 
2017 
8 19 27 106 76 40 116 9 4 2 
264 
3.0% 7.2% 10.2% 40.2% 28.8% 15.2% 43.9% 3.4% 1.5% 0.8% 
March 
2018 
4 23 27 109 84 40 124 12 4 5 
281 
1.4% 8.2% 9.6% 38.8% 29.9% 14.2% 44.1% 4.3% 1.4% 1.8% 
March 
2019 
14 24 38 224 182 96 278 16 11 8 
575 
2.4% 4.2% 6.6% 39.0% 31.7% 16.7% 48.3% 2.8% 1.9% 1.4% 
March 
2020 
6 14 20 93 80 34 114 11 8 4 
250 
2.4% 5.6% 8.0% 37.2% 32.0% 13.6% 45.6% 4.4% 3.2% 1.6% 
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20 23 43 168 96 33 129 13 5 3 
361 
5.5% 6.4% 11.9% 46.5% 26.6% 9.1% 35.7% 3.6% 1.4% 0.8% 
March 
2014 
13 13 26 137 80 34 114 7 3 1 
288 
4.5% 4.5% 9.0% 47.6% 27.8% 11.8% 39.6% 2.4% 1.0% 0.3% 
March 
2015 
10 30 40 124 100 42 142 8 8 1 
323 
3.1% 9.3% 12.4% 38.4% 31.0% 13.0% 44.0% 2.5% 2.5% 0.3% 
March 
2016 
10 17 27 156 97 34 131 12 5 1 
332 
3.0% 5.1% 8.1% 47.0% 29.2% 10.2% 39.5% 3.6% 1.5% 0.3% 
March 
2017 
14 15 29 134 83 36 119 7 4 0 
293 
4.8% 5.1% 9.9% 45.7% 28.3% 12.3% 40.6% 2.4% 1.4% 0.0% 
March 
2018 
9 27 36 123 88 47 135 2 5 1 
302 
3.0% 8.9% 11.9% 40.7% 29.1% 15.6% 44.7% 0.7% 1.7% 0.3% 
March 
2019 
15 17 32 233 163 74 237 10 6 9 
527 
2.8% 3.2% 6.1% 44.2% 30.9% 14.0% 45.0% 1.9% 1.1% 1.7% 
March 
2020 
11 11 22 99 66 47 113 4 4 6 
248 
4.4% 4.4% 8.9% 39.9% 26.6% 19.0% 45.6% 1.6% 1.6% 2.4% 
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11 24 35 115 73 32 105 8 5 0 
268 
4.1% 9.0% 13.1% 42.9% 27.2% 11.9% 39.2% 3.0% 1.9% 0.0% 
March 
2014 
20 21 41 125 68 27 95 8 10 1 
280 
7.1% 7.5% 14.6% 44.6% 24.3% 9.6% 33.9% 2.9% 3.6% 0.4% 
March 
2015 
14 26 40 127 64 28 92 7 2 2 
270 
5.2% 9.6% 14.8% 47.0% 23.7% 10.4% 34.1% 2.6% 0.7% 0.7% 
March 
2016 
11 16 27 137 71 35 106 5 1 1 
277 
4.0% 5.8% 9.7% 49.5% 25.6% 12.6% 38.3% 1.8% 0.4% 0.4% 
March 
2017 
20 21 41 158 74 51 125 9 3 1 
337 
5.9% 6.2% 12.2% 46.9% 22.0% 15.1% 37.1% 2.7% 0.9% 0.3% 
March 
2018 
14 19 33 102 76 39 115 14 2 2 
268 
5.2% 7.1% 12.3% 38.1% 28.4% 14.6% 42.9% 5.2% 0.7% 0.7% 
March 
2019 
15 27 42 276 172 98 270 10 11 2 
611 
2.5% 4.4% 6.9% 45.2% 28.2% 16.0% 44.2% 1.6% 1.8% 0.3% 
March 
2020 
10 12 22 119 72 42 114 4 7 3 
269 
3.7% 4.5% 8.2% 44.2% 26.8% 15.6% 42.4% 1.5% 2.6% 1.1% 
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37 51 88 187 104 48 152 35 22 11 
495 
7.5% 10.3% 17.8% 37.8% 21.0% 9.7% 30.7% 7.1% 4.4% 2.2% 
March 
2014 
38 65 103 214 79 37 116 29 14 4 
480 
7.9% 13.5% 21.5% 44.6% 16.5% 7.7% 24.2% 6.0% 2.9% 0.8% 
March 
2015 
31 48 79 214 102 42 144 31 16 11 
495 
6.3% 9.7% 16.0% 43.2% 20.6% 8.5% 29.1% 6.3% 3.2% 2.2% 
March 
2016 
34 57 91 233 145 66 211 31 12 4 
582 
5.8% 9.8% 15.6% 40.0% 24.9% 11.3% 36.3% 5.3% 2.1% 0.7% 
March 
2017 
34 55 89 306 167 88 255 32 9 4 
695 
4.9% 7.9% 12.8% 44.0% 24.0% 12.7% 36.7% 4.6% 1.3% 0.6% 
March 
2018 
34 48 82 266 145 84 229 26 20 3 
626 
5.4% 7.7% 13.1% 42.5% 23.2% 13.4% 36.6% 4.2% 3.2% 0.5% 
March 
2019 
49 96 145 642 366 158 524 34 29 13 
1,387 
3.5% 6.9% 10.5% 46.3% 26.4% 11.4% 37.8% 2.5% 2.1% 0.9% 
March 
2020 
14 38 52 223 145 82 227 15 13 6 
536 
2.6% 7.1% 9.7% 41.6% 27.1% 15.3% 42.4% 2.8% 2.4% 1.1% 
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95 135 230 734 470 190 660 74 47 23 
1,768 
5.4% 7.6% 13.0% 41.5% 26.6% 10.7% 37.3% 4.2% 2.7% 1.3% 
March 
2014 
101 142 243 783 415 160 575 65 44 11 
1,721 
5.9% 8.3% 14.1% 45.5% 24.1% 9.3% 33.4% 3.8% 2.6% 0.6% 
March 
2015 
73 157 230 739 440 183 623 56 46 23 
1,717 
4.3% 9.1% 13.4% 43.0% 25.6% 10.7% 36.3% 3.3% 2.7% 1.3% 
March 
2016 
71 130 201 791 523 219 742 72 28 14 
1,848 
3.8% 7.0% 10.9% 42.8% 28.3% 11.9% 40.2% 3.9% 1.5% 0.8% 
March 
2017 
82 130 212 842 499 257 756 74 22 12 
1,918 
4.3% 6.8% 11.1% 43.9% 26.0% 13.4% 39.4% 3.9% 1.1% 0.6% 
March 
2018 
72 137 209 721 525 250 775 67 40 15 
1,827 
3.9% 7.5% 11.4% 39.5% 28.7% 13.7% 42.4% 3.7% 2.2% 0.8% 
March 
2019 
108 196 304 1605 1099 529 1628 86 78 48 
3,749 
2.9% 5.2% 8.1% 42.8% 29.3% 14.1% 43.4% 2.3% 2.1% 1.3% 
March 
2020 
44 90 134 639 468 252 720 36 41 24 
1,594 
2.8% 5.6% 8.4% 40.1% 29.4% 15.8% 45.2% 2.3% 2.6% 1.5% 
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3 9 12 60 107 46 153 5 5 2 
237 
1.3% 3.8% 5.1% 25.3% 45.1% 19.4% 64.6% 2.1% 2.1% 0.8% 
Female 
4 5 9 82 84 45 129 4 7 7 
238 
1.7% 2.1% 3.8% 34.5% 35.3% 18.9% 54.2% 1.7% 2.9% 2.9% 
Ethnicity 
White 
5 8 13 118 157 75 232 9 11 5 
388 
1.3% 2.1% 3.4% 30.4% 40.5% 19.3% 59.8% 2.3% 2.8% 1.3% 
Ethnic 
Minority 
2 6 8 22 34 16 50 0 0 4 
84 




7 12 19 116 155 80 235 6 12 9 
397 
1.8% 3.0% 4.8% 29.2% 39.0% 20.2% 59.2% 1.5% 3.0% 2.3% 
Rural 
0 2 2 26 36 11 47 3 0 0 
78 




0 0 0 13 16 9 25 0 0 0 
38 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 34.2% 42.1% 23.7% 65.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
C1 
1 7 8 40 85 29 114 1 2 3 
168 
0.6% 4.2% 4.8% 23.8% 50.6% 17.3% 67.9% 0.6% 1.2% 1.8% 
C2 
2 1 3 33 39 18 57 2 2 1 
98 
2.0% 1.0% 3.1% 33.7% 39.8% 18.4% 58.2% 2.0% 2.0% 1.0% 
DE 
4 6 10 56 51 35 86 6 8 5 
171 
2.3% 3.5% 5.8% 32.7% 29.8% 20.5% 50.3% 3.5% 4.7% 2.9% 
Data Adapted from BEIS (2019b) 
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59 112 171 831 626 305 931 58 25 22 
2,038 
2.9% 5.5% 8.4% 40.8% 30.7% 15.0% 45.7% 2.8% 1.2% 1.1% 
Female 
56 98 154 916 664 315 979 37 65 35 
2,186 
2.6% 4.5% 7.0% 41.9% 30.4% 14.4% 44.8% 1.7% 3.0% 1.6% 
Ethnicity 
White 
99 183 282 1,560 1,145 544 1689 82 75 40 
3,728 
2.7% 4.9% 7.6% 41.8% 30.7% 14.6% 45.3% 2.2% 2.0% 1.1% 
Ethnic 
Minority 
14 26 40 174 137 72 209 10 9 15 
457 




96 155 251 1,328 986 518 1504 75 83 45 
3,286 
2.9% 4.7% 7.6% 40.4% 30.0% 15.8% 45.8% 2.3% 2.5% 1.4% 
Rural 
19 55 74 419 304 102 406 20 7 12 
938 




15 27 42 293 286 125 411 7 6 2 
761 
2.0% 3.5% 5.5% 38.5% 37.6% 16.4% 54.0% 0.9% 0.8% 0.3% 
C1 
21 46 67 439 403 146 549 13 12 9 
1,089 
1.9% 4.2% 6.2% 40.3% 37.0% 13.4% 50.4% 1.2% 1.1% 0.8% 
C2 
23 43 66 384 234 122 356 23 18 9 
856 
2.7% 5.0% 7.7% 44.9% 27.3% 14.3% 41.6% 2.7% 2.1% 1.1% 
DE 
56 94 150 631 367 227 594 52 54 37 
1,518 
3.7% 6.2% 9.9% 41.6% 24.2% 15.0% 39.1% 3.4% 3.6% 2.4% 
 
 























































7 11 18 72 62 30 92 1 4 1 
188 
3.7% 5.9% 9.6% 38.3% 33.0% 16.0% 48.9% 0.5% 2.1% 0.5% 
NW 
England 
14 30 44 161 163 99 262 14 15 3 
499 
2.8% 6.0% 8.8% 32.3% 32.7% 19.8% 52.5% 2.8% 3.0% 0.6% 
Yorkshire 
& Humber 
9 23 32 168 107 40 147 4 6 4 
361 
2.5% 6.4% 8.9% 46.5% 29.6% 11.1% 40.7% 1.1% 1.7% 1.1% 
East 
Midlands 
11 13 24 156 66 41 107 11 3 2 
303 
3.6% 4.3% 7.9% 51.5% 21.8% 13.5% 35.3% 3.6% 1.0% 0.7% 
West 
Midlands 
17 26 43 160 110 46 156 6 4 1 
370 
4.6% 7.0% 11.6% 43.2% 29.7% 12.4% 42.2% 1.6% 1.1% 0.3% 
East of 
England 
14 16 30 144 110 51 161 15 7 10 
367 
3.8% 4.4% 8.2% 39.2% 30.0% 13.9% 43.9% 4.1% 1.9% 2.7% 
London 
9 27 36 205 141 87 228 19 19 11 
518 
1.7% 5.2% 6.9% 39.6% 27.2% 16.8% 44.0% 3.7% 3.7% 2.1% 
SE 
England 
13 20 33 255 174 82 256 5 15 9 
573 
2.3% 3.5% 5.8% 44.5% 30.4% 14.3% 44.7% 0.9% 2.6% 1.6% 
SW 
England 
5 13 18 128 142 50 192 3 5 3 
349 
1.4% 3.7% 5.2% 36.7% 40.7% 14.3% 55.0% 0.9% 1.4% 0.9% 
Wales 
10 11 21 88 59 28 87 3 1 4 
204 
4.9% 5.4% 10.3% 43.1% 28.9% 13.7% 42.6% 1.5% 0.5% 2.0% 
Scotland 
6 16 22 170 110 41 151 8 11 9 
371 
1.6% 4.3% 5.9% 45.8% 29.6% 11.1% 40.7% 2.2% 3.0% 2.4% 
Northern 
Ireland 
0 4 4 40 46 25 71 6 0 0 
121 
0.0% 3.3% 3.3% 33.1% 38.0% 20.7% 58.7% 5.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 
 


























































33 54 87 361 240 141 381 31 27 15 
902 
3.7% 6.0% 9.6% 40.0% 26.6% 15.6% 42.2% 3.4% 3.0% 1.7% 
£16,000 - 
£24,999 
17 27 44 230 158 86 244 8 4 1 
531 
3.2% 5.1% 8.3% 43.3% 29.8% 16.2% 46.0% 1.5% 0.8% 0.2% 
£25,000 - 
£34,999 
6 17 23 160 137 77 214 9 2 2 
410 
1.5% 4.1% 5.6% 39.0% 33.4% 18.8% 52.2% 2.2% 0.5% 0.5% 
£35,000 - 
£49,999 
8 21 29 148 119 57 176 5 2 0 
360 
2.2% 5.8% 8.1% 41.1% 33.1% 15.8% 48.9% 1.4% 0.6% 0.0% 
>£49,999 
6 7 13 119 146 63 209 1 2 0 
344 
1.7% 2.0% 3.8% 34.6% 42.4% 18.3% 60.8% 0.3% 0.6% 0.0% 
NE England = North East England; NW England = North West England; Yorkshire & Humber = Yorkshire and the Humber; SE England = South East England; SW England = 
South West England 
Data Adapted from BEIS (2019b) 
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Question 180 - Which of these describes your views about the impact of climate change in the UK? 













will do in 
my lifetime 
Climate will 
not have an 
impact in 
my lifetime, 
but will do 
for future 
generations 













2,762 437 566 138 321 
65.4% 10.3% 13.4% 3.3% 7.6% 
Age Group 
16-24 
319 61 49 11 35 
67.2% 12.8% 10.3% 2.3% 7.4% 
25-34 
435 63 58 26 67 
67.0% 9.7% 8.9% 4.0% 10.3% 
35-44 
400 63 49 15 48 
69.6% 11.0% 8.5% 2.6% 8.3% 
45-54 
359 49 59 22 38 
68.1% 9.3% 11.2% 4.2% 7.2% 
55-64 
415 57 95 17 27 
67.9% 9.3% 15.5% 2.8% 4.4% 
65+ 
834 144 256 47 106 
60.1% 10.4% 18.5% 3.4% 7.6% 
Gender 
Male 
1,307 234 279 65 153 
64.1% 11.5% 13.7% 3.2% 7.5% 
Female 
1,455 203 287 73 168 
66.6% 9.3% 13.1% 3.3% 7.7% 
Ethnicity 
White 
2,442 392 519 118 257 
65.5% 10.5% 13.9% 3.2% 6.9% 
Ethnic 
Minority 
300 44 43 16 54 
65.6% 9.6% 9.4% 3.5% 11.8% 
Area Type 
Urban 
2,138 337 452 109 250 
65.1% 10.3% 13.8% 3.3% 7.6% 
Rural 
624 100 114 29 71 
66.5% 10.7% 12.2% 3.1% 7.6% 
Social Class 
AB 
555 76 90 16 24 
72.9% 10.0% 11.8% 2.1% 3.2% 
C1 
760 101 146 32 50 
69.8% 9.3% 13.4% 2.9% 4.6% 
C2 
555 100 103 32 66 
64.8% 11.7% 12.0% 3.7% 7.7% 
DE 
892 160 227 58 181 
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will do in 
my lifetime 
Climate will 
not have an 
impact in 
my lifetime, 
but will do 
for future 
generations 















128 18 29 8 5 
68.1% 9.6% 15.4% 4.3% 2.7% 
North West 
England 
310 72 72 17 28 




241 42 50 7 21 
66.8% 11.6% 13.9% 1.9% 5.8% 
East 
Midlands 
191 26 44 19 23 
63.0% 8.6% 14.5% 6.3% 7.6% 
West 
Midlands 
219 41 77 16 17 
59.2% 11.1% 20.8% 4.3% 4.6% 
East of 
England 
240 27 34 16 50 
65.4% 7.4% 9.3% 4.4% 13.6% 
London 
353 36 48 15 66 
68.10% 6.90% 9.30% 2.90% 12.70% 
South East 
England 
394 61 62 11 45 
68.8% 10.6% 10.8% 1.9% 7.9% 
South West 
England 
249 32 41 9 18 
71.3% 9.2% 11.7% 2.6% 5.2% 
Wales 
126 30 30 7 11 
61.8% 14.7% 14.7% 3.4% 5.4% 
Scotland 
215 43 71 13 29 
58.0% 11.6% 19.1% 3.5% 7.8% 
Northern 
Ireland 
96 9 8 0 8 




568 91 132 37 74 
63.0% 10.1% 14.6% 4.1% 8.2% 
£16,000 - 
£24,999 
355 54 81 14 27 
66.9% 10.2% 15.3% 2.6% 5.1% 
£25,000 - 
£34,999 
291 48 46 10 15 
71.0% 11.7% 11.2% 2.4% 3.7% 
£35,000 - 
£49,999 
253 42 48 8 9 
70.3% 11.7% 13.3% 2.2% 2.5% 
£50,000+ 
268 37 32 5 2 
77.9% 10.8% 9.3% 1.5% 0.6% 
Data Adapted from BEIS (2019b) 
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will do in 
my lifetime 
Climate will 
not have an 
impact in 
my lifetime, 
but will do 
for future 
generations 













1,219 206 231 52 143 
65.9% 11.1% 12.5% 2.8% 7.7% 
Age Group 
16-24 
182 31 17 7 20 
70.8% 12.1% 6.6% 2.7% 7.8% 
25-34 
193 40 33 7 18 
66.3% 13.7% 11.3% 2.4% 6.2% 
35-44 
157 25 34 10 24 
62.8% 10.0% 13.6% 4.0% 9.6% 
45-54 
165 31 30 10 12 
66.5% 12.5% 12.1% 4.0% 4.8% 
55-64 
181 32 33 5 18 
67.3% 11.9% 12.3% 1.9% 6.7% 
65+ 
341 47 84 13 51 
63.6% 8.8% 15.7% 2.4% 9.5% 
Gender 
Male 
575 105 111 31 63 
65.0% 11.9% 12.5% 3.5% 7.1% 
Female 
644 101 120 21 80 
66.7% 10.5% 12.4% 2.2% 8.3% 
Ethnicity 
White 
1,090 181 195 40 120 
67.0% 11.1% 12.0% 2.5% 7.4% 
Ethnic 
Minority 
117 23 32 10 21 
57.6% 11.3% 15.8% 4.9% 10.3% 
Area Type 
Urban 
929 155 176 38 121 
65.5% 10.9% 12.4% 2.7% 8.5% 
Rural 
290 51 55 14 22 
67.1% 11.8% 12.7% 3.2% 5.1% 
Social Class 
AB 
290 20 24 10 8 
82.4% 5.7% 6.8% 2.8% 2.3% 
C1 
391 51 67 11 25 
71.70% 9.40% 12.30% 2.00% 4.60% 
C2 
229 56 56 9 35 
59.5% 14.5% 14.5% 2.3% 9.1% 
DE 
309 79 84 22 75 
54.3% 13.9% 14.8% 3.9% 13.2% 
Data Adapted from BEIS (2020b) 
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Table Y.12 – Differing views about the impact of climate change in the UK between March 2019 













will do in 
my lifetime 
Climate will 
not have an 
impact in 
my lifetime, 
but will do 
for future 
generations 












Overall + 0.5% + 0.8% - 0.9% - 0.5% + 0.1% 
Age Group 
16-24 + 3.6% - 0.7% - 3.7% + 0.4% + 0.4% 
25-34 - 0.7% + 4.0% + 2.4% - 1.6% - 4.1% 
35-44 - 6.8% - 1.0% + 5.1% + 1.4% + 1.3% 
45-54 - 1.6% + 3.2% + 0.9% - 0.2% - 2.4% 
55-64 - 0.6% + 2.6% - 3.2% - 0.9% + 2.3% 
65+ + 3.5% - 1.6% - 2.8% - 1.0% + 1.9% 
Gender 
Male + 0.9% + 0.4% - 1.2% + 0.3% - 0.4% 
Female + 0.1% + 1.2% - 0.7% - 1.1% + 0.6% 
Ethnicity 
White + 1.5% + 0.6% - 1.9% - 0.7% + 0.5% 
EM - 8.0% + 1.7% + 6.4% + 1.4% - 1.5% 
Area Type 
Urban + 0.4% + 0.6% - 1.4% - 0.6% + 0.9% 
Rural + 0.6% + 1.1% + 0.5% + 0.1% - 2.5% 
Social Class 
AB + 9.5% - 4.3% - 5.0% + 0.7% - 0.9% 
C1 + 1.9% + 0.1% - 1.1% - 0.9% = 0.0% 
C2 - 5.3% + 2.8% + 2.5% - 1.4% + 1.4% 
DE - 4.5% + 3.4% - 0.2% + 0.1% + 1.3% 
Data Adapted from BEIS (2019b) and BEIS (2020b) 
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Question 182 – Thinking just about the UK, have you noticed any impacts of climate change over 
the past few years? If so, which ones? 
Table Y.13 – Proportion of respondents that believe rising sea levels and/or more flooding are 
already occurring within the United Kingdom due to climate change 
Socio-Economic Factors March 2019 March 2020 Diff. Sig. 
Age 
16-24 120 (25.8%) 112 (44.1%) + 18.3% 0.000*** 
25-34 197 (31.1%) 129 (44.6%) + 13.5% 0.000*** 
35-44 186 (33.3%) 99 (41.4%) + 8.1% 0.028** 
45-54 182 (35.2%) 128 (52.5%) + 17.3% 0.000*** 
55-64 176 (29.3%) 148 (55.8%) + 26.5% 0.000*** 
65+ 365 (27.0%) 274 (52.6%) + 25.6% 0.000*** 
Gender 
Male 561 (28.3%) 425 (49.5%) + 21.2% 0.000*** 
Female 665 (30.9%) 465 (48.7%) + 17.8% 0.000*** 
Social Class 
AB 250 (33.2%) 224 (64.6%) + 31.4% 0.000*** 
C1 335 (31.1%) 265 (49.2%) + 18.1% 0.000*** 
C2 254 (30.5%) 177 (47.6%) + 17.1% 0.000*** 
DE 387 (26.4%) 224 (40.4%) + 14.0% 0.000*** 
Ethnicity 
White 1,092 (30.0%) 8252 (51.8%) + 21.8% 0.000*** 
Ethnic Minority 126 (28.2%) 61 (30.8%) + 2.6% 0.499 
Household 
Income 
< £16,000 240 (27.6%) - - - 
£16,000 - £24,999 180 (34.4%) - - - 
£25,000 - £34,999 133 (33.2%) - - - 
£35,000 - £49,999 119 (33.5%) - - - 
>£49,999 111 (32.4%) - - - 
Area Type 
Urban 931 (29.0%) 645 (46.6%) + 17.6% 0.000*** 
Rural 295 (32.1%) 245 (57.4%) + 25.3% 0.000*** 
Region 
North East England 59 (31.6%) - - - 
North West England 144 (29.7%) - - - 
Yorkshire and the Humber 102 (28.6%) - - - 
East Midlands 74 (25.3%) - - - 
West Midlands 119 (32.7%) - - - 
East of England 69 (19.6%) - - - 
London 127 (25.5%) - - - 
South East England 186 (32.7%) - - - 
South West England 136 (39.3%) - - - 
Wales 68 (33.8%) - - - 
Scotland 98 (27.0%) - - - 
Northern Ireland 44 (38.3%) - - - 
Total 1,226 (29.7%) 890 (49.1%) + 19.4% 0.000*** 
Sig. = Significance; Diff. = Difference; ** = 95 per cent significance; *** = 99 per cent significance. 
Data Adapted from BEIS (2019b) and BEIS (2020b)  
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Table Y.14 – Proportion of respondents that believe a reduction of food availability and/or impact 
on farming are already occurring within the United Kingdom due to climate change 
Socio-Economic Factors March 2019 March 2020 Diff. Sig. 
Age 
16-24 45 (9.7%) 28 (11.0%) + 1.3% 0.561 
25-34 69 (10.9%) 35 (12.1%) + 1.2% 0.590 
35-44 45 (8.1%) 16 (6.7%) - 1.4% 0.509 
45-54 44 (8.5%) 22 (9.0%) + 0.5% 0.817 
55-64 49 (8.2%) 17 (6.4%) - 1.8% 0.374 
65+ 78 (5.8%) 42 (8.1%) - 2.3% 0.069* 
Gender 
Male 151 (7.6%) 78 (9.1%) + 1.5% 0.188 
Female 179 (8.3%) 82 (8.6%) + 0.3% 0.805 
Social Class 
AB 49 (6.5%) 23 (6.6%) + 0.1% 0.936 
C1 90 (8.4%) 42 (7.8%) - 0.6% 0.692 
C2 75 (9.0%) 40 (10.8%) + 1.8% 0.340 
DE 116 (7.9%) 55 (9.9%) + 2.0% 0.147 
Ethnicity 
White 281 (7.7%) 138 (8.7%) + 1.0% 0.241 
Ethnic Minority 47 (10.5%) 21 (10.6%) + 0.1% 0.972 
Household 
Income 
< £16,000 85 (9.8%) - - - 
£16,000 - £24,999 57 (10.9%) - - - 
£25,000 - £34,999 32 (8.0%) - - - 
£35,000 - £49,999 29 (8.2%) - - - 
>£49,999 24 (7.0%) - - - 
Area Type 
Urban 274 (8.5%) 118 (8.5%) = 0.0% 0.988 
Rural 56 (6.1%) 42 (9.8%) + 3.7% 0.014** 
Region 
North East England 14 (7.5%) - - - 
North West England 25 (5.2%) - - - 
Yorkshire and the Humber 12 (3.4%) - - - 
East Midlands 26 (8.9%) - - - 
West Midlands 37 (10.2%) - - - 
East of England 20 (5.7%) - - - 
London 51 (10.2%) - - - 
South East England 65 (11.4%) - - - 
South West England 34 (9.8%) - - - 
Wales 11 (5.5%) - - - 
Scotland 35 (9.6%) - - - 
Northern Ireland 0 (0.0%) - - - 
Total 330 (8.0%) 160 (8.8%) + 0.8% 0.280 
Sig. = Significance; Diff. = Difference; * = 90 per cent significance; ** = 95 per cent significance. 
Data Adapted from BEIS (2019b) and BEIS (2020b) 
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Table Y.15 – Proportion of respondents that believe a reduction of water availability and/or 
increased frequency/magnitude of droughts are already occurring within the United Kingdom due 
to climate change 
Socio-Economic Factors March 2019 March 2020 Diff. Sig. 
Age 
16-24 44 (9.4%) 26 (10.2%) + 0.8% 0.731 
25-34 66 (10.4%) 33 (11.4%) + 1.0% 0.652 
35-44 66 (11.8%) 21 (8.8%) - 2.0% 0.210 
45-54 67 (13.0%) 20 (8.2%) - 4.8% 0.054* 
55-64 64 (10.6%) 21 (7.9%) - 2.7% 0.214 
65+ 116 (8.6%) 35 (6.7%) - 1.9% 0.186 
Gender 
Male 199 (10.1%) 76 (8.9%) - 1.2% 0.324 
Female 224 (10.4%) 80 (8.4%) - 2.0% 0.078* 
Social Class 
AB 81 (10.7%) 38 (11.0%) + 0.3% 0.918 
C1 117 (10.9%) 56 (10.4%) - 0.5% 0.767 
C2 97 (11.6%) 27 (7.3%) - 4.3% 0.021** 
DE 128 (8.7%) 35 (6.3%) - 2.4% 0.076* 
Ethnicity 
White 362 (9.9%) 132 (8.3%) - 1.6% 0.061* 
Ethnic Minority 58 (13.0%) 23 (11.6%) - 1.4% 0.631 
Household 
Income 
< £16,000 88 (10.1%) - - - 
£16,000 - £24,999 72 (13.8%) - - - 
£25,000 - £34,999 36 (9.0%) - - - 
£35,000 - £49,999 37 (10.4%) - - - 
>£49,999 48 (14.0%) - - - 
Area Type 
Urban 342 (10.7%) 125 (9.0%) - 1.7% 0.094* 
Rural 81 (8.8%) 31 (7.3%) - 1.5% 0.334 
Region 
North East England 17 (9.1%) - - - 
North West England 36 (7.4%) - - - 
Yorkshire and the Humber 23 (6.4%) - - - 
East Midlands 32 (11.0%) - - - 
West Midlands 45 (12.4%) - - - 
East of England 33 (9.4%) - - - 
London 70 (14.0%) - - - 
South East England 82 (14.4%) - - - 
South West England 47 (13.6%) - - - 
Wales 13 (6.5%) - - - 
Scotland 24 (6.6%) - - - 
Northern Ireland 1 (0.9%) - - - 
Total 423 (10.2%) 156 (8.6%) - 1.6% 0.050** 
Sig. = Significance; Diff. = Difference; * = 90 per cent significance; ** = 95 per cent significance. 
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Table Y.16 – Proportion of respondents that believe a change in plants or wildlife [including plants 
and animal extinctions] are already occurring within the United Kingdom due to climate change 
Socio-Economic Factors March 2019 March 2020 Diff. Sig. 
Age 
16-24 69 (14.8%) 36 (14.2%) - 0.6% 0.818 
25-34 101 (16.0%) 39 (13.5%) - 2.5% 0.334 
35-44 80 (14.3%) 31 (13.0%) - 1.3% 0.616 
45-54 82 (15.9%) 29 (11.9%) - 4.0% 0.147 
55-64 85 (14.1%) 33 (12.5%) - 1.6% 0.504 
65+ 181 (13.4%) 66 (12.7%) - 0.7% 0.684 
Gender 
Male 271 (13.7%) 106 (12.4%) - 1.3% 0.337 
Female 327 (15.2%) 128 (13.4%) - 1.8% 0.191 
Social Class 
AB 111 (14.7%) 50 (14.4%) - 0.3% 0.892 
C1 162 (15.1%) 80 (14.8%) - 0.3% 0.910 
C2 129 (15.5%) 47 (12.6%) - 2.9% 0.195 
DE 196 (13.4%) 57 (10.3%) - 3.1% 0.062* 
Ethnicity 
White 524 (14.4%) 208 (13.1%) - 1.3% 0.207 
Ethnic Minority 70 (15.7%) 23 (11.6%) - 4.1% 0.178 
Household 
Income 
< £16,000 150 (17.2%) - - - 
£16,000 - £24,999 90 (17.2%) - - - 
£25,000 - £34,999 56 (14.0%) - - - 
£35,000 - £49,999 66 (18.6%) - - - 
>£49,999 42 (12.2%) - - - 
Area Type 
Urban 474 (14.8%) 169 (12.2%) - 2.6% 0.022** 
Rural 124 (13.5%) 65 (15.2%) + 1.7% 0.400 
Region 
North East England 24 (12.8%) - - - 
North West England 33 (6.8%) - - - 
Yorkshire and the Humber 43 (12.0%) - - - 
East Midlands 36 (12.3%) - - - 
West Midlands 65 (17.9%) - - - 
East of England 33 (9.4%) - - - 
London 77 (15.4%) - - - 
South East England 89 (15.7%) - - - 
South West England 84 (24.3%) - - - 
Wales 21 (10.4%) - - - 
Scotland 87 (24.0%) - - - 
Northern Ireland 6 (5.2%) - - - 
Total 598 (14.5%) 234 (12.9%) - 1.6% 0.109 
Sig. = Significance; Diff. = Difference; * = 90 per cent significance; ** = 95 per cent significance. 
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Table Y.17 – Proportion of respondents that believe that more health problem [e.g. asthma] are 
already occurring within the United Kingdom due to climate change 
Socio-Economic Factors March 2019 March 2020 Diff. Sig. 
Age 
16-24 58 (12.4%) 39 (15.4%) + 3.0% 0.275 
25-34 109 (17.2%) 58 (20.1%) + 2.9% 0.297 
35-44 94 (16.8%) 36 (15.1%) - 1.7% 0.539 
45-54 72 (13.9%) 32 (13.1%) - 0.8% 0.761 
55-64 80 (13.3%) 33 (12.5%) - 0.8% 0.730 
65+ 120 (8.9%) 66 (12.7%) + 3.8% 0.014** 
Gender 
Male 226 (11.4%) 121 (14.1%) + 2.7% 0.045** 
Female 307 (14.3%) 143 (15.0%) + 0.7% 0.607 
Social Class 
AB 68 (9.0%) 51 (14.7%) + 5.7% 0.005*** 
C1 147 (13.7%) 83 (15.4%) + 1.7% 0.346 
C2 129 (15.5%) 57 (15.3%) - 0.3% 0.942 
DE 189 (12.9%) 73 (13.2%) + 0.3% 0.865 
Ethnicity 
White 437 (12.0%) 213 (13.4%) + 1.4% 0.162 
Ethnic Minority 91 (20.4%) 49 (24.7%) + 4.3% 0.212 
Household 
Income 
< £16,000 127 (14.6%) - - - 
£16,000 - £24,999 83 (15.9%) - - - 
£25,000 - £34,999 67 (16.7%) - - - 
£35,000 - £49,999 50 (14.1%) - - - 
>£49,999 35 (10.2%) - - - 
Area Type 
Urban 422 (13.1%) 209 (15.1%) + 2.0% 0.078* 
Rural 111 (12.1%) 55 (12.9%) + 0.8% 0.682 
Region 
North East England 13 (7.0%) - - - 
North West England 29 (6.0%) - - - 
Yorkshire and the Humber 37 (10.4%) - - - 
East Midlands 53 (18.2%) - - - 
West Midlands 52 (14.3%) - - - 
East of England 32 (9.1%) - - - 
London 94 (18.8%) - - - 
South East England 74 (13.0%) - - - 
South West England 53 (15.3%) - - - 
Wales 15 (7.5%) - - - 
Scotland 58 (16.0%) - - - 
Northern Ireland 23 (20.0%) - - - 
Total 533 (12.9%) 264 (14.6%) + 1.7% 0.084* 
Sig. = Significance; Diff. = Difference; * = 90 per cent significance; ** = 95 per cent significance; *** = 99 per 
cent significance. 
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Table Y.18 – Proportion of respondents that believe rising temperatures and/or hotter summers 
are already occurring within the United Kingdom due to climate change 
Socio-Economic Factors March 2019 March 2020 Diff. Sig. 
Age 
16-24 242 (51.9%) 100 (39.4%) - 12.5% 0.001*** 
25-34 335 (52.9%) 117 (40.5%) - 12.4% 0.000*** 
35-44 295 (52.8%) 89 (37.2%) - 15.6% 0.000*** 
45-54 257 (49.7%) 77 (31.6%) - 18.1% 0.000*** 
55-64 297 (49.4%) 101 (38.1%) - 11.3% 0.002*** 
65+ 579 (42.8%) 174 (33.4%) - 9.4% 0.000*** 
Gender 
Male 959 (48.4%) 321 (37.4%) - 11.0% 0.000*** 
Female 1,046 (48.7%) 337 (35.3%) - 13.4% 0.000*** 
Social Class 
AB 420 (55.7%) 158 (45.5%) - 10.1% 0.002*** 
C1 562 (52.2%) 230 (42.7%) - 9.5% 0.000*** 
C2 378 (45.4%) 116 (31.2%) - 14.2% 0.000*** 
DE 645 (44.0%) 154 (27.8%) - 16.2% 0.000*** 
Ethnicity 
White 1,741 (47.8%) 573 (36.0%) - 11.8% 0.000*** 
Ethnic Minority 249 (55.7%) 79 (39.9%) - 15.8% 0.000*** 
Household 
Income 
< £16,000 385 (44.2%) - - - 
£16,000 - £24,999 255 (48.8%) - - - 
£25,000 - £34,999 210 (52.4%) - - - 
£35,000 - £49,999 195 (54.9%) - - - 
>£49,999 196 (57.1%) - - - 
Area Type 
Urban 1,579 (49.2%) 510 (36.8%) - 12.4% 0.000*** 
Rural 426 (46.4%) 148 (34.7%) - 11.7% 0.000*** 
Region 
North East England 96 (51.3%) - - - 
North West England 206 (42.5%) - - - 
Yorkshire and the Humber 170 (47.6%) - - - 
East Midlands 129 (44.2%) - - - 
West Midlands 183 (50.3%) - - - 
East of England 203 (57.7%) - - - 
London 284 (56.9%) - - - 
South East England 322 (56.7%) - - - 
South West England 163 (47.1%) - - - 
Wales 92 (45.8%) - - - 
Scotland 138 (38.0%) - - - 
Northern Ireland 19 (16.5%) - - - 
Total 2,005 (48.6%) 658 (36.3%) - 12.3% 0.000*** 
Sig. = Significance; Diff. = Difference; *** = 99 per cent significance. 
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Table Y.19 – Proportion of respondents that believe more extreme events [including storms] are 
already occurring within the United Kingdom due to climate change 
Socio-Economic Factors March 2019 March 2020 Diff. Sig. 
Age 
16-24 123 (26.4%) 83 (32.7%) + 6.3% 0.075* 
25-34 182 (28.8%) 97 (33.6%) + 4.8% 0.140 
35-44 163 (29.2%) 79 (33.1%) + 3.9% 0.273 
45-54 159 (30.8%) 70 (28.7%) - 2.1% 0.562 
55-64 205 (34.1%) 85 (32.1%) - 2.0% 0.559 
65+ 371 (27.4%) 179 (34.4%) - 7.0% 0.003*** 
Gender 
Male 567 (28.6%) 299 (34.8%) + 6.2% 0.001*** 
Female 636 (29.6%) 294 (30.8%) + 1.2% 0.493 
Social Class 
AB 263 (34.9%) 140 (40.3%) + 5.4% 0.080* 
C1 321 (29.8%) 176 (32.7%) + 2.9% 0.247 
C2 224 (26.9%) 119 (32.0%) + 5.1% 0.070* 
DE 395 (26.9%) 158 (28.5%) + 1.6% 0.479 
Ethnicity 
White 1,101 (30.2%) 533 (33.5%) + 3.3% 0.019** 
Ethnic Minority 96 (21.5%) 54 (27.3%) + 5.8% 0.108 
Household 
Income 
< £16,000 232 (26.6%) - - - 
£16,000 - £24,999 186 (35.6%) - - - 
£25,000 - £34,999 131 (32.7%) - - - 
£35,000 - £49,999 123 (34.6%) - - - 
>£49,999 108 (31.5%) - - - 
Area Type 
Urban 936 (29.1%) 440 (31.8%) + 2.7% 0.075* 
Rural 267 (29.1%) 153 (35.8%) + 6.7% 0.013** 
Region 
North East England 52 (27.8%) - - - 
North West England 139 (28.7%) - - - 
Yorkshire and the Humber 76 (21.3%) - - - 
East Midlands 77 (26.4%) - - - 
West Midlands 110 (30.2%) - - - 
East of England 66 (18.8%) - - - 
London 109 (21.8%) - - - 
South East England 174 (30.6%) - - - 
South West England 148 (42.8%) - - - 
Wales 75 (37.3%) - - - 
Scotland 117 (32.2%) - - - 
Northern Ireland 60 (52.2%) - - - 
Total 1,203 (29.1%) 593 (32.7%) + 3.6% 0.006*** 
Sig. = Significance; Diff. = Difference; * = 90 per cent significance; ** = 95 per cent significance; *** = 99 per 
cent significance. 
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Table Y.20 – Proportion of respondents that believe increased pollution is already occurring within 
the United Kingdom due to climate change 
Socio-Economic Factors March 2019 March 2020 Diff. Sig. 
Age 
16-24 90 (19.3%) 50 (19.7%) + 0.4% 0.904 
25-34 137 (21.6%) 60 (20.8%) - 0.8% 0.762 
35-44 110 (19.7%) 44 (18.4%) - 1.3% 0.678 
45-54 84 (16.2%) 30 (12.3%) - 3.9% 0.154 
55-64 106 (17.6%) 33 (12.5%) - 5.1% 0.055* 
65+ 147 (10.9%) 64 (12.4%) + 1.5% 0.384 
Gender 
Male 320 (16.2%) 145 (16.9%) + 0.7% 0.626 
Female 354 (16.5%) 136 (14.3%) - 2.2% 0.118 
Social Class 
AB 98 (13.0%) 59 (17.0%) + 4.0% 0.077* 
C1 196 (18.2%) 82 (15.2%) - 3.0% 0.132 
C2 150 (18.0%) 57 (15.3%) - 2.7% 0.254 
DE 230 (15.7%) 83 (15.0%) - 0.7% 0.695 
Ethnicity 
White 549 (15.1%) 233 (14.6%) - 0.5% 0.687 
Ethnic Minority 123 (27.5%) 46 (23.2%) - 4.3% 0.254 
Household 
Income 
< £16,000 152 (17.5%) - - - 
£16,000 - £24,999 92 (17.6%) - - - 
£25,000 - £34,999 88 (21.9%) - - - 
£35,000 - £49,999 68 (19.2%) - - - 
>£49,999 51 (14.9%) - - - 
Area Type 
Urban 536 (16.7%) 229 (16.5%) - 0.2% 0.895 
Rural 138 (15.0%) 52 (12.2%) - 2.8% 0.162 
Region 
North East England 22 (11.8%) - - - 
North West England 42 (8.7%) - - - 
Yorkshire and the Humber 28 (7.8%) - - - 
East Midlands 82 (28.1%) - - - 
West Midlands 65 (17.9%) - - - 
East of England 37 (10.5%) - - - 
London 137 (27.5%) - - - 
South East England 102 (18.0%) - - - 
South West England 68 (19.7%) - - - 
Wales 29 (14.4%) - - - 
Scotland 40 (11.0%) - - - 
Northern Ireland 22 (19.1%) - - - 
Total 674 (16.3%) 281 (15.5%) - 0.8% 0.431 
Sig. = Significance; Diff. = Difference; * = 90 per cent significance. 
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Table Y.21 – Proportion of respondents that believe increased frequency/magnitude of wildfires 
are already occurring within the United Kingdom due to climate change 
Socio-Economic Factors March 2019 March 2020 Diff. Sig. 
Age 
16-24 33 (7.1%) 21 (8.3%) + 1.2% 0.564 
25-34 47 (7.4%) 25 (8.7%) + 1.3% 0.520 
35-44 40 (7.2%) 15 (6.3%) - 0.9% 0.653 
45-54 38 (7.4%) 10 (4.1%) - 3.3% 0.085* 
55-64 44 (7.3%) 10 (3.8%) - 3.5% 0.047** 
65+ 69 (5.1%) 35 (6.7%) + 1.6% 0.170 
Gender 
Male 115 (5.8%) 56 (6.5%) + 0.7% 0.460 
Female 156 (7.3%) 60 (6.3%) - 1.0% 0.327 
Social Class 
AB 57 (7.6%) 23 (6.6%) - 1.0% 0.580 
C1 79 (7.3%) 38 (7.1%) - 0.2% 0.831 
C2 62 (7.4%) 24 (6.5%) - 0.9% 0.537 
DE 73 (5.0%) 31 (5.6%) + 0.6% 0.576 
Ethnicity 
White 239 (6.6%) 106 (6.7%) + 0.1% 0.894 
Ethnic Minority 30 (6.7%) 10 (5.1%) - 1.6% 0.420 
Household 
Income 
< £16,000 58 (6.7%) - - - 
£16,000 - £24,999 46 (8.8%) - - - 
£25,000 - £34,999 24 (6.0%) - - - 
£35,000 - £49,999 40 (11.3%) - - - 
>£49,999 19 (5.5%) - - - 
Area Type 
Urban 224 (7.0%) 89 (6.4%) - 0.6% 0.497 
Rural 47 (5.1%) 27 (6.3%) + 1.2% 0.368 
Region 
North East England 14 (7.5%) - - - 
North West England 25 (5.2%) - - - 
Yorkshire and the Humber 12 (3.4%) - - - 
East Midlands 24 (8.2%) - - - 
West Midlands 26 (7.1%) - - - 
East of England 10 (2.8%) - - - 
London 29 (5.8%) - - - 
South East England 50 (8.8%) - - - 
South West England 31 (9.0%) - - - 
Wales 17 (8.5%) - - - 
Scotland 31 (8.5%) - - - 
Northern Ireland 2 (1.7%) - - - 
Total 271 (6.6%) 116 (6.4%) - 0.2% 0.816 
Sig. = Significance; Diff. = Difference; * = 90 per cent significance; ** = 95 per cent significance. 
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Table Y.22 – Proportion of respondents that believe increased frequency of coastal erosion is 
already occurring within the United Kingdom due to climate change 
Socio-Economic Factors March 2019 March 2020 Diff. Sig. 
Age 
16-24 39 (8.4%) 21 (8.3%) - 0.1% 0.962 
25-34 49 (7.7%) 30 (10.4%) + 2.7% 0.184 
35-44 58 (10.4%) 20 (8.4%) - 2.0% 0.382 
45-54 61 (11.8%) 31 (12.7%) + 0.9% 0.720 
55-64 79 (13.1%) 36 (13.6%) + 0.5% 0.860 
65+ 127 (9.4%) 70 (13.4%) + 4.0% 0.010*** 
Gender 
Male 197 (9.9%) 102 (11.9%) + 2.0% 0.122 
Female 216 (10.1%) 106 (11.1%) + 1.0% 0.372 
Social Class 
AB 85 (11.3%) 46 (13.3%) + 2.0% 0.345 
C1 123 (11.4%) 61 (11.3%) - 0.1% 0.946 
C2 85 (10.2%) 43 (11.6%) + 1.4% 0.481 
DE 120 (8.2%) 58 (10.5%) + 2.3% 0.106 
Ethnicity 
White 377 (10.3%) 200 (12.6%) + 2.3% 0.018** 
Ethnic Minority 34 (7.6%) 8 (4.0%) - 3.6% 0.090* 
Household 
Income 
< £16,000 83 (9.5%) - - - 
£16,000 - £24,999 68 (13.0%) - - - 
£25,000 - £34,999 58 (14.5%) - - - 
£35,000 - £49,999 47 (13.2%) - - - 
>£49,999 31 (9.0%) - - - 
Area Type 
Urban 294 (9.2%) 146 (10.5%) + 1.3% 0.143 
Rural 119 (13.0%) 62 (14.5%) + 1.5% 0.436 
Region 
North East England 16 (8.6%) - - - 
North West England 31 (6.4%) - - - 
Yorkshire and the Humber 26 (7.3%) - - - 
East Midlands 24 (8.2%) - - - 
West Midlands 20 (5.5%) - - - 
East of England 39 (11.1%) - - - 
London 39 (7.8%) - - - 
South East England 62 (10.9%) - - - 
South West England 65 (18.8%) - - - 
Wales 24 (11.9%) - - - 
Scotland 40 (11.0%) - - - 
Northern Ireland 27 (23.5%) - - - 
Total 413 (10.0%) 208 (11.5%) + 1.5% 0.087* 
Sig. = Significance; Diff. = Difference; * = 90 per cent significance; ** = 95 per cent significance; *** = 99 per 
cent significance. 
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Table Y.23 – Proportion of respondents that believe changes to the seasons and/or erratic weather 
patterns are already occurring within the United Kingdom due to climate change 
Socio-Economic Factors March 2019 March 2020 Diff. Sig. 
Age 
16-24 10 (2.1%) 3 (1.2%) - 0.9% 0.353 
25-34 19 (3.0%) 5 (1.7%) - 1.3% 0.261 
35-44 17 (3.0%) 9 (3.8%) + 0.8% 0.597 
45-54 24 (4.6%) 12 (4.9%) + 0.3% 0.867 
55-64 26 (4.3%) 12 (4.5%) + 0.2% 0.894 
65+ 62 (4.6%) 16 (3.1%) - 1.5% 0.142 
Gender 
Male 68 (3.4%) 24 (2.8%) - 0.6% 0.379 
Female 90 (4.2%) 33 (3.5%) - 0.7% 0.337 
Social Class 
AB 35 (4.6%) 18 (5.2%) + 0.6% 0.694 
C1 46 (4.3%) 14 (2.6%) - 1.7% 0.093* 
C2 32 (3.8%) 16 (4.3%) + 0.5% 0.706 
DE 45 (3.1%) 9 (1.6%) - 1.5% 0.072* 
Ethnicity 
White 147 (4.0%) 53 (3.3%) - 0.7% 0.221 
Ethnic Minority 10 (2.2%) 3 (1.5%) - 0.7% 0.547 
Household 
Income 
< £16,000 37 (4.2%) - - - 
£16,000 - £24,999 18 (3.4%) - - - 
£25,000 - £34,999 14 (3.5%) - - - 
£35,000 - £49,999 19 (5.4%) - - - 
>£49,999 18 (5.2%) - - - 
Area Type 
Urban 114 (3.6%) 35 (2.5%) - 1.1% 0.072* 
Rural 44 (4.8%) 22 (5.2%) + 0.4% 0.777 
Region 
North East England 2 (1.1%) - - - 
North West England 25 (5.2%) - - - 
Yorkshire and the Humber 11 (3.1%) - - - 
East Midlands 16 (5.5%) - - - 
West Midlands 23 (6.3%) - - - 
East of England 15 (4.3%) - - - 
London 4 (0.8%) - - - 
South East England 15 (2.6%) - - - 
South West England 13 (3.8%) - - - 
Wales 6 (3.0%) - - - 
Scotland 24 (6.6%) - - - 
Northern Ireland 4 (3.5%) - - - 
Total 158 (3.8%) 57 (3.1%) - 0.7% 0.196 
Sig. = Significance; Diff. = Difference; * = 90 per cent significance. 
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Q183 – Which of these do you think are likely to occur in the UK in the next 15 to 20 years as a 
result of climate change? 
Table Y.24 – Proportion of respondents that believe rising sea levels and/or more flooding will 
occur within the United Kingdom in the future due to climate change 
Socio-Economic Factors March 2019 March 2020 Diff. Sig. 
Age 
16-24 241 (51.7%) 158 (62.2%) + 10.5% 0.007*** 
25-34 344 (54.3%) 170 (58.8%) + 4.5% 0.204 
35-44 301 (53.8%) 140 (58.6%) + 4.8% 0.218 
45-54 296 (57.3%) 159 (65.2%) + 7.9% 0.038** 
55-64 357 (59.4%) 163 (61.5%) + 2.1% 0.559 
65+ 668 (49.4%) 308 (59.1%) + 9.7% 0.000*** 
Gender 
Male 1037 (52.4%) 534 (62.2%) + 9.8% 0.000*** 
Female 1170 (54.4%) 564 (59.1%) + 4.7% 0.016** 
Social Class 
AB 492 (65.3%) 238 (68.6%) + 3.3% 0.277 
C1 651 (60.5%) 349 (64.7%) + 4.2% 0.097* 
C2 428 (51.4%) 215 (57.8%) + 6.4% 0.039** 
DE 636 (43.4%) 296 (53.4%) + 10.0% 0.000*** 
Ethnicity 
White 1,983 (54.4%) 1,004 (63.0%) + 8.6% 0.000*** 
Ethnic Minority 210 (47.0%) 87 (43.9%) - 3.1% 0.475 
Household 
Income 
< £16,000 409 (47.0%) - - - 
£16,000 - £24,999 299 (57.2%) - - - 
£25,000 - £34,999 232 (57.9%) - - - 
£35,000 - £49,999 218 (61.4%) - - - 
>£49,999 221 (64.4%) - - - 
Area Type 
Urban 1,709 (53.2%) 827 (59.7%) + 6.5% 0.000*** 
Rural 498 (54.2%) 271 (63.5%) + 9.3% 0.001*** 
Region 
North East England 102 (54.5%) - - - 
North West England 276 (56.9%) - - - 
Yorkshire and the Humber 195 (54.6%) - - - 
East Midlands 123 (42.1%) - - - 
West Midlands 190 (52.2%) - - - 
East of England 161 (45.7%) - - - 
London 236 (47.3%) - - - 
South East England 340 (59.9%) - - - 
South West England 202 (58.4%) - - - 
Wales 112 (55.7%) - - - 
Scotland 203 (55.9%) - - - 
Northern Ireland 67 (58.3%) - - - 
Total 2,207 (53.5%) 1,098 (60.6%) + 7.1% 0.000*** 
Sig. = Significance; Diff. = Difference; * = 90 per cent significance; ** = 95 per cent significance; *** = 99 per 
cent significance. 
Data Adapted from BEIS (2019b) and BEIS (2020b)  
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Table Y.25 – Proportion of respondents that believe a reduction of food availability and/or impact 
on farming will occur within the United Kingdom in the future due to climate change 
Socio-Economic Factors March 2019 March 2020 Diff. Sig. 
Age 
16-24 158 (33.9%) 101 (39.8%) + 5.9% 0.118 
25-34 229 (36.2%) 108 (37.4%) + 1.2% 0.727 
35-44 220 (39.4%) 76 (31.8%) - 7.6% 0.043** 
45-54 180 (34.8%) 76 (31.1%) - 3.7% 0.317 
55-64 207 (34.4%) 81 (30.6%) - 3.8% 0.264 
65+ 358 (26.5%) 138 (26.5%) = 0.0% 0.990 
Gender 
Male 593 (29.9%) 270 (31.5%) + 1.6% 0.419 
Female 759 (35.3%) 310 (32.5%) - 2.8% 0.127 
Social Class 
AB 302 (40.1%) 126 (36.3%) - 3.8% 0.237 
C1 389 (36.2%) 182 (33.8%) - 2.4% 0.344 
C2 261 (31.3%) 98 (26.3%) - 5.0% 0.080* 
DE 400 (27.3%) 174 (31.4%) + 4.1% 0.067* 
Ethnicity 
White 1,194 (32.7%) 521 (32.7%) = 0.0% 0.976 
Ethnic Minority 149 (33.3%) 56 (28.3%) - 5.0% 0.204 
Household 
Income 
< £16,000 276 (31.7%) - - - 
£16,000 - £24,999 187 (35.8%) - - - 
£25,000 - £34,999 151 (37.7%) - - - 
£35,000 - £49,999 146 (41.1%) - - - 
>£49,999 135 (39.4%) - - - 
Area Type 
Urban 1,063 (33.1%) 452 (32.6%) - 0.5% 0.756 
Rural 289 (31.5%) 128 (30.0%) - 1.5% 0.579 
Region 
North East England 49 (26.2%) - - - 
North West England 172 (35.5%) - - - 
Yorkshire and the Humber 99 (27.7%) - - - 
East Midlands 69 (23.6%) - - - 
West Midlands 144 (39.6%) - - - 
East of England 105 (29.8%) - - - 
London 152 (30.5%) - - - 
South East England 217 (38.2%) - - - 
South West England 112 (32.4%) - - - 
Wales 59 (29.4%) - - - 
Scotland 128 (35.3%) - - - 
Northern Ireland 46 (40.0%) - - - 
Total 1,352 (32.7%) 580 (32.0%) - 0.7% 0.578 
Sig. = Significance; Diff. = Difference; * = 90 per cent significance; ** = 95 per cent significance. 
Data Adapted from BEIS (2019b) and BEIS (2020b) 
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Table Y.26 – Proportion of respondents that believe a reduction of water availability and/or 
increased frequency/magnitude of droughts will occur within the United Kingdom in the future due 
to climate change 
Socio-Economic Factors March 2019 March 2020 Diff. Sig. 
Age 
16-24 143 (30.7%) 93 (36.6%) + 5.9% 0.105 
25-34 213 (33.6%) 99 (34.3%) + 0.7% 0.857 
35-44 228 (40.8%) 79 (33.1%) - 7.7% 0.040** 
45-54 197 (38.1%) 64 (26.2%) - 11.9% 0.001*** 
55-64 256 (42.6%) 83 (31.3%) - 11.3% 0.002*** 
65+ 434 (32.1%) 122 (23.4%) - 8.7% 0.000*** 
Gender 
Male 675 (34.1%) 260 (30.3%) - 3.8% 0.049** 
Female 796 (37.0%) 280 (29.4%) - 7.6% 0.000*** 
Social Class 
AB 345 (45.8%) 125 (36.0%) - 9.8% 0.002*** 
C1 438 (40.7%) 181 (33.6%) - 7.1% 0.005*** 
C2 284 (34.1%) 101 (27.2%) - 6.9% 0.017** 
DE 404 (27.6%) 133 (24.0%) - 3.6% 0.107 
Ethnicity 
White 1,324 (36.3%) 478 (30.0%) - 6.3% 0.000*** 
Ethnic Minority 137 (30.6%) 58 (29.3%) - 1.3% 0.729 
Household 
Income 
< £16,000 284 (32.6%) - - - 
£16,000 - £24,999 206 (39.4%) - - - 
£25,000 - £34,999 155 (38.7%) - - - 
£35,000 - £49,999 154 (43.4%) - - - 
>£49,999 173 (50.4%) - - - 
Area Type 
Urban 1,145 (35.7%) 423 (30.5%) - 5.2% 0.001*** 
Rural 326 (35.5%) 117 (27.4%) - 8.1% 0.003*** 
Region 
North East England 61 (32.6%) - - - 
North West England 186 (38.4%) - - - 
Yorkshire and the Humber 123 (34.5%) - - - 
East Midlands 75 (25.7%) - - - 
West Midlands 150 (41.2%) - - - 
East of England 126 (35.8%) - - - 
London 168 (33.7%) - - - 
South East England 236 (41.5%) - - - 
South West England 129 (37.3%) - - - 
Wales 72 (35.8%) - - - 
Scotland 105 (28.9%) - - - 
Northern Ireland 40 (34.8%) - - - 
Total 1,471 (35.6%) 540 (29.8%) - 5.8% 0.000*** 
Sig. = Significance; Diff. = Difference; ** = 95 per cent significance; *** = 99 per cent significance. 
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Table Y.27 – Proportion of respondents that believe a change in plants or wildlife [including plants 
and animal extinctions] will occur within the United Kingdom in the future due to climate change 
Socio-Economic Factors March 2019 March 2020 Diff. Sig. 
Age 
16-24 207 (44.4%) 114 (44.9%) + 0.5% 0.905 
25-34 253 (40.0%) 120 (41.5%) + 1.5% 0.656 
35-44 257 (46.0%) 95 (39.7%) - 6.3% 0.105 
45-54 227 (43.9%) 91 (37.3%) - 6.6% 0.084* 
55-64 276 (45.9%) 92 (34.7%) - 11.2% 0.002*** 
65+ 459 (33.9%) 168 (32.2%) - 1.7% 0.490 
Gender 
Male 732 (37.0%) 317 (36.9%) - 0.1% 0.991 
Female 947 (44.1%) 363 (38.1%) - 6.0% 0.002*** 
Social Class 
AB 374 (49.6%) 161 (46.4%) - 3.2% 0.323 
C1 510 (47.4%) 207 (38.4%) - 9.0% 0.001*** 
C2 333 (40.0%) 129 (34.7%) - 5.3% 0.081* 
DE 462 (31.5%) 183 (33.0%) + 1.5% 0.514 
Ethnicity 
White 1,500 (41.1%) 614 (38.5%) - 2.6% 0.078* 
Ethnic Minority 166 (37.1%) 62 (31.3%) - 5.8% 0.154 
Household 
Income 
< £16,000 338 (38.8%) - - - 
£16,000 - £24,999 227 (43.4%) - - - 
£25,000 - £34,999 181 (45.1%) - - - 
£35,000 - £49,999 171 (48.2%) - - - 
>£49,999 179 (52.2%) - - - 
Area Type 
Urban 1,327 (41.3%) 511 (36.9%) - 4.4% 0.005*** 
Rural 352 (38.3%) 169 (39.6%) + 1.3 0.665 
Region 
North East England 77 (41.2%) - - - 
North West England 213 (43.9%) - - - 
Yorkshire and the Humber 124 (34.7%) - - - 
East Midlands 87 (29.8%) - - - 
West Midlands 163 (44.8%) - - - 
East of England 128 (36.4%) - - - 
London 175 (35.1%) - - - 
South East England 257 (45.2%) - - - 
South West England 153 (44.2%) - - - 
Wales 83 (41.3%) - - - 
Scotland 163 (44.9%) - - - 
Northern Ireland 56 (48.7%) - - - 
Total 1,679 (40.7%) 680 (37.5%) - 3.2% 0.023** 
Sig. = Significance; Diff. = Difference; * = 90 per cent significance; ** = 95 per cent significance; *** = 99 per 
cent significance. 
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Table Y.28 – Proportion of respondents that believe that more health problem [e.g. asthma] will 
occur within the United Kingdom in the future due to climate change 
Socio-Economic Factors March 2019 March 2020 Diff. Sig. 
Age 
16-24 187 (40.1%) 123 (48.4%) + 8.3% 0.031** 
25-34 282 (44.5%) 134 (46.4%) + 1.9% 0.607 
35-44 264 (47.2%) 109 (45.6%) - 1.6% 0.674 
45-54 230 (44.5%) 103 (42.2%) - 2.3% 0.555 
55-64 267 (44.4%) 100 (37.7%) - 6.7% 0.066* 
65+ 459 (33.9%) 185 (35.5%) + 1.6% 0.518 
Gender 
Male 752 (38.0%) 356 (41.5%) + 3.5% 0.078* 
Female 937 (43.6%) 398 (41.7%) - 1.9% 0.328 
Social Class 
AB 325 (43.1%) 161 (46.4%) + 3.3% 0.306 
C1 495 (46.0%) 229 (42.5%) - 3.5% 0.180 
C2 341 (40.9%) 143 (38.4%) - 2.5% 0.414 
DE 528 (36.0%) 221 (39.9%) + 3.9% 0.108 
Ethnicity 
White 1,484 (40.7%) 647 (40.6%) - 0.1% 0.953 
Ethnic Minority 190 (42.5%) 100 (50.5%) + 8.0% 0.060* 
Household 
Income 
< £16,000 364 (41.8%) - - - 
£16,000 - £24,999 235 (44.9%) - - - 
£25,000 - £34,999 185 (46.1%) - - - 
£35,000 - £49,999 158 (44.5%) - - - 
>£49,999 166 (48.4%) - - - 
Area Type 
Urban 1,343 (41.8%) 604 (43.6%) + 1.8% 0.261 
Rural 346 (37.7%) 150 (35.1%) - 2.6% 0.365 
Region 
North East England 61 (32.6%) - - - 
North West England 213 (43.9%) - - - 
Yorkshire and the Humber 111 (31.1%) - - - 
East Midlands 111 (38.0%) - - - 
West Midlands 163 (44.8%) - - - 
East of England 146 (41.5%) - - - 
London 212 (42.5%) - - - 
South East England 248 (43.7%) - - - 
South West England 129 (37.3%) - - - 
Wales 72 (35.8%) - - - 
Scotland 159 (43.8%) - - - 
Northern Ireland 64 (55.7%) - - - 
Total 1,689 (40.9%) 754 (41.6%) + 0.7% 0.611 
Sig. = Significance; Diff. = Difference; * = 90 per cent significance; ** = 95 per cent significance. 
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Table Y.29 – Proportion of respondents that believe rising temperatures and/or hotter summers 
will occur within the United Kingdom in the future due to climate change 
Socio-Economic Factors March 2019 March 2020 Diff. Sig. 
Age 
16-24 305 (65.5%) 158 (62.2%) - 3.3% 0.385 
25-34 384 (60.7%) 152 (52.6%) - 8.1% 0.021** 
35-44 361 (64.6%) 124 (51.9%) - 12.7% 0.001*** 
45-54 317 (61.3%) 125 (51.2%) - 10.1% 0.008*** 
55-64 369 (61.4%) 127 (47.9%) - 13.5% 0.000*** 
65+ 736 (54.4%) 230 (44.1%) - 10.3% 0.000*** 
Gender 
Male 1,184 (59.8%) 448 (52.2%) - 7.6% 0.000*** 
Female 1,288 (59.9%) 468 (49.1%) - 10.8% 0.000*** 
Social Class 
AB 525 (69.6%) 205 (59.1%) - 10.5% 0.001*** 
C1 698 (64.9%) 297 (55.1%) - 9.8% 0.000*** 
C2 471 (56.5%) 180 (48.4%) - 8.1% 0.009*** 
DE 778 (53.1%) 234 (42.2%) - 10.9% 0.000*** 
Ethnicity 
White 2,182 (59.8%) 814 (51.1%) - 8.7% 0.000*** 
Ethnic Minority 268 (60.0%) 96 (48.5%) - 11.5% 0.007*** 
Household 
Income 
< £16,000 496 (56.9%) - - - 
£16,000 - £24,999 321 (61.4%) - - - 
£25,000 - £34,999 267 (66.6%) - - - 
£35,000 - £49,999 236 (66.5%) - - - 
>£49,999 247 (72.0%) - - - 
Area Type 
Urban 1,927 (60.0%) 703 (50.8%) - 9.2% 0.000*** 
Rural 545 (59.4%) 213 (49.9%) - 9.5% 0.001*** 
Region 
North East England 112 (59.9%) - - - 
North West England 279 (57.5%) - - - 
Yorkshire and the Humber 209 (58.5%) - - - 
East Midlands 168 (57.5%) - - - 
West Midlands 215 (59.1%) - - - 
East of England 233 (66.2%) - - - 
London 310 (62.1%) - - - 
South East England 379 (66.7%) - - - 
South West England 214 (61.8%) - - - 
Wales 102 (50.7%) - - - 
Scotland 180 (49.6%) - - - 
Northern Ireland 71 (61.7%) - - - 
Total 2,472 (59.9%) 916 (50.6%) - 9.3% 0.000*** 
Sig. = Significance; Diff. = Difference; ** = 95 per cent significance; *** = 99 per cent significance. 
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Table Y.30 – Proportion of respondents that believe more extreme events [including storms] will 
occur within the United Kingdom in the future due to climate change 
Socio-Economic Factors March 2019 March 2020 Diff. Sig. 
Age 
16-24 215 (46.1%) 149 (58.7%) + 12.6% 0.001*** 
25-34 317 (50.1%) 146 (50.5%) + 0.4% 0.901 
35-44 298 (53.3%) 129 (54.0%) + 0.6% 0.863 
45-54 302 (58.4%) 129 (52.9%) - 5.5% 0.150 
55-64 348 (57.9%) 145 (54.7%) - 3.2% 0.383 
65+ 636 (47.0%) 280 (53.7%) + 6.7% 0.009*** 
Gender 
Male 1,011 (51.1%) 486 (56.6%) + 5.5% 0.006*** 
Female 1,105 (51.4%) 492 (51.6%) + 0.2% 0.937 
Social Class 
AB 477 (63.3%) 220 (63.4%) + 0.1% 0.965 
C1 598 (55.6%) 302 (56.0%) + 0.4% 0.863 
C2 411 (49.3%) 185 (49.7%) + 0.4% 0.900 
DE 630 (43.0%) 271 (48.9%) + 5.9% 0.017** 
Ethnicity 
White 1,908 (52.3%) 890 (55.9%) + 3.6% 0.018** 
Ethnic Minority 193 (43.2%) 81 (40.9%) - 2.3% 0.591 
Household 
Income 
< £16,000 421 (48.3%) - - - 
£16,000 - £24,999 276 (52.8%) - - - 
£25,000 - £34,999 222 (55.4%) - - - 
£35,000 - £49,999 220 (62.0%) - - - 
>£49,999 228 (66.5%) - - - 
Area Type 
Urban 1,630 (50.8%) 745 (53.8%) + 3.0% 0.059* 
Rural 486 (52.9%) 233 (54.6%) + 1.7% 0.578 
Region 
North East England 93 (49.7%) - - - 
North West England 244 (50.3%) - - - 
Yorkshire and the Humber 153 (42.9%) - - - 
East Midlands 130 (44.5%) - - - 
West Midlands 192 (52.7%) - - - 
East of England 160 (45.5%) - - - 
London 212 (42.5%) - - - 
South East England 340 (59.9%) - - - 
South West England 196 (56.6%) - - - 
Wales 113 (56.2%) - - - 
Scotland 192 (52.9%) - - - 
Northern Ireland 91 (79.1%) - - - 
Total 2,116 (51.2%) 978 (54.0%) + 2.8% 0.053* 
Sig. = Significance; Diff. = Difference; * = 90 per cent significance; ** = 95 per cent significance; *** = 99 per 
cent significance. 
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Table Y.31 – Proportion of respondents that believe increased pollution will occur within the 
United Kingdom in the future due to climate change 
Socio-Economic Factors March 2019 March 2020 Diff. Sig. 
Age 
16-24 247 (53.0%) 153 (60.2%) + 7.2% 0.062* 
25-34 331 (52.3%) 165 (57.1%) + 4.8% 0.175 
35-44 292 (52.2%) 115 (48.1%) - 4.1% 0.286 
45-54 246 (47.6%) 115 (47.1%) - 0.5% 0.907 
55-64 304 (50.6%) 109 (41.1%) - 9.5% 0.010*** 
65+ 521 (38.5%) 190 (36.5%) - 2.0% 0.415 
Gender 
Male 908 (45.9%) 399 (46.5%) + 0.6% 0.752 
Female 1,033 (48.1%) 448 (47.0%) - 1.1% 0.568 
Social Class 
AB 390 (51.7%) 170 (49.0%) - 2.7% 0.399 
C1 574 (53.3%) 280 (51.9%) - 1.4% 0.596 
C2 383 (46.0%) 161 (43.3%) - 2.7% 0.384 
DE 594 (40.5%) 236 (42.6%) + 2.1% 0.396 
Ethnicity 
White 1,701 (46.7%) 733 (46.0%) - 0.7% 0.669 
Ethnic Minority 228 (51.0%) 109 (55.1%) + 4.1% 0.343 
Household 
Income 
< £16,000 388 (44.5%) - - - 
£16,000 - £24,999 260 (49.7%) - - - 
£25,000 - £34,999 222 (55.4%) - - - 
£35,000 - £49,999 188 (53.0%) - - - 
>£49,999 199 (58.0%) - - - 
Area Type 
Urban 1,525 (47.5%) 662 (47.8%) + 0.3% 0.849 
Rural 416 (45.3%) 185 (43.3%) - 2.0% 0.494 
Region 
North East England 76 (40.6%) - - - 
North West England 237 (48.9%) - - - 
Yorkshire and the Humber 126 (35.3%) - - - 
East Midlands 150 (51.4%) - - - 
West Midlands 175 (48.1%) - - - 
East of England 165 (46.9%) - - - 
London 248 (49.7%) - - - 
South East England 292 (51.4%) - - - 
South West England 156 (45.1%) - - - 
Wales 99 (49.3%) - - - 
Scotland 154 (42.4%) - - - 
Northern Ireland 63 (54.8%) - - - 
Total 1,941 (47.0%) 847 (46.7%) - 0.3% 0.851 
Sig. = Significance; Diff. = Difference; * = 90 per cent significance; *** = 99 per cent significance. 
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Table Y.32 – Proportion of respondents that believe increased frequency/magnitude of wildfires 
will occur within the United Kingdom in the future due to climate change 
Socio-Economic Factors March 2019 March 2020 Diff. Sig. 
Age 
16-24 151 (32.4%) 81 (31.9%) - 0.5% 0.888 
25-34 181 (28.6%) 80 (27.7%) - 0.9% 0.775 
35-44 182 (32.6%) 59 (24.7%) - 7.9% 0.027** 
45-54 168 (32.5%) 45 (18.4%) - 14.1% 0.000*** 
55-64 220 (36.6%) 62 (23.4%) - 13.2% 0.000*** 
65+ 384 (28.4%) 117 (22.5%) - 5.9% 0.009*** 
Gender 
Male 585 (29.5%) 220 (25.6%) - 3.9% 0.034** 
Female 701 (32.6%) 224 (23.5%) - 9.1% 0.000*** 
Social Class 
AB 295 (39.1%) 90 (25.9%) - 13.2% 0.000*** 
C1 376 (34.9%) 135 (25.0%) - 9.9% 0.000*** 
C2 244 (29.3%) 86 (23.1%) - 6.2% 0.026** 
DE 371 (25.3%) 133 (24.0%) - 1.3% 0.547 
Ethnicity 
White 1,169 (32.1%) 397 (24.9%) - 7.2% 0.000*** 
Ethnic Minority 108 (24.2%) 46 (23.2%) - 1.0% 0.799 
Household 
Income 
< £16,000 255 (29.3%) - - - 
£16,000 - £24,999 182 (34.8%) - - - 
£25,000 - £34,999 141 (35.2%) - - - 
£35,000 - £49,999 144 (40.6%) - - - 
>£49,999 128 (37.3%) - - - 
Area Type 
Urban 1,000 (31.1%) 345 (24.9%) - 6.2% 0.000*** 
Rural 286 (31.2%) 99 (23.2%) - 8.0% 0.003*** 
Region 
North East England 55 (29.4%) - - - 
North West England 191 (39.4%) - - - 
Yorkshire and the Humber 103 (28.9%) - - - 
East Midlands 72 (24.7%) - - - 
West Midlands 124 (34.1%) - - - 
East of England 91 (25.9%) - - - 
London 116 (23.2%) - - - 
South East England 210 (37.0%) - - - 
South West England 101 (29.2%) - - - 
Wales 61 (30.3%) - - - 
Scotland 120 (33.1%) - - - 
Northern Ireland 42 (36.5%) - - - 
Total 1,286 (31.1%) 444 (24.5%) - 6.6% 0.000*** 
Sig. = Significance; Diff. = Difference; ** = 95 per cent significance; *** = 99 per cent significance. 
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Table Y.33 – Proportion of respondents that believe increased frequency of coastal erosion will 
occur within the United Kingdom in the future due to climate change 
Socio-Economic Factors March 2019 March 2020 Diff. Sig. 
Age 
16-24 165 (35.4%) 113 (44.5%) + 9.1% 0.017** 
25-34 250 (39.5%) 117 (40.5%) + 1.0% 0.776 
35-44 268 (47.9%) 94 (39.3%) - 8.6% 0.025** 
45-54 255 (49.3%) 108 (44.3%) - 5.0% 0.192 
55-64 304 (50.6%) 120 (45.3%) - 5.3% 0.151 
65+ 597 (44.1%) 240 (46.1%) + 2.0% 0.449 
Gender 
Male 848 (42.8%) 393 (45.8%) + 3.0% 0.142 
Female 991 (46.1%) 399 (41.8%) - 4.3% 0.027** 
Social Class 
AB 431 (57.2%) 175 (50.4%) - 6.8% 0.037** 
C1 538 (50.0%) 264 (49.0%) - 1.0% 0.699 
C2 349 (41.9%) 151 (40.6%) - 1.3% 0.671 
DE 521 (35.5%) 202 (36.5%) + 1.0% 0.699 
Ethnicity 
White 1,685 (46.2%) 741 (46.5%) + 0.3% 0.841 
Ethnic Minority 146 (32.7%) 48 (24.2%) - 8.5% 0.032** 
Household 
Income 
< £16,000 344 (39.5%) - - - 
£16,000 - £24,999 247 (47.2%) - - - 
£25,000 - £34,999 200 (49.9%) - - - 
£35,000 - £49,999 180 (50.7%) - - - 
>£49,999 201 (58.6%) - - - 
Area Type 
Urban 1,377 (42.9%) 607 (43.8%) + 0.9% 0.554 
Rural 462 (50.3%) 185 (43.3%) - 7.0% 0.017** 
Region 
North East England 76 (40.6%) - - - 
North West England 241 (49.7%) - - - 
Yorkshire and the Humber 154 (43.1%) - - - 
East Midlands 109 (37.3%) - - - 
West Midlands 164 (45.1%) - - - 
East of England 151 (42.9%) - - - 
London 155 (31.1%) - - - 
South East England 280 (49.3%) - - - 
South West England 179 (51.7%) - - - 
Wales 106 (52.7%) - - - 
Scotland 160 (44.1%) - - - 
Northern Ireland 64 (55.7%) - - - 
Total 1,839 (44.5%) 792 (43.7%) - 0.8% 0.553 
Sig. = Significance; Diff. = Difference; ** = 95 per cent significance. 
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Table Y.34 – Proportion of respondents that believe changes to the seasons and/or erratic weather 
patterns will occur within the United Kingdom in the future due to climate change 
Socio-Economic Factors March 2019 March 2020 Diff. Sig. 
Age 
16-24 4 (0.9%) 0 (0.0%) - 0.9% 0.303 
25-34 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) = 0.0% 1.000 
35-44 4 (0.7%) 0 (0.0%) - 0.7% 0.323 
45-54 5 (1.0%) 1 (0.4%) - 0.6% 0.670 
55-64 0 (0.0%) 1 (0.4%) + 0.4% 0.306 
65+ 6 (0.4%) 1 (0.2%) - 0.2% 0.681 
Gender 
Male 9 (0.5%) 1 (0.1%) - 0.4% 0.299 
Female 10 (0.5%) 2 (0.2%) - 0.3% 0.364 
Social Class 
AB 6 (0.8%) 1 (0.3%) - 0.5% 0.443 
C1 6 (0.6%) 1 (0.2%) - 0.4% 0.436 
C2 2 (0.2%) 1 (0.2%) + 0.1% 1.000 
DE 5 (0.3%) 0 (0.0%) - 0.3% 0.331 
Ethnicity 
White 18 (0.5%) 3 (0.2%) - 0.3% 0.152 
Ethnic Minority 1 (0.2%) 0 (0.0%) - 0.2% 1.000 
Household 
Income 
< £16,000 7 (0.8%) - - - 
£16,000 - £24,999 3 (0.6%) - - - 
£25,000 - £34,999 0 (0.0%) - - - 
£35,000 - £49,999 0 (0.0%) - - - 
>£49,999 3 (0.9%) - - - 
Area Type 
Urban 13 (0.4%) 2 (0.1%) - 0.3% 0.258 
Rural 6 (0.7%) 1 (0.2%) - 0.5% 0.442 
Region 
North East England 0 (0.0%) - - - 
North West England 1 (0.2%) - - - 
Yorkshire and the Humber 3 (0.8%) - - - 
East Midlands 0 (0.0%) - - - 
West Midlands 0 (0.0%) - - - 
East of England 1 (0.3%) - - - 
London 0 (0.0%) - - - 
South East England 3 (0.5%) - - - 
South West England 4 (1.2%) - - - 
Wales 3 (1.5%) - - - 
Scotland 3 (0.8%) - - - 
Northern Ireland 1 (0.9%) - - - 
Total 19 (0.5%) 3 (0.2%) - 0.3% 0.105 
Sig. = Significance; Diff. = Difference. 
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Appendix Z – Example of the Eurobarometer Questionnaire [2019] 
QB1 Which of the following statements best describes your opinion? 
1. Climate change is entirely due to human activity 
2. Climate change is partly due to human activity 
3. Climate change is not at all due to human activity 
4. There is no climate change/ I don’t believe in climate change 
5. Don’t Know 
 




































1 Heat or cold waves 
1 2 3 4 5 
2 Droughts and wildfires 
3 Floods 




QB3a By 2050, which of the following is the most likely to intensify because of climate 
change? Firstly? 
1. Increasing food and water shortages 
2. Biodiversity loss 
3. An increase in infectious diseases or epidemics 
4. Soil degradation and desertification 
5. A rise in mass migration to Europe 
6. Damages to buildings and infrastructures 
7. Other (Question 4) 
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QB3b  And then? 
1. Increasing food and water shortages 
2. Biodiversity loss 
3. An increase in infectious diseases or epidemics 
4. Soil degradation and desertification 
5. A rise in mass migration to Europe 
6. Damages to buildings and infrastructures 
7. Other 
8. Don’t Know 
 



































More measures to promote and encourage recycling 
should be implemented in EU Member States 
1 2 3 4 5 
2 
More measures to promote and encourage energy 
efficiency should be implemented in EU Member 
States 
3 
More measures to promote and encourage the 
development of a clean and modern economy should 
be implemented in EU Member States 
 
 



































Fighting Climate Change and using energy more 
efficiently can boost the economy and jobs in the EU? 
1 2 3 4 5 
2 
Promoting EU expertise in new clean technologies to 
countries outside the EU can benefit the EU 
economically? 
3 
Reducing fossil fuel imports from outside the EU can 
benefit the EU economically? 
4 
Reducing fossil fuel imports from outside the EU can 
increase the security of EU energy supplies? 
5 
More public financial support should be given to the 
transition to clean energies even if it means subsidies 
to fossil fuels should be reduced 
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Appendix AA - Yonmenkaigi System Method Brief (11th October 2018) 
Brief: 
You being asked by Newcastle City Council to discuss and give ideas to how Newcastle can do to 
reduce the effects of climate change through mitigating and adaption. 
 
Background to Climate Change: 
Climate change is defined as the large variation in the state of climate, which can occur over an 
extended time period of a couple of decades or longer. Climate change can occur in both 
anthropogenic and natural forms. There is a consensus within the scientific community that current 
climate change is mainly caused by human causes. Within the last report by the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 2013, they warned that the planet faces “severe, pervasive and 
irreversible” effects due to climate change if greenhouse gas emissions are not drastically cut (IPCC, 
2014a, p. 56). In 2018, the IPCC highlighted that the world has already experienced 1oC temperature 
increase since pre-industrial times. The official target by the United Nations is to limit temperature 
increase to 1.5oC. However, if greenhouse gas emissions continue at its current rate, it is expected 
that global temperatures will increase by 1.5oC target by 2030 and 2052. 
As result of these increase global temperatures, it is expected that other elements of the climate will 
experience change. These include sea-level raise; species extinction; change in participations rates and 
patterns. In addition, it is expected that climate change will have an impact human health; food 
security; water supply; and economic growth. 
 
United Kingdom Greenhouse Gas Emissions: 
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Climate Change in Newcastle-upon-Tyne: 
Table 1 – Change within the North East of England between 1961 and 2006 (DEFRA UK Climate 
Change Projection, 2009) 
 Spring Summer Autumn Winter Annual 
Mean 
Temperature 
1.43 1.57 1.13 1.86 1.46 
Maximum 
Temperature 
1.63 1.72 1.1 1.92 1.55 
Minimum 
Temperature 
1.19 1.42 1.13 1.78 1.35 
Days of air 
frost 
-5.3 -0.2 -5.0 -15.2 -28.2 
Days of rain 
 
-1.9 -1.8 2.4 2.7 0.1 
Precipitation 
(mm) 
4.6 -6.9 12.4 29.6 8.7 
 
Table 2 – Projected Change of Weather within Newcastle-upon-Tyne by 2020s, 2050s and 2080s 
(DEFRA UK Climate Change Projection, 2009) 




2020s 2050s 2080s 
Summer Mean 
Temperature 
13.5oC 14.1 – 16oC 14.6 – 18.2oC 14.8 – 20.7oC 
Summer Mean 
Daily Maximum 
17oC 17.4 – 20.2oC 17.9 – 22.9oC 17.9 – 24.9oC 
Summer Mean 
Daily Minimum 
10oC 10.5 – 12.4oC 10.9 – 14.6oC 11 – 17.3oC 
Winter Mean 
Temperature 
3oC 3.3 – 5oC 3.8 – 6.3oC 3.8 – 6.3oC 
Summer Mean 
Precipitation 
2mm/day 1.6 – 2.19 mm/day 1.36 – 2.15 mm/day 




2mm/day 1.91 – 2.37 mm/day 1.99 – 2.74 mm/day 
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Appendix AB – Yonmenkaigi System Method Questionnaire 
 
PLEASE NOTE, THERE ARE NO WRONG ANSWERS WITHIN THIS QUESTIONNAIRE! 
Questionnaire 1 
1. How worried are you about the following issues? 













    
Climate 
Change 








    
Economic 
Instability 




    
Genetic 
Engineering 




    
Nuclear 
Weapons 




    
 
2. Do you think that climate change is caused by natural processes, human activity, or both? 
(Please Circle) 
a. Entirely by Natural Processes 
b. Mainly by Natural Processes 
c. About Equally by Natural Processes and Human Activity 
d. Mainly by Human Activity 
e. Entirely by Human Activity 
 
3. To what extend do you feel a personal responsibility to try to reduce climate change? 
Not at 
all 
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4. How good or bad do you think the impact of climate change will be on people across the 
world? 























5. How good or bad do you think the impact of climate change will be on people within the 
United Kingdom? 































We can all do our bit to reduce the 
effects of climate change 
     
Climate change will improve the British 
weather 
     
The government should provide 
incentives for people to look after the 
environment 
     
It is already too late to do anything 
about climate change 
     
Developed countries should take most 
of the blame for climate change 
     
Radical change to society are needed to 
tackle climate change 
     
People are too selfish to do anything 
about climate change 
     
If I come across information about 
climate change, I tend to look at it 
     
Leaving the light on in my home and/or 
adds to climate change 
     
The impacts of climate change is 
already been felt within the UK 
     
Nothing I do on a regular basis 
contributes to climate change  
     
The Government is doing enough to 
combat climate change 
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7. To what extent are you in favour or against the following policies in the United Kingdom to 













Increasing taxes on 
petrol and diesel and 
petrol 
     
Increase Road Tax for 
non-electric car 
     
More Public Investment 
in Renewable Energy 
     
Increasing the 
government greenhouse 
gas emissions reduction 
targets 
     
Should ban the sale of 
pure petrol and diesel 
cars 
     
 
8. In your opinion, who within the UK is responsible for tackling climate change? (Multiple 
Answers Allowed) 
a. National Government 
b. Local Authorities 
c. Business and Industry 
d. Environmental Groups 
e. Researchers 
f. Your Personally 
 
9. Have you personally taken any action to fight climate change over the past six months? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. Don’t Know 
 
10. How likely are you to take personally action to fight climate change in the next six months? 
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Appendix AC – Google Trends Results 
Table AC.1 – Google Trends Levels for Climate Change, Global Warming, Global Cooling and 










CC vs GW 
January 2004 12 43 0 0 -31 
February 2004 20 35 1 0 -15 
March 2004 16 38 0 0 -22 
April 2004 10 21 0 0 -11 
May 2004 17 32 0 0 -15 
June 2004 10 35 1 0 -25 
July 2004 10 20 0 0 -10 
August 2004 9 8 0 0 1 
September 2004 15 30 1 0 -15 
October 2004 16 29 1 0 -13 
November 2004 21 46 1 0 -25 
December 2004 16 28 0 0 -12 
January 2005 22 51 1 0 -29 
February 2005 21 48 1 0 -27 
March 2005 16 39 1 0 -23 
April 2005 13 31 1 0 -18 
May 2005 14 32 1 0 -18 
June 2005 17 35 0 0 -18 
July 2005 14 23 1 0 -9 
August 2005 11 10 0 0 1 
September 2005 14 29 0 0 -15 
October 2005 19 30 0 0 -11 
November 2005 25 43 1 0 -18 
December 2005 18 26 0 0 -8 
January 2006 19 40 0 0 -21 
February 2006 26 39 1 0 -13 
March 2006 33 48 0 0 -15 
April 2006 16 23 0 0 -7 
May 2006 19 34 1 0 -15 
June 2006 23 45 0 0 -22 
July 2006 16 25 0 0 -9 
August 2006 14 7 0 0 7 
September 2006 20 33 0 0 -13 
October 2006 32 43 0 0 -11 
November 2006 36 60 0 0 -24 
December 2006 21 34 0 0 -13 
January 2007 34 58 0 0 -24 
February 2007 40 66 1 0 -26 
March 2007 44 100 0 0 -56 
April 2007 28 48 0 0 -20 
May 2007 32 47 0 0 -15 
June 2007 25 57 0 0 -32 
July 2007 23 40 0 0 -17 
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Table AC.1 – Google Trends Levels for Climate Change, Global Warming, Global Cooling and 










CC vs GW 
August 2007 20 13 0 0 7 
September 2007 22 31 0 0 -9 
October 2007 29 39 0 0 -10 
November 2007 33 45 0 0 -12 
December 2007 28 36 0 0 -8 
January 2008 26 45 0 0 -19 
February 2008 29 44 0 0 -15 
March 2008 27 40 0 0 -13 
April 2008 26 35 1 0 -9 
May 2008 21 30 0 0 -9 
June 2008 25 40 0 0 -15 
July 2008 15 23 1 0 -8 
August 2008 13 8 0 0 5 
September 2008 20 24 0 0 -4 
October 2008 26 28 0 0 -2 
November 2008 26 34 0 0 -8 
December 2008 24 24 0 0 0 
January 2009 25 32 1 0 -7 
February 2009 24 34 0 0 -10 
March 2009 30 38 0 0 -8 
April 2009 24 27 0 0 -3 
May 2009 21 27 0 0 -6 
June 2009 24 30 0 0 -6 
July 2009 21 17 1 0 4 
August 2009 16 6 0 0 10 
September 2009 22 21 0 0 1 
October 2009 31 29 0 0 2 
November 2009 40 39 0 0 1 
December 2009 48 37 1 0 11 
January 2010 29 38 1 0 -9 
February 2010 31 33 0 0 -2 
March 2010 28 34 0 0 -6 
April 2010 22 21 0 0 1 
May 2010 22 24 0 0 -2 
June 2010 17 20 0 0 -3 
July 2010 13 12 0 0 1 
August 2010 11 5 0 0 6 
September 2010 15 15 0 0 0 
October 2010 19 18 0 0 1 
November 2010 23 26 0 0 -3 
December 2010 17 18 0 0 -1 
January 2011 20 27 0 0 -7 
February 2011 22 27 0 0 -5 
March 2011 25 33 0 0 -8 
April 2011 15 17 0 0 -2 
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Table AC.1 – Google Trends Levels for Climate Change, Global Warming, Global Cooling and 










CC vs GW 
May 2011 18 23 0 0 -5 
June 2011 16 20 0 0 -4 
July 2011 12 12 0 0 0 
August 2011 8 5 0 0 3 
September 2011 12 16 0 0 -4 
October 2011 18 18 0 0 0 
November 2011 22 23 0 0 -1 
December 2011 16 16 0 0 0 
January 2012 17 24 0 0 -7 
February 2012 17 25 0 0 -8 
March 2012 19 26 0 0 -7 
April 2012 15 14 0 0 1 
May 2012 16 18 0 0 -2 
June 2012 11 12 0 0 -1 
July 2012 9 8 0 0 1 
August 2012 8 5 0 0 3 
September 2012 12 12 0 0 0 
October 2012 15 16 0 0 -1 
November 2012 17 19 0 0 -2 
December 2012 13 12 0 0 1 
January 2013 15 17 0 0 -2 
February 2013 15 17 0 0 -2 
March 2013 17 17 0 0 0 
April 2013 15 14 0 0 1 
May 2013 15 15 0 0 0 
June 2013 12 14 0 0 -2 
July 2013 9 7 0 0 2 
August 2013 6 3 0 0 3 
September 2013 13 11 0 0 2 
October 2013 15 13 0 0 2 
November 2013 19 17 0 0 2 
December 2013 12 11 0 0 1 
January 2014 16 15 0 0 1 
February 2014 19 16 0 0 3 
March 2014 19 17 0 0 2 
April 2014 15 10 0 0 5 
May 2014 15 12 0 0 3 
June 2014 12 11 0 0 1 
July 2014 9 6 0 0 3 
August 2014 7 4 0 0 3 
September 2014 15 11 0 0 4 
October 2014 14 11 0 0 3 
November 2014 18 14 0 0 4 
December 2014 13 10 0 0 3 
January 2015 16 13 0 0 3 
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Table AC.1 – Google Trends Levels for Climate Change, Global Warming, Global Cooling and 










CC vs GW 
February 2015 17 14 0 0 3 
March 2015 19 13 0 0 6 
April 2015 15 10 0 0 5 
May 2015 14 10 0 0 4 
June 2015 15 10 0 0 5 
July 2015 10 6 0 0 4 
August 2015 8 3 0 0 5 
September 2015 14 9 0 0 5 
October 2015 15 10 0 0 5 
November 2015 26 14 0 0 12 
December 2015 25 14 0 0 11 
January 2016 18 11 0 0 7 
February 2016 17 9 0 0 8 
March 2016 17 10 0 0 7 
April 2016 16 9 0 0 7 
May 2016 16 9 0 0 7 
June 2016 11 7 0 0 4 
July 2016 10 4 0 0 6 
August 2016 8 3 0 0 5 
September 2016 12 6 0 0 6 
October 2016 15 7 0 0 8 
November 2016 25 12 0 0 13 
December 2016 16 8 0 0 8 
January 2017 20 10 0 0 10 
February 2017 18 10 0 0 8 
March 2017 20 11 0 0 9 
April 2017 14 7 0 0 7 
May 2017 16 8 0 0 8 
June 2017 19 9 0 0 10 
July 2017 10 5 0 0 5 
August 2017 9 3 0 0 6 
September 2017 13 7 0 0 6 
October 2017 15 7 0 0 8 
November 2017 18 9 0 0 9 
December 2017 13 7 0 0 6 
January 2018 16 10 0 0 6 
February 2018 15 8 0 0 7 
March 2018 14 9 0 0 5 
April 2018 14 6 0 0 8 
May 2018 14 7 0 0 7 
June 2018 10 6 0 0 4 
July 2018 10 6 0 0 4 
August 2018 9 4 0 0 5 
September 2018 10 5 0 0 5 
October 2018 22 9 0 0 13 
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Table AC.1 – Google Trends Levels for Climate Change, Global Warming, Global Cooling and 










CC vs GW 
November 2018 21 8 0 0 13 
December 2018 18 7 0 0 11 
January 2019 17 8 0 0 9 
February 2019 29 13 0 1 16 
March 2019 31 10 0 1 21 
April 2019 48 11 0 1 37 
May 2019 38 12 0 4 26 
June 2019 31 10 0 2 21 
July 2019 25 8 0 2 17 
August 2019 21 6 0 1 15 
September 2019 52 11 0 2 41 
October 2019 39 9 0 2 30 
November 2019 38 10 0 2 28 
December 2019 30 9 0 1 21 
January 2020 41 11 0 1 30 
February 2020 35 9 0 2 26 
March 2020 30 10 0 1 20 
April 2020 22 7 0 1 15 
May 2020 21 7 0 0 14 
June 2020 22 8 0 1 14 
July 2020 16 5 0 0 11 
CC = Climate Change; GW = Global Warming; Blue Cells = More ‘Climate Change’ searches;  Red Cells = More 
‘Global Warming’ searches 
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Appendix AD – Questionnaire 1 Results 
 
Question 13 – How trustworthy do you think different people and organisations are in relation in 
terms of communicating the truth of climate change? (Please tick only one response per row) 
Table AD.1 – The truthfulness in communicating climate change by different individuals and 
institutions according to respondents, 2017 
   




118 390 607 19 
10.4% 34.4% 53.5% 1.7% 
Education 
676 253 196 9 
59.6% 22.3% 17.3% 0.8% 
Environmental Group 
668 179 279 8 
58.9% 15.8% 24.6% 0.7% 
Family 
230 617 271 16 
20.3% 54.4% 23.9% 1.4% 
Friend 
229 605 281 19 
20.2% 53.4% 24.8% 1.7% 
Local Government 
442 348 330 14 
39.0% 30.7% 29.1% 1.2% 
National Government 
394 265 466 9 
34.7% 23.4% 41.1% 0.8% 
Police 
173 626 315 20 
15.3% 55.2% 27.8% 1.8% 
Religious Leader 
155 421 541 17 
13.7% 37.1% 47.7% 1.5% 
Scientists and 
Researchers 
877 110 138 9 
77.3% 9.7% 12.2% 0.8% 
 
Question 24 – Are you a member of an environmental organisation? 
Table AD.2 – Proportion of respondents that are a member of an environmental organisation, 
2017 
 Yes No Refused Total 
Overall 171 (15.1%) 954 (84.1%) 9 (0.8%) 1,134 
18-24 19 (11.7%) 144 (88.3%) 0 (0.0%) 163 
25-34 18 (11.9%) 133 (88.1%) 0 (0.0%) 151 
35-44 15 (13.0%) 99 (86.1%) 1 (0.9%) 115 
45-54 30 (17.9%) 137 (81.5%) 1 (0.6%) 168 
55-64 41 (17.8%) 187 (81.3%) 2 (0.9%) 230 
65+ 46 (15.2%) 251 (83.1%) 5 (1.7%) 302 
Male 113 (16.7%) 558 (82.4%) 6 (0.9%) 677 
Female 58 (12.9%) 387 (86.4%) 3 (0.7%) 448 
 
500 | P a g e  
 
Question 23 – Which of the following have you undertaken in the last three years, which have reduced your contributions towards climate change? 
Table AD.3 – Climate change mitigation engagement action by age group, 2017 
 18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+ Overall 
Driving an electric/hybrid car 7 (4.3%) 9 (6.0%) 7 (6.1%) 6 (3.6%) 21 (9.1%) 24 (7.9%) 74 (6.5%) 
Making fewer car journeys 62 (38.0%) 63 (41.7%) 46 (40.0%) 63 (37.5%) 93 (40.4%) 122 (40.4%) 450 (39.7%) 
Car share to work 18 (11.0%) 23 (15.2%) 11 (9.6%) 19 (11.3%) 13 (5.7%) 17 (5.6%) 101 (8.9%) 
Walk or cycle to work 95 (58.3%) 88 (58.3%) 53 (46.1%) 64 (38.1%) 69 (30.0%) 59 (19.5%) 430 (37.9%) 
Usage of Public Transport (e.g. Bus and Trains) 107 (65.6%) 97 (64.2%) 52 (45.2%) 64 (38.1%) 89 (38.7%) 135 (44.7%) 547 (48.2%) 
Buy second hand produces 41 (25.2%) 56 (37.1%) 36 (31.3%) 68 (40.5%) 68 (29.6%) 67 (22.2%) 337 (29.7%) 
Buy food with less packaging 75 (46.0%) 96 (63.6%) 63 (54.8%) 103 (61.3%) 143 (62.2%) 171 (56.6%) 654 (57.7%) 
Buy locally grown food 71 (43.6%) 80 (53.0%) 59 (51.3%) 84 (50.0%) 136 (59.1%) 165 (54.6%) 599 (52.8%) 
Eat less meat 67 (41.1%) 72 (47.7%) 38 (33.0%) 56 (33.3%) 79 (34.3%) 100 (33.1%) 414 (36.5%) 
Grow your own food 18 (11.0%) 36 (23.8%) 33 (28.7%) 42 (25.0%) 66 (28.7%) 102 (33.8%) 301 (26.5%) 
Install house insulation 38 (23.3%) 29 (19.2%) 42 (36.5%) 78 (46.4%) 125 (54.3%) 183 (60.6%) 497 (43.8%) 
Install low energy light bulbs 105 (64.4%) 104 (68.9%) 83 (72.2%) 140 (83.3%) 193 (83.9%) 259 (85.8%) 889 (78.4%) 
Install renewable energy 12 (7.4%) 11 (7.3%) 19 (16.5%) 32 (19.0%) 49 (21.3%) 68 (22.5%) 191 (16.8%) 
Unplug appliance when not used 108 (66.3%) 94 (62.3%) 47 (40.9%) 84 (50.0%) 118 (51.3%) 130 (43.0%) 585 (51.6%) 
Switch off lights 152 (93.3%) 132 (87.4%) 87 (75.7%) 131 (78.0%) 184 (80.0%) 238 (78.8%) 929 (81.9%) 
Turn down heating 118 (72.4%) 113 (74.8%) 73 (63.5%) 121 (72.0%) 151 (65.7%) 184 (60.9%) 763 (67.3%) 
Use water sparingly 74 (45.4%) 71 (47.0%) 42 (36.5%) 77 (45.8%) 104 (45.2%) 155 (51.3%) 527 (46.5%) 
Reduce personal waste production 69 (42.3%) 76 (50.3%) 54 (47.0%) 94 (56.0%) 138 (60.0%) 154 (51.0%) 588 (51.9%) 
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Appendix AE – Definition of Terms 
“Diseases” refers to any infectious virus, bacteria or other pathogen that spreads throughout the 
human race. Diseases are a concern to the public, where they have a history of killing large numbers 
of people. An example is the H1N1 influenza flu, commonly known as Spanish flu, which occurred 
between 1918 and 1920. It is estimated that the Spanish flu killed 50 million people, roughly between 
3 and 5 percent of the world’s population (Taubenberger and Morens, 2006). Whilst such illnesses are 
rare, there have been a number of diseases in recent years that have caught the public’s attention, 
for example COVID-19; Ebola and Zika viruses; and swine influenza. 
“Economic Instability” refers to communities and nations experiencing financial struggles. This can be 
attributed to high unemployment, significantly higher costs of products and services. These can affect 
the survivability of businesses and the financial, mental and physical well-being of individuals. There 
are two major examples of “economic instability” within the United Kingdom, Great Depression, which 
occurred between 1929 and 1939; and the Great Recession, which occurred in the late 2000s and early 
2010s. The second one is fresh of the mind of most people within the United Kingdom, especially the 
youth, as its employment rates were highest amongst this group (Bell and Blanchflower, 2011). 
 “Espionage” is colloquially known as spying, in which secret information is collected without the 
permission of the holder. Typically, high profile cases involve governmental espionage; however, the 
News of the World Phone Hacking in the 2000s, demonstrated that espionage occurs at all levels. 
“Migration” is when people move from one country to another with the intension of settling into a 
new permanent home, though there can also be temporary short-term migrations. Migration usually 
occurs in varying forms, such as mobility for a better life, mainly financial; or through explicit force, 
such as fleeing wars and/or persecution or extreme poverty. Migration has been in the news a lot in 
recent years, with many fleeing the war in Syria and the persecution of the IS. This has become to be 
known as the European Migration Crisis. It is thought by many experts that this migration crisis was a 
partial cause of the United Kingdom leaving the European Union; and the rise of the far right-wing 
political parties across Europe; for example, Front National in France; and Alternative für Deutschland 
in Germany. 
“Nuclear Weapons” are explosive devices that are caused by a nuclear reaction. In the history of 
Europe, there have only been two nuclear weapons used in war situations. These are on the Japanese 
populations of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 by the United States to end World War Two. 
During the height of the Cold War in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, there was a high level of concern 
amongst the public about a nuclear holocaust between the United States and Soviet Union. This is 
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demonstrated in the number of movies and songs around this period that were based upon this issue. 
Whilst the threat of a nuclear holocaust has significantly reduced since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, the concern in recent years and risen due to rising tensions between NATO and Russia; North 
Korea and the United States; and dirty bombs from terrorist groups, such as IS, resulting in a growing 
number of articles in the media. 
 “Political tensions” includes acts of war against sovereign nations, for example the bombing of 
Yemen; major verbal disagreements/political standoffs between nations, such as bombing by France, 
the United Kingdom and the United States in April 2018 against Syria in the aftermath of the suspected 
chemical attacks in Douma. Another example of recent political tensions is in the aftermath of the use 
of Novichok in Salisbury, United Kingdom in March 2018, suspected to have been carried out by the 
Russian Government against a former Russian double agent and his daughter.  
“Terrorism” refers to the use of intentional indiscriminate violence, both in terror or fear, to achieve 
a political, religious, or ideological aim (Fortna, 2015). The current terrorism, which is all over the front 
pages of newspapers, has its origins to the terrorist attacks throughout the East Coast of the United 
States on September 11th 2001; which created the War on Terror. Whilst terrorism within the United 
Kingdom is rare, the United Kingdom does have a long history with terrorism. For example, the 
Gunpowder Plot in 1605, that had the aim of blowing up the Houses of Parliament. The peak in 
terrorist attacks within the United Kingdom was between the late 1960s and 1998, with the bombing 
campaign by the Irish Republic Army (IRA), especially in Northern Ireland; but its most famous was the 
Brighton Bombing 1984, in attempt to assassinate the then British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher. 
However, in recent years, there has been an increase of terrorism in Europe; and especially in France 






78 - The Manchester Arena Bombings occurred when people were leaving an Ariana Grande concert, killing 23 
people and injuring 250. 
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